Evaluationen sind Formen angewandter Sozialforschung zur systematisch-wissenschaftlichen Generierung von Qualitätsbewertungen von Evaluationsgegenständen und gegebenenfalls Entwicklungsempfehlungen in Bezug auf Entscheidungs- und Handlungsprozesse, die zur Lösung praktischer, meta-wissenschaftlicher, gesellschaftlicher und politischer Probleme beitragen. Evaluationen sind also Bewertungen von Qualitäts- und Entwicklungsniveaus von Evaluationsgegenständen (z. B. materielle Ausstattung von Organisationen; Leistungen von Schülern, Studierenden oder Lehrenden; Wirkungen von Studienprogrammen oder Programmen der Entwicklungszusammenarbeit; Erfolge von Forschungsprogrammen; Effektivität und Effizienz von Organisationen; etc.). Angesichts der Vielfalt von Evaluationsgegenständen finden Evaluationen grundsätzlich in Spannungsfeldern verschiedener Stakeholderinteressen, (...) Werte, Institutionen und Überzeugungssysteme statt. (shrink)

Die Kernaufgaben von Hochschulen sind Studium und Lehre (Persönlichkeitsbildung; inhaltliche und methodische Ausbildung, insbesondere des akademischen Nachwuchses; Bildung zur Berufsfähigkeit), Forschung und Third Mission (z. B. Wissens- und Technologietransfer; regionales Engagement; Weiterbildungsangebote; transdisziplinäre und soziale Innovationen). Im Rahmen dieses breiten Auftrags zu Aufklärung, Bildung und Innovation in Wissensgesellschaften sehen sich Hochschulen als kreative lernende Organisationen und strategische offene Republiken von Akademikern und Studierenden gegenwärtig vielfältigen und komplexen Herausforderungen konfrontiert. Solchen Herausforderungen kann ohne systematische, aufklärerisch-kritische Evaluation nicht produktiv und proaktiv begegnet (...) werden. (shrink)

The notion of (deterministic) chaos is frequently used in an increasing number of scientific (as well as non-scientific) contexts, ranging from mathematics and the physics of dynamical systems to all sorts of complicated time evolutions, e.g., in chemistry, biology, physiology, economy, sociology, and even psychology. Despite (or just because of) these widespread applications, however, there seem to fluctuate around several misunderstandings about the actual impact of deterministic chaos on several problems of philosophical interest, e.g., on matters of prediction and computability, (...) and determinism and the free will. In order to clarify these points a survey of the meaning variance of the concept(s) of deterministic chaos, or the various contexts in which it is applied, is given, and its actual epistemological implications are extracted. In summary, it turns out that the various concepts of deterministic chaos do not constitute a “new science”, or a “revolutionary” change of the “scientific world picture”. Instead, chaos research provides a sort of toolbox of methods which are certainly useful for a more detailed analysis and understanding of such dynamical systems which are, roughly speaking, endowed with the property of exponential sensitivity on initial conditions. Such a property, then, implies merely one, but quantitatively strong type of limitation of long-time computability and predictability, respectively. (shrink)

Some problems rarely discussed in traditional philosophy of science are mentioned: The empirical sciences using mathematico-quantitative theoretical models are frequently confronted with several types of computational problems posing primarily methodological limitations on explanatory and prognostic matters. Such limitations may arise from the appearances of deterministic chaos and high computational complexity in general. In many cases, however, scientists circumvent such limitations by utilizing reductional approximations or complexity reductions for intractable problem formulations, thus constructing new models which are computationally tractable. Such activities (...) are compared with reduction types established in philosophy of science. (shrink)

Man ist sie fast schon leid, die Rede vom „Chaos“, mit der wissenschaftspublizistisch versierte Forscher bemüht sind, sich ihren Anteil am hart umkämpften Markt der Forschungsmittel und -reputation zu sichern. Die inflationäre Verkündigung von „wissenschaftlichen Revolutionen“, „Paradigmenwechseln“ und „postmoderner Wissenschaft“ mag manchem Philosophen zwar insgeheim noch schmeicheln wegen der Gebrauchs- und Marktfähigkeit - und Autorität - philosophischer Termini. So recht zu glauben sind solche Botschaften jedoch selten. Aber welcher Philosoph wollte sich da ein sachgerechtes und kritisches Urteil erlauben, ob die (...) Inanspruchnahme philosophischer Begriffe an diversen aktuellen Forschungsfronten überhaupt angemesen ist? Wer könnte es andererseits besser, als jemand, der wie Theodor Leiber sowohl in Physik als auch in Philosophie promoviert ist und dessen überarbeitete Philosophiedisseration hier zur Diskussion steht? (shrink)

In order to perfectly describe the world, it is not enough to speak truly. One must also use the right concepts - including the right logical concepts. One must use concepts that "carve at the joints", that give the world's "structure". There is an objectively correct way to "write the book of the world". Much of metaphysics, as traditionally conceived, is about the fundamental nature of reality; in the present terms, this is about the world's structure. Metametaphysics - inquiry into (...) the status of metaphysical questions - turns on structure. The question of whether ontological, causal, or modal questions are "substantive" is in large part a question of whether the world has ontological, causal, and modal structure - whether quantifiers, causal relations, and modal operators carve at the joints. (shrink)

Most facts of grounding involve nonfundamental concepts, and thus must themselves be grounded. But how? The leading approaches—due to Bennett, deRosset, and Dagupta—are subject to objections. The way forward is to deny a presupposition common to the leading approaches, that there must be some simple formula governing how grounding facts are grounded. Everyone agrees that facts about cities might be grounded in some complex way about which we know little; we should say the same about the facts of grounding themselves. (...) The kinds of facts that might enter into the grounds of the facts of grounding are explored at length. (shrink)

Precis of my book by this title, for a symposium.

