Inspired by the writings of J. M. Hinton (1967a, 1967b, 1973), but ushered into the mainstream by Paul Snowdon (1980–1, 1990–1), John McDowell (1982, 1986), and M. G. F. Martin (2002, 2004, 2006), disjunctivism is currently discussed, advocated, and opposed in the philosophy of perception, the theory of knowledge, the theory of practical reason, and the philosophy of action. But what is disjunctivism?

I critically discuss two claims which Hannah Ginsborg makes on behalf of her account of meaning in terms of ‘primitive normativity’: first, that it avoids the sceptical regress articulated by Kripke's Wittgenstein; second, that it makes sense of the thought—central to Kripke's Wittgenstein—that ‘meaning is normative’, in a way which shows this thought not only to be immune from recent criticisms but also to undermine reductively naturalistic theories of content. In the course of the discussion, I consider and attempt to (...) shed light on a number of issues: the structure of the sceptical regress; the content of the thought that ‘meaning is normative’, and its force against reductive theories; the connection between meaning and justification; and the notion of ‘primitive normativity’. (shrink)

Michela Bella & Matteo Santarelli – What did you know about Pragmatism when you started? Where did you start as a student? Charlene Haddock Seigfried – I came to pragmatism by way of existentialism. During the late sixties, I took my first graduate class at the University of Southern California – an introduction to empiricism – which I didn’t like at all, and I also attended a lecture on existentialism, which intrigued me. But I was always interested in social (...) and political issues and I was m... (shrink)

In seinem Aufsatz “Transparency, Self-Consciousness, and Reflection” und in seinem Buch Transparency and Reflection entwickelt Boyle eine Lösung für das Problem der Transparenz. Antworten, die auf Fragen über das Bewusstsein gegeben werden, bringen demnach nur die Arten des Gegebenseins zum Ausdruck, die in Antworten auf weltbezogene Fragen schon enthalten sind. Diese sowie auch die Lösung für ein anderes Problem, das Boyle „the anti-egoist challenge“ nennt, gründen auf der Idee, dass eine Antwort auf eine weltbezogene Frage eine Art des Gegebenseins enthält, (...) die ihrerseits implizit auf das antwortende Subjekt referiert. Diese wird expliziert, wenn eine Frage über das Bewusstsein beantwortet wird. Mir scheint, dass diese Idee einen Fallstrick spannt. Denn damit die von Boyle vorgeschlagene Lösung gelingt, muss die relevante Referenz auf die erste Person in einer Art des Gegebenseins des Subjekts bestehen. Doch wenn diese Art des Gegebenseins die typische Fregeanische Spezifizierung erfüllt, dann ist sie privat, – und genauso privat ist dann auch die Art des Gegebenseins, in der sie enthalten ist. Folglich wird sich die Privatheit über diejenigen Antworten, die sich auf Fragen über das Bewusstsein richten, auf alle Antworten hinaus ausbreiten, die sich auf die mit ihnen verknüpften Fragen über die Welt richten. (shrink)

Anscombe seems to think that, even though “the knowledge that a man has of his intentional actions” is not “knowledge by observation”, it can be aided by observation. My aim in this essay is to explain how I think we should understand this thought. I suggest that, in a central class of cases, knowledge of one's intentional action is knowledge whose canonical linguistic expression is an utterance of the form “I am doing something to that G": knowledge in which the (...) subject, at once, knows himself “as self" (and so, not by observation), and knows an outer object “as other” (and so, by observation). To characterise this knowledge either as knowledge by observation, or as knowledge not by observation, is to characterise it in a manner that abstracts away from its fundamental unity. (shrink)

Anscombe seems to think that, even though “the knowledge that a man has of his intentional actions” is not “knowledge by observation”, it can be aided by observation. My aim in this essay is to explain how I think we should understand this thought. I suggest that, in a central class of cases, knowledge of one's intentional action is knowledge whose canonical linguistic expression is an utterance of the form “I am doing something to that G": knowledge in which the (...) subject, at once, knows himself “as self" (and so, not by observation), and knows an outer object “as other” (and so, by observation). To characterise this knowledge either as knowledge by observation, or as knowledge not by observation, is to characterise it in a manner that abstracts away from its fundamental unity. (shrink)

Matthias Schirn (ed.), Frege:Importance and Legacy, Berlin, Walter De Gruyter, 1996, viii + 466pp.

