Early and automatic neuropsychological processes may be influenced by altered dopaminergic functions but cannot be fully explained by these or by altered reinforcement and extinction processes. The reinforcement-extinction model is excellent for understanding certain causal pathways of attention-deficit/hyperactivity disorder, but it can hardly explain the heterogeneous developmental trajectories of ADHD fully. It should be integrated into a multiple pathways model.

Business and Economic textbooks warn against committing the Sunk Cost Fallacy: you, rationally, shouldn't let unrecoverable costs influence your current decisions. In this paper, I argue that this isn't, in general, correct. Sometimes it's perfectly reasonable to wish to carry on with a project because of the resources you've already sunk into it. The reason? Given that we're social creatures, it's not unreasonable to care about wanting to act in such a way so that a plausible story can be told (...) about you according to which your diachronic behavior doesn't reveal that you've suffered, what I will call, diachronic misfortune. Acting so as to hide that you've suffered diachronic misfortune involves striving to make yourself easily understood while disguising any shortcomings that might damage your reputation as a desirable teammate. And making yourself easily understood to others while hiding your flaws will, sometimes, put pressure on you to honor sunk costs. (shrink)

Although the sunk‐cost effect is a well‐documented psychological phenomenon in monetary investments, existing literature investigating behavioral investments (e.g., time, effort) has not replicated this effect except when such investments relate to monetary values. The current explanation for this discrepancy proposes that purely behavioral sunk‐cost effects are unlikely to be observed because they are difficult to book, track, and balance in a mental account. Conversely, we argue that, through an effort‐justification mechanism, people account for the amount of behavioral resources invested when (...) selecting an alternative, in which case they may fall prey to purely behavioral sunk‐cost effects. The results of two experiments support this prediction. Because many decisions involve behavioral investments, behavioral sunk‐cost effects should be pervasive psychological phenomena. (shrink)

The sunk cost fallacy is a well-established phenomenon where decision makers continue to commit resources, or escalate commitment, because of previously committed efforts, even when they have knowledge that their returns will not outweigh their investment. Most research on the sunk cost fallacy is done using hypothetical scenarios where participants make a single decision to continue with a project or to abandon it. This paradigm has several limitations and has resulted in a relatively limited understanding sunk cost behavior. To address (...) some of these limitations, we created a dynamic repeated choice paradigm where sunk costs are learned over time and opportunity costs are explicit. Over three experiments we show that the sunk cost fallacy depends on the relative a priori importance of the goal being invested in. We observed escalation of commitment only when the sunk cost domain is more important than alternatives, and participants showed de-escalation of commitment to the sunk costs domain otherwise. (shrink)

The problem of moral sunk costs pervades decision-making with respect to war. In the terms of just war theory, it may seem that incurring a large moral cost results in permissiveness: if a just goal may be reached at a small cost beyond that which was deemed proportionate at the outset of war, how can it be reasonable to require cessation? On this view, moral costs already expended could have major implications for the ethics of conflict termination. Discussion of sunk (...) costs in moral theorizing about war has settled into four camps: Quota, Prospect, Addition, and Discount. In this paper, I offer a mathematical model that articulates each of these views. The purpose of the mathematisation is threefold. First, to unify the sunk costs problem. Second, to show that these views differ in the nature of their justifications: some are justified qualitatively and others quantitatively. Third, to clarify the differential force of qualitative and quantitative critiques of these four views. (shrink)

Many find it reasonable to take our past actions into account when making choices for the future. In this paper, I address two important issues regarding taking past investments into account in prudential deliberation. The first is the charge that doing so commits the fallacy of honoring sunk costs. I argue that while it is indeed irrational to care about sunk costs, past investments are not sunk costs when we can change their teleological significance, roughly their contribution to our excellence (...) as temporally extended, reasons-responsive, and goal-directed agents. I suggest some general principles for evaluating such significance. Second, it’s a live issue whether we should care about the fate of our past projects, even if we can now affect it. I reject Dale Dorsey’s recent answer, and argue that the puzzle he addresses turns out to be merely apparent, if we take seriously the fact that we are temporally extended. (shrink)

Decision theorists generally object to “honoring sunk costs” – that is, treating the fact that some cost has been incurred in the past as a reason for action, apart from the consideration of expected consequences. This paper critiques the doctrine that sunk costs should never be honored on three levels. As background, the rationale for the doctrine is explained. Then it is shown that if it is always irrational to honor sunk costs, then other common and uncontroversial practices are also (...) irrational. Second, it is argued that there is no satisfactory way to make a distinction between the two kinds of cases. Third, a proposal is developed which would explain how it could be rational, under certain circumstances, to honor sunk costs. (shrink)

