How much should we know about the underlying structure of a technological artifact in order to understand its history? Quite a bit, according to the authors of The First Computers: History and Architectures. This book, a collection of papers presented at the International Conference on the History of Computing in 1998, is aimed at computer scientists and programmers as well as historians of science and technology. The term “architecture” is used in computing to refer to the structure and capabilities of (...) a computer; it includes both logical design and physical design . Architecture is an abstraction that helps the authors make comparisons between computers from different countries and eras.The First Computers brings together a wealth of information on computers from the 1940s and 1950s, which the editors present in five main sections. Part 1, “History, Reconstructions, Architectures,” addresses general themes in the history of computing. Michael Mahoney's chapter, “The Structures of Computation,” examines the relationship between computer science and “pure” mathematics. Even in its most theoretical aspects, Mahoney notes, computer science has always focused pragmatically on feasible implementations of mathematical ideas, thus “blurring commonly made distinctions among science, engineering, and craft practice” . Robert W. Seidel examines the rationale for reconstructing historic computers, an activity that has engaged many of the book's contributors. Seidel notes that “as the artifacts of modern computing become invisible, older, larger computers supply a symbol of computing to practitioners, the public, and patrons which is not only visible, but comprehensible” .The four remaining parts cover computing developments in America, Germany, Britain, and Japan. The American computers include the Atanasoff‐Berry Computer, Aiken Mark I, ENIAC, and the Institute for Advanced Study computer. The section on Germany contains several chapters on Konrad Zuse as well as on such developments as the Göttingen machines, which may not be that well known. Britain is represented by the Colossus, Manchester Mark I, Atlas, and EDSAC. Perhaps least familiar to historians are the Japanese computers: Seiichi Okoma surveys nine early Japanese computers, and Eiiti Wada describes the PC‐1, which he helped build. Many of the chapters, especially those written by engineers, begin with a brief history of the machine followed by a detailed technical description of its design and operation. The contributions by historians tend to describe the computer's features in more general terms and discuss the intellectual, organizational, and economic context in which the machine was built.Because so many of the authors are technically trained, they are able to offer in‐depth information on the theoretical underpinnings and design of early computers. But often the discussion is difficult to follow, even for historians working in this area. Tony Sales's chapter on the Colossus, a British code‐breaking computer, exemplifies the strengths and weaknesses of accounts written by technical specialists. Sales begins with a clear and engaging narrative of the origins of the Colossus, its method for decoding messages, and its significance to the Allied effort in the Second World War. He then veers into a highly technical discussion that will likely be opaque to readers unfamiliar with terms such as “thyratron rings.” The final section is a personal story of Sales's successful effort to have the machine rebuilt. Like the book as a whole, Sales's chapter can be read for a quick introduction to a milestone in the history of computing or for insight into the meanings embedded in technological artifacts—but readers should be prepared to decipher some formidable technical jargon along the way. (shrink)

I argue that the accounts of inference recently presented (in this journal) by Paul Boghossian, John Broome, and Crispin Wright are unsatisfactory. I proceed in two steps: First, in Sects. 1 and 2, I argue that we should not accept what Boghossian calls the “Taking Condition on inference” as a condition of adequacy for accounts of inference. I present a different condition of adequacy and argue that it is superior to the one offered by Boghossian. More precisely, I point out (...) that there is an analog of Moore’s Paradox for inference; and I suggest that explaining this phenomenon is a condition of adequacy for accounts of inference. Boghossian’s Taking Condition derives its plausibility from the fact that it apparently explains the analog of Moore’s Paradox. Second, in Sect. 3, I show that neither Boghossian’s, nor Broome’s, nor Wright’s account of inference meets my condition of adequacy. I distinguish two kinds of mistake one is likely to make if one does not focus on my condition of adequacy; and I argue that all three—Boghossian, Broome, and Wright—make at least one of these mistakes. (shrink)

Abstract The paper explores responses to an inconsistent quartet of theses regarding rule-following. In addressing this inconsistent quartet, two lines of thought pull in opposite directions. On the one hand, it can seem that rule-following cannot require acts that shape or guide themselves or acts that require infinitely many similar acts. On the other hand, rule-following seems to require that we are responsible for our acts of rule-following in a special way. It is difficult to see how these thoughts can (...) be coherently combined. (shrink)

Organizations routinely make choices when addressing conflicting stakes of their stakeholders. As stakeholder theory continues to mature, scholars continue to seek ways to make it more usable, yet proponents continue to debate its legitimacy. Various scholarly attempts to ground stakeholder theory have not narrowed down this debate. We draw from the work of Juergen Habermas to theoretically advance stakeholder theory, and to provide practical examples to illustrate our approach. Specifically, we apply Habermas’ language-pragmatic approach to extend stakeholder theory by advancing (...) seven sets of normative axioms. We conclude that a deliberative approach, with its focus on the conditions of legitimation and deliberative democracy, has the potential to become a cornerstone of stakeholder theory. The need for global stakeholder discourse and its internalization in corporate structures and institutions is exemplified by a multitude of CSR and stakeholder initiatives that have mushroomed in response to global risk scenarios such as climate change, nuclear warfare, or terrorism. Further research may help to build a functioning global governance system in order to provide guidance for management in the 21st century. (shrink)