The present collection of seventeen papers, most of them already published in international philosophical journals, deals both with issues in the philosophy of logic, the philosophy of mathematics, the philosophy of language and epistemology. The first part contains critical assessments and somewhat deviant renderings of the work of two seminal philosophers, Frege and Husserl, as well as of the young Carnap and Kripke. The second part contains analyses of central issues in the philosophy of logic, the philosophy of mathematics and (...) semantics, including arguments on behalf of Platonism in the philosophy of mathematics, a defense of second-order logic, a new definition of analyticity, a sketch of a semantics for mathematical statements and a critique of Kripke s possible world semantics for modal logic.". (shrink)

Most areas of philosopher Edmund Husserl’s thought have been explored, but his views on logic, mathematics, and semantics have been largely ignored. These essays offer an alternative to discussions of the philosophy of contemporary mathematics. The book covers areas of disagreement between Husserl and Gottlob Frege, the father of analytical philosophy, and explores new perspectives seen in their work.

Gottlob Frege is one of the greatest logicians ever and also a philosopher of great significance. In this book Rosado Haddock offers a critical presentation of the main topics of Frege's philosophy, including, among others, his philosophy of arithmetic, his sense-referent distinction, his distinction between function and object, and his criticisms of formalism and psychologism. More than just an introduction to Frege's philosophy this book is also a highly critical and mature assessment of it as a whole in which (...) the limitations, confusions and other weaknesses of Frege's thought are closely examined. The author is also a Husserlian scholar and this book contains valuable discussions of Husserl's neglected views and comparisons between the two great philosophers. (shrink)

This volume will be an essential resource for anyone working in the central areas of philosophy, and the starting point for future research in this fascinating ...

Wilfrid Sellars employs the metaphor of the space of reasons to express a certain conception of knowledge: “in characterising an episode or state as that of knowing … one is placing it in the logical space of reasons, of justifying and being able to justify what one says”.1 A growing number of philosophers employ the same metaphor to express a conception of at least some (other) mental states: in characterising a state as that of belief, or intention, one is placing (...) it in the same logical space.2 The burden of Alan Millar’s characteristically careful and thought-provoking book is to tell us what this conception amounts to, and to argue for its truth. Its central claim is that the concepts of belief and intention, and what they are concepts of, are (in a sense to be explained) normative. Chapter four – “the heart of the book”, in Millar’s view3 – is devoted to explaining, and defending this claim. (shrink)

The Italian author Giovanni Gentile occupied a radical position among philosophers of the first half of the twentieth century. He tried in earnest to revolutionize idealist theory, developing a doctrine that retained the idealist conception of the thinking subject as the centre and source of any intelligible reality, while eschewing many of the unwarranted abstractions that had pervaded earlier varieties of idealism and led their adherents astray. Given his great prominence during his lifetime, it is perhaps remarkable that Gentile is (...) so little discussed, and even then so poorly understood, in the English-speaking world. Few of his works have ever been translated into English, and these represent only a fraction of his great corpus and the many topics discussed therein. This neglect is partly explained by his close association with the Partito Nazionale Fascista, of which he remained a loyal member and supporter between 1923 and his assassination in 1944. The volume comprises eleven essays. Seven of these are new pieces written especially for Thought Thinking, and are intended both to contribute to ongoing debates about Gentile's philosophy and to indicate just a few of its many aspects that continue to draw the attention of philosophers, political theorists and intellectual historians. These are supplemented by new English translations of four of Gentile's shorter works, selected to offer some direct insight into his ideas and style of writing. (shrink)

Anscombe raises a difficulty for the very idea of quotation. Davidson seeks to dissolve this difficulty. But the difficulty is real. And its lesson is that, in quotation, language takes itself as its topic in a non-objectifying manner. The idea of a non-objectifying manner of being a topic is crucial, not merely for understanding quotation, but for understanding the distinctive form of sensory consciousness in which language is perceived.