This project tackles the problem of analyzing a specific form of reasoning called ‘sunk costs’ in economics and ‘argument from waste’ in argumentation theory. The project is to build a normative structure representing the form of the argument, and then to apply this normative structure to actual cases in which the sunk costs argument has been used. The method is partly structural and partly empirical. The empirical part is carried out through the analysis of case studies of the sunk costs (...) argument found in business decision-making, as well as other areas like medical decision-making and everyday conversational argumentation. The structural part is carried out by using existing methods and techniques from argumentation theory, like argumentation schemes. The project has three especially significant findings. First, the sunk costs argument is not always fallacious, and in many cases it can be seen to be a rational precommitment strategy. Second, a formal model of argumentation, called practical reasoning, can be constructed that helps a rational critic to judge which sunk costs arguments are fallacious and which are not. Third, this formal model represents an alternative model of rationality to the cost-benefit model based on Bayesian calculation of probabilities. This alternative model is called the argumentation model, and it is based on interpersonal reasoning in dialogue as the model of rational thinking. This model in turn is based on the underlying notion of commitment in dialogue. (shrink)

This chapter focuses on one of the common fallacies in Western philosophy called 'sunk cost'. In economics, a sunk cost is an investment that can never be recovered. Prime examples include money spent on research and development or advertising for a product. However, there is a way to think of cost in terms of time, energy, and even emotion. The way to avoid this fallacy is to not allow the fear of losing what was already invested in something to influence (...) one's rational, objective decision about a present or future investment. In Eric Nielsen's words, when making any decision, economic or otherwise, it “makes no sense to factor in sunk costs precisely because they are sunk; no present action can change them. No matter what happens, the sunk costs are always there”. (shrink)

If you are more likely to continue a course of action in virtue of having previously invested in that course of action, then you tend to honor sunk costs. It is widely thought both that (i) individuals often do give some weight to sunk costs in their decision-making and that (ii) it is irrational for them to do so. In this paper I attempt to cast doubt on the conventional wisdom about sunk costs, understood as the conjunction of these two (...) claims. (shrink)

Suppose that you are trying to pursue a morally worthy goal, but cannot do so without incurring some moral costs. At the outset, you believed that achieving your goal was worth no more than a given moral cost. And suppose that, time having passed, you have wrought only harm and injustice, without advancing your cause. You can now reflect on whether to continue. Your goal is within reach. What's more, you believe you can achieve it by incurring—from this point forward—no (...) more cost than it warranted at the outset. If you now succeed, the total cost will exceed the upper bound marked at the beginning. But the additional cost from this point is below that upper bound. And the good you will achieve is undiminished. How do the moral costs you have already inflicted bear upon your decision now? (shrink)

Optimal foraging theory has been criticized for underestimating patch exploitation time. However, proper modeling of costs not only answers these criticisms, but it also explains apparently irrational behaviors like the sunk-cost effect. When a forager is sure to experience high initial costs repeatedly, the forager should devote more time to exploitation than searching in order to minimize the accumulation of said costs. Thus, increased recognition or reconnaissance costs lead to increased exploitation times in order to reduce the frequency of future (...) costs, and this result can be used to explain paradoxical human preference for higher costs. In fact, this result also provides an explanation for how continuing a very costly task indefinitely provides the optimal long-term rate of gain; the entry cost of each new task is so great that the forager avoids ever returning to search. In general, apparently irrational decisions may be optimal when considering the lifetime of a forager within a larger system. (shrink)

The sunk cost cognitive bias, or sunk cost fallacy, is a human tendency to continue with: an investment, make a decision, business, couple or project based on the resources that have been invested, instead of making a current evaluation of the results. future benefits and costs. The objective of the research was to analyze the impact of sunk cost cognitive bias on customer decisions and its application in neuromarketing strategies. The specific objectives were: (i) Evaluate how sunk cost influences the (...) perception of the value of products or services. (ii) Identify marketing strategies that exploit the sunk cost bias. (iii) Propose strategies to apply the sunk cost bias in marketing. The results show that the sunk cost bias significantly influences the perception of the value of products and services, affecting purchasing decisions, depending on the educational level, gender, and income level that influence the continuity in the use of products and services. due to previous investment of time or money; When purchasing expensive items customers feel obligated to continue using paid more even if it is not useful and used in full. The continuity in prepaid subscriptions, the perception of discounts for large quantities as a way to make better use of money, the probability of participating in loyalty programs for the accumulated rewards, the preference for payments and flexible cancellation, create a valuable perception of products they have previously invested in, the preference for repairing expensive items, and the perception of loss from a previous investment. It is concluded that the sunk cost cognitive bias significantly influences the decisions and behavior of a vast majority of customers, and how companies can use this information to design effective marketing campaigns. (shrink)

