The final chapter of Peter Winch's book on Simone Weil discusses Weil's idea of supernatural virtue. Weil uses this language in connection with certain exceptional actions: actions of a kind which are for most of us, most of the time, simply impossible. She is particularly struck by cases in which someone refrains from exercising a power which they have over another: in which, for example, someone refrains from killing or enslaving an enemy who has grievously harmed him and (...) who is now at his mercy. We could also speak of cases in which someone helps an enemy, or a stranger, at very real cost, or risk, to himself. In such cases Weil speaks of the ‘supernatural’ as being at work. (shrink)

This book provides a Thomistic account of growing in virtue. That account requires a precise explanation of what habits are, why they are needed, and what they supply once possessed. The book begins with a technical analysis of habit based on the thought of Thomas Aquinas. That analysis supplies a foundation for the two central parts of the book. The author first offers an account on the attainment of and growth in acquired virtue, in dialogue with contemporary moral (...) philosophy and addressing recent debates in moral theology. He then offers an account of the attainment of and growth in infused virtue, in a manner attentive to the continuities and discontinuities between natural and supernatural virtues. In conclusion, the book has two appendices, written in the genre of the Scholastic "disputed question," on the relationship between the acquired and infused virtues. (shrink)

In recent years, there has been a remarkable resurgence of interest in classical conceptions of what it means for human beings to lead a good life. Although the primary focus of the return to classical thought has been Aristotle's account of virtue, the ethics of Aquinas has also received much attention. Our understanding of the integrity of Aquinas's thought has clearly benefited from the recovery of the ethics of virtue.Understood from either a natural or a supernatural perspective, (...) the good life according to Aquinas involves the exercise not just of the moral virtues, but also of the intellectual virtues. Following Aristotle, Aquinas divides the intellectual virtues into the practical, which have either doing (prudence) or making (art) as an end, and the theoretical or speculative, which are ordered to knowing for its own sake (understanding, knowledge, and wisdom). One of the intellectual virtues, namely, prudence has received much recent attention. With few exceptions, however, contemporary discussions of Aquinas ignore the complex and nuanced relationships among, and comparisons between, the different sorts of intellectual virtue. Even more striking is the general neglect of the speculative, intellectual virtues and the role of contemplation in the good life.In Virtue's Splendor Professor Hibbs seeks to overcome this neglect, approaching the ethical thought of Thomas Aquinas in terms of the great debate of antiquity and the Middle Ages concerning the rivalry between the active and the contemplative lives, between prudence and wisdom as virtues perfective of human nature. In doing so, he puts before the reader the breadth of Aquinas's vision of the good life. (shrink)

The first scene-by-scene philosophical study of any Shakespeare play, this book demonstrates why Shakespeare's poetic writings still arouse and sustain serious inquiry and reflection. Using a combination of philosophical rigor, political insight, and textual thoroughness, Jan H. Blits delineates the competing forms of virtue within Macbeth--the courageous public virtue of warriors like Macbeth and the internal Christian virtue evoked by Duncan. This new interpretation of Macbeth explains crucial paradoxes overlooked by previous scholars and will serve as a (...) model for future scholarship in the field. (shrink)

Berkeley's Passive Obedience presents a fragment of morality. Moral duties are dictated by divine natural laws that the good God gives to all people. This justifies morality but may not motivate right conduct. Only God's commands may properly motivate the agent. Morality guides people from this unhappy world to heaven and has political consequences, especially the citizen's duties of obedience and loyalty to a supreme political authority. Loyalty and obedience to God are virtues that earn eternal happiness. Berkeley is a (...) divine-command theorist who supports a morality focused on a heavenly reward. His moral reflections serve political ends. (shrink)

Some philosophers seem to argue that faith is or should be produced by arguments, whereas others describe faith as non-rational or even irrational. In the Summa Theologiae, Thomas states that arguments and miracles can show that faith is reasonable, even though unaided reason on its own cannot produce an act of faith. The insufficiency of reason for faith is a necessary condition of faith’s freedom and merit. The explanation of this insufficiency lies in the formal object of faith, which makes (...) the virtue and its acts essentially supernatural. Faith’s principles, namely the articles of faith, are seen to be true only by God and the blessed in heaven. Those who have faith assent to these revealed principles not though their natural ability, but through the “light of faith,” which is somehow similar to the “light of reason” by which humans assent to principles that are known through their terms. Faith’s supernatural character explains why reason is properly applied to faith only after one already possesses faith. It also explains how faith can be more certain than other intellectual habits, even though great uncertainty might arise on account of the believer’s imperfection. (shrink)

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:Reviewed by:Virtue and Grace in the Theology of Thomas Aquinas by Justin M. AndersonThomas V. BergVirtue and Grace in the Theology of Thomas Aquinas by Justin M. Anderson (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2020), xiii + 327 pp.To ignore Aquinas's theological backstory to his account of the virtues—namely, his account of grace in its relation to human action—is to distort his account of the virtues. This is the very (...) valid thesis explored by Justin Anderson in Virtue and Grace in the Theology of Thomas Aquinas. Anderson critiques the tendency among contemporary Anglophone virtue ethicists to quietly bracket his account of grace even as they admire his account the virtues. More pointedly, Anderson holds that Aquinas's account of virtue is inseparable from his account of sin, grace, "and God's presence in human life and action." He endeavors to evidence Aquinas's authentic account of virtue and its "inner reliance on the theological categories of grace, sin, and divine providence" (1).Anderson thus proposes a reading of Aquinas that is diachronic, analytical and systematic, and text-based, and which follows the logic inherent in Aquinas's own reasoning.And he delivers.After a brief overview of Aquinas's understanding of virtue in chapter 1, in chapter 2, Anderson explores the Thomistic distinction that will largely serve as a heuristic for most of the study: the distinction between virtue secundum quid (pagan virtue) and virtue simpliciter, virtue infused in us by God—virtue in the truest sense of the term.In chapter 3, Anderson traces the historical evolution in Aquinas's understanding of grace as this impacts his understanding of the conditions under which a person can possess or embody virtue. He bases this exploration in part on the work of both Henri Bouillard and Bernard Lonergan. First Anderson explores how that evolution came about in the context of the emergence of two powerful categories of thought: the Aristotelian concept of nature in the twelfth century and the category of the supernatural in the thirteenth. According to Bouillard, Aquinas's understanding of grace would [End Page 1421] have been further shaped by two sets of discoveries during his sojourn in Italy in the early 1260s, the first being two anti-Pelagian tracts of St. Augustine, and the second being the Liber de bona fortuna, a Latin compilation, possibly translated by William of Moerbeke, consisting of two chapters on good fortune, one taken from Aristotle's Magna Moralia, and the other from the Eudemian Ethics.Aquinas discovers in Augustine's anti-Pelagian works the contention that the beginning of faith is from God and not from the individual. As with the grace of final perseverance, both initiation and perdurance in faith are gratuitous gifts of God. In his encounter with the Liber (and particularly his consideration therein of the "problem of the first deliberation"), like other medievals, Aquinas "[was] presented Aristotelian investigations regarding the possibility of a divine movement, even unacknowledged by the agent, at the very roots of human action" (98). And, in Thomas's evolved understanding, this divine influence would constitute an inner movement within the human agent apart from those external circumstances ordained by providence.Anderson embraces the thesis that, in this context, and under these influences, Aquinas's understanding of grace underwent a "revolution," that a mature Aquinas—and this is the thesis of Lonergan—moves beyond a consideration of grace merely as habitus (gratia gratum faciens) to a notion of operative grace, of grace as a movement, utilizing "the unique idea of a 'moving grace', a movement of God in, and in some cases with, the human soul" (105).And—Anderson is emphatic—this revolution in thought quickly steers Aquinas clear of what centuries later will be termed semi-Pelagianism, and toward a firmly anti-Pelagian conception of the human capacity for virtue.Chapters 4–9 comprise the second and third parts of the book. It is here that Anderson masterfully and exhaustively engages in the heavy lifting of evincing just how, in fact, Aquinas's account of virtue is inseparable from his theology of grace. On the supposition that Aquinas's mature theology of grace understands the latter to... (shrink)