Recent epistemology has reflected a growing interest in issues about the value of knowledge and the values informing epistemic appraisal. Is knowledge more valuable that merely true belief or even justified true belief? Is truth the central value informing epistemic appraisal or do other values enter the picture? Epistemic Value is a collection of previously unpublished articles on such issues by leading philosophers in the field. It will stimulate discussion of the nature of knowledge and of directions that might be (...) taken by the theory of knowledge. The contributors are Jason Baehr, Michael Brady, Berit Brogaard, Michael DePaul, Pascal Engel, Catherine Elgin, Alvin Goldman, John Greco, Stephen Grimm, Ward Jones, Martin Kusch, Jonathan Kvanvig, Michael Lynch, Erik Olsson, Wayne Riggs and Matthew Weiner. (shrink)

The liberal and democratic political order is underpinned by universal principles of justice. However, the universality of these principles is now being questioned and undermined by challenges from postmodernism, communitarianism, multiculturalism and other forms of anti-foundationalism. These challenges highlight the sheer diversity of cultures and values, treating liberal values and democratic political culture as one idea of social organization amongst many. While social and political orders are capable of almost endless variation, it may be that not every diverse order is (...) legitimate and we can justifiably regard some forms of social organization as beyond the pale and a 'thin' form of universalism has been developed to support this contention. The core idea behind 'thin universalism' is that it is possible to rehabilitate the universalist aspirations of normative theory while acknowledging the force of many antifoundationalist and multiculturalist criticisms of universalism. This book brings together prominent international political theorists to explain and discuss this contested concept and explore how we can stand up for and act upon principles in a world characterized by cultural difference, moral skepticism, and political division. The authors present a variety of perspectives: some chapters are sympathetic to the idea of a thin universalist account of justification, some are reluctant advocates and others are skeptical about its success or even desirability. Opening out core debates in contemporary normative theory, this volume will be of great interest to researchers and scholars working in the fields of contemporary political theory, political philosophy and IR theory. (shrink)

The themes of the book—the value of knowledge and epistemic appraisal broadly conceived—are introduced in this chapter. The Meno problem is explained and related to the swamping problem as discussed by Jonathan Kvanvig. The stance of virtue epistemologists is outlined. This is followed by a brief discussion of the role of truth in epistemic appraisal. The remainder of the introduction summarises the contributions to the book.

There is a lot of misunderstanding and ignorance about Husserl’s philosophy among analytic philosophers. The present paper attempts to help correct that situation. It begins with some quotations of Husserl written around 1890, which clearly establish that he arrived at the distinction between sense and reference with independence from Frege. Then follows a brief survey of the most important themes of Husserl’s Logical Investigations, emphazising those that are of special interest to analytic philosophers. The paper concludes by mentioning other interesting (...) issues treated in later Husserlian writings, including his valuable conferences on ancient and modern logic from 1908-1909.Existen muchos malentendidos y mucha ignorancia acerca de la filosofía de Husserl entre los filósofos analíticos. El presente artículo intenta contribuir a corregir esa situacion. Él comienza con algunas citas de Husserl de aproximadamente 1890, que claramente establecen que Husserl obtuvo la distinción entre sentido y referente con independenica de Frege. Luego sigue un breve recuento de los más importantes temas de las Investigaciones Lógicas de Husserl, destacando aquéllos que son de particular interés para los filósofos analíticos. El artículo concluye haciendo référencia a otros temas tratados en escritos posteriores de Husserl, incluyendo sus valiosas conferencias acerca de lógica antigua y moderna de 1908-1909. (shrink)

Quine’s criticism of the notion of analyticity applies, at best, to Carnap’s notion, not to those of Frege or Husserl. The failure of logicism is also the failure of Frege’s definition of analyticity, but it does not even touch Husserl’s views, which are based on logical form. However, some relatively concrete number-theoretic statements do not admit such a formalization salva veritate. A new definition of analyticity based not on syntactical but on semantical logical form is proposed and argued for.