INCONTINENCE, HONOURING SUNK COSTS AND RATIONALITY According to a basic principle of rationality, the decision to engage in a course of action should be determined solely by the analysis of its consequences. Thus, considerations associated with previous use of resources should have no bearing on an agent’s decision-making process. Frequently, however, agents persist carrying on an activity they themselves judge to be nonoptimal under the circumstances because they have already allocated resources to that activity. When this is the case, agents (...) are said to be honouring sunk costs. Honouring sunk costs is thus typically viewed as irrational economic behaviour. Two striking findings of the psychological literature on the sunk cost effect are that it is, in general, not lessened by having taken previously courses in economics, and that agents who did take such courses and that do honour sunk costs seem to be frequently aware of a cognitive dissonance in their behaviour. Davidson’s account of the possibility conditions of incontinent action renders continent action materially unfeasible. The very idea of incontinent action becomes thus a hollow one. I’ll present an alternative description of these possibility conditions that renders continent action materially feasible, and both, continent and incontinent action, cognitively plausible. In a nutshell, my proposal rests upon the drawing of an essential cognitive contrast between explicit processes of deliberative reasoning and lower level heuristic procedures. I conclude the paper arguing that my redescription of incontinent action accounts for the above mentioned cognitive dissonance effect better than the alternatives and that viewing at least an important subset of behaviours of honouring sunk costs as incontinent actions will enable us to consider them as peculiar manifestations of a more general and meaningful pattern in human behaviour. (shrink)

In the WebSurf task, humans forage for videos paying costs in terms of wait times on a time-limited task. A variant of the task in which demands during the wait time were manipulated revealed the role of attention in susceptibility to sunk costs. Consistent with parallel tasks in rodents, previous studies have found that humans preferred shorter delays, but waited longer for more preferred videos, suggesting that they were treating the delays economically. In an Amazon Mechanical Turk sample, we replicated (...) these predicted economic behaviors for a majority of participants. In the lab, participants showed susceptibility to sunk costs in this task, basing their decisions in part on time they have already waited, which we also observed in the subset of the mTurk sample that behaved economically. In another version of the task, we added an attention check to the wait phase of the delay. While that attention check further increased the proportion of subjects with predicted economic behaviors, it also removed the susceptibility to sunk costs. These findings have important implications for understanding how cognitive processes, such as the deployment of attention, are key to driving re-evaluation and susceptibility to sunk costs. (shrink)

The all too common sunk cost effect is apparent when an investor influenced by what has been spent already persists in a venture, committing further resources or foregoing more profitable opportunities, when the economically rational action is to quit. Less common but arguably just as much a sunk cost effect is the mistake of giving up on a failed or failing venture too readily, sometimes out of nothing but pique at what has been lost, or perhaps through the more subtle (...) psychological forces posited by Kahneman, Tversky, Thaler and others within prospect theory and related work on ``mental budgeting''. Two case examples are considered, wherein decision makers dissatisfied with the results of their investments, and having lost money, appear to compound their losses by selling out at prices less than their own estimates of the remaining financial worth of the failed assets. These decisions are evaluated from the perspectives of both behavioral and prescriptive economics, and are found to have possible explanations in both. Their prescriptive rationale assumes a portfolio theory of investment decisions, and is demonstrated within both expected utility (economics) and mean-variance (finance) frameworks. (shrink)

The present study describes the mechanism of need regulation, which accompanies the so-called “biased” decisions. We hypothesized an unconscious urge for psychological need satisfaction as the trigger for cognitive biases. In an experimental study (N = 106), participants had the opportunity to win money in a functionality test. In the test, they could either use the solution they had developed (sunk cost) or an alternative solution that offered a higher probability of winning. The selection of the sunk-cost option was the (...) most chosen option, supporting the hypothesis of this study. The reason behind the majority of participants choosing the sunk-cost option seemed to be the satisfaction of psychological needs, despite a reduced chance of winning money. An intervention, which aimed at triggering self-reflection, had no impact on the decision. The findings of this study contribute to the discussion on the reasons for cognitive biases and their formation in the human mind. Moreover, it discusses the application of the label “irrational” for biased decisions and proposes reasons for instrumental rationality, which exist at an unconscious, need-regulative level. (shrink)