Personal identity is not always symmetric: even if I will not be a later person, the later person may have been me. What makes this possible is that the relations that are criterial of personal identity---such as memory and anticipation---are asymmetric and "count in favor of personal identity from one side only". Asymmetric personal identity can be accommodated by temporal counterpart theory but not by Lewisian overlapping aggregates of person stages. The question of uncertainty in cases of personal fission (and (...) in Everettian quantum mechanics) is also discussed. (shrink)

Mereological nihilism says that there do not exist (in the fundamental sense) any objects with proper parts. A reason to accept it is that we can thereby eliminate 'part' from fundamental ideology. Many purported reasons to reject it - based on common sense, perception, and the possibility of gunk, for example - are weak. A more powerful reason is that composite objects seem needed for spacetime physics; but sets suffice instead.

In the Nicomachean Ethics Aristotle begins his investigation by exploring the nature of the end of all action. In the very first sentence of the work he says: "Every art and every enquiry and similarly every action and pursuit is thought to aim at some good and for this reason the good has rightly been declared to be that at which all things aim". It is easy, says Aristotle, to find verbal agreement between people regarding that good because they all (...) consider it to be happiness. Aristotle says: " Let us resume our inquiry and state in view of the fact that all knowledge and every pursuit aims at some good, what it is that we say that Political Science aims at and what is the highest of all good achievable by action. Verbally, there is very general ageement; for both the general run of men and people of superior refinement say that it is happiness, arrd identify living well and doing well with being happy". But there is no agreement between people with regard to what the good is. Some think it is pleasure, others wealth, others honour and so on, for each what happens to be most desirable to them. As is well known Aristotle's general method of approach to a new subject relies on the endoxrg namely the respected opinions of society. But in this case, as he informs us, there is much and radical disagreement on the accepted even the respected positions within society on the subject of what eudaimonia is. For this reason, far from finding the truth in the respected opinions of society, Aristotle cannot use them even as his starting point. Thus we'find him turning to argument, a metaphysical one at that, in order to be assisted in his endeavour to determine the nature of the good at which human action aims. This is the well known function argument. My concern in the present article is to study the steps of this. (shrink)

This book addresses key topics in social theory such as the basic structures of social life, the character of human activity, and the nature of individuality. Drawing on the work of Wittgenstein, the author develops an account of social existence that argues that social practices are the fundamental phenomenon in social life. This approach offers insight into the social formation of individuals, surpassing and critiquing the existing practice theories of Bourdieu, Giddens, Lyotard and Oakeshott. In bringing Wittgenstein's work to bear (...) on issues of social theory the book shows the relevance of his work to a body of thought to which it has never been applied. The book will be of particular interest to philosophers of the social sciences, a wide range of social theorists in political science and sociology, as well as some literary theorists. (shrink)

In the 24 years since the founding of BioEssays, the level of translational research, as well as the expectations for its success, have burgeoned. Based on our analysis of current and projected US efforts to establish effective centers of translational research, our own institutional experience and discussions with academic research center leaders and institutional research executives, we have arrived at several critical conclusions about how best to foster disease‐based research on the institutional, national and international level, what summary statistics may (...) best serve as a measurement of successful practice, roughly how much more money will be required to fund the ongoing venture in the US and how to organize and promote this vision. BioEssays 30:1025–1029, 2008. © 2008 Wiley Periodicals, Inc. (shrink)

Elizabeth Barnes and Mari Mikkola raise the important question of whether certain recent approaches to metaphysics exclude feminist metaphysics. My own approach does not, or so I argue. I do define “substantive” questions in terms of fundamentality; and the concepts of feminist metaphysics are nonfundamental. But my definition does not count a question as being nonsubstantive simply because it involves nonfundamental concepts. Questions about the causal structure of the world, including the causal structure of the social world, are generally substantive (...) because their answers are not sensitive to any alternate, equally good conceptual choices we could have made. I also argue that such questions are substantive regardless of the ontology of social kinds. (shrink)

