Results for 'The rule-following paradox'

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  1.  63
    The Rule-Following Paradox and its Implications for Metaphysics.Jody Azzouni - 2017 - Cham: Springer Verlag.
    This monograph presents Azzouni’s new approach to the rule-following paradox. His solution leaves intact an isolated individual’s capacity to follow rules, and it simultaneously avoids replacing the truth conditions for meaning-talk with mere assertability conditions for that talk. Kripke’s influential version of Wittgenstein’s rule-following paradox—and Wittgenstein’s views more generally—on the contrary, make rule-following practices and assertions about those practices subject to community norms without which they lose their cogency. Azzouni summarizes and develops (...)
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  2. Semantic dispositionalism and the rulefollowing paradox.Elek Lane - 2022 - Metaphilosophy 53 (5):685-695.
    In virtue of what does a sign have meaning? This is the question raised by Wittgenstein's rule-following considerations. Semantic dispositionalism is a (type of) theory that purports to answer this question. The present paper argues that semantic dispositionalism faces a heretofore unnoticed problem, one that ultimately comes down to its reliance on unanalyzed notions of repeated types of signs. In the context of responding to the rule-following paradox—and offering a putative solution to it—this amounts to (...)
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  3. The Rule-Following Paradox and the Impossibility of Private Rule-Following.Jody Azzouni - 209 - The Baltic International Yearbook of Cognition, Logic and Communication 5.
    Kripke’s version of Wittgenstein’s rule-following paradox has been influential. My concern is with how it—and Wittgenstein’s views more generally—have been perceived as undercutting the individualistic picture of mathematical practice: the view that individuals— Robinson Crusoes —can, entirely independently of a community, engage in cogent mathematics, and indeed have “private languages.” What has been denied is that phrases like “correctly counting” can be applied to such individuals because these normative notions can only be applied cogently in a context (...)
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  4. Wittgenstein, Kripke, and the rule following paradox.Adam M. Croom - 2010 - Dialogue 52 (3):103-109.
    In §201 of Philosophical Investigations, Ludwig Wittgenstein puts forward his famous "rule-following paradox". The paradox is how can one follow in accord with a rule - the applications of which are potentially infinite - when the instances from which one learns the rule and the instances in which one displays that one has learned the rule are only finite? How can one be certain of rule-following at all? In Wittgenstein: On Rules (...)
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  5. Another Look at the RuleFollowing Paradox.Greg Janzen - 2014 - Philosophical Forum 45 (1):69-88.
    Saul Kripke has famously argued that the central question of Wittgenstein's Philosophical Investigations, at least in relation to Wittgenstein's discussion of meaning, is the question: what facts determine that a speaker is following a particular rule? For example, assuming that language-use is a rule-governed activity, what facts determine that the rule a speaker is complying with in her current usage of a word is equivalent to the rule she complied with in her previous usage of (...)
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  6. Wittgenstein's rule-following paradox and the objectivity of meaning.Claudine Verheggen - 2003 - Philosophical Investigations 26 (4):285–310.
    Two readings of Wittgenstein's rule-following paradox dominate the literature: either his arguments lead to skepticism, and thus to the view that only a deflated account of meaning is available, or they lead to quietism, and thus to the view that no philosophical account of meaning is called for. I argue, against both these positions, that a proper diagnosis of the paradox points the way towards a constructive, non-sceptical account of meaning.
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  7. (1 other version)Skepticism about Meaning, Indeterminacy, Normativity, and the Rule-Following Paradox.Scott Soames - 1997 - Canadian Journal of Philosophy 27 (sup1):211-249.
    Quine and Kripke's Wittgenstein both present “skeptical” arguments for the conclusion that there are no facts about meaning. In each case the argument for the conclusion is that if there are facts about meaning, then they must be determined by some more fundamental facts, but facts about meaning are not determined by any such facts. Consequently there are no facts about meanings. Within this overall framework, Quine and Kripke's Wittgenstein differ substantially — both in their reasons for thinking that facts (...)
