慶応義塾大学法学部のゼミナール「伊東乾民事訴訟法研究会」の卒業生の会「乾会」による論文集。今回はテーマを民事訴訟法に限ることなく、現在関心を持っている法律分野について執筆した。.

I CATEGORIES AND PRINCIPLES ii Introductory Remarks The value of linguistics as a cognitive science lies largely in its potential for providing insights ...

The aim of the present paper is to provide an axiomatic analysis of incomplete social judgments. In particular, we clarify the underlying power structure of Arrovian collective choice rules when social preferences are allowed to be incomplete. We propose the concept of quasi-decisiveness and investigate the properties of the collection of quasi-decisive sets associated with an Arrovian collective choice rule. In the course of this, we offer a series of applications.

The Trends in International Mathematics and Science Study found that even though children from all East Asian countries outperformed American children, American students reported higher self-evaluation of their math and science abilities than did students from East Asian countries such as China, Korea, and Japan (Mullis, Martin, Gonzalez, & Chrostowski, 2004). Such cross-cultural differences in self-appraisal fit the stereotype of the modest East Asian and contribute to the received view that East Asians have less positive self-concepts than Americans. This view (...) was summarized recently by Heine, Lehman, Markus, and Kitayama (1999) as follows: ‘‘The need for positive self-regard, as it is currently conceptualized, is not a universal, but rather is rooted in significant aspects of North American culture’’ (p. 766; but cf. Sedikides, Gaertner, & Vevea. (shrink)

「語の意味」とは何か?『類語大辞典』の編集・執筆に関わってきた著者が、「意味の本質」「同義・類義・多義」「意味記述の方法」「辞書と意味記述」の4部に渡って、これまで深めてきた考察を明らかにする、「こと ばの意味」の研究に大きく資する一冊。.

The purpose of this paper is to investigate the relationship between collective rationality and permissible collective choice rules using a unified approach inspired by Bossert and Suzumura (J Econ Theory 138:311–320, 2008). We consider collective choice rules satisfying four axioms: unrestricted domain, strong Pareto, anonymity, and neutrality. A number of new classes of collective choice rules as well as the Pareto and Pareto extension rules are characterized under various concepts of collective rationality: acyclicity, transitivity, quasi-transitivity, semi-transitivity, and the interval order (...) property. Further, new concepts of collective rationality, K-term acyclicity and K-term consistency, are proposed and the corresponding characterizations are provided. (shrink)

This paper provides an alternative proof of the Gibbard–Satterthwaite theorem.

Suzumura consistency is a necessary and sufficient condition for the existence of a weak-order extension. This paper provides some remarks on collective choice rules that generate Suzumura consistent social preferences. We examine the properties of such collective choice rules by introducing a procedural condition on collective choice rules. As applications of the procedural condition, we first investigate the decisive structure of a Paretian collective choice rule, and then consider the assignment of individual rights. In our analysis, the concept of semi-decisiveness (...) works effectively. (shrink)

The purpose of this study is to investigate a relationship between egalitarian equivalence and envy-freeness in a continuum-agent economy, where tastes vary continuously across individuals. Under efficiency, the two criteria of equity are not compatible, except in the knife-edge case. In particular, when individual utility functions are restricted to the class of Cobb–Douglas-type functions, there exists an efficient, egalitarian-equivalent, and envy-free allocation if and only if all individuals have the same taste over commodities.

This paper examines social choice theory with the strong Pareto principle. The notion of conditional decisiveness is introduced to clarify the underlying power structure behind strongly Paretian aggregation rules satisfying binary independence. We discuss the various degrees of social rationality: transitivity, semi-transitivity, the interval-order property, quasi-transitivity, and acyclicity.

いかなる方向に臨めば日本が文化的小児病から脱することができるのか、そしてその果てに日本文明の成熟をすら望みうるのか(「西欧の自己懐疑と日本の自己放棄」より)―保守的自由主義の源流、エドマンド・バーク、 「大衆」に関して、それを「奇怪」なる存在と捉えていたキルケゴール、民主主義批判をしたニーチェ...など十五人の思想家たちの言説を、私たちが今を生き抜くための精神的な糧にしようとする画期的な書、待望の文 庫化。.

本巻は、「他者」とされた異教・女性・被差別民の問題と、「境界」に位置した北海道・沖縄という異文化に焦点をあて、宗教との関価を論じる。.

本书精辟阐述朝鲜朱子学集大成者-李退溪的主敬哲学的形成、发展过程,思想体系特点及其影响等。.

This article provides a systematic analysis of social choice theory without the Pareto principle, by revisiting the method of Murakami Yasusuke. This article consists of two parts. The first part investigates the relationship between rationality of social preference and the axioms that make a collective choice rule either Paretian or anti-Paretian. In the second part, the results in the first part are applied to obtain impossibility results under various rationality requirements of social preference, such as S-consistency, quasi-transitivity, semi-transitivity, the interval-order (...) property, and acyclicity. (shrink)

The intersection approach is a common method of overcoming a conflict among multiple values. Under this approach, a state is more desirable than another if it is so for all criteria in question. A fundamental difficulty is that judgment under the intersection approach lacks completeness in too many cases. We propose alternative methods that extend the intersection approach: the union and union-intersection approaches. Our methods generate a (quasi-)coherence judgment which is more completed and can be applied to most problems of (...) ethical indices. (shrink)

This paper addresses the Arrovian social choice problem. Our focus is the role of positive responsiveness, which requires social judgments to be strongly monotonic with respect to individual judgments. We clarify the structure of decisive coalitions associated with collective choice rules that satisfy positive responsiveness and Arrow's axioms. Transitivity of social preferences is relaxed to quasi‐transitivity or acyclicity.

This paper examines the logical relationship among Maskin monotonicity, independent person-by-person monotonicity, independent weak monotonicity, strategy-proofness, and coalitional strategy-proofness in a society with infinite individuals.

This paper shows that weak Pareto and strong Pareto are equivalent under continuity and strong quasi-concavity. We use a framework that incorporates welfare as well as non-welfare information.