This paper presents a very simple model in which situational cues associated with a particular consumption good compel an agent—who may have otherwise been “thinking about” something else—to consider the decision to consume that good. Within this framework, it is shown how an endowment effect and a present bias can arise through a common mechanism. The analysis points to a novel, contributing role for inattention in understanding both of these behavioral anomalies while also speaking to evidence that they are often (...) cue-induced. (shrink)

There is growing interest in whether and how sunk-cost effects for purely behavioral investments occur. In this article, we further discuss Cunha and Caldieraro’s (2009) Behavioral Investment Sunk Cost (BISC) model and reconcile Otto’s (2010) results with the BISC model predictions. We also report new data from two unpublished experiments that are consistent with the BISC model, and we discuss the conditions under which purely behavioral sunk-cost effects are likely to be observed.

Cunha and Caldieraro (2009) investigated whether sunk-cost effects, which are well documented in hypothetical situations involving monetary investments, also occur in choice situations with purely behavioral investments. Their results suggest that decision makers indeed fall prey to behavioral sunk-cost effects under certain circumstances. I have been unable to replicate their pattern of results in three separate investigations. In these studies, I attempted to recover the effect using two other behavioral effort manipulations in addition to the manipulation used by Cunha and (...) Caldieraro. This failure to replicate the pattern of results calls into question the robustness of the initial findings. (shrink)

Cognitive Science, Volume 45, Issue 11, November 2021.

Only in recent years have developmental psychologists begun advocating and exploring dual-process theories and their applicability to cognitive development. In this paper, a dual-process model of developments in two processing systems—an “analytic” and an “experiential” system—is discussed. We emphasise the importance of “metacognitive intercession” and developments in this ability to override experiential processing. In each of two studies of sunk cost decisions, age-related developments in normative decisions were observed, as were declines in the use of a “waste not” heuristic. In (...) the second study, children and adolescents were presented with arguments for normative and non-normative sunk cost decisions. Following argument evaluation, participants were re-presented the original problems and a set of novel, transfer problems. Results indicated that post-argument improvements were most apparent during adolescence. Age-related improvements were most noticeable on the transfer problems. In general, the findings suggest that the ability to metacognitively intercede (i.e., reflect on arguments; inhibit experientially produced responses) emerges towards middle adolescence. However, even by the end of adolescence, in the absence of significant contextual cues and motivation, this ability is infrequently utilised. (shrink)

It is a commonplace in economics that we should disregard sunk costs. The sunk cost effect might be widespread, goes the conventional wisdom, but we would be better off if we could rid ourselves of it. In this paper, I argue against the orthodoxy by showing that the sunk cost effect is often beneficial. Drawing on discussions of related topics in dynamic choice theory, I show that, in a range of cases, being disposed to honor sunk costs allows an agent (...) to mimic a resolute chooser, someone who adopts the best plan at the outset of a decision problem and sticks with it, even when resoluteness is unfeasible. I discuss several kinds of cases in which honoring sunk costs coincides with resolute choice. (shrink)

Ratio Juris, Volume 35, Issue 1, Page 21-29, March 2022.

Many philosophers hold that the achievement of one's goals can contribute to one's welfare apart from whatever independent contributions that the objects of those goals or the processes by which they are achieved make. Call this the Achievement View, and call those who accept it achievementists. In this paper, I argue that achievementists should accept both that one factor that affects how much the achievement of a goal contributes to one’s welfare is the amount that one has invested in that (...) goal and that the amount that one has invested in a goal is a function of how much one has personally sacrificed for its sake, not a function of how much effort one has put into achieving it. So I will, contrary to at least one achievementist, be arguing against the view that the greater the amount of productive effort that goes into achieving a goal, the more its achievement contributes to one's welfare. Furthermore, I argue that the reason that the achievement of those goals for which one has personally sacrificed matters more to one’s welfare is that, in general, the redemption of one's self-sacrifices in itself contributes to one’s welfare. Lastly, I argue that the view that the redemption of one's self-sacrifices in itself contributes to one's welfare is plausible independent of whether or not we find the Achievement View plausible. We should accept this view so as to account both for the Shape of a Life Phenomenon and for the rationality of honoring "sunk costs.". (shrink)

How should deontologists approach decision-making under uncertainty, for an iterated decision problem? In this paper I explore the shortcomings of a simple expected value approach, using a novel example to raise questions about attitudes to risk, the moral significance of tiny probabilities, the independent moral reasons against imposing risks, the morality of sunk costs, and the role of agent-relativity in iterated decision problems.

