Hacking and other entity realists suggest a strategy to build scientific realism on a stronger foundation than inference to the best explanation. They argue that if beliefs in the existence of theoretical entities are derived from experimentation rather than theories, they can escape the antirealist's criticism and provide a stronger ground for realism. In this paper, an outline and a critique of entity realism are presented. It will be argued that entity realism cannot stand as a (...) separate position from classical realism. Thus, entity realism cannot avoid the problems facing classical realism.. (shrink)

This paper argues that existence claims for theoretical entities must be based on more than their role in one theory. The supplementary evidence should be either observation, whether direct or indirect, or the possibility of detaching the existence claim from one particular theory. A logical schematism for the latter type of support is developed.

According to retail realism, we ought to abandon wholesale arguments, which purport to demonstrate realism or anti-realism about theoretical entities in general, and embrace retail arguments, which purport to demonstrate realism or anti-realism about specific kinds of theoretical entities. My aim is to argue that there is a further wholesale element that retail realism must avoid in order to qualify as a viable position. In order to do so, I distinguish between what I call wholesale and retail treatments (...) of theoretical entities. Wholesale treatments individuate theoretical entities in such a way that the same entity can appear in distinct theories. In that case, realism about a given entity implies realism about that entity as it appears in a number of distinct theories. Retail treatments, on the other hand, individuate theoretical entities more finely, so that distinct theories actually involve distinct entities. In that case, realism about one entity needn't imply realism about a similar, but distinct, entity. I argue that retail realists ought to reject wholesale treatments in favor of retail treatments, and I do so by examining a case from the history of chemistry involving the hypothetical constituent of hydrochloric acid known as the muriatic radical. I argue that there are distinct muriatic radicals in distinct theories, and that we ought to be realists about some, but not others. Hence, in this case, a retail treatment is preferable to a wholesale one, and I conclude by discussing why the combination of retail realism and retail treatments constitutes an attractive position within the scientific realism debate more generally. (shrink)

Buttercups, GNP's and Quarks: Are Fallacies Theoretical Entities?

Finite spirits can be plausibly viewed as entities postulated by a theory, comparable to the position on mental states and processes developed in the latter part of the twentieth century. This position is developed here by reference to the account in the synoptic gospels of the exorcism of the Gadarene demoniacs. The role played by specifying causal relationships between postulated entities and objects whose existence is not in doubt is examined. Also, various features of theories are discussed in relation to (...) this example, viz. theory-laden description, classifying theories as naturalistic or supernaturalistic, kinds of evidence, and the importance of the method of hypothesis (or abduction) in critically scrutinizing the claims of religion. (Published Online August 11 2004). (shrink)

As such this book fills a void in the philosophical literature and presents a challenge to every would-be (anti-)reductionist.

This dissertation reconstructs some aspects of the historical development of the concept of the electron from 1891, when the term "electron" was introduced, to 1925, when the notion of spin was put forward, in the light of the relevant historiographical and philosophical problems. The central historiographical tool employed is Karl Popper's notion of a problem situation. Furthermore, some of the historical episodes are reconstructed in terms of a "biographical" approach to theoretical entities that portrays them as active agents that (...) participate in the development of scientific knowledge. Their agency is due to the heuristic resources that they embody and to the resistance that they exhibit to manipulation. The historical analysis begins with a reconceptualization of the "discovery" of the electron and aims at situating the principal historical actors within the wider process which led to the acceptance of the electron as an element of the ontology of physics. I continue with a reconstruction of the discovery of the Zeeman effect in the light of recent work on the history and philosophy of experimental science. The next three chapters are devoted to a reading of the development of the old quantum theory of the atom , which aimed at understanding the behavior and distribution of electrons bound within the atom, from the perspective of the electron's biography. Furthermore, I discuss the chemists' representation of the electron and contrast it with its physical counterpart. The main philosophical problem examined concerns the implications of meaning change for scientific realism . I discuss in detail that issue and argue against the widespread view that meaning variance is incompatible with scientific realism. Thus, I provide a way out for the aspiring realist, without however committing myself to a realist position. Finally, I argue that the historical development of the concept of the electron from 1896 to 1925 is compatible with a realist construal of its ontological status. (shrink)