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:The Life of Virtue as an Act of Worship:On the Eucharistic Orientation of the Moral LifeMichael A. WahlThe Second Vatican Council's sole mention of moral theology, which occurs in the decree on priestly formation Optatam Totius, consists in a brief but unmistakable call for its renewal (§16). The need for such renewal stems from the state of moral theology in the mid-twentieth century, dominated by the manualist tradition (...) that had emerged after the Council of Trent. The manuals were increasingly thought to be inadequate in at least two important respects. First, they framed the moral life primarily in juridical terms of duty and obligation.1 As the author of one early-twentieth-century manual put it, the manuals do not "hold up a high ideal of Christian perfection for the imitation of the faithful. Rather, they deal with what is of obligation under pain of sin; they are books of moral pathology."2 Second, the focus of the manuals was principally on resolving cases of conscience rather than on treating the theological principles at the heart of Christian ethics, and the method they employed in this task was primarily philosophical, occasionally supplemented by biblical citations. What resulted from this approach is what one contemporary moral theologian describes as a "stifling of the theological imagination," a severing of moral theology from its place within [End Page 1399] the larger context of Christian theology and its self-relegation to the domain of problem-solving.3Given this context, the Council's summons to renewal would entail a significant reorientation of moral theology in at least two ways. First and perhaps most pressingly, the Council's injunction that moral theology "should shed light on the loftiness of the vocation of the faithful in Christ" calls on moral theologians to re-conceive the moral life in positive terms, as the pursuit of beatitude through growth in holiness, rather than solely in the minimalist terms of avoiding sin (Optatam Totius §16). Second, the Council's insistence that moral theology "should be renewed by a more living contact with the mystery of Christ" and "more nourished by Sacred Scripture" demands a recovery of the properly theological character of moral theology and its more intentional integration with Scripture, dogmatic theology, the liturgy, and spirituality (§16).Over the past seventy-five years—in the time both leading up to and following the Council—Catholic moral theologians have returned to the sources of Christian ethics in fresh and creative ways in order to renew moral theology.4 One crucial component of this renewal, especially in the wake of Pope John Paul II's 1993 encyclical Veritatis Splendor—approximately the midpoint between the end of the Council and the present—has been the resurgence of virtue ethics, including and especially the virtue ethics of Thomas Aquinas, in Catholic moral theology.5 This return to virtue has incorporated several important elements of the Council's call for renewal. For example, many virtue ethicists have emphasized the teleological character of the moral life by emphasizing the call to supernatural beatitude as the foundation for moral theology.6 In addition, contemporary works in [End Page 1400] theological virtues ethics have given special consideration to the relationship between Scripture and the moral life.7 For these reasons and others, many scholars regard virtue ethics as the most promising way forward for developing a theological approach to the Christian moral life aligned to the vision of the Council.There remains, however, one of the Council's desiderata for moral theology's renewal to which virtue ethics has devoted less attention. While theological virtue ethics has striven to "shed light on the loftiness of the vocation of the faithful in Christ" and to ensure that it has been "more nourished by Sacred Scripture," comparatively less consideration has been given to ensuring that moral theology is put in "living contact with the mystery of Christ." To be sure, several recent contributions to Catholic virtue ethics have emphasized the role of grace, the infused virtues, and the gifts of the Holy Spirit in order to highlight the properly supernatural character of the Christian moral life.8 But at the same time, virtue ethics... (shrink)

This essay will focus on analogies drawn from Aristotle’s account of natural motion and change which Thomas Aquinas uses to construct responses and explanations of free choice and its characteristic act, i.e. creation for God, and acts of virtue for human beings. Though these analogies to natural change recur throughout the Thomistic corpus, my analysis will focus on their use in the Summa Theologiae, where they consistently bear the weight of Aquinas’s account of the divine and human will and (...) their acts, and tend to be used to minimize the differences between the elements, animals, human beings, and God by relating them as being which tend to, move toward, act for, and are themselves an end. In contrast to De veritate and other texts, in which categories and examples of physical change are used to distance and distinguish human or divine willing and action from motion and change, the Summa attempts to build up from the ground of material natures and change toward the human and divine in gradual steps, transforming the gap and opposition separating creature from creator into a gradual ascent. (shrink)

Ponto de partida do artigo é a consideração de que o problema da relação entre Filosofia e Espiritualidade, ainda que problemático, é filosoficamente pensável e pode ser historicamente reconstruído. Com efeito, o artigo mostra de que modo o problema foi objecto de uma sistematização paradoxal, ainda que coerente e exemplar, por parte de S. Boaventura, cuja reflexão, tematizando a espiritualidade minorítica, radica em S. Francisco de Assis, ainda que também através da mediação de Santo António de Lisboa. Segundo S. Boaventura, (...) Deus manifesta-se de forma natural no livro da natureza mediante o Verbo incriado, cognoscível mediante a razão natural na ciência natural, que é a Filosofia; e revela-se sobrenaturalmente no livro da Escritura mediante o Verbo incarnado, cognoscível mediante a razão iluminada pela fé na ciência sobrenatural, que é a Teologia; mas também se comunica pessoalmente e concretamente no coração dos crentes mediante o Verbo inspirado, ou seja, o Cristo feito presente pelo Espírito Santo na "vida espiritual", num processo ascético-místico, cujo primeiro estádio é, paradoxalmente, a própria Filosofia, aqui entendida como a busca da sabedoria através das virtudes cardeais. Por outro lado, o artigo mostra também como o próprio paradigma da reedificação interior através das virtudes parece estabelecer um vínculo entre S. Francisco de Assis e Santo António de Lisboa, bem como entre os dois e S. Boaventura, o qual, hipotiza o autor do artigo, não só leu alguma coisa dos Sermões de Santo António, como deles retirou elementos para as suas reflexões mais maduras. /// The starting point of this article is the consideration that the problem of the relation between Philosophy and Spirituality, even if problematic, can be philosophically thought and historically reconstructed. In effect, the article shows how this problem was object of a paradoxical systematization, coherent and exemplar, on the part of Saint Bonaventure, whose reflection, typical of the Franciscan spirituality, is rooted in Saint Francis of Assisi, even if also through the mediation of Saint Anthony of Lisbon. According to Saint Bonaventure, God reveals Godself naturally in the Book of nature by means of the uncreated Logos, knowable through natural reason in the natural science, which is Philosophy; and God reveals Godself supernaturally in the Book of Scripture by means of the incarnated Logos knowable by means of reason illuminated by faith in the supernatural science, which is Theology; but God also communicates Godself personally and concretely in the hearts of the believers by means of the inspired Logos, i.e., the Christ made present through the Holy Spirit in the "spiritual life", in an ascetic-mystical process, whose first stage is, paradoxically, Philosophy itself, here understood as the search for Wisdom through the cardinal virtues. On the other hand, the article also shows how the paradigm of the interior edification through the virtues seems to establish a link between Saint Francis of Assisi and Saint Anthony of Lisbon, as well as between the two and Saint Bonaventure, who, according to the article, not only has read something of Saint Anthony's Sermons, but also has taken something from them for his mature reflexions. (shrink)

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:Reviewed by:Ethics as a Work of Charity: Thomas Aquinas and Pagan Virtue by David DecosimoTravis KroekerEthics as a Work of Charity: Thomas Aquinas and Pagan Virtue David Decosimo stanford, ca: stanford university press, 2014. 376 pp. $65.00 / $29.95If "debeo distinguere" represents the programmatic scholarly agenda for "prophetic Thomism," over against the more mystical narrative "exitus et reditus" itinerary of Dionysian Augustinianism, David Decosmio should be considered (...) a virtuous practitioner of this Thomistic craft in the domain of political ethics. To put it more accurately, Decosimo provides a complex, lucid account of his reading of Thomas as one who tutors Christians and especially Christian ethicists through "fraternal correction" in what it means to provide a generous, charitable account of "pagan virtue" via the making of distinctions. For Decosimo the word "pagan" refers to non-Christian "outsiders"—that is, "all those without charity" (11). While that may seem to be a noncharitable way to put it, Decosimo means it to bespeak that form of charity that allows non-Christians to be and to speak as non-Christians, absent (or refusing) those virtues that Thomas calls "theological"—those habits infused supernaturally by God through the "redemptive grace" that orders and unites humans "in loving friendship with the God revealed in Jesus Christ" (11). Thomas's representative pagan is, of course, Aristotle. Decosimo insists that a correct reading of Thomas opposes both "hyper-Augustinian Thomism" (on which account non-Christians are incapable of true virtue) as well as a "public reason Thomism" (which avoids theological claims). At the same time, Decosimo claims that Thomas remains fully Augustinian in his theological account of charity and yet "unites and transforms Aristotle and Augustine alike to teach charity toward outsiders and their virtues" (1). To put it in terms of the formula Decosimo reiterates throughout the book, Aquinas "strives to be Aristotelian by being Augustinian and vice versa" (41, 70, 181 253, etc.). In so doing, he offers resources for a prophetic Thomism that more charitably navigates the church's relations to secular politics by welcoming the contributions of pagan virtue to its own Christian virtue.If "charity's scholarly work is the multiplication of distinctions" (8) then Decosimo's book is a model of charity. Decosimo works as an analytic philosopher at a high level of erudition to elucidate the linguistic and syllogistic puzzles in Thomas's accounts of virtue in a close reading of a range of works to show that, for Thomas, natural human virtue oriented toward the shared human and political good (the highest good attainable without charity) is true [End Page 199] virtue in which Christians and non-Christians, Augustinians and Aristotelians, may fully share and participate together. Indeed, the theological virtues must be devoted to the charitable interpretation of all contributions dialectically considered and ordered to the highest human good. Only by adhering to such a vision of virtue that welcomes pagan virtue will Christians practice the ethics of charity, and prophetic Thomism provides a model for how the church may engage difference in a way that honors others while being faithful to its own vision of the gift of grace.I hope it will not be taken as uncharitable or (ugh!) "hyper-Augustinian" to suggest that Decosimo's account of prophetic Thomism is more attuned to Aristotelian logic and the dialectic of definitional distinctions than it is to Augustine's more Platonic account of pagan virtue as a Dionysian erotic dialectic in which the "logos is wild." But I am in full agreement with Decosimo's claim that ethics as a work of charity ought to be open to both (and "all") in providing resources to Christian and non-Christian ethicists alike for engaging contemporary political challenges concerning otherness and difference in the service of justice.Travis KroekerMcMaster UniversityCopyright © 2018 Society of Christian Ethics... (shrink)