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  8. Solving Kripke/Wittgenstein's Rule-Following Paradox.Kai-Yuan Cheng - 2002 - Dissertation, City University of New York
    The rule-following paradox of Kripke's Wittgenstein posits that there is no fact of the matter about an individual that can determine whether he means one thing or another by a term, such as "+". The paradox thus renders the existence of meaning illusory. The objective of this thesis is to examine the paradox and try to offer a version of a dispositional account that can counteract Kripke's skeptics. ;Gaining insights from previous dispositionalist accounts of meaning (...)
     
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  9.  34
    Jody Azzouni, The Rule-Following Paradox and Its Implications for Metaphysics, Springer , 2017, pp. $$hbox {viii} + 124$$, ISBN: 978-3-319-49060-1 $99.99; $89.99; $69.99. [REVIEW]Juan J. Colomina - 2019 - Studia Logica 107 (2):445-450.
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  10. (1 other version)Facts, truth conditions, and the skeptical solution to the rule-following paradox.Scott Soames - 1998 - Philosophical Perspectives 12:313-48.
  11.  20
    Essay sixteen. Facts, truth conditions, and the skeptical solution to the rule-following paradox.Scott Soames - 2009 - In Philosophical Essays, Volume 2: The Philosophical Significance of Language. Princeton University Press. pp. 416-456.
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  12.  29
    Essay fifteen. Skepticism about meaning: Indeterminacy, normativity, and the rule-following paradox.Scott Soames - 2009 - In Philosophical Essays, Volume 2: The Philosophical Significance of Language. Princeton University Press. pp. 385-415.
  13. Rule-Following I: The Basic Issues.Indrek Reiland - 2024 - Philosophy Compass 19 (1):e12900.
    Rule-following’ is a name for a cluster of phenomena where we seem both guided and “normatively” constrained by something general in performing particular actions. Understanding the phenomenon is important because of its connection to meaning, representation, and content. This article gives an overview of the philosophical discussion of rule-following with emphasis on Kripke’s skeptical paradox and recent work on possible solutions. Part I of this two-part contribution is devoted to the basic issues from Wittgenstein to (...)
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  14. Kripke's account of the rulefollowing considerations.Andrea Guardo - 2012 - European Journal of Philosophy 20 (3):366-388.
    This paper argues that most of the alleged straight solutions to the sceptical paradox which Kripke ascribed to Wittgenstein can be regarded as the first horn of a dilemma whose second horn is the paradox itself. The dilemma is proved to be a by‐product of a foundationalist assumption on the notion of justification, as applied to linguistic behaviour. It is maintained that the assumption is unnecessary and that the dilemma is therefore spurious. To this end, an alternative conception (...)
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  15. The Paradox Of Rule-Following.L. Lenka - 2001 - Indian Philosophical Quarterly 28 (2):195-200.
     
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  16. Rule-Following and Meaning.Alexander Miller & Crispin Wright (eds.) - 2002 - Mcgill-Queen's University Press.
    The rule-following debate, in its concern with the metaphysics and epistemology of linguistic meaning and mental content, goes to the heart of the most fundamental questions of contemporary philosophy of mind and language. This volume gathers together the most important contributions to the topic, including papers by Simon Blackburn, Paul Boghossian, Graeme Forbes, Warren Goldfarb, Paul Horwich, John McDowell, Colin McGinn, Ruth Millikan, Philip Pettit, George Wilson, and José Zalabardo. This debate has centred on Saul Kripke's reading of (...)
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  17. Sceptical Paradoxes of Rule Following.Tomoji Shogenji - 1991 - Dissertation, University of Southern California
    In this dissertation I examine the sceptical problem of rule following presented by Saul Kripke in his interpretation of Ludwig Wittgenstein's later works: Do any facts determine what rule we were following in our apparently rule-following activities such as the use of language? I distinguish three ways of understanding this question--modest scepticism, radical scepticism, and metascepticism--and address them in Parts 1, 2 and 3 of the dissertation, respectively. ;Part 1 discusses modest scepticism, which asserts (...)
