In this article I argue that the mechanical inexplicability of natural ends in the third Critique is best understood against the background of a fairly traditional picture of the metaphysics of living things, one embraced by Kant himself. On this picture, the distinctive unity of a living thing was to be explained by a soul, form, or monad. The constraints placed on the understanding in the first Critique, however, make such an explanation impossible: because the principle of a living thing (...) in virtue of which it constitutes a whole—rather than a mere aggregate of things—is simple, it cannot be met with in space. By ruling out a widely accepted explanans for a well-recognized explanandum, in other words, Kant’s first Critique makes living things inexplicable in precisely those ways suggested by the third. (shrink)

I argue that Kuhn's account of scientific practice is profitably understood as a kind of hinge epistemology: like our epistemic practices more generally, scientific inquiry is made possible precisely by the fact that certain things are not subject to doubt. In Kuhn's own words, ‘dogmatism’ is essential to scientific practice and one of the primary engines of its success. For this reason, I argue that Kuhn's account is a rich source for reflection on the relationship between faith and reason. At (...) the same time, Kuhn has faced objections similar to those which have faced hinge-epistemologists: how can disputes grounded in different, incompatible ‘dogmas’ be rationally resolved? Kuhn's response is similar to one put forward by Duncan Pritchard, but is, I argue, an improvement on it. In particular, the hinges on which deep scientific disagreement turns are for Kuhn certain shared values in light of which debate is possible. The choice among competing dogmas can, I argue, be understood on analogy with a prudential judgement of practical reasoning, i.e., an exercise of phronēsis. (shrink)