Paul M. Pietroski, University of Maryland I had heard it said that Chomsky’s conception of language is at odds with the truth-conditional program in semantics. Some of my friends said it so often that the point—or at least a point—finally sunk in.

Paul M. Pietroski, University of Maryland I had heard it said that Chomsky’s conception of language is at odds with the truth-conditional program in semantics. Some of my friends said it so often that the point—or at least a point—finally sunk in.

In this paper I attempt to respond to the worries of the source incompatibilist, and try to sketch a naturalistically plausible, compatibilist notion of self-authorship and control that I believe captures important aspects of the folk intuitions regarding freedom and responsibility. It is my hope to thus offer those moved by source incompatibilist worries a reason not to adopt what P.F. Strawson called “the obscure and panicky metaphysics of Libertarianism” (P. F. Strawson, 1982) or the panic-inducing moral austerity of the (...) hard incompatibilist (Pereboom, 2001). I am well aware that many great minds have sunk their teeth into this problem and have not prevailed, but at the very least, I hope to become clearer on where the sticking points are. (shrink)

Important moral dilemmas arise in the context of what I have called jus terminatio and Darrel Moellendorf has called jus ex bello—the norms governing the termination of war. I discuss three dilemmas, showing how they also illuminate proportionality and jus ad bellum: morally accounting for new costs that arise during the course of a war; two variants of the “sunk-cost dilemma” in which an agent is permitted to contribute to a project that is all things considered morally unjust, when that (...) project is morally justified on a forward-looking basis; and the problem of moral hazard in peace negotiations. (shrink)

Data do not speak for themselves. Data must be narrated—put to work in particular contexts, sunk into narratives that give them shape and meaning, and mobilized as part of broader processes of interpretation and meaning-making. We examine these processes through the lens of ethnographic practice and, in particular, ethnography’s attention to narrative processes. We draw on a particular case in which digital data must be animated and narrated by different groups in order to examine broader questions of how we might (...) come to understand data ethnographically. (shrink)

Consciousness exists in time, but time is also to be found within consciousness: we are directly aware of both persistence and change, at least over short intervals. On reflection this can seem baffling. How is it possible for us to be immediately aware of phenomena which are not (strictly speaking) present? What must consciousness be like for this to be possible? In "Stream of Consciousness" I argued that influential accounts of phenomenal temporality along the lines developed by Broad and Husserl (...) were fundamentally flawed, and proposed a quite different account: the overlap model. While recognizing that the latter has merits, Gallagher argues that it too is fundamentally flawed; he also takes issue with some of my claims concerning Broad and Husserl. My reply comes in three main parts. I start by clarifying my use of certain terms, in particular realism and anti-realism as applied to theories of phenomenal temporality in general, and the accounts of Broad and Husserl in particular. I then turn to Gallagher’s main criticisms of the overlap theory. Gallagher argues that the theory is sunk by a problem with ongoing contents, that if our experience possessed the structures I ascribe to it, we would be aware of contents as having longer durations than is actually the case. I suggest otherwise: the version of the overlap theory which is afflicted by this difficulty is not the version I put forward, as becomes clear when two distinct forms of overlap are distinguished. Gallagher is also concerned that the theory lacks phenomenological grounding, and has difficulties with experiential holism. The latter worry, I argue, is completely misplaced. While the former has more warrant, it too is rooted in a misconception: the overlap theory was intended only to provide an account of the most basic sensory components of our short-term experience of temporality, and can easily be expanded to accommodate other aspects. I supply a sketch an augmented theory to back up this claim. I conclude with an assessment of the intentional account of time-consciousness Gallagher ascribes to Husserl. A meaning-based account of this kind is incapable of accounting for experienced sensory continuity, or so I argue. I also suggest that both Broad and Husserl may have had leanings towards the Simple Conception of consciousness. -/- . (shrink)