According to Thomas Aquinas, what distinguishes the theological from the cardinal virtues is the nature of their object: the latter aim at the natural excellence of humans, while the former direct us beyond ourselves to focus on the Divine. This paper considers the cinematic work of Drew Goddard — in particular, his 2018 film _Bad Times at the El Royale_ — as a post-religious response to Aquinas, insofar as it retains and re-presents Faith, Hope, and Love as valuable elements of (...) the human experience itself, even in the absence of a supernatural vector of their application. After the fashion of Caputo’s Derrida, I offer a religionless interpretation of each of the three theological virtues and show how _Bad Times_ itself deconstructs the roles of ‘god’ and ‘human,’ interchanging them in a way that manifests a “religionless religion” wherein the theological virtues can remain vibrant, even without the theological structure that might be expected to undergird them. In short: _Bad Times at the El Royale_ demonstrates how even if God is dead, Faith, Hope, and Love are not. (shrink)

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:Reviewed by:The Primacy of God: The Virtue of Religion in Catholic Theology by R. Jared StaudtD. C. SchindlerThe Primacy of God: The Virtue of Religion in Catholic Theology. By R. Jared Staudt. Steubenville, Ohio: Emmaus Academic, 2022. Pp. xii + 409. $49.95 (hardcover). ISBN: 978-1-64585-167-7.Echoing and amplifying a theme from his predecessor, Benedict XVI was known for insisting that the deepest problem of our age, which has (...) not only distorted the culture of the West but has indeed in some ways infected the life of the Church itself, is the forgottenness of God. Recalling the “memory of God” is arguably what Benedict conceived to be the central mission of his papacy, and by that he meant recovering a sense of the primacy of God, not just in matters of private faith, but as a fundamental principle ordering the whole of human existence. In this respect, one can imagine that Benedict would have been heartened to see the new book by R. Jared Staudt, The Primacy of God: The Virtue of Religion in Catholic Theology, which draws not only on Joseph Ratzinger, but also Hans Urs von Balthasar, Christopher Dawson, and, most fundamentally, Thomas Aquinas, to show, indeed, that there is nothing more fundamental than religion.What prompts the need for such an effort is the pervasive sociological reduction of religion in the contemporary imagination to a culturally conditioned set of beliefs and practices that concern God, the divine, or in any event the “afterlife.” In other words, religion is wholly immanentized, understood as an essentially human contrivance, by which man attempts to relate himself to what he takes to be God. It is just this interpretation that lies behind the general assumption of the phenomenon of “religious pluralism”: the world is made up of a potentially infinite number of “different religions,” all of which must be “tolerated” (i.e., must be relegated to a circumscribed social space that renders them more or less politically innocuous) because they offer no rational basis for any sort of arbitration. In contrast to the more typically Protestant response to this “humanistic” reduction of religion, exemplified by Karl Barth, which would insist that Christianity is not “a religion,” Staudt attempts to recover a more robust tradition that recognizes both the deep natural roots of religion and the supernatural distinctiveness of Christianity. To do so, he wisely adopts what he calls a “ressourcement Thomist” approach, but what we might call a genuinely Catholic—and catholic—perspective, namely, one that affirms Thomas Aquinas as a culminating figure of the classical Christian tradition, rather than as one [End Page 685] current of that tradition that defines itself principally in contrast to other currents. In other words, Staudt reads Aquinas in light of Scripture, the Fathers of the Church, and classical philosophy, on the one hand, and in positively disposed engagement with more recent thinkers, such as Ratzinger and Balthasar, on the other. In treating such a fundamental theme as religion, it is especially fitting to attempt to take a fundamental, rather than a “partisan,” approach.The book falls into three basic parts. The first part seeks, in three chapters, to lay out the basic principles of the argument. In chapter 1, Staudt contrasts the opposition Barth presents between religion and the revelation of Scripture, to Aquinas’s interpretation of religion, which integrates philosophy—in this case, Cicero—with Scripture. Chapter 2 considers another objection to Christian religion, this time from the other side, namely, Kant’s attempt to rethink religion from within the limits of reason, and therefore in separation from God. The third chapter sets up the book’s second part by considering religion “as an unfolding of law” (11), specifically, as a matter that, while rooted in natural law, must contend, in its historical enactment, with the distorting reality of sin and the redemption of grace. In other words, religion must be considered in its fundamental expression in the Old Law, and in its fulfillment in the New.The second part of the book investigates in more depth the specifically Christian reality of religion, again in three chapters. Chapter 4 presents religion as exemplified in the... (shrink)

This paper discusses three topics in contemporary British ethical philosophy: naturalisms, moral reasons, and virtue. Most contemporary philosophers agree that 'ethics is natural' - in Section 1 I examine the different senses that can be given to this idea, from reductive naturalism to supernaturalism, seeking to show the problems some face and the problems others solve. Drawing on the work of John McDowell in particular, I conclude that an anti-supernatural non-reductive naturalism plausibly sets the limits on what we (...) can do in ethics. Moral reasons are widely discussed - in Section 2 I describe some of the criteria that used to distinguish moral practical reasons, and note possibilities and problems. Drawing on the work of Elizabeth Anscombe in particular, I suggest that an inclusive, minimalist account of moral reasons may be most fruitful. There has been a revival of philosophical interest in virtue ethics, which I take to be linked to the emergence of non-reductive naturalisms - in Section 3 I describe three points where virtue ethics has an especially significant contribution to make: learning, motivational self-sufficiency, and the question of whether virtues can be reasons. The naturalism of Section 1 constrains the accounts of moral reasons considered in Section 2, and depends upon an account of virtue as learned second nature, discussed in Section 3. (shrink)

While less common than narratives about their male counterparts, accounts of female avengers are scattered throughout Chinese literature and historiography. Nevertheless, despite being included in a variety of genres and modes of writing, the extant corpus of Tang and pre-Tang female avengers appear to share remarkably similar tropes, tensions, and outcomes. In this article, I will explore how three tensions are apparent across Tang and pre-Tang female avenger accounts through the case study of narratives about Xie Xiao’e 謝小娥, a woman (...) who seeks revenge after her father and husband are killed by bandits. Supernatural elements, cross-dressing, and judicial proceedings all seek to reduce the power and autonomy of the heroine, presenting us with a fascinating and rich example of the limits of revenge. It has been previously assumed that this is the sole example of a female avenger account preserved in two modes of writing, but this is not the case. A detailed comparison of the versions relating to Xie Xiao’e will act as a springboard to recategorize the corpus of female avenger accounts and in turn more amply reveal the variety of methods used to curtail, control, and Confucianize these women. (shrink)

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:AN ITALIAN VIEW OF THE DEBATE ON VIRTUE TERENCE KENNEDY, C.Ss.R. Accademia Alfonsiana Rome, Italy FATHER GIUSEPPE ABBA, S.B.D., professor of moral philosophy at the Pontifical Salesian University in Rome, has written two volumes of prime importance for the theory of the moral virtues. Although writing in Italian, he has entered into the thick of debate in other languages, especially English. The first, Lex et Virtus: Studi sull'evoluzione (...) delta dottrina morale di san Tommaso d'Aquino (Las-Roma, 1983, 293 pp.) is every bit as wide ranging as its title suggests. His thesis is that St. Thomas's moral thought underwent a long and radical evolution that issued in "a new science" in the Secunda Pars of the Summa Theologiae totally centered in the virtues. His book is neatly divided in two parts: humanity under the regime of law and humanity under the regime of virtue. He argues that the Scriptum super Sententiis presents virtue as the capacity to put law into practice in life. Here law has priority because it is conceived as participation in the divine rectitude, and virtue is derivative in as far as it facilitates compliance with God's law, making our response easy, pleasurable and spontaneous by restraining the disorderly influence of passion on our moral response. The De V eritate, he maintains, follows the same descending schema. Truth is communicated downwards through the hierarchy of intellectual beings so that the human virtues are seen mainly in terms of how they reflect the divine truth, especially in the moral knowledge involved in free choice or liberum arbitrium. The Summa Contra Gentiles III classifies morality under the rubric of the law as rational submission to divine government through 123 124 TERENCE KENNEDY, c.ss.R. Providence. In this vision, our return to God as final end is given focal emphasis before being considered the fruit of our effort. Abba makes a strong case that in the Secunda Pars St. Thomas passes from a conception of morality based in law to one founded in the virtues. Morality assumes deeper significance in its own right because the human person is no longer viewed mainly as a direct reflection of divine truth but truly as imago Dei having dominion over his acts in freedom and deliberation. God, the subjectum of theology, is known through his effects in creation and the motus hominis in Deum provides matter for the speculative discipline of theology as the study of God. Morality unveils the mystery of God through how He works in our free activity drawing us to Himself. St. Thomas thus has very little in common with those contemporary moralists who are wholly taken up with the rightness of actions in normative ethics. Abba maintains that in the Summa St. Thomas was the first to afford morality its rightful place as an integral part in his theological synthesis. This involved a reworking of the idea of virtue beginning, with a fresh approach to habitus in the Ia!Jae. The determination of a habit ad unum is necessary because of the way a specifically human form is received in particular matter. This determination means not just a further specification of the matter, but the coming into being of new abilities, a creative enablement. of our nature with original energies so that it can reach its enc(' efficaciously. Virtue now has priority over law, because facility, pleasure and spontaneity are only the effects of this new interior transformation of our nature. Thus the originality of virtue arises not from our mode of acting firmiter, faciliter, delectabiliter, but from the new interior capacities by which we can realize our moral selves, naturally and supernaturally. Law is thereafter thought of in relation to its service of virtue as an external command promulgated for the government of a collectivity. It is given precisely so as to educate the collectivity to virtue. In the community governed by God's divine law it is not possible to follow His law without being enlivened by the infused virtues. The eternal law is not exhausted by our understanding of the precepts of divine law THE DEBATE ON VIRTUE 125 but it embraces God's complete idea... (shrink)