Mi preocupación en este trabajo, siguiendo las directrices de Verene, es cambiar la dirección de la lectura habitual de la Vita, la autobiografía de Vico. En lugar de usar la Vita con el fin de clarificar algunos oscuros pasajes de la Scienza nuova, me gustaría usar la Scienza nuova como si fuera una clave interpretativa de la Vita. Lo que me propongo es elegir algunos temas de cierta significación filosófica de la Scienza nuova que Vico elabora en la Vita y (...) que, discutiblemente, arrojan alguna luz sobre la significación filosófica de la autobiografía como género literario.My concern in this paper, following Verene, is to reverse the usual reading of the Vita, Vico’s autobiography. Instead of using the Vita to clarify obscure passages in the Scienza nuova, I want to use the Scienza nuova as an interpretative key to the Vita. What I want to do instead is to pick out central philosophical themes from the Scienza nuova which Vico works into the Vita and which, arguably, shed some light on the philosophical signficance of autobiography as a genere. (shrink)

The article focuses on Vincenzo Cuoco’s attempt to learn theoretical and political lessons from the failed Neapolitan Revolution of 1799. His Saggio storico sought to steer a course between revolution and reaction, arguing that practical reforms should be couched in terms that reflected traditional understandings within Neapolitan popular culture. He highlighted the responsibility of political leaders to shape popular culture rather than to impose ‘ideal’ solutions to political questions. The position he espoused (linking normative political theory to historical context) became (...) a dominant motif in later liberal nationalist positions, enabling moderates to champion constitutional reform without embarking on radical economic and social change. (shrink)

Arthur C. Danto’s Analytical Philosophy of History has a Kantian ambition: to state the conditions that make historical knowledge possible and to show “the unhappy destiny” that attends attempts to extend modes of representation beyond these conditions. Even though Danto’s book fails to achieve this ambition, it succeeds in making a number of important—if neglected—suggestions in the course of its attempt. One concerns the significance of the progressive tense for our thinking about human agency. Another concerns the way agency can (...) impact negatively on the possibility of foreknowledge. (shrink)

Husserl's contributions to the nature of mathematical knowledge are opposed to the naturalist, empiricist and pragmatist tendences that are nowadays dominant. It is claimed that mainstream tendences fail to distinguish the historical problem of the origin and evolution of mathematical knowledge from the epistemological problem of how is it that we have access to mathematical knowledge.

This paper is concerned with the use of logic to solve philosophical problems. Such use of logic goes counter to the prevailing empiricist tradition in analytic circles. Specifically, model-theoretic tools are applied to three fundamental issues in the philosophy of logic and mathematics, namely, to the issue of the existence of mathematical entities, to the dispute between first- and second-order logic and to the definition of analyticity.

Examining the scholarly interest of the last two decades in the origins of logical empiricism, and especially the roots of Rudolf Carnap's Der logische Aufbau der Welt, Rosado Haddock challenges the received view, according to which that book should be inserted in the empiricist tradition.

Jennifer Hornsby's account of human action frees us from the temptation to think of the person who acts as 'doing' the events that are her actions, and thereby removes much of the allure of 'agent causation'. But her account is spoiled by the claim that physical actions are 'tryings' that cause bodily movements. It would be better to think of physical actions and bodily movements as identical; but Hornsby refuses to do this, seemingly because she thinks that to do so (...) would be to endorse the so-called 'standard causal story'. But Hornsby misses a possibility here, for we can insist on this identity claim without endorsing the standard story if we embrace an account which parallels the disjunctive account in the philosophy of perception. This will leave us with a picture of physical action that saves the insights of Hornsby's account without succumbing to its distortions. (shrink)

John McDowell's conception of perceptual knowledge commits him to the claim that if I perceive that P then I am in a position to know that I perceive that P. In the first part of this essay, I present some reasons to be suspicious of this claim - reasons which derive from a general argument against 'luminosity' - and suggest that McDowell can reject this claim, while holding on to almost all of the rest of his conception of perceptual knowledge, (...) by supplementing his existing disjunctive conception of experience with a new disjunctive conception of perceiving. In the second part of the essay, I present some reasons for thinking that one's justification, in cases of perceptual knowledge, consists not in the fact that one perceives that P but in the fact that one perceives such-and-such. I end by suggesting that the disjunctive conception of perceiving should be understood as a disjunctive conception of perceiving such-and-such. (shrink)