The Shape-of-a-Life phenomenon is widely recognized by philosophers of well-being: an upward life trajectory seems better than its downward equivalent if the sum of momentary well-being is held fixed. But what if we hold fixed the sum of momentary well-being in an upward trajectory, are certain ways to improve from the bad times better than the others? Velleman suggests that a redemptive trajectory is better than a bare upward trajectory. In this paper, I elaborate this proposal by developing a mediating (...) factor account of prudential redemption. I argue that, in redemptive trajectories, there is a mediating factor that bears certain relations with the negative and the positive events respectively, one that does not necessarily appear in bare upward trajectories. Prudential redemption, compared to mere improvement, can enhance a person’s lifetime well-being because a redeemed event is made less bad by virtue of the mediating factor. This result has implications for making decisions in the face of equally good options and for evaluating the rationality of honoring sunk costs. (shrink)

In reflecting on events of considerable significance, it is commonplace to remark that ‘it hasn’t sunk in yet’ or ‘it’s still sinking in’. Such talk is sometimes associated with things seeming unreal, surreal, unfathomable, or somehow impossible. In this paper, I develop an account of what these experiences consist of. First of all, I suggest that they involve explicitly acknowledging the reality of one’s situation, while at the same time experiencing it as inconsistent with the organization of one’s life. I (...) go on to show how this tension is experienced dynamically, through disturbances of unfolding patterns of anticipation. I suggest that these patterns contribute to our grasp of what is and is not the case, thus accommodating the manner in which things can seem ‘unbelievable’ or ‘unreal’. (shrink)

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:The Two Creations: Metamorphoses: i.5–162, 274–415 OVID (Translated by C. Luke Soucy) The Metamorphoses of Ovid opens with the creation of the world, only to recount its destruction and recreation almost immediately after. These stories begin Ovid’s mythic anthology with a sustained exploration of the uncertain origin of humanity, the conflicts in its nature, and its uneasy place in a world governed by divine forces. The following excerpts endeavor (...) to reproduce and contextualize that exploration in a blank verse translation, preserving much of the original wordplay and employing the same number of lines as in the Latin. Before there were seas, lands, and arching skies, Throughout the whole world, nature bore one face, Which was called Chaos, an unordered, rough And tumble mass of lifeless weight, wherein Lay packed the jangling elemental seeds. 10 No Titan1 then brought sunlight to the earth, No Phoebe2 yet wrought full her lunar curve; Nor hung the Earth self-poised in swaddling air, With Amphitrite’s3 arms stretched round her banks. For though the land, the sea, and air were there, 15 The land could bear no tread, the waves no stroke, The mist no light. No being retained its shape, And each opposed with each, for in one self arion 28.3 winter 2021 1. The Sun, son of the Titan Hyperion. 2. Diana, here representing the moon. 3. A Nereid and the wife of Neptune, here representing the sea. 46 the two creations Heat battled cold, wet strove with dry, soft parts Struck against hard, and weight fought weightless things. 20 A god—and better nature—broke this strife. He tore the lands from sky and seas from land, And from the dense air split the crystal heaven. Then, after he released the separate forms, Plucked from that sightless mass, he fastened them 25 In place with common peace. Next, weightless fire Leapt up and claimed its place in vaulting heaven, With air beneath, the next by lightness placed. But denser earth sank under its own weight And drew down heavy masses by its side. 30 The circling water took hold last of all, And wrapped the solid earth inside its flow. Once he, whichever of the gods he was, Had so reduced the whole to living parts, He spun the land into a giant sphere, 35 And, to begin, lest all sides be alike, He ordered straits to stream and swell beneath The sweeping winds and clasp the circled earth. And he made springs and lakes and boundless pools, And tilted banks hemmed in by slanting streams, 40 A share of which the earth absorbs; the rest Runs to the sea, where, in a freer flood, It pounds no banks, but breaks on ocean shores. He ordered fields unrolled and valleys sunk, The forests wreathed with leaves, the mountains raised; 45 And, as two regions on both left and right Divide the sky (a fiery fifth between), So did the might of god segment its load: The same five bounds are stamped upon the earth. The middle zone is home to heat alone, 50 The outer two to snow, but those between He gave both flame and frost in measured fare, And over all, the air—as great a weight Compared to fire as water feels from earth. Ovid 47 He ordered there the mists and there the clouds, 55 And thunder, soon to frighten mortal minds, And, mixed with bolts of light, the flashing Winds. To them, the maker did not grant the air Outright (for even now, when each one blows In his own realm, the brothers quarrel so 60 They scarce withhold from shattering the world). So Eurus sought Arabian lands of dawn And Persian peaks aglow with morning rays, While near the western shores by sunset warmed, Dwells Zephyrus; and wintry Boreas seized 65 The Scythian north, while southern lands drip wet With constant clouds and rain by Auster’s hand. Above them all, the god let aether flow, A liquid lacking weight or earthly trace. Such boundaries had he scarcely set in place 70 Before the stars, which had so long been crushed In sightless gloom, began to light the sky. And... (shrink)