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:Reviewed by:Aquinas and the Infused Moral Virtues by Angela McKay KnobelThomas M. Osborne Jr.KNOBEL, Angela McKay. Aquinas and the Infused Moral Virtues. Notre Dame, Ind.: University of Notre Dame Press, 2021. 214 pp. Cloth, $65.00This book is the first substantial English monograph on Aquinas's account of the infused virtues in many years, and the most significant treatment of the issue since Gabriel Bullet, Vertus morales infuses et vertus morales (...) acquises selon Saint Thomas d'Aquin (Fribourg: Éditions Universitaires, 1958). The infused virtues are about, or they are intrinsically ordered to, the supernatural end of human beings. Aquinas was among the first to argue that the infused virtues include not only the three theological virtues of faith, hope, and charity, but also supernatural counterparts to the acquired virtues, which are proportionate to the natural end of humans. These infused moral virtues are infused with charity and lost with mortal sin. Aquinas never addressed at length the relationship between acquired [End Page 144] and infused moral virtues, and many theologians rejected Aquinas's position that there are infused moral virtues.Knobel's book has two parts. The first part of the book consists of three chapters about Aquinas's own views. Chapter 1 is on natural virtue, which can be acquired through the agent's own efforts. Knobel emphasizes the way in which this virtue is proportionate to the natural end and abilities of humans. She correctly notes that Aquinas thinks that humans can perform such virtuous acts without grace. However, since she does not distinguish between morally good acts and morally good agents, she does not adequately address Aquinas's view of how sinners without grace might possess acquired virtue. Additionally, although she correctly notes the way in which moral virtue orders the agent to the end, it is often unclear whether she is discussing the proximate end of the will (which is an object), a further end (as when someone steals to commit adultery), or the ultimate end (which is God as the object of charity or the self as an object of disordered love). For example, she writes, "[I]f an act is not sinful, it cannot be ordered to an evil end." She might be making the uncontroversial claim that good acts are made evil when directed to a bad end, but in her argument she seems to be making the stronger claim that someone with a disordered ultimate end cannot habitually order good acts to such an end.Chapter 2 is on the infused virtues. Knobel notes that for Aquinas synderesis, which is a habit of grasping first practical principles, is a seed of the natural virtues, and that faith, which grasps revealed principles, plays this role in infused virtue. She shows how infused moral virtues, which share the same matter as the acquired moral virtues, have different ends and rules than the acquired virtues. Chapter 3 concerns Aquinas's account of the relationship between the acquired and infused virtues, and in particular the infused moral virtues. Knobel draws attention to texts in which Aquinas argues that the two coexist in someone who has grace, but she states that this coexistence is contradicted in the discussion of Macrobius's fourfold division of virtue in the Summa Theologiae (I-II, q. 61, a. 5). In this article, she thinks, acquired virtue is political virtue, and a stage toward infused virtue. She does not address how Aquinas uses the term "political virtue" differently in different texts, and how the schema of four virtues in this text might be read as describing both four stages of acquired virtue and four stages of infused virtue. Knobel supports her view—that those with grace lack acquired virtue—by claiming that Aquinas consistently states that there is no acquired virtue in heaven. This view only tenuously (at best) supports her point that acquired virtue does not exist in this life among those in a state of grace. Moreover, Aquinas seems to suggest that acquired virtue persists in the next life in ST I-II, q. 67, a. 1-2.The second part of the book is a criticism of contemporary interpretations of Aquinas, and an exposition of... (shrink)

The movement of epistemic standards closer to moral virtue reflects a worrisome trend in the recent renascence of naturalism in philosophy that links access to truth with a deepening sense of the knower's history. While it is relatively harmless to insist that mastery of a scientific specialty requires training in certain techniques, it is more problematic (pace Kuhn) to insist that all such specialists share the same disciplinary narrative -- and still more problematic to require that they pledge allegiance (...) to the same philosophical world-view, say, what the US National Academy of Sciences calls "methodological naturalism." It makes for bad philosophy, bad science, and bad politics. Yet, we seem to be sliding down this slippery slope, which in the past has led to loyalty oaths and in the future could lead to the genetic profiling of people as unfit for scientific endeavors because of their propensity to belief in, say, the supernatural. (shrink)

This textbook will give students a clear understanding of the connection between faith and reason. Illuminating Faith gives students a clear and accessible introduction to some of the major ways faith and the relationship between faith and reason have been understood within Western Christianity. In twenty-six short and easy to digest units it covers different accounts of faith beginning with Scripture, moving through the history of Christian thought, and ending with contemporary views. Along the way it explores some of the (...) decisive theological and philosophy accounts of faith, such as faith seeking understanding, faith and supernatural virtue, faith and skepticism, and faith and science. Yet it also includes significant issues and movements not typically covered in introductory texts, such as documents from church councils, faith as knowledge, assent, and trust in the Protestant scholastics, faith and the heart in pietism, secularized accounts of faith, faith after Auschwitz, and faith and liberation. The goal of each unit is to introduce students to topical issues surrounding the nature of faith, to provide historical background for each topic, and to generate further discussion and reflection on the nature of faith. The result is a well balanced and unique introduction to various understandings of faith. Designed specifically with classroom use in mind, Illuminating Faith includes a glossary of words, an update-to-date bibliography, and each chapter ends with questions for discussion as well as suggestions for relevant reading material. (shrink)

The author, after reviewing Aquinas work and the Teachings of the Catholic Church about the cognitive statute of the virtue of Faith, argues, based on Polo's proposals on Anthropology, that is the «personal knowledge», that is, the knowledge at the level of the act of being, and not simply the «rational knowledge» what is elevated by the supernatural virtue of Faith, that God infuses in the «personal kernel» of the human being.

Man's ultimate end, by the Rev. Father James.--Free will and responsibility, by H. Pope.--The criteria of morality, by the Rev. Father James.--Law and its obligations, by T. Flynn.--Conscience, by B. Grimley.--The natural virtues, by H. Carpenter.--The supernatural virtues, by H. Carpenter.--Merit and demerit, by H. Pope.--Rights natural and civil, by T. E. Flynn.--The right to private property, by L. Watt.--Marriage and conjugal duties, by H. Davis.--The duties of parents, by H. Davis.--The purpose and authority of civil society, by B. (...) Grimley.--International relations, by J. Keating. (shrink)

According to Arendt and Habermas, the reinterpretation of Aristotle made by Thomas Aquinas, identifying politicus and socialis, has weakened the nature of classical Aristotelian politics by introducing in the polis relations and private interests that the Greeks had reserved for domestic space. Moreover, being the concept of societas in this context naturally Christian, the purpose of society is no longer self-sufficiency and acquisition of natural virtue, which allow us to live together in order to the good life, but requires (...) supernatural virtue given by God in order to achieve the true supreme good. Therefore, the possibility of happiness now refers to eschatology, reason because kings are to be subject to priests, especially the pope, Christ’s representative, whose role is to take care of the highest aim of our existence. However, the application of a pyramidal and hierarchical scheme of spiritual power over the temporal realm is subverted by Juan Quidort of Paris, introducing a «small» shift: the kingdom understood as perfecta multitudo. In this perfect multitude an upward causality is the basis for distinction and non-subordination of the temporal power by the spiritual; at the same time freedom of individuals to choose their leaders is essential. This view undermines the dynastic transmission’s model of power in a kingdom as well as, at the ecclesial level, points to superiority of the General Council in relation to the pope. (shrink)

The author, after reviewing Aquinas work and the Teachings of the Catholic Church about the cognitive statute of the virtue of Faith, argues, based on Polo's proposals on Anthropology, that is the "personal knowledge", that is, the knowledge at the level of the act of being, and not simply the "rational knowledge" what is elevated by the supernatural virtue of Faith, that God infuses in the "personal kernel" of the human being.

In this article, I claim that emotions, as we understand the term today, have a more prominent role in the moral life described by Thomas Aquinas than has been traditionally thought. First, clarity is needed about what exactly the emotions are in Aquinas. Second, clarity is needed about true virtue: specifically, about the relationship of acquired virtue to infused, supernatural virtues. Given a fuller understanding of both these things, I claim that emotions are not only auxiliary to (...) the life of flourishing, specifically with regard to moral motivation and morally relevant knowledge. In fact, at the highest stage of moral development, emotions have a more prominent role than at lower stages. Pointing this out helps us to resist over-intellectualizing interpretations of Aquinas’s moral philosophy. (shrink)

: The study of gratitude has become an increasingly important topic among psychologists to address the nature of human flourishing. Of more recent interest is how gratitude to God specifically functions within an account of human flourishing, with theologians seeking to provide a distinctively Christian account of the nature of gratitude. This article enters into the ongoing conversation by attending to Jonathan Edwards’s theological anthropology and development of natural and supernatural gratitude. In particular, Edwards’s anthropology includes within it an (...) account of how the self can, and should, enlarge to receive another in love. This “enlargement” is the creaturely mirror of God’s self-giving and is the supernatural response to the creature who has received God’s grace and been infused with divine love. As a supernatural response based on God’s action in the soul, this account of gratitude differs from its natural counterpart. On Edwards’s account, therefore, there is a need to develop studies that differentiate natural and supernatural gratitude. Furthermore, this article ends with a suggestion for a study that could pick up this task based on recent psychological studies that attend to how gratitude affects self-relation. On Edwards’s account of the enlargement of the self, as well as his notion of supernatural gratitude, there is meaningful research to be done on how these can help assess development in the formation of gratitude and human flourishing. (shrink)