     
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  18.  35
    Rule-Following and Charity : Wittgenstein and Davidson on Meaning Determination.Kathrin Glüer - 2017 - In Claudine Verheggen, Wittgenstein and Davidson on Language, Thought, and Action. New York: Cambridge University Press. pp. 69-96.
    The project of this chapter is to explore some relations between the rule-following considerations and radical interpretation. I spell out the sense in which the rule-following considerations are about meaning determination, and investigate whether the principle of meaning determination used in the early Davidson's account of meaning determination - the principle of charity - provides an answer to what I shall call "Wittgenstein's paradox". More precisely, I am interested in one aspect of the paradox: (...)
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  19.  28
    Rule-following, objectivity and meaning.Bob Hale - 1997 - In Bob Hale, Crispin Wright & Alexander Miller, A Companion to the Philosophy of Language. Chichester, West Sussex, UK: Wiley-Blackwell. pp. 619–648.
    This chapter concentrates on two discussions, both of which enlist Wittgenstein's rulefollowing considerations in support of radical and highly revisionary conclusions about the objectivity of meaning ‐ conclusions which may appear to entail, and have been taken to entail, consequences for the objectivity of truth and judgment which are no less radical and revisionary. There is widespread agreement that Wittgenstein advances, in the rulefollowing sections of Philosophical Investigations and Remarks on the Foundations of Mathematics, considerations that (...)
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  20.  73
    Rule-Following and Primitive Normativity.Ben Sorgiovanni - 2018 - Dialectica 72 (1):141-150.
    In her ‘Primitive Normativity and Scepticism about Rules’ (2011b), Hannah Ginsborg proposes a novel solution to Kripke’s sceptical challenge to factualists about meaning (those who think that there is some fact about what you mean or meant by your utterances). According to Ginsborg, the fact in virtue of which you mean, say, addition by ‘plus’ is the fact that ‘you are disposed to respond to a query about (say) “68 plus 57” with “125,” where, in responding in that way, you (...)
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  21.  45
    Rule-Following and Charity : Wittgenstein and Davidson on Meaning Determination.Kathrin Glüer-Pagin - 2017 - In Claudine Verheggen, Wittgenstein and Davidson on Thought, Language and Action. Cambridge University Press. pp. 69-96.
    The project of this chapter is to explore some relations between the rule-following considerations and radical interpretation. I spell out the sense in which the rule-following considerations are about meaning determination, and investigate whether the principle of meaning determination used in the early Davidson's account of meaning determination - the principle of charity - provides an answer to what I shall call "Wittgenstein's paradox". More precisely, I am interested in one aspect of the paradox: (...)
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  22. Rule-Following II: Recent Work and New Puzzles.Indrek Reiland - 2024 - Philosophy Compass 19 (5):e12976.
    Rule-following’ is a name for a cluster of phenomena where we seem both guided and “normatively” constrained by something general in performing particular actions. Understanding the phenomenon is important because of its connection to meaning, representation, and content. This article gives an overview of the philosophical discussion of rule-following with emphasis on Kripke’s skeptical paradox and recent work on possible solutions. Part I of this two-part contribution was devoted to the basic issues from Wittgenstein to (...)
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  23. Rule-following as coordination: a game-theoretic approach.Giacomo Sillari - 2013 - Synthese 190 (5):871-890.
    Famously, Kripke has argued that the central portion of the Philosophical Investigations describes both a skeptical paradox and its skeptical solution. Solving the paradox involves the element of the community, which determines correctness conditions for rule-following behavior. What do such conditions precisely consist of? Is it accurate to say that there is no fact to the matter of rule following? How are the correctness conditions sustained in the community? My answers to these questions revolve (...)
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  24. Rule-following and externalism.Alexander Miller - 2004 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 68 (1):127-140.