Carnap’s ‘Empiricism, Semantics, and Ontology’ (Carnap (1950a), ESO hereafter) is certainly a classic of twentieth century analytic philosophy. For decades now, most undergraduates are expected to read it at some point in their studies. Lately, it is being seen as the inspiration for a host of positions in the field of metaontology. Despite the widespread agreement on the importance of the paper, there is a lack of agreement on what Carnap attempts to do in the paper. My main aim in (...) this chapter is to defend an interpretation of ESO by displaying its relation to Carnap’s earlier works. My secondary goal will be to draw a lesson from this discussion for Carnap’s later work on unobservable entities in science. (shrink)

Retail realists advocate abandoning wholesale arguments, which concern the reality of theoretical entities in general, and embracing retail arguments, which concern the reality of particular kinds of theoretical entities. They can thus be realists about some and anti-realists about others. But realism about a kind of entity can take different forms depending on how retail realists individuate kinds of entities. This chapter introduces the notion of the inclusiveness of individuation: the more inclusively we individuate a kind of (...) entity, the more theories there are in which it appears. The form of realism that retail realists accept regarding a particular kind of entity can be more selective or more encompassing depending on how inclusively they individuate that kind of entity. This chapter illustrates these ideas in terms of a case from the history of chemistry involving the hypothetical component of hydrochloric acid known as the muriatic radical. (shrink)

This paper revisits the concept of fiction employed in recent debates about the reality of theoretical entities in the philosophy of science. From an anti-realist perspective the dependence of evidence for some scientific entities on mediated forms of observation and modelling strategies reflects a degree of construction that is argued to closely resemble fiction. As a realist’s response to this debate, this paper provides an analysis of fictional entities in comparison to real ones. I argue that the distinction between (...) fictional and real entities is reflected in their different relations toward their representations. This is particularly evident when it comes to the investigation of properties not explicitly given in a representation but that rely on knowledge external to it. A comparison of the resulting difference in the interpretation of fictional and real entities is then shown to provide guidelines for the assessment of when a realist claim can be made for model-based inferences to theoretical entities in science. At the end of this paper I advocate a pluralistic view on scientific realism by showing that representational pluralism, far from posing a problem for a realist interpretation of scientific practice, serves as an indicator for the reality of scientific entities. (shrink)

The paper is focused on some aspects of experimental realism of Ian Hacking, and especially on his manipulability criterion of existence. The problem is here related to chemical molecules, the objects of interest in chemical research. The authors consider whether and to what extent this criterion has been applied in experimental practice of chemistry. They argue that experimentation on is a fundamental criterion of existence of entities in chemistry rather than experimentation with. Some examples regarding studies of structures of complex (...) compounds, taken from organic chemistry, are presented to support the authors' considerations. Chemists' laboratory practice depends strongly on the way that representations of entities on (or with) the experiments are used. The authors show that this point has not been given sufficient attention by the new experimentalists. (shrink)

Though Sellars often criticizes Hume, Hume's treatment of theoretical entities turns out to have more in common with Sellars' view of them than with the view of the logical positivists who claimed Hume as their predecessor.

In this chapter I shall address the question as to whether there exists a universal and atemporal justification for the claims made by a community that adopts a particular style of reasoning. I shall present a case study in which a claim made in the laboratory style of reasoning has no universal and atemporal justification. As I shall explain, Hacking justifies his belief that unobservable entities exist on the ground that they can be regularly manipulated by experimenters in order to (...) find out and produce various phenomena (experimental realism); he also maintains that no belief that our theories are true is required in order to be realist about unobservable entities. I shall argue that his justification is relative to the laboratory style of reasoning. Ultimately, from this case study I shall draw the important conclusion that the styles of reasoning project implies epistemic relativism. In the first part of this chapter, I shall analyse Hacking’s experimental realism in the light of the styles of reasoning project. I shall start by making these points: Hacking’s theory anti-realism denies the possibility of ranking styles of reasoning in terms of their capacity to explain phenomena; furthermore, Hacking is not successful in showing that his entity realism is justified for a community that does not adopt the laboratory style of reasoning. It will follow that the styles of reasoning project is in conflict with the claim that we know about unobservable entities. (shrink)