The paper presents a truth-maker semantics for Strict/Tolerant Logic (ST), which is the currently most popular logic among advocates of the non-transitive approach to paradoxes. Besides being interesting in itself, the truth-maker presentation of ST offers a new perspective on the recently discovered hierarchy of meta-inferences that, according to some, generalizes the idea behind ST. While fascinating from a mathematical perspective, there is no agreement on the philosophical significance of this hierarchy. I aim to show that there is no clear (...) philosophical significance of meta-inferences above the first level. (shrink)

This paper comprises a critical examination of foundationalist conceptions of comprehensive doctrines in the religion in politics-debate. I argue that John Rawls, the towering figure of this debate, operates with a foundationalist conception of comprehensive doctrines that has shaped the debate’s view of relevant alternatives (often referred to as exclusivism and inclusivism). However, there are several problems with foundationalist conceptions, and the most serious is that they are empirically inadequate in relation to modern Western societies. I conclude that participants of (...) the exclusivist/inclusivist debate ought to look closer at alternative, non-foundationalist conceptions, and I supply a brief sketch of one such approach, inspired by American pragmatism. (shrink)

The paper offers an account of inference. The account underwrites the idea that inference requires that the reasoner takes her premises to support her conclusion. I reject views according to which such ‘takings’ are intuitions or beliefs. I sketch an alternative view on which inferring consists in attaching what I call ‘inferential force’ to a structured collection of contents.

This article seeks to contribute to the discussion of how the gender gap in foreign and security policy issues can be explained by examining how early the gender differences manifest themselves. All told, 251 Swedish children between the ages of six and nine were interviewed about their views on foreign aid, refugee policy, weapons exports, armed resistance, self-defense, and concern or fear about the outbreak of war. Opinion differences between boys and girls were then compared to the differences between adult (...) men and women. The results showed that the differences between boys and girls were very small or nonexistent. Only in the question of fear about the outbreak of war did girls differ significantly from boys, displaying a much higher degree of worry. In the conclusion, these results are discussed in relation to different theories about the causes of the gender gap in foreign policy issues. (shrink)

This book presents pragmatist humanism as a form of anti-authoritarianism and sheds light on the contemporary significance of pragmatist aesthetics and the revival of humanism.

This paper explores two different strategies that may be useful to give substance to Deweyandemocracy’s claim that in order for democratic associations to develop into communities, citizens needto learn how to conduct inquiry in a social setting. The two strategies reflect a principal division amongviews of public deliberation. The first strategy, the separation strategy, closely resembles Rawls’political liberalism by advocating the development of a separate sphere of public deliberation, guidedby factual and normative assumptions that we need not accept anywhere outside (...) that sphere.Comprehensive doctrines are to be held outside of public deliberation, a move which makes possible arather straightforward application of Dewey’s theory of inquiry. The second strategy, theembeddedness strategy, stresses the fact that public deliberation is inevitably embedded in broaderspheres of social life, and that the development towards community must be piecemeal, and go hand inhand with developments in social life as a whole. I argue that there are weighty reasons for doubtingthe feasibility of the separation strategy, and I also argue that these reasons are relevant for ourevaluation of all versions of the separation strategy, including political liberalism. I conclude that oneof Deweyan democracy’s most important assets, which deserves further examination, is its insight thatreflection on public deliberation needs to take its embedded character into account. (shrink)

philosophers have always been attracted to disagreements, perhaps because they almost immediately lead to philosophically exciting questions about how to distinguish positions, theories, and so forth, that are right from those that are mistaken. Philosophy of religion is certainly no exception, and, here, focus has often been on disagreements over belief in the existence of the God of classical theism as manifested in the great Abrahamic traditions, on the one hand, and atheism, on the other—though disagreements between religious traditions have (...) also attracted attention. Particularly in Anglo-American philosophy of religion, these disagreements have generally been conceptualized in epistemological terms: Which (if.. (shrink)

This paper deals with EMIL-S, a software tool box which was designed during the EMIL project for the simulation of processes during which norms emerged in an agent society. This tool box implements the cognitive architecture of normative agents which was designed during the EMIL project which is also discussed in other papers in this issue. This implementation is described in necessary detail, and two examples of its application to several different scenarios are given, namely a scenario in which persons (...) involved in micro finance are simulated and learn how to sanction free riders and how to learn from these sanctions, and a scenario in which simulated persons move through a simulated airport where they more often than not have to wait in queues and learn how to behave properly in queues. (shrink)

The paper presents teleo-inferentialism, which is a novel meta-semantic theory that combines advantages of teleosemantics and normative inferentialism. Like normative inferentialism, teleo-inferentialism holds that contents are individuated by the norms that govern inferences in which they occur. This allows teleo-inferentialism to account for sophisticated concepts. Like teleosemantics, teleo-inferentialism explains conceptual norms in a naturalistically acceptable way by appeal to the broadly biological well-functioning of our innate capacities. As a test-case for teleo-inferentialism, I discuss how the view handles Kripkenstein-style meaning skepticism.