    John McDowell has suggested recently that there is a route from his favoured solution to Kripke's Wittgenstein's "sceptical paradox" about rule-following to a particular form of cognitive externalism. In this paper, I argue that this is not the case: even granting McDowell his solution to the rule-following paradox, his preferred version of cognitive externalism does not follow.
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  25. Husserlian Phenomenology, Rule-following, and Primitive Normativity.Jacob Rump - 2020 - In Chad Engelland, Language and Phenomenology. New York: Routledge. pp. 74-91.
    The paper presents a phenomenological approach to recent debates in the philosophy of language about rule-following and the normativity of meaning, a debate that can be traced to Ludwig Wittgenstein’s Philosophical Investigations but that was given new life with Saul Kripke’s Wittgenstein on Rules and Private Language. Taking a cue from Hannah Ginsborg’s recent work on “primitive normativity,” I use some of Husserl’s own comments about meaning and the status of rules to sketch a solution to Kripke’s (...)-following paradox by appealing to a kind of normativity at the level of perception and intersubjective embodiment. This level of normativity arises, like Ginsborg’s, via a primitive kind of judgment that does not presuppose linguistic or conceptual mastery. Unlike for Ginsborg, however, for Husserl this level should still be understood in terms of meaning—just not in the standard linguistic or conceptual senses prominent in the Anglo-American philosophical tradition in which the rule-following debates have occurred. My interpretation thus also demonstrates how Husserl’s account bypasses certain presuppositions about meaning common in the period of the linguistic turn—presuppositions also questioned, in different ways, by Wittgenstein, by Kripke, and by Ginsborg. (shrink)
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  26.  98
    Rule-following, praxeology, and anarchy.Roderick T. Long - 2006 - New Perspectives on Political Economy 1 (2):36-46.
    JEL Classification: B41, B53, B31, B2, P48, A12 Abstract: Wittgenstein’s rule-following paradox has important implications for two aspects of Austrian theory. First, it makes it possible to reconcile the Misesian, Rothbardian, and hermeneutical approaches to methodology; second, it provides a way of defending a stateless legal order against the charge that such an order lacks, yet needs, a final arbiter.
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  27.  89
    RuleFollowing and Objective Spirit.Thomas J. Spiegel - 2022 - Philosophical Investigations 46 (1):76-98.
    This paper deals with Wittgenstein’s rule-following paradox, focussing on the infinite rule-regress as featured in Kripke’s Wittgenstein on Rules and Private Language. I argue that one of the most salient and popular proposed solutions (championed by John McDowell), which argues that rule-following is grounded in “custom,” “practice” or “form of life, remains unsatisfactory because part of this proposal is the rejection of further “theory” (commonly attributed to Wittgenstein) which seemingly makes it impossible to substantiate (...)
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  28. Rule Following, Error Theory and Eliminativism.Alexander Miller - 2015 - International Journal of Philosophical Studies 23 (3):323-336.
    In this paper, I argue for three main claims. First, that there are two broad sorts of error theory about a particular region of thought and talk, eliminativist error theories and non-eliminativist error theories. Second, that an error theory about rule following can only be an eliminativist view of rule following, and therefore an eliminativist view of meaning and content on a par with Paul Churchland’s prima facie implausible eliminativism about the propositional attitudes. Third, that despite (...)
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  29. Rules as constitutive practices defined by correlated equilibria.Ásgeir Berg Matthíasson - 2022 - Inquiry: An Interdisciplinary Journal of Philosophy 65.
    In this paper, I present a game-theoretic solution to the rule-following paradox in terms of what I will call basic constitutive practices. The structure of such a practice P constitutes what it is to take part in P by defining the correctness conditions of our most basic concepts as those actions that lie on the correlated equilibrium of P itself. Accordingly, an agent S meant addition by his use of the term ‘+’ because S is taking part (...)
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  30.  34
    Rules as Icons: Wittgenstein's Paradox and the Law.Bert Van Roermund - 2013 - Ratio Juris 26 (4):538-559.