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:BOOK REVIEWS 375 7he Westminster Dictionary of Christian Ethics. Edited by JAMES F. CHILDRESS and J mrn MACQUARRIE. Philadelphia: The Westminster Press, 1986. Pp. xvii + 678. $29.95. This is a second, revised edition of The Dictionary of Christian Ethics, prepared by John Macquarrie and published in 1967. This new edition follows Macquarrie's conception of a dictionary, but expands it. It includes several subject areas, basic ethical concepts, biblical (...) ethics, theological ethics, philosophical ethics, non-Cbistian ethics; psychological, 8ociological, political, and other relevant concepts; and articles on substantial issues such as war and abortion. The criterion for selection, as stated by the editor, was the importance of the topic for Christian ethical reflection. The aim was to indicate both what is agr.eed upon and what is controversial. About 40% of the entries from the first edition have been included. These are generally updated so as to include recent developments. The selection of subjects, the way in which they are treated and the list of contributors, reflect the ecumenical character of contemporary Christian ethics. The dictionary includes a host of valuable contributions. Readers who consults the work will no doubt evaluate the entries in terms of their particular purposes. This reviewer found most useful the entries which expla~ned particular basic concepts, for example Autonomy; those dealing with schools of thought, for example, Platonic Ethics, Marxist Ethics, or the contribution of particular traditions, for example, Jewish Ethics, Puritan Ethics, Official Roman Catholic Social Teaching, Eastern Orthodox Christian Ethics, and the many entries dealing with Biomedical Ethics and peace issues. 'rhere are a number of articles on topics which are most important, but for which it is often difficult to find a succinct and comprehensive treatment; such are the contributions on "Embodiment," and " Feminist Ethics." There are a number of useful entries on urg.ent contemporary questions such as Energy and Environmental Ethics. Practical questions such as the care of the aged and the ethics of counseling are also addressed. Each article has a short bibliography appended. Numerous cross-references to other relevant entries are most helpful in providing complementary information. There is a thorough index of names. The dictionary is not conceived as a compendium of the accepted or " official " ethical teachings of churches or religious traditions. Mention could be made, however, of the entry on " Official Roman Catholic Social Teaching." '¥here such teachings exist, they am usually indicated. There are some cases where the churches and/or traditions clearly differ. The approach which is most helpful to ethical debate is to acknowledge such differences clearly, with an appropriate statement of the relevant teaching. The editor himself (James F. Childress), in his own contributions, fol- 376 BOOK REVIEWS lows this p1'0cedure. Some Roman Catholic readers may find the articles on Abortion and Contraception, while excellent in other ways, less satisfactory in this respect. The general focus seems intended to be " middle of the road "; more conservative or radical groups may find their views insufficiently represented. No doubt some of the positions presented would be disputed by Christian ethicists. But the treatment of difficult points is balanced and fair. There are, unfortunately, some inaccuracies. The following examples deserve mention. In the article on Nullity, the Roman Catholic annulment is wrongly equated with papal dissolution of the marriage bond. In the article on Virtue, it is said that St. Thomas held that along with the infused supernatural virtues there are "infused natural virtues." St. Thomas spoke ratht>r of infused theological virtues and infused moral virtues (I. II, Q.63, 3.) In the article on deterrence, it is stated that the strategy of "mutual assured destruction ", dating from the 1960s, still provides the framework of American deterrence strategy. This point would be challenged by some representat.ives of the military, who claim that M.A.D. has not been policy for some years. The same article interprets the U.S. Bishops' Pastoral Letter, The Challenge of Peace. as basing its (conditional) acceptance of nuclear deterrence on the distinction between threatening to do an immoral aet without intending to do it, and threat coupled with the intent. That is, deterrence is aceepted as a "bluff." This is not a correct reading... (shrink)

He maintained that there are two main categories of truth: those that are a result of natural laws and those that are completely necessary since their opposite suggests contradiction. God can dispense solely with the latter rules, such as the law of human mortality. Although a doctrine of faith may conflict with second-type realities, it can never contradict first-type truths. Therefore, reason may not be able to completely understand an article of religion, even though it cannot be self-contradictory. Simply put, (...) mysteries like the Trinity are "above reason." However, how can we balance the odds in favor of a religious belief with those based on natural law and common experience? The presence and character of God, as well as the global harmony that underpins the providential creation and order of the universe, must all be considered when we make these choices. On the other hand, moving from the higher to the lower classes is also feasible. Since goodness has an immediate order to the higher pattern of the universal source of being, rational creatures are able to understand "the meaning of the good as such" (II-IIae q.2, a.3). The last good that theologians and philosophers examine is different; the former is the bonum ultimum, which can only be understood with the help of revelation, while the later is the beatific vision, which reason can understand. Both conceptions of the ultimate good have significant implications since they serve as the foundation for the political division between secular and ecclesiastical authority as well as the moral division between natural and supernatural virtues. (shrink)

This article addresses the problem of the understanding of love in St. Thomas Aquinas. For him love is the basis of ethics. He divides love into the natural, the sensual and the rational. In turn, rational love is divided into appetitive love and benevolent love. The latter is the basis of friendship, which is possible when such love is reciprocated. True friendship is based on virtue, and when her primary subject is God, the friendship becomes a supernatural (...) class='Hi'>virtue—that of charity. (shrink)

The Christian idea of man -- The idea of man in general -- The Christian idea of man and St. Thomas Aquinas's theory of virtues -- The true concept of virtue and the hierarchy of virtues -- Prudence -- Justice -- Courage and fear of the Lord -- Discipline and moderation -- Faith, hope, and love -- The distinction between a natural and supernatural ethos.

If the theological virtues are supernatural they must be said to be in some sense not natural. This suggests the possibility that they are not only not natural but positively unnatural, in that they postulate either an inhumanly high level of achievement or a divine takeover of human life. The solution proposed draws on Peter Forrest’s work inGod Without the Supernatural: A Defence of Scientific Theism, and suggests a naturalistic account of the virtues in question.

In recent controversies about Intelligent Design Creationism (IDC), the principle of methodological naturalism (MN) has played an important role. In this paper, an often neglected distinction is made between two different conceptions of MN, each with its respective rationale and with a different view on the proper role of MN in science. According to one popular conception, MN is a self-imposed or intrinsic limitation of science, which means that science is simply not equipped to deal with claims of the (...) class='Hi'>supernatural (Intrinsic MN or IMN). Alternatively, we will defend MN as a provisory and empirically grounded attitude of scientists, which is justified in virtue of the consistent success of naturalistic explanations and the lack of success of supernatural explanations in the history of science (Provisory MN or PMN). Science does have a bearing on supernatural hypotheses, and its verdict is uniformly negative. We will discuss five arguments that have been proposed in support of IMN: the argument from the definition of science, the argument from lawful regularity, the science stopper argument, the argument from procedural necessity, and the testability argument. We conclude that IMN, because of its philosophical flaws, proves to be an ill-advised strategy to counter the claims of IDC. Evolutionary scientists are on firmer ground if they discard supernatural explanations on purely evidential grounds, instead of ruling them out by philosophical fiat. (shrink)

In this timely study, Dawes defends the methodological naturalism of the sciences. Though religions offer what appear to be explanations of various facts about the world, the scientist, as scientist, will not take such proposed explanations seriously. Even if no natural explanation were available, she will assume that one exists. Is this merely a sign of atheistic prejudice, as some critics suggest? Or are there good reasons to exclude from science explanations that invoke a supernatural agent? On the one (...) hand, Dawes concedes the bare possibility that talk of divine action could constitute a potential explanation of some state of affairs, while noting that the conditions under which this would be true are unlikely ever to be fulfilled. On the other hand, he argues that a proposed explanation of this kind would rate poorly, when measured against our usual standards of explanatory virtue. (shrink)

This study deals with the transformations of a number of topics of Aristotelian political philosophy provoked by their crossing with the Augustinian interpretation of Christian doctrine, promoted by Thomas Aquinas in his Treatise on the Kingdom. The following is a review of the place of the universality of politics in Aquinas’s text, which in Aristotle’s philosophy was linked to political naturalism and that in Thomist reception seems to tend towards a supernatural and divine scenario. In order to evaluate this (...) conjecture we will refer to the causes and ends attributed by Thomas to the dominion of man over man, trying to recognize the place occupied by political virtue in this approach. The proposed hypothesis is that Thomas’s characterization of the political model of the kingdom implies a bifurcation in the end to which the political community aims, all of which would propitiate the de-universalization of politics itself. (shrink)

What is the highest good? In the ethics of René Descartes, we can distinguish between at least seven different answers to this question: God; the sum of all the different goods that “we either possess... or have the power to acquire” ; free will; virtue; love of God; wisdom; and supernatural beatitude. In this paper, I argue that each of these answers, in Descartes’s view, provides the correct particular conception, relative to a distinct sense or concept of the (...) highest good. Just as there are seven different conceptions of the highest good, according to Descartes, there are thus also seven different senses or concepts of the highest good. (shrink)