Some think that logic concerns the “laws of truth”; others that logic concerns the “laws of thought.” This paper presents a way to reconcile both views by building a bridge between truth-maker theory, à la Fine, and normative bilateralism, à la Restall and Ripley. The paper suggests a novel way of understanding consequence in truth-maker theory and shows that this allows us to identify a common structure shared by truth-maker theory and normative bilateralism. We can thus transfer ideas from normative (...) bilateralism to truth-maker theory, such as non-transitive solutions to paradox, and vice versa, such as notions of factual equivalence and containment. (shrink)

I argue against abductivism about logic, which is the view that rational theory choice in logic happens by abduction. Abduction cannot serve as a neutral arbiter in many foundational disputes in logic because, in order to use abduction, one must first identify the relevant data. Which data one deems relevant depends on what I call one's conception of logic. One's conception of logic is, however, not independent of one's views regarding many of the foundational disputes that one may hope to (...) solve by abduction. (shrink)

Nontransitive responses to the validity Curry paradox face a dilemma that was recently formulated by Barrio, Rosenblatt and Tajer. It seems that, in the nontransitive logic ST enriched with a validity predicate, either you cannot prove that all derivable metarules preserve validity, or you can prove that instances of Cut that are not admissible in the logic preserve validity. I respond on behalf of the nontransitive approach. The paper argues, first, that we should reject the detachment principle for naive validity. (...) Secondly, I show how to add a validity predicate to ST while avoiding the dilemma. (shrink)

I argue that logic is unlike science in its methodology, thus rejecting anti-exceptionalism about logic. Logic has a mathematical and a philosophical part. In its mathematical part, the methodology of logic is like that of mathematics, and no need to choose between theories arises in that part. In its philosophical part, the methodology of logic is like that of philosophy. Philosophy and mathematics are both unlike the empirical sciences in their methodology. So logic is unlike the empirical sciences in its (...) methodology. I end by looking at disagreements about the liar paradox as an example. (shrink)

I argue that recent attempts to show that meaning and content are not normative fail. The two most important arguments anti-normativists have presented are what I call the ‘argument from constitution’ and the ‘argument from guidance’. Both of these arguments suffer from the same basic problem: they overlook the possibility of focusing on assessability by norms, rather than compliance with norms or guidance by norms. Moreover, I argue that the anti-normativists arguments fail even if we ignore this basic problem. Thus, (...) we have not been given good reasons to think that normativism is false. (shrink)

Moral disengagement was initially conceptualized as a process through which people reconstrue unethical behaviors, with the effect of deactivating self-sanctions and thereby clearing the way for ethical transgressions. Our article challenges how researchers now conceptualize moral disengagement. The current literature is overly liberal, in that it mixes two related but distinct constructs—process moral disengagement and the propensity to morally disengage—creating ambiguity in the findings. It is overly conservative, as it adopts a challengeable classification scheme of “four points in moral self-regulation” (...) and perpetuates defining moral disengagement via a set of eight psychological mechanisms, narrowing our understanding of the phenomenon. To address these problems, we propose to define process moral disengagement intensionally (specifying the necessary and sufficient conditions for correct application of the term) as intrapsychic cognitive reasoning processes through which people selectively reconstrue a moral judgment “behavior B by actor A is morally wrong” and shift it toward becoming “behavior B is not morally wrong” or “actor A is not responsible for behavior B.” This definition achieves disambiguation and increased concept clarity. We leverage the definition to motivate a classification scheme for psychological mechanisms of moral disengagement along two dimensions—reconstruing morality and reconstruing agency—and to initiate an open inventory of psychological mechanisms that specify how process moral disengagement operates. (shrink)

This paper offers an account of deontic normativity in terms of attributive goodness. An action is permissible for S in C just in case there is a good practical inference available to S in C that results in S performing (or intending to perform) the action. The standards of goodness for practical inferences are determined by what is a good or bad exercise of the human capacity of practical reason, which is an attributive (and not a deontic) assessment.