    In this paper Section 1 distinguishes between two modes of interpreting legal rules: rehearsal and discourse, arguing that the former takes priority over the latter in law, as in many other contexts. Section 2 offers two arguments that following a legal rule in the rehearsing mode presents a riddle. The first argument develops from law, and submits that legal rules do not tell us anything, because they are tautological. The second one develops from philosophy (Wittgenstein's later works), confronting (...)
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  31.  7
    Rules as constitutive practices defined by correlated equilibria.Ásgeir Berg - 2025 - Inquiry: An Interdisciplinary Journal of Philosophy 68 (2):874-908.
    In this paper, I present a game-theoretic solution to the rule-following paradox in terms of what I will call basic constitutive practices. The structure of such a practice P constitutes what it is to take part in P by defining the correctness conditions of our most basic concepts as those actions that lie on the correlated equilibrium of P itself. Accordingly, an agent S meant addition by his use of the term ‘+’ because S is taking part (...)
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  32. The Rule of Contradictory Pairs, Insolubles and Validity.Stephen Read - 2020 - Vivarium 58 (4):275-304.
    The Oxford Calculator Roger Swyneshed put forward three provocative claims in his treatise on insolubles, written in the early 1330s, of which the second states that there is a formally valid inference with true premises and false conclusion. His example deployed the Liar paradox as the conclusion of the inference: ‘The conclusion of this inference is false, so this conclusion is false’. His account of insolubles supported his claim that the conclusion is false, and so the premise, referring to (...)
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  33.  43
    Genius Is What Happens: Derrida and Kant on Genius, Rule-Following and the Event.Michael Haworth - 2014 - British Journal of Aesthetics 54 (3):323-337.
    This essay examines the concept of genius in the work of Jacques Derrida and Immanuel Kant and argues that, despite Derrida’s arguments to the contrary, there is significant space for convergence between the two accounts. This convergence is sought in the complex, paradoxical relationship between the invention of the new and the contextual conditions, or ‘rules’, from which any work of genius must depart but without which no work of genius would be possible. It is my argument that Kant evades (...)
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  34.  22
    (1 other version)Wittgenstein and Die Meistersinger: The Aesthetic Road to a Sceptical Solution of the Sceptical Paradox.Vojtěch Kolman - 2020 - Estetika: The European Journal of Aesthetics 57 (1):44-63.
    Starting with Wittgenstein’s remark about his allegedly frequent visits to the performance of Wagner’s Die Meistersinger von Nürnberg, the paper presents Wagner’s opera – being explicitly an opera about rules and rule-following – as a possible stimulus for the later Wittgenstein’s thinking about language. Besides Wittgenstein’s systematic interest in parallels between music and language, the paper draws on the choice of terminology and on Wittgenstein’s own examples of rule-following. More speculatively, the phrasing as well as the (...)
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  35.  38
    Verheggen on Davidson and Kripke on Rule-Following and Meaning.Alexander Miller - 2020 - Dialogue 59 (2):207-217.
    ABSTRACTThis paper discusses Claudine Verheggen's account of what she takes to be Donald Davidson's response to the sceptical paradox about rule-following and meaning developed in Saul Kripke's interpretation of Wittgenstein's ‘rule-following considerations.’ It focusses on questions about the normativity of meaning, the social character of meaning, and the role of triangulation in Davidson's account of the determination of meaning, and invites Verheggen to compare the non-reductionism she finds in Davidson with that developed in Crispin Wright's (...)
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  36. The Cookie Paradox.Dylan Dodd - 2014 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 92 (2):355-377.
    We’ve all been at parties where there's one cookie left on what was once a plate full of cookies, a cookie no one will eat simply because everyone is following a rule of etiquette, according to which you’re not supposed to eat the last cookie. Or at least we think everyone is following this rule, but maybe not. In this paper I present a new paradox, the Cookie Paradox, which is an argument that seems (...)
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  37.  58
    Goodman's paradox and rules of acceptance.Peter M. Williams - 1969 - Philosophy of Science 36 (3):311-315.