The present essay contends that progressive readings of Smith ignore the influence of theological concepts and religious ideas on his work, notably three distinct strands: first, seventeenth- and eighteenth-century natural theology; second, Jansenist Augustinianism; third, Stoic arguments of theodicy. Taken together, these theological elements help explain why Smith’s moral philosophy and political economy intensifies the secular early modern and Enlightenment idea that the Fall brought about ‘radical evil’ and a ‘fatherless world’ in need of permanent divine intervention. As such, Smith (...) views the market as divine regulation of human sinfulness and an instrument to serve God’s providential plan. Indeed, the ‘invisible hand of the market’ represents a nominalist realm where human cooperation intersects with divine providence, blending private self-interest with the public commonweal. I will also argue that Smith’s conception of a morally neutral market is ultimately incompatible with creedal Christianity, in particular orthodox catholic Christian ideas of the common good in which all can share and the practice of charity for those most in need who have been abandoned by state bureaucracy and the marketplace. The main reason is that Smith, not unlike Calvin, tends to divorce human contract from divine gift by dividing the theo-logic of gratuitous reciprocal giving from the economic logic of contract – a dualism that bears an uncanny resemblance with Suárez’s Baroque scholasticism of which Smith’s friend David Hume was rightly critical. In particular, the Reformation and Counter-Reformation theology of Calvin, Luther and Suárez sunders ‘pure nature’ from the supernatural and develops a ‘two ends’ account of human nature, according to which human beings have a natural end separate from their supernatural finality. So instead of participating in the divine oikonomia of asymmetrical gift-exchange, human society and the economy operate autonomously and are ordered towards a purely natural end. Smith conceptualises the market mechanism as both a fundamental precondition for interpersonal relationality and at the same time separate from the sociality it engenders. Smith’s anthropology hovers half-way between Machiavelli and Mandeville’s homo œconomicus in search for maximal profit, on the one hand, and the diametrically opposed conception of man as a gift-exchanging animal striving for mutual social recognition, on the other hand. By viewing market exchange as separate from the private virtues of benevolence, justice and prudence, he introduces a split between the exercise of moral virtues and the operation of commercial society. Such a divide is wholly foreign to the project of an overarching civil compact in the writings of Smith’s contemporary Antonio Genovesi and other members of the Italian schools of civic humanism and civil economy. In consequence, Smith’s œuvre marks a decisive shift from civil to political economy. (shrink)

Introduction -- Rational anthropology and the difference between persons and animals -- Human freedom and conscience -- The three moral determinants and doubts of conscience -- The principle of double effect and consequentialism -- Cooperation and scandal -- Virtues--natural and supernatural -- Sin and grace -- Revelation -- Reproductive technologies -- Homosexuality and same-sex marriage -- Contraception -- Abortion -- Marriage and family -- End of life issues -- Appendix A : Summary of Evangelium Vitae -- Appendix B : (...) Summary of Savifici Doloris. (shrink)

__Dante and the Blessed Virgin __is distinguished philosopher Ralph McInerny's eloquent reading of one of western literature's most famous works by a Catholic writer. The book provides Catholic readers new to Dante's _The Divine Comedy _ with a concise companion volume. McInerny argues that the Blessed Virgin Mary is the key to Dante. She is behind the scenes at the very beginning of the _Commedia_, and she is found at the end in the magnificent closing cantos of the _Paradiso_. McInerny (...) also discusses Dante's _Vita Nuova_, where Mary is present as the object of the young Beatrice's devotion. McInerny draws from a diverse group of writers throughout this book, including Plato, Aristotle, St. Bernard, St. Bonaventure, St. Thomas Aquinas, and George Santayana, among others. It is St. Thomas, however, to whom McInerny most often turns, and this book also provides an accessible introduction to Thomistic moral philosophy focusing on the appetites, the ordering of goods, the distinction between the natural and the supernatural orders, the classification of capital vices and virtues, and the nature of the theological virtues. This engagingly written book will serve as a source of inspiration and devotion for anyone approaching Dante's work for the first time as well as those who value the work of Ralph McInerny. "Dante was a literary genius with a profound understanding of St. Thomas Aquinas and the _philosophia perennis_ that structured and permeated the _Divina Commedia_. Who better to help us get beyond the surface to the depths of Dante than the most literarily genial of Thomas' twentieth century disciples, the indefatigable Ralph McInerny? Dante needed guides, from Vergil to Beatrice, to reach the summit of _Paradiso_. Fortunately, we have Ralph McInerny to accompany us on the same journey." --_Fr. Joseph Fessio, S.J., Founder and Editor, Ignatius Press_ "Weaving together poetry, philosophy and theology, Ralph McInerny shows that 'the Blessed Virgin Mary is the key to Dante.' Starting with the _Vita Nuova _and the beginning of the _Divine Comedy_, this becomes ever more explicit throughout the great poem, till the magnificent closing cantos of the _Paradiso_. The book is beautifully written, making sense of every step, however complex at times, of the great journey to the gate of heaven described by Dante in the _Commedia_, drawing on Scripture, on Aquinas, on philosophers like Aristotle, on a medley of modern and contemporary writers, with immense learning, always worn lightly and made easily accessible. Dominant are themes that concern everyone, such as love or happiness, are treated with freshness and clarity so the reader is made to feel he or she is discovering them anew. The total effect is joy induced by the incredible wealth of content of this little book and by the light it sheds on so many vital issues." --_Thomas De Koninck, Laval University_. (shrink)

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:Reviewed by:Knowledge and Faıth in Thomas Aquinas by John I. JenkinsE.J. AshworthJohn I. Jenkins. Knowledge and Faıth in Thomas Aquinas. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1997. Pp. xv + 267. Cloth, $59.95.There is a strong tension in the thought of Thomas Aquinas. On the one hand, he is strongly naturalist. He insists that our cognition is rooted in sense-perception and that [End Page 673] it is normally reliable. He insists (...) that our moral life is grounded in our nature both as physical beings, able to feel pain and pleasure, and as social beings, depending on each other for our welfare. But he is also strongly supernaturalist. Human nature by virtue of its cognitive orientation toward the physical is not able through its own powers to know God. Still less is human nature able to achieve moral virtue by its own powers. This is not just because we are cut off from God by original sin; rather, there is a primal lack that was there even before the Fall. To achieve our true end, both cognitive and moral, we depend on God’s free gift of grace which elevates our nature and renders it able both to know God through the beatific vision in Heaven and to respond to God through loving, virtuous action. The gift of faith becomes central to human nature and destiny in a way that was to worry later thinkers such as Duns Scotus, who pertinently asked how our intellect can have the ultimate end of knowing God if it has to be made a different intellect before it achieves that end.Jenkins does not worry about the point raised by Scotus. Instead, he sets out to give an interpretation of the Summa theologiae which will help us understand more deeply the interplay between the natural and the supernatural in Aquinas. He begins by taking advantage of new readings of Aristode’s Posterior Analytics which present Aristode’s account of the demonstration which moves from cause to effect, not just as a pedagogic device for presenting material obtained by moving from effect to cause, but as a recipe for cognitive restructuring. Certainly we have to begin with mere observation, and with the piecemeal discovery of causes, but to achieve true scıentia (to use the medieval Latin term for organized, necessary knowledge) we need to acquire a new vision of how reality is structured and to see how effects flow necessarily from their causes. True demonstration is an expression of this new vision. Jenkins applies this reading of Aristotle to Aquinas. He takes with absolute seriousness Aquinas’s claim at the beginning of the Summa theologıae that theology too is an Aristotelian scientıa, and he sees the work as presenting a recipe for the cognitive restructuring of apprentice theologians (those to whom the work is addressed).The scientıa of the Summa theologiae differs from the scientia of the Posterior Analytics in two ways. First, Aquinas allows the term scientia to have an extended sense, so that God too can have scientia, even though he does not move from principles to conclusions by a process of syllogistic demonstration, but instead grasps all that is knowable in one simple act. Second, the basic principles which are the foundation of theological demonstration are the articles of faith, especially those of the creeds, which cannot be known by us in any naturalistic way. It is through God’s infused light that we assent to these articles as divinely revealed. After a lengthy examination of the role of faith in Aquinas’s account, Jenkins describes the epistemology involved as supernatural externalism.Although Jenkins’s presentation of the relationship between scientıa and faith in the Summa is carefully and lucidly argued, there are two aspects of the book that I would question.First, while it is true that Aquinas does present theology as an Aristotelian scientia, I doubt that this single fact “determines the purpose and structure of the Summa theologiae” (15) in any very detailed way. Jenkins further claims that the structure of the Summa is determined by the structure of God’s knowledge (220), but if God is truly [End... (shrink)