Benj. R. Tucker, the business partner and confrère of E. H. Heywood of Princeton, Mass., has translated and published, in an elegant volume of nearly 500 royal octavo pages, the most renowned of the politico-economical works of the justly celebrated P. J. Proudhon. The title of the work in English is: What is Property? An Inquiry into the Principle of Right and of Government. I am requested to write a review-notice of the work. The temptation is strong to expand into (...) au exhaustive review, but I am not certain of any avenue to the public for such a treatise, and I shall confine myself to the smaller plan. First, as to what is usually put last. The volume as a book is superb. Print, presswork, paper, and binding are at the top of the powers of the bookmaking art, and the price is not excessive. The work of the translator is also conscientiously and well done, and is nearly faultless from the literary point of view. A few Gallicisms may be pointed out, but they are exceptionally few, and the translator's personality is completely sunk in the labor of love which he evidently had before him. (shrink)

The concept of memory has always been a crucial topic in philosophical discourse. This book re-traces the thought of major philosophers such as Edmund Husserl, Paul Ricoeur, Hannah Arendt, Karl Jaspers, William James, José Luis Borges and Sigmund Freud to provide an in-depth exploration around several aspects of this timely issue. How is a memory formed? How can we bring into existence what has sunk into oblivion? What is the role of our instincts and inner drives in the constitution of (...) memory? What is the connection between memory and forgetfulness, as well as that between mercy and remembrance? Focusing on these fundamental questions, the author presents a rich interconnection of concepts and ideas that build a significant work on the great theme of memory"--Front cover flap. (shrink)

The debate over group selection shows no signs of abating. If existent, group selection is likely to have significantly reinforced prosocial and altruistic behavior. This article is theoretical and argues that there have been some major lacunae in the debate as concerns humans. The traits that are most uniquely and universally human—such as prolonged rearing of dependent offspring, the family, large-scale, tribal networks, and cultural-linguistic diversity and exclusivity—have been largely overlooked. These most salient and mutually reinforcing human specifics vastly increased (...) individuals' stake in and commitment to ancestral tribal groups. Tribal members were in the same boat, and risked massive fitness loss if it were sunk. This suggests that group selection existed and was much stronger among humans than among any other animal species. (shrink)

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:HIV, Art, and a Journey toward Healing:One Man's StoryJulia Kellman (bio)Some of the territory is wilder and reports do not tally. The guides are good for only so much. In these wild places I become part of the map, part of the story, adding my versions there. This Talmudic layering of story on story, map on map, multiplies possibilities, but also warns me of the weight of accumulation. I (...) live in one world—material, seemingly solid—and the weight of that is quite enough.1I have just reread anthropologist Ruth Behar's2 essay, "Anthropology That Breaks Your Heart." It started me thinking about several things—the outer limits of psychic pain, for example, or the relationship of the researcher and the researched, of bearing witness and giving testimony, and of the "ethnographic experience of talking, listening, transcribing, translating, and interpreting" that forms the core of enquiry about people and their lives.3 What can I say, I wonder, to touch readers in such a way that they see the indispensable truth in the individual stories that develop from such enquiries? How can my role as interpreter and witness lead to the understanding that the buffeting winds of lived experience (those of the researcher and of those who are researched) are not inconveniences but an essential quality of humanistic research? How can I use the accretion of stories that make up my research and my life (as if there were a difference), I muse, as I sit at my computer screen reading a text as "it in its turn reads me," as the writer Jeanette Winterson4 describes this experience. For over the years, I, too, not only have come to feel this pulse of the systole and diastole of telling and being told, but I have also used this alternating relationship to develop insight into the nature of the connection of researcher and researched, teacher and taught.There are two main narratives that form the core of this particular undertaking—one personal and the other the result of informal conversations, [End Page 33] formal interviews, casual interactions, social events, and interchanges during the art class for people with HIV/AIDS that I teach weekly at a local hospital. The stories both probe the mystery of disease, expression, and the search for coherence, and, in my case, the role of "the wild places on the map"5 where the researcher/writer adds her witness and testimony to the narrative to become part of the story.Individual ExperienceBefore we begin this discussion of individual experience, art, and illness, it is important to point out that there are only two general types of humanities enquiry: One enumerates, compares and contrasts, creates and tests hypotheses, reads literature, and/or examines the minutiae of materials or systems of one sort or another. The other is engaged in exploring the individual, the idiosyncratic, and the unique. Its subject is that which is particular. My research consists of the second type, qualitative to its core, and deeply sunk in the narrative, personal world of lived experience.The privacy of individual situations, our utter singularity, is one of the factors that most marks our lives as creatures. We can share our stories, describe our impressions, explain our sensations, but unless we participate in an actual experience in which our boundaries momentarily disappear, the most we can hope for is the simultaneous partaking of similar feelings with a sensitive, empathetic companion in what philosopher-sociologist Alfred Schutz6 describes as a We-relationship, an intersubjective experience that leads to sharing time, mutuality, and growing old together. Thus the ticklish nature of achieving actual interpersonal congruence makes enquiries into the specifics of actual lived experience difficult. If one is to learn anything useful from such considerations, one must focus on the individual and the story of his/her particular life journey in an intimate, extended, multifaceted manner and content one's self with the fact that all one will ever be able to report about in such an undertaking are discrete events and single people, never grand numerical accumulations or demographically significant quantities.Researcher's DisclaimerFor a reader to orient herself in... (shrink)