Some realists claim that theoretical entities like numbers and electrons are indispensable for describing the empirical world. Motivated by the meta-ontology of Quine, I take this claim to imply that, for some first-order theory T and formula δ(x) such that T ⊢ ∃xδ ∧ ∃x¬δ, where δ(x) is intended to apply to all and only empirical entities, there is no first-order theory T′ such that (a) T and T′ describe the δ:s in the same way, (b) T′ ⊢ ∀xδ, (...) and (c) T′ is at least as attractive as T in terms of other theoretical virtues. In an attempt to refute the realist claim, I try to solve the general problem of nominalizing T (with respect to δ), namely to find a theory T′ satisfying conditions (a)–(c) under various precisifications thereof. In particular, I note that condition (a) can be understood either in terms of syntactic or semantic equivalence, where the latter is strictly stronger than the former. The results are somewhat mixed. On the positive side, even under the stronger precisification of (a), I establish that (1) if the vocabulary of T is finite, a nominalizing theory can always be found that is recursive if T is, and (2) if T postulates infinitely many δ:s, a nominalizing theory can always be found that is no more computationally complex than T. On the negative side, even under the weaker precisification of (a), I establish that (3) certain finite theories cannot be nominalized by a finite theory. (shrink)

Philosophical debates about the concept of disease, particularly of mental disease, might benefit from reconsideration and a closer look at the established terminology and conceptual structure of contemporary medical pathology and clinical nosology. The concepts and principles of medicine differ, to a considerable extent, from the ideas and notions of philosophical theories of disease. In medical theory, the concepts of disease entity and pathologicity are, besides the concept of disease itself, of fundamental importance, and they are essentially connected to (...) the concepts cause of disease or etiological factor, natural course or natural history of disease, and pathological disposition. It is the concept of disease entity that is of key importance for understanding medical pathology and theory of disease. Its central role is shown by a short reconstruction of its main features and its intrinsic connection to the concept of pathologicity. The meaning of pathologicity is elucidated by explicating the underlying criteria. (shrink)

Entity realism is the view that ‘a good many theoretical entities do really exist’. The main novelty of entity realism was that it provided an account of scientific realism that did not have to endorse realism about theories—the general proposal was that entity realism is noncommittal about whether we should be realist about scientific theories. I argue that the only way entity realists can resist the pull of straight scientific realism about theories is by endorsing (...) a recent new player in the scientific realism debate: singularist semirealism. (shrink)

In the article, I discuss some ideas of the type theoretical grammar of Aarne Ranta and the analysis of the problem of Quine (Ralph and Ortcutt), which Oleg Domanov implemented by means of this theory. There are more similarities than differences in TT grammar with well-known ideas, including “fine grinding” of meanings, counterparts, procedural understanding of – intensions. The main problem, which, in my opinion, exists in the TT grammar, consists in understanding how another agent’s epistemic attitudes can be (...) justified for me. Ranta proceeds from the metaphor of the agent as a calculator, which for the general case is unacceptable. I believe that the interpretation of the epistemic attitudes of another agent must be externalistic, that is, referring not to the agent’s worlds, but to his actions in the actual world: “agent X believes that A” is true when the interpreter sees the behavior of the agent in situations that the interpreter would consider adequate for himself if he believed A and would be “in place” of X. To formalize here, it would take complicated tools which are used for describing actions. I’ve come to the conclusion that an understanding of the type in TT grammar makes it intensional in some extended sense, since the working with the naming relation is already an element of a specific pragmatics. (shrink)

Scientific realists are committed to the claim that scientific discourse should be interpreted realistically, so that theoretical terms are understood as putatively referring expressions that have putative reference to empirical entities. In order to argue against realistic interpretation, I draw on an episode from the history of chemistry. One of the hypothetical entities of late 18th century chemistry was the muriatic radical, a hitherto unknown element that was thought to be a constituent of muriatic acid. I argue that the (...) term 'muriatic radical' resists realistic interpretation, and that we should therefore refrain from interpreting discourse concerning hypothetical entities realistically. (shrink)

