In search of general generative principles I start from the postulate of a reality which comprises both materialistic and psychic aspects. This overall reality, described by others as the world of archetypes, is not directly accessible to sensory perception. Yet, by studying archetypical manifestations, it is possible to distinguish different structures or generative principles in it. Comparison of three models, which depict developmental processes in different disciplines, shows that they have the same basic structure. The effects of the archetypes involved (...) can be described as four general generative principles: 1st the principle of wholeness (connection and integration of conflicting opposites), 2nd the principle of complementation and compensation (periodic change of opposite influences); 3rd the enstructuring principle (relative stability or spatial aspect of a manifest structure), and 4th the principle of gesture (change or temporal aspect of that structure). (shrink)

The views of the Enlightenment in European countries are in general well known, while the attempts to introduce the Enlightenment to countries in the periphery of Europe, like Greece, are not known in the same degree. How did the scientific revolution migrate to the Greek‐speaking regions occupied by the Ottoman Empire? How did the Greeks accept the truly revolutionary ideas of the French Revolution and liberalism? What were the reactions of the conservative Greek Orthodox Church and who sacrificed their lives (...) in the cause of their ideas? Theophilos Kairis (1784–1853), a scholar, philosopher, and priest, was the tragic victim of clerical bigotry. The creator of Theosebism in Greece, Kairis suffered the tragic end reserved by fate for those who, being pioneers, tried to introduce to Greece the liberal ideas of Western Europe and the Enlightenment. (shrink)

Résultat des recherches du philosophe allemand positiviste ayant pour objectif d'établir un système logique de constitution des concepts par dérivation, à partir d'un petit nombre de concepts fondamentaux.

The ‘hard problem’ is hard because of the special epistemological status of consciousness, which does not, however, preclude its scientific investigation. Data from phenomenologically trained observers can be combined with neurological investigations to establish the relation between experience and neurodynamics. Although experience cannot be reduced to physical phenomena, parallel phenomenological and neurological analyses allow the structure of experience to be related to the structure of the brain. Such an analysis suggests a theoretical entity, an elementary unit of experience, the protophenomenon, (...) which corresponds to an activity site in the brain. The structure of experience is determined by connections between these activity sites; the connections correspond to temporal patterns among the elementary units of experience, which can be expressed mathematically. This theoretical framework illuminates several issues, including degrees of consciousness, nonbiological consciousness, sensory inversions, unity of consciousness and the unconscious mind. (shrink)

The referent of the transcendental and indexical “I” is present non-ascriptively and contrasts with “the personal I” which necessity is presenced as having properties. Each is unique but in different ways. The former is abstract and incomplete until taken as a personal I. The personal I is ontologically incomplete until it self-determines itself morally. The “absolute Ought” is the exemplary moral self-determination and it finds a special disclosure in “the truth of will.” Simmel's situation ethics is useful for making more (...) precise Husserl's ethical position. (shrink)

A description of the founding of the Journal of Phenomenological Psychology and some of its vicissitudes during its first 25 years are described. Some of the difficulties the journal experienced are correlated with the minority status of phenomenological psychology in the world of psychology at large. Several factors are hypothesized to be the basis of Phenomenology's little impact on mainstream psychology: intrinsic difficulties in comprehending phenomenological philosophy, the fact that phenomenological psychology has not yet sufficiently diflerentiated itself from phenomenological philosophy; (...) and mainstream psychology's clear non-openness to approaches that seem different to its established values. (shrink)

Dans la foulée des débats de bioéthique en France, l'Ecole Supérieure d'Ethique des Sciences de l'Institut catholique de Toulouse a organisé cinq grands débats éthiques en 2010-2011, en partenariat avec le monde industriel et universitaire, et qui sont ici rapportés. Le livre reprend les interventions des conférenciers et intervenants, présente de manière synthétique et pédagogique les débats qui ont suivi. et en propose une relecture. Cette dernière est faite en termes de défis que l'ensemble de la société est invité à (...) relever pour que les sciences et les techniques soient vraiment au service d'une société toujours plus humaine. Le livre souligne également l'impact des sciences et techniques sur les mentalités de nos contemporains et sur la manière de considérer la place de l'homme et le respect de la vie humaine. (shrink)

Though Husserl tends to receive less attention than other phenomenologists, there is growing interest in his ethics. Proponents of Husserl’s ethics argue that his moral philosophy is not merely of historical interest; Husserl, they claim, can contribute positively to contemporary debates in ethics, specifically debates about the role of feelings in moral agency. This paper raises questions about this last claim. I argue that, on the one hand, Husserl’s moral psychology proves superior to some of his modern predecessors, insofar as (...) Husserl accounts (1) for the intentionality of emotions and (2) for their cognitive content, and (3) for the connections between emotions and evaluation and between emotions and reasons. On the other hand, I argue that Husserl mistakenly claims that all valuing requires some feeling on the part of the person valuing. This error, I argue, is due to Husserl’s conflation of desires and emotions. I defend my critique of Husserl by reference to an Aristotelian account of rational and non-rational desires. (shrink)