Inspired by Heidegger’s concept of the clearing of being, and by Wittgenstein’s ideas on human practice, Theodore Schatzki offers a novel approach to understanding the constitution and transformation of social life. Key to the account he develops here is the context in which social life unfolds—the "site of the social"—as a contingent and constantly metamorphosing mesh of practices and material orders. Schatzki’s analysis reveals the advantages of this site ontology over the traditional individualist, holistic, and structuralist accounts that have (...) dominated social theory since the mid-nineteenth century. A special feature of the book is its development of the theoretical argument by sustained reference to two historical examples: the medicinal herb business of a Shaker village in the 1850s and contemporary day trading on the Nasdaq market. First focusing on the relative simplicity of Shaker life to illuminate basic ontological characteristics of the social site, Schatzki then uses the sharp contrast with the complex and dynamic practice of day trading to reveal what makes this approach useful as a general account of social existence. Along the way he provides new insights into many major issues in social theory, including the nature of social order, the significance of agency, the distinction between society and nature, the forms of social change, and how the social present affects its future. (shrink)

We often speak of an object being composed of various other objects. We say that the deck is composed of the cards, that a road is the sum total of its sections, that a house is composed of its walls, ceilings, floors, doors, etc. Suppose we have some material objects. Here is a philosophical question: what conditions must obtain for those objects to compose something? In his recent book Material Beings, Peter van Inwagen addresses this question, which he calls the (...) ‘special composition question’; his answer is:1 (1) For any material objects X , the X s compose something iff the activity of the X s constitutes a life, or there is only one of the Xs. Additionally, he accepts a simpler thesis that follows from (1):2 (2) Every material object is either a mereological atom or a living thing, where a mereological atom is an object lacking proper parts. (2) may seem radical. If it is true then there are no tables, chairs, planets, protons, galaxies, gas stations, etc. But van Inwagen does not hold it lightly— there are serious difficulties with alternate views. Moreover, he claims that.. (shrink)

Ideas for integrating AI into politics are now emerging and advancing at accelerating pace. This chapter highlights a few different varieties and show how they reflect different assumptions about the value of democracy. We cannot make informed decisions about which, if any, proposals to pursue without further reflection on what makes democracy valuable and how current conditions fail to fully realize it. Recent advances in political philosophy provide some guidance but leave important questions open. If AI advances to a state (...) where it can secure superior political outcomes, leading perspectives in political philosophy suggest that democracy may become obsolete. If we find this suggestion troubling, we need to put the case for democracy on stronger foundations. (shrink)

The Weimar Nietzsche-Bibliographie, which is available online along with an exhaustive index, contains hundreds of entries, ranging from "absolute Musik" to "Zynismus." But despite references to his treatment in film and to the names of several novelists, it provides no rubric for Friedrich Nietzsche in novels or otherwise as a fictional figure.Yet the twenty-first century alone has already produced at least four such works, in addition to two others over the preceding eighty years—not to mention films in Italian and French. (...) Liliana Cavani's controversial 1977 Italian film Al di là del bene e del male was widely criticized for its focus on violent sex, including... (shrink)

I argue that we can accept modal normativism—a view that the function of modal claims is to express semantic rules—while also accepting possible worlds semantics. I argue that by keeping the metaphysical insights of normativism at the level of metasemantics—i.e., at the level of accounts of what metaphysically explains facts about the meaning of modal claims—it is open to the normativist to wholeheartedly accept possible worlds semantics.

L'effort principal de Merleau-Ponty, au début de son cheminement philosophique, consiste à amener l'expérience perceptive à l'expression de son propre sens.Pourquoi fallait-il commencer par le retour à l'expérience perceptive? Pour deux raisons qui finalement n'en font qu'une, mais dont la première fut plus explicitement reconnue par Merleau-Ponty au moment où il décida de consacrer ses thèses au problème de la perception. Il lui était évident, dès les années 1933–1934, que la perception est une forme d'expérience particulièrement mutilée et faussée par (...) les philosophies d'inspiration criticiste qui l'interprétaient «comme une opération intellectuelle par laquelle des données inextensives sont mises en relation et expliquées de telle sorte qu'elles finissent par constituer un univers objectif». Il est clair déjà que cette interprétation intellectualiste se base, par un côté, sur la conception empiriste des «sensations», et que la critique de l'intellectualisme devra être tout à la fois une critique de l'empirisme. (shrink)

Shamik Dasgupta has argued that realists about natural properties (and laws, grounding, etc.) cannot account for their epistemic value. For "properties are cheap": in addition to natural properties and any value the realist might attach to them, there are also "shmatural" properties (standing to natural properties like charge and mass as Goodman's grue and bleen stand to green and blue) and a corresponding "shmvalue" of theorizing in terms of them. Dasgupta's challenge is one of objectivity: the existence of the "shmamiked" (...) network of concepts threatens the objectivity of facts stated using the unshmamiked network. But the challenge can be repelled given a proper understanding of objectivity itself. (shrink)

I raise two challenges for scientific realists. The first is a pessimistic meta-induction, but not of the more common type, which focuses on rejected theories and abandoned entities. Rather, the PMI I have in mind departs from conceptual change, which is ubiquitous in science. Scientific concepts change over time, often to a degree that is difficult to square with the stability of their referents, a sine qua non for realists. The second challenge is to make sense of successful scientific practice (...) that was centered on entities that have turned out to be fictitious. (shrink)