Paracelsus was a transmutational alchemist: For most of his career, he believed that one metal could be turned into another. In an alchemical text, the De renovatione et restauratione, he explored the theoretical foundations of transmutation and hinted at recipes for bringing it about. He proposed that from plants, gems, metals, and minerals might be prepared a class of marvelous medicaments, which he called prima entia (first entities). Each primum ens had particular uses, but the entia were all supposed (...) to be able to revitalize the human body and cleanse it of disease. Certain entia could also transmute metals. The De renovatione et restauratione affirmed the metaphysical centrality, in goldmaking and medicine alike, not just of purification or alteration but of renewal and transformation. It expressed the author’s eschatological excitement at God’s works of wonder, whether within or above nature. (shrink)

When once-successful physical theories are abandoned, common wisdom has it that their characteristic theoretical entities are abandoned with them: examples include phlogiston, light rays, Newtonian forces, Euclidean space. But sometimes a theory sees ongoing use, despite being superseded. What should scientific realists say about the characteristic entities of the theories in such cases? The standard answer is that these ‘theoretical relicts’ are merely useful fictions. In this paper we offer a different answer. We start by distinguishing horizontal reduction (...) (in which a superseded theory approximates the successor theory) from vertical reduction (in which a higher-level theory abstracts away from the lower-level theory, but nonetheless can be constructed from it); these are usually regarded as having different ontological consequences. We describe a ‘verticalization’ procedure which transforms horizontal reductions into vertical reductions. The resulting verticalized theories are abstractions rather than approximations, with restricted domains. We identify a sense in which the higher-level theory describes distinct subject matters from the lower-level theory, enabling in certain cases the higher-level theory to retain distinctive explanatory power even in the presence of reduction. We suggest that theoretical entities from superseded theories should be retained in a scientific realist worldview just when, reinterpreted as higher-level abstractions, those theories and their characteristic entities continue to perform distinctive explanatory work in providing the best explanation for less-fundamental phenomena of interest. In slogan form: a good relict is an emergent relict. (shrink)

A classic challenge for any theory of physical causation based on conserved quantities and formulated within the framework of special relativity theory, has been to distinguish two regions, that of genuine causal relationships and that of those spurious or noncausal ones. In the causal processes theory defended by P. Dowe, this is done by introducing a criterion based on the possession of a conserved quantity, which would seem to efficiently demarcate between causal processes and causal pseudoprocesses. However, faced with criticism (...) about the inadequacy of his criteria, Dowe has proposed modifying his physical ontology and introducing, along with processes and pseudo-processes, two types of physical gerrymander entities, both temporal and spatial. In this article, we analyze and criticize, from the perspective of ERT, Dowe’s characterization of these quasi-entities and the theoretical need to make a clear-cut distinction between them. This implies a fundamental modification of Dowe's ontology and raises other doubts about its original motivation. (shrink)

A simple explanation of theoreticity says that a term is theoretical if and only if it refers to nonobservational entities. Paradigmatic examples of such entities are electrons, neutrinos, gravitational forces, genes etc. There is yet another explanation of theoreticity: a theoretical term is one whose meaning becomes determined through the axioms of a scientific theory. The meaning of the term ‘force’, for example, is seen to be determined by Newton’s laws of motion and further laws about special forces, (...) such as the law of gravitation. Theoreticity is a property that is commonly applied to both expressions in the language of science, and referents and concepts of such expressions. Objects, relations and functions as well as concepts thereof may thus qualify as theoretical in a derived sense. (shrink)

Examples of theory development in quantum field theory and in S-matrix theory are related to three questions of interest to the philosophy of science. The first is the central role of highly abstract, mathematical models in the creation of theories. Second, the process of creation and justification actually used make it plausible that a successful theory is equally well characterized as being stable against attack rather than as being objectively correct. Lastly, the issue of the reality of theoretical entities (...) is discussed in light of this representation of theory generation and selection. (shrink)

According to David Hume, the concept of causation and probability are to be understood in terms of the concepts of similarity and repetition. In this book, it is shown that they are to be understood in terms of the concept of continuity. One corollary is that there is no legitimate basis for skepticism concerning the legitimacy of inductive inference. Another is that anti-realism about theoretical entities is misconceived.

As the answer to the question clearly depends on its precise meaning, the paper aims at presenting some explications of the problem and the conclusions entailed by each of them. If mathematical entity is taken in a narrow sense, the answer turns out to be negative; on some broader conceptions, it is positive. Though irreducible to a numerical structure, a scientific domain is identifiable with some set theoretic entity.