Lucette's suicide left me indifferent. This time I knew it was coming, but years ago, when I first read Ada, or Ardor, I also felt relatively indifferent (apart from the element of surprise) to learn about her sudden death. I was aware of my indifference at the time and was surprised at my (non)reaction. It surprised me yet again in my recent rereading of the novel. Manipulating and withholding the reader's engagement with the text and empathy toward a character may (...) have been part of the author's intention, of course. But for me, this lack of emotional engagement with Lucette's fate is emblematic of what I find problematic in Nabokov's admittedly brilliant novel: though intellectually challenging and aesthetically pleasing, Ada (unlike Lolita, for example) is not emotionally engaging. Of course, not all readers find such engagement an important feature of the reading experience, but I do. For this reader, its absence makes Ada (both with and without the italics) a gorgeous but empty shell.Ada's reader, activated by an urge to dig out buried clues, finds that deciphering a clue—aside from the joy to which it may give rise—contributes little to the characters’ reality, to the breadth and depth of their fictional humanity. Instead, Van and Ada remain, throughout the novel, more superhuman than human, endowed with almost supernatural excellences and perfections (their intellect, their looks, their way of life, their unique capacities and skills). Nabokov's heroes indeed bring to mind Nietzsche's Übermensch and the philosopher's critique of traditional ethics. It seems to me that his view of what constitutes human greatness is echoed in the charismatic figures of Van and Ada, whose outlook—an outlook privileging virtues such as aestheticism, intelligence, individuality, and human “greatness”—appears to embody a Nietzschean revaluation of values, privileging an aesthetic outlook on morality. As an amateur of Nabokov, therefore, I was surprised to see that very little has been written about this Nietzschean presence in Ada. An aesthetic revaluation of values is, however, what Ada delivers. As Michael Wood observes, “Nabokov would have hated the association [of his own name with Nietzsche's], but... the connection is not arbitrary.”While this association—whether it was intentional or not—surely contributes to the novel's intellectual breadth and complexity, it adds nothing to the psychology of its main characters. Instead, Van and Ada's übermenschliche qualities—their human “greatness”—seem to be inborn, part of their aristocratic nature, rather than acquired through transformative struggle. I suspect that it is this lack of transformation in the characters that undermines the reader's engagement with their fate. This lack makes Nabokov's family chronicle much less memorable than Tolstoy's.In the first sentence of Ada (“All happy families are more or less dissimilar; all unhappy ones are more or less alike”), Nabokov parodies by reversing the famous first sentence of Anna Karenina and thereby, as Robert Alter argues, reverses “the major thematic movement of the novel as a genre”: whereas Tolstoy's novel concerns lost illusions, Ada “is an attempt to return to paradise.” Nabokov's swing away from Tolstoy is startling and impressive but fails to convince me that the paradise inhabited by the happy Veens is superior to the lost illusions of the Karenins. Even in death, Anna is more alive than Ada. (shrink)

This paper describes Berkeley’s ethics and analyses its metaphysical presuppositions. His ethical though is based on the theological idea of virtue that means obedience to God’s will and, hence, all ethically relevant concepts contain a reference to God. Berkeley also says that happiness in this vale of tears is God’s gift to us and a reward of virtue in heaven. Happiness is a sign and criterion of virtuous conduct. Obviously this kind of supernatural ethics can work only (...) if its metaphysical foundation is so obvious that all decent people can figure it out. This is to say that revealed religion must be replaced by natural religion. According to Berkeley, the existence of God, his goodness, the reality of heaven, and its supreme happiness can be proved philosophically and in terms of natural religion. The main part of the paper describes and evaluates Berkeley’s logic, especially analogical reasoning and his inferences from conclusions to premises, or effects to causes. Another major theme is the mutual independence of revealed and natural theology. Berkeley’s minor writings are in a major role here. Due to the unsystematic nature of its sources the conclusions of this paper are open-ended and speculative. (shrink)

In this paper we present a prototype approach to awe. We suggest that two appraisals are central and are present in all clear cases of awe: perceived vastness, and a need for accommodation, defined as an inability to assimilate an experience into current mental structures. Five additional appraisals account for variation in the hedonic tone of awe experiences: threat, beauty, exceptional ability, virtue, and the supernatural. We derive this perspective from a review of what has been written about (...) awe in religion, philosophy, sociology, and psychology, and then we apply this perspective to an analysis of awe and related states such as admiration, elevation, and the epiphanic experience. (shrink)

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:Reviewed by:Buddhist Ethics: A Philosophical Exploration by Jay L. GarfieldYilun Zhai (bio)Buddhist Ethics: A Philosophical Exploration. By Jay L. Garfield. New York: Oxford University Press, 2021. Pp. xiv + 248. Paperback $24.95, ISBN 978-0-19-090764-8.Jay L. Garfield's Buddhist Ethics: A Philosophical Exploration offers a comprehensive presentation of Buddhist ethics as well as one of the most ingenious metaethical developments in the field. With Western philosophers as its potential readers, the (...) tone and the choice of examples of this book contain a typical philosophical flavor. Most interestingly, it is not only an objective interpretation of the existing Buddhist ethical theories, but also an innovative work that expands the current theoretical boundary. Buddhist Ethics is divided into three parts: in the first part ("Structure") Garfield argues that Buddhist ethics is best characterized by "moral phenomenology," a metaethical theory that emphasizes how we experience over what we do. The second part ("Doctrine") elaborates on how both the Theravāda and Mahāyāna paths are ethical in nature and compatible with a phenomenological interpretation. The third part ("Contemporary Issues") introduces Engaged Buddhism, and claims that Buddhist ethics can function naturalistically without supernatural concepts such as rebirth and the six realms of transmigration.The first part of Buddhist Ethics maps a structural framework of moral phenomenology. Over the past decades, philosophers have endeavored to place Buddhist ethics under the existing Western metaethical categories, for Buddhist ethical thought bears a striking resemblance to all of the major traditions of Western ethics--consequentialism, virtue ethics, and deontology. But Garfield rejects any simple generalization and proposes a particularist reading of Buddhist ethics, which he calls "moral phenomenology." For Garfield, Buddhist ethics cannot be captured by any universal, overarching moral principle; not because Buddhists neglected ethics or failed to create metaethical theory, he argues, but that no universal moral principle is sufficiently sophisticated as a guidance for real life (p. 23). The complexity of dependent origination and the unique goal-oriented paths make the Buddhist definitions of action, agent, free will, pleasure, and pain utterly distinct from their Western counterparts. In particular, while Western philosophers often rely on our natural perceptual capacities and the conceptual mind as sources of information (such as the Cartesian "clear and distinct ideas"), according to Garfield, Buddhist ethicists regard ordinary perception as [End Page 1] fundamentally flawed and the source of all suffering. Thus, they "aim to correct a 'natural' way of experiencing ourselves," characterized by moral phenomenology (p. 22).Although moral phenomenology is the nucleus of Garfield's entire project, a comprehensive, formal definition of the term is lacking throughout the book. To help the reader understand this sophisticated term and its ethical stance, I will briefly summarize it here. Buddhist moral phenomenology centers on the transformation of our mental experiences, which Garfield calls an "input ethics," in contrast to the Western "output ethics" that emphasize explicit rules, external actions and their consequences, and cultivation of virtues (p. 29). The process of ethical cultivation--completed through prescriptive paths--replaces our natural egocentric experiences with a liberated perspective stemming from the interdependence of all things. Such a perceptual transformation in turn replaces one's instinctive reactions with a spontaneous and responsive mode of comportment toward the world (p. 27). The final goal of moral phenomenology is the elimination of suffering for all sentient beings, with the buddhas and bodhisattvas as exemplary models of its perfection. In this sense, it is a combination of an ethical path and a soteriological path.To the best of my knowledge, Garfield is the first person to explicitly identify a moral phenomenological reading of Buddhist ethics: His 2010 article "What Is It Like to Be a Bodhisattva" and 2015 book Engaging Buddhism include pioneering research on this theory. The current book (Buddhist Ethics) further develops the theory, offering a more mature metaethical structure and in-depth explorations of canonical texts from the Indo-Tibetan traditions. By endorsing a moderate form of ethical particularism, Buddhist phenomenology refrains from committing to a single Western metaethical category, and gains notable advantage in synthesizing a myriad of Buddhist moral discourses into a united whole. This theory is undoubtedly Garfield's paramount contribution in the... (shrink)

"Moore's provocative conclusion is that monotheism - with its monopoly on virtue and failure to provide supernatural scapegoats - is responsible for some of the most virulent forms of intolerance and is a major cause of human nastiness and suffering.

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:Reviewed by:Housing the Powers: Medieval Debates about Dependence on God by Marilyn McCord AdamsZita V. TothMarilyn McCord Adams. Housing the Powers: Medieval Debates about Dependence on God. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2022. Pp. 240. Hardback, $80.00.Housing the Powers is a collection of eight interrelated articles by the late Marilyn McCord Adams (the fourth one coauthored with Cecilia Trifogli), pieced together as chapters of a book by Robert Merrihew Adams, (...) who also provides an introduction to the volume and a bibliography. The chapters are detailed and rigorous, and provide new perspectives on some old issues in medieval Aristotelian philosophy. The book is a must-read for anyone interested in medieval theories of causal powers and their surrounding clusters of problems, whether in the context of metaphysics, epistemology, the philosophy of mind, or even ethics.The book receives its title from some persistent conundrums in the medieval discussion concerning how to find suitable subjects for some Aristotelian causal powers, what these subjects must be like, how they and their power(s) are related, and some connected issues on the side of these powers’ objects. The subtitle indicates that the book also pays attention to the theological considerations that often played a significant role in the medieval treatments of these puzzles.Housing the Powers divides roughly into four parts. The first two chapters give a general introduction to the basic hylomorphic framework, discussing issues such as why to posit causal powers in the first place and how to account for the appearance of self-actuation (a causal power’s ability to reduce itself from potency to act) in some but not all instances of observed causal interaction. The next two chapters apply this general theory of causal powers to the human soul, discussing how the soul is related to its powers while dealing with various theological issues, mostly in connection with the Christian doctrine of the Trinity. Specifically, these two chapters analyze various solutions to a central conundrum: although the intellect is purely inorganic and immaterial, and the sensory part of the soul is necessarily tied to bodily organs, nevertheless they constitute some kind of a unity, since we commonly think that the subject of intellection and the subject of sensation are the same. Chapters 5 and 6 turn to the problem of knowledge and divine illumination, presenting various solutions to another puzzle: while for certainty and knowledge proper we need stability of objects and subjects, in our current life we seem to have neither. Finally, chapters 7 and 8 discuss some issues related to habits and virtues—especially regarding the role they play in relation to powers—and the problems arising from the theological thesis that some of these virtues are supernaturally infused. [End Page 662]The greatest strength of the book is Adams’s almost ruthless way of getting to the bottom of things: she sees where certain seemingly innocuous claims eventually lead and chases disagreements to their ultimate source—which can be a rather difficult task in the case of the authors under consideration, who share a basic theological outlook as well as a broadly speaking Aristotelian background. This ruthlessness makes the discussion of these otherwise relatively well-known issues unique and fascinating. Thus, in chapter 2, we can see how the seemingly niche question of self-actuation led to broader disagreements between Henry of Ghent, Godfrey of Fontaines, and Duns Scotus on the matter of free will and the basic nature of causal powers. Similarly, in chapter 3, we see how the question of the essential relationality of powers led to remarkably different views concerning the number of distinct powers or even the number of distinct substantial forms.Disagreements between the discussed authors come in many forms and from many sources. Thus, already in the first chapter, we glimpse a disagreement between Aquinas and Scotus on the adequate object of powers, which ultimately points to their deeper disagreement regarding how to define powers in the first place. Similarly, chapter 6 leads us to an exhilarating search for the roots of the disagreement regarding the question of divine illumination: while it is well known that Henry of Ghent thinks that some divine illumination is necessary... (shrink)