The paper distinguishes two versions of the guise of the good in Anscombe’s Intention and raises some doubts about Francesco Orsi’s recent proposal for how these two versions hang together. While Orsi’s interpretation of the two versions are separately insightful and illuminating, Orsi’s “Anscombean argument” for connecting Anscombe’s two versions of the guise of the good is at odds with Anscombe’s own approach.

Im 82. Brief an Lucilius führt Seneca den Versuch, mittels Dialektik in Form eines Syllogismus von der Todesfurcht zu befreien, durch seine eigene unnachahmliche Art der Psychagogie ad absurdum. Der bisher im Einzelnen noch nicht hinreichend erklärte Text wird durch eine ausführliche Einleitung und einen Kommentar (mit durchgängiger interpretierender Übersetzung) erschlossen. Die Einleitung ordnet den Brief in die dialektische Tradition der Stoiker ein, beleuchtet römische Einschätzungen der Dialektik und versucht auf dieser Basis Senecas durchaus differenzierte Position herauszuarbeiten. Den Hauptteil bildet (...) ein detaillierter Kommentar mit textkritischen, sprachlichen und sachlichen Erläuterungen. (shrink)

A number of novel gene detection techniques all revolve around the ligation of synthetic nucleic acid probes. In such ligase‐assisted gene detection reactions, specific DNA or RNA sequences are investigated by using them as guides for the covalent joining of pairs of probe molecules. The probes are designed to hybridize immediately next to each other on the target nucleic acid strand. Demonstration of ligated probes results in highly specific detection of and efficient distinction between similar sequence variants under standard reaction (...) conditions. Accordingly, the principle has been applied in automated genetic screening procedures. Ligation reactions are also integral to a number of amplification procedures and they will be of value in an expanding range of genetic analyses. (shrink)

Vom Finden zum Machen bietet die erste ausführliche Diskussion über die Beziehung zwischen Marxismus und Pragmatismus. Diese beiden Philosophien der Praxis sind nicht unvereinbar, und eine Analyse ihrer Beziehung hilft, beide besser zu verstehen. Im Rahmen eines transatlantischen theoretischen Dialogs werden in diesem Buch Gemeinsamkeiten und Unterschiede zwischen diesen Philosophien erörtert. Es handelt sich um eine interdisziplinäre Studie, die Philosophie, amerikanische und europäische Geistesgeschichte und Literaturwissenschaft zusammenführt. Schulenbergs Buch zeigt, dass der Versuch, die Dialektik von Marxismus und Pragmatismus zu erhellen, (...) ein guter Ausgangspunkt ist, wenn wir das unvollendete Projekt der Etablierung einer wirklich postmetaphysischen Kultur weiterführen wollen. Das Buch bietet detaillierte Diskussionen über Sidney Hook, Georg Lukács, Theodor W. Adorno, Fredric Jameson, W.E.B. Du Bois, John Dewey, Richard Rorty und Jacques Rancière. (shrink)

The term ‚consumption‘ includes the use of material and non-material goods. For some decades it has been successfully employed by several scientific disciplines to examine causal relationships between the various life styles and the respective historical circumstances. This paper applies the term to the way texts, prestige-goods and social rules are used in different situations. As case studies serve the ‚oriental‘ texts included in the „Iliad“, the Lydian goods as they are differently estimated by Sappho and Xenophanes, and the way (...) how Theognis interprets social rules. Starting from the principle of the ‚relativity of the best‘, as it can be detected in the Homeric epics, various types of consumption are discerned to give way for circumscribing the leeway open for creating individual lifestyles. (shrink)

Richard Rorty never cared much for religion, to say the least. Faithful to his own philosophical and political outlook, he did, however, abandon atheism in favor of anticlericalism—the view that religion should play no role in the public life of democratic societies.1 This shift sets him apart from advocates of New Atheism (and their opponents), who consider the arguments for atheism a crucial component in the overall case against religion,2 but also from the growing group of religious and nonreligious intellectuals (...) who argue that democratic societies need more, not less, religious contributions to public life.3Rorty also came to articulate—particularly in the last volume of his Collected Papers—his .. (shrink)

Several cognitive accounts of human communication argue for a language-independent, prelinguistic basis of human communication and language. The current study provides evidence for the universality of a prelinguistic gestural basis for human communication. We used a standardized, semi-natural elicitation procedure in seven very different cultures around the world to test for the existence of preverbal pointing in infants and their caregivers. Results were that by 10–14 months of age, infants and their caregivers pointed in all cultures in the same basic (...) situation with similar frequencies and the same proto-typical morphology of the extended index finger. Infants’ pointing was best predicted by age and caregiver pointing, but not by cultural group. Further analyses revealed a strong relation between the temporal unfolding of caregivers’ and infants’ pointing events, uncovering a structure of early prelinguistic gestural conversation. Findings support the existence of a gestural, language-independent universal of human communication that forms a culturally shared, prelinguistic basis for diversified linguistic communication. (shrink)