    The purpose of this note is to examine the claim made by Howard Smokler that “Goodman's paradox should be considered as an independent argument against a conception of inductive logic which makes use of rules of acceptance”.Smokler's claim arises from his treatment of Goodman's paradox in the form given it by Israel Scheffler. Schefflerhas discussed this paradox primarily in the context of a methodology of induction which views inductive rules as rules of acceptance permitting one to assert (...)
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  38. Kripke’s paradox and the Church–Turing thesis.Mark D. Sprevak - 2008 - Synthese 160 (2):285-295.
    Kripke (1982, Wittgenstein on rules and private language. Cambridge, MA: MIT Press) presents a rule-following paradox in terms of what we meant by our past use of “plus”, but the same paradox can be applied to any other term in natural language. Many responses to the paradox concentrate on fixing determinate meaning for “plus”, or for a small class of other natural language terms. This raises a problem: how can these particular responses be generalised to (...)
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  39. Regresses, Rules, and Representation: Wittgenstein's Gordian Knot.Donna M. Summerfield - 1984 - Dissertation, University of Notre Dame
    Saul Kripke recently has published an interpretation of the later Wittgenstein's rule-following problem as a "sceptical paradox," the conclusion of which is that language is impossible. In this dissertation, I document the history of the rule-following problem in Wittgenstein's writings, thereby providing a historical perspective not provided by Kripke. In chapters I and II, I develop a broadly Kantian interpretation of the epistemology of the Tractatus. My interpretation conflicts both with interpretations according to which the (...)
     
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  40. Some oddities in Kripke's Wittgenstein on rules and private language.John Humphrey - manuscript
    Oddity One : Kripke claims that Wittgenstein has invented "a new form of scepticism", one which inclines Kripke "to regard it as the most radical and original sceptical problem that philosophy has seen to date, one that only a highly unusual cast of mind could have produced" (K, p. 60). However, Kripke also claims that there are analogies (and sometimes the analogies look very much like identities) between Wittgenstein's sceptical argument and the work of at least three and maybe four (...)
     
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  41. The Church–Fitch knowability paradox in the light of structural proof theory.Paolo Maffezioli, Alberto Naibo & Sara Negri - 2012 - Synthese 190 (14):2677-2716.
    Anti-realist epistemic conceptions of truth imply what is called the knowability principle: All truths are possibly known. The principle can be formalized in a bimodal propositional logic, with an alethic modality ${\diamondsuit}$ and an epistemic modality ${\mathcal{K}}$, by the axiom scheme ${A \supset \diamondsuit \mathcal{K} A}$. The use of classical logic and minimal assumptions about the two modalities lead to the paradoxical conclusion that all truths are known, ${A \supset \mathcal{K} A}$. A Gentzen-style reconstruction of the Church–Fitch paradox is (...)
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  42. The Sceptical Paradox and the Nature of the Self.Tony Cheng - 2015 - Philosophical Investigations 39 (1):3-14.
    In the present article, I attempt to relate Saul Kripke's “sceptical paradox” to some issues about the self; specifically, the relation between the self and its mental states and episodes. I start with a brief reconstruction of the paradox, and venture to argue that it relies crucially on a Cartesian model of the self: the sceptic regards the Wittgensteinian “infinite regress of interpretation” as the foundation of his challenge, and this is where he commits the crucial mistake. After (...)
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  43.  66
    The Paradoxes of Utopian Game-Playing.Deborah P. Vossen - 2017 - Journal of the Philosophy of Sport 44 (3):315-328.
    In The Grasshopper: Games, Life, and Utopia, Suits maintains the following two theses: game-playing is defined as ‘activity directed towards bringing about a specific state of affairs, using only means permitted by rules, where the rules prohibit more efficient in favour of less efficient means, and where such rules are accepted just because they make possible such activity’ and ‘game playing is what makes Utopia intelligible.’ Observing that these two theses cannot be jointly maintained absent paradox, this essay (...)
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  44.  36
    At the Margins of Sense: The Function of Paradox in Deleuze and Wittgenstein.Reidar A. Due - 2011 - Paragraph 34 (3):358-370.