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:NOTES AND DISCUSSIONS 501 the practical problems of daily life by providing an explanation for misfortune and a source of guidance in times of uncertainty. There were also attempts to use it for divination and supernatural healing" (p. 151). Along these same lines, one should also cite a number of articles by Natalie Zemon Davis and, above all, the work of Robert Mandl 'ou. 17 To conclude these (...) remarks, I must stress once again that Cassirer's program, in its pure form, is not only impossible for any but the mystic to follow; it is fundamentally anti~ historical. Peter Gay himself, a great admirer of Cassker, and a historian who has a penchant for such neo--idealist hocus-pocus, has tended to follow Cassirer's dictum in his interpretation of the Enlightenment as a whole (to his grid, one is tempted to add).TM Earlier, in Voltaire's Politics (1959), Gay had made a most convincing case for a radically different approach, which he calls "the social history of ideas." Instead of "searching for a dynamic center of thought," "a single point of view," of which each pamphlet, poem or tale was but another facet, Gay presented Voltaire's works as responses to specific situatiom--a series of positions which, if not discrete, were at least sufficientlydiverse as to be incomprehensible without intimate knowledge of the peculiar circumstances of each. I am not suggestinghere that the historian of philosophy abandon his traditional m6tier in a mad search for more fashionable methods. There will always be a need for insightful, penetrating analyses of individual thinkers, and probing essays into internal consistencies or contradictions. Febvre readily conceded that the historian concerned only with "placing" Descartes in his century has not thereby come to grips with Cartesianism. But abstract analysis cannot safelybe divorced from its natural collateral disciplines. It is time to stop studying philosophical ideas as if they were statements propounded in a void. If we neglect the rhetorical situation of philosophy, if we forget the particular audience to which an idea was addressed, we run the risk of forgetting what it is we mean by an idea in the first place. ALeaev SOMA~ Par/~ COMPLEMENTARY METHODOLOGIES IN THE HISTORY OF IDEAS Alfred Soman doses his article with the modest statement, "I am not suggesting here that the historian of philosophy abandon his traditional metier in a mad search for more fashionable methods. There will always be a need for insightful, penetrating analyses of 1T N. Z. Davis, "The Reasons of Misrule: Youth Groups and Charivaris in Sixteenth-Century France.,"Past and Present, No. 50 (February, 1971), 41-75; "The Rites of Violence: Religious Riot in Sixteenth-Century France," ibid., No. 59 (May, 1973), 51-91. Mandrou's recent Des humaniatea au.r hommea de science: XVI 9 et XVIIe si~cles (1973) is by far the most coherent and systematic synthesisof the new historiography of ideas for this period. Specialistswill of course findroom to quarrel over some of the details;but as an initial outline and as a program for future research, the virtues of Mandrou's book are, I think, indisputable. is E.g., P. Gay, The Enlightenment, an Interpretation, 2 vols. (New York, 1966-1969). Gay's s~lmmaryremarks on Charron (I, 303) are so typical of his verbal sleights of hand that I cannot resist the following quotation: "While Charron was not a philosophe before his time---he was a priest and a theologian---the values he celebrates, in open dcfcren~ to his Romans, are the v~u of tl~ Eallghtc~m~nt." 502 HISTORY OF PHILOSOPHY individual thinkers, and probing essays into internal consistencies or contradictions.''t Yet what else might his intent be when he tacks on to a critique of an article explicitly designed as a textual analysis of De la Sagesse a glowing!audation of the new trends in the social history of ideas. The second half of his article is in fact an attack on many of the textual studies that fill this journal. The new trends in historiography that have so greatly affected eighteenth-century studies do indeed look most promising,2 hut in our concern for the social milieu in which... (shrink)

The role of divine power in Aquinas’s spiritual doctrine has often been neglected in favor of a focus on the primacy of charity, the controlling virtue of spiritual progress. The tendency among some thinkers (e.g. Polkinghorne) to juxtapose divine love and power stems from the stress on divine immanence at the cost of divine transcendence, and from an evolutionary (vs. classical) view of God with its ‘kenotic’ theodicy. A study of the ways in which divine power grounds and directs (...) the spiritual life highlights the robust role that metaphysics plays in spiritual ascent for Aquinas, and offers a philosophical entry point to his doctrine. Themes in his doctrine of the spiritual life incorporate Platonic transcendent causal plenitude and Aristotelian causal axioms and motifs of growth and unity. From the side of theology, divine power is analyzed through several lenses, including power through weakness in Christ, the sin of Lucifer against the gift of being in contrast to the counsel of obedience, and the role of Christ’s human nature in the Church. Taken together, these themes combine to characterize divine power as redemptive medicine, as opposed to a distant, arbitrary force, and to reveal the ways in which Aquinas applies metaphysical insights to the supernatural order. (shrink)

This chapter defends a pluralistic view of science: the various projects of enquiry that fall under the general rubric of science share neither a methodology nor a subject matter. Ontologically, it is argued that sciences need have nothing in common beyond an antipathy to the supernatural. Epistemically one central virtue is defended, empiricism, meaning just that scientific knowledge must ultimately be answerable to experience. Prima facie science is as diverse as the world it studies; and rejection of this (...) prima facie diversity in favour of a spurious aspiration to unity is grounded in a priori assumption not experience. Disunity, however, does not mean disconnectedness, and the connections between different areas of knowledge are an important theme in the book. (shrink)

In Branden Thornhill-Miller and Peter Millican’s challenging and provocative essay, we hear a considerably longer, more scholarly and less melodic rendition of John Lennon’s catchy tune—without religion, or at least without first-order supernaturalisms, there’d be significantly less intra-group violence. First-order supernaturalist beliefs, as defined by Thornhill-Miller and Peter Millican, are “beliefs that claim unique authority for some particular religious tradition in preference to all others”. According to M&M, first-order supernaturalist beliefs are exclusivist, dogmatic, empirically unsupported, and irrational. Moreover, again according (...) to M&M, we have perfectly natural explanations of the causes that underlie such beliefs. They then make a case for second-order supernaturalism, “which maintains that the universe in general, and the religious sensitivities of humanity in particular, have been formed by supernatural powers working through natural processes”. Second-order supernaturalism is a kind of theism, more closely akin to deism than, say, Christianity or Buddhism. It is, as such, universal, empirically supported, and beneficial. With respect to its pragmatic value, second-order supernaturalism, according to M&M, gets the good of religion without its bad. Second-order supernaturalism is thus rational and inconducive to violence. In this paper, I will examine just one small but important part of M&M’s argument: the claim that religion is a primary motivator of violence and that its elimination would eliminate or curtail a great deal of violence in the world. Imagine, they say, no religion, too. Janusz Salamon offers a friendly extension or clarification of M&M’s second-order theism, one that I think, with emendations, has promise. He argues that the core of first-order religions, the belief that Ultimate Reality is the Ultimate Good, is rational and, if widely conceded and endorsed by adherents of first-order religions, would reduce conflict in the world. While I favor the virtue of intellectual humility endorsed in both papers, I will argue contra M&M that belief in first-order religion is not a primary motivator of conflict and violence. Second, partly contra Salamon, who I think is half right, I will argue that the religious resources for compassion can and should come from within both the particular and the universal aspects of religious beliefs. Finally, I will argue that both are guilty, as I am, of the philosopher’s obsession with belief. (shrink)

I raise a difficulty for Thomas’s views on the passions I call the instrumentalizing problem: Can well-ordered passions contribute to good human activity beyond merely expressing or rendering more effective the independent work of intellect and will? If not, does that not raise the risk that we are merely handicapped angels? I develop a response by examining Thomas’s discussion of the filiae luxuriae, intellectual and volitional flaws arising from lust. I draw on Thomas’s understanding of one filia, blindness of mind, (...) to help sketch an account of the good habits it opposes: the acquired virtue I term attentiveness and the corresponding Spiritual gift of understanding. These good habits, I argue, render their bearers responsive to natural and supernatural reasons that guide them in the conduct of life. By partly constituting these habits, well-ordered passion makes an indispensable contribution to human activity at its best. (shrink)