    Gilles Deleuze famously expressed distaste for the philosophy of Ludwig Wittgenstein and his followers. The two thinkers are here seen as irreconcilable. The critique of false problems and the refutation of scepticism found in Wittgenstein have no resonance in Deleuze, who was a systematic metaphysical philosopher in the tradition of pre-Kantian rationalism. Pragmatic-sceptical self-limitation of thought's capabilities on the grounds of existing practice flies in the face of aesthetic experience. Moreover Deleuze explicitly upholds modern literature as a locus of philosophical (...)
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  45.  97
    What Kind of Normativity is the Normativity of Grammar?Hanne Appelqvist - 2017 - Metaphilosophy 48 (1-2):123-145.
    The overall goal of this article is to show that aesthetics plays a major role in a debate at the very center of philosophy. Drawing on the work of David Bell, the article spells out how Kant and Wittgenstein use reflective judgment, epitomized by a judgment of beauty, as a key in their respective solutions to the rule-following problem they share. The more specific goal is to offer a Kantian account of semantic normativity as understood by Wittgenstein. The (...)
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  46.  66
    Patterns, Patterns, Patterns: Art and Meaning at the Crossroads between Two Opposing Forces.Olga Ramirez Calle - 2020 - Theoria (2):220-244.
    This article aims to defend the need to recognize the independent role of those cognitive abilities on whose behalf linguistic meaning is introduced from the proper institution of language. I call this capacity “private pattern recognition” (PPR) and argue that it plays an essential part not just in the instauration of linguistic meaning but also in other relevant cognitive phenomena such as artistic creation and understanding. Moreover, it is precisely the failure to separate both aspects that gives rise to important (...)
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  47. (1 other version)Rule-following without Reasons: Wittgenstein’s Quietism and the Constitutive Question.Crispin Wright - 2007 - Ratio 20 (4):481–502.
    This is a short, and therefore necessarily very incomplete discussion of one of the great questions of modern philosophy. I return to a station at which an interpretative train of thought of mine came to a halt in a paper written almost 20 years ago, about Wittgenstein and Chomsky,[1] hoping to advance a little bit further down the track. The rule-following passages in the Investigations and Remarks on the Foundations of Mathematics in fact raise a number of distinct (...)
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  48.  15
    Unravelling Meaning in Therapeutic Conversations.Tomas Zidek - 2023 - International Journal of Philosophical Practice 9 (1):53-73.
    This paper inspects the relationship between problem analysis—a fundamental part of many therapeutic approaches—and meaning. In the first part, I argue that problem analysis emerges from the representational theory of meaning. I introduce Wittgenstein’s version of this theory as presented in the Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus, and examine its difficulties. Later, I focus on two fundamental themes of late Wittgenstein’s Philosophical Investigations: private language and rule-following. I argue that the rule-following paradox has disproven the representational theory of (...)
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  49. Yet another skeptical solution.Andrea Guardo - 2019 - Philosophia 47 (1):117-129.
    The paper puts forward a new skeptical solution to Kripke’s Wittgenstein’s rule-following paradox, a solution which revolves around the idea that human communication does not require meaning facts - at least as defined by Kripke. After a brief discussion of the paradox, I explain why I think that Kripkenstein’s solution needs revision and argue that the main goal of a skeptical solution to the rule-following paradox should be that of showing that communication does (...)
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  50. Can the lottery paradox be solved by identifying epistemic justification with epistemic permissibility?Benjamin Kiesewetter - 2019 - Episteme 16 (3):241-261.
    Thomas Kroedel argues that the lottery paradox can be solved by identifying epistemic justification with epistemic permissibility rather than epistemic obligation. According to his permissibility solution, we are permitted to believe of each lottery ticket that it will lose, but since permissions do not agglomerate, it does not follow that we are permitted to have all of these beliefs together, and therefore it also does not follow that we are permitted to believe that all tickets will lose. I present (...)
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