Understanding Aesthetics in it's etymological meaning as the "science of the perception" makes any study of the theory of the sensibility essential to understand a given aesthetics. Moreover, theories of sensibility and knowledge in Arabic and Islamic classical culture, have hardly been probed in it's aesthetic dimension. As a result of this, the spread of conceptualizations about Arabic and Islamic aesthetics has, in many cases, sunk in a sea of imprecisions and prejudgements. In the following pages, we present an approximation (...) of these topics through works of greats thinkers from Al-Andalus such as Ibn Hazm, Ibn Bayya, Ibn Tufayl, Ibn Rusd, Hazim al-Qartayanni, Ibn 'Arabi and Ibn Jaldun, in whose works we appreciate a clear, though diverse, intention of constituting a cognizant and percipient human subject, ethically and aesthetically defined, across psychologies and concepts that we will also discover in the construction of Aesthetics in the West. (shrink)

Today, in an epoch of the proclamation of radical incommunicability between ethnic groups, between the sexes, and between individuals sunk in the privacy of their own gratifications, supported by a theoretical rejection of principles or universals of any sort, I want to explore the possibility of "taking the universal viewpoint" and thus finding a way out of a situation of radical cultural disintegration without succumbing to one or the other mode of intellectual imperialism, theological or otherwise. I will attempt to (...) do so by attending to what, I would claim, is the most obvious and showing what is implicit in recognizing that. In focusing our attention, let us attempt to set aside for the time being everything we might think we know from other sources, science included: bracket temporarily all theories, all dogmas, all preferences, all commitments other than that of paying attention to what presents itself to careful attention here and now. Nothing should intrude except the evidence present to us, since, I would claim, that evidence is presupposed in appealing to these other factors, including arguments for the "theory-ladenness" of evidence. (shrink)

This study examines how the reference-point effect and sunk-cost fallacy interact with stakeholder theory and influence how investors evaluate corporate social performance. We propose that ex-ante (pre-IPO) corporate social performance influences ex-post (post-IPO) perceived riskiness and that this relationship is U-shaped. We also evaluate how CEO duality and company age moderate this U-shaped relationship. Using young and newly public entrepreneurial firms in China, and focusing on stock returns in the secondary market, empirical results and robustness tests provide strong support for (...) our hypotheses. (shrink)

A rise of academic capitalism over the past four decades has been well documented within many research-intensive universities. Largely missing, however, are in-depth studies of how particularly situated academic groups manage the uncertainties that come with intermittent and fickle commercial funding streams in their daily research practice and problem choice. To capture the strategies scientists adopt under these conditions, this article provides an ethnographically detailed (and true) story about how a single project in Artificial Intelligence grew over several years from (...) a peripheral idea to the very center of an academic lab’s commercial portfolio. The analysis theorizes an epistemic form—nimble knowledge production—and documents three of its lab-level features: 1) rapid prototyping to keep sunk costs low, 2) shared search for “real world problems” rather than “theoretical” ones, and 3) nimble commitment to research problem choice. While similar forms of academic knowledge transfer have been lauded as “mode 2,” “innovative,” or “hybrid” for initiating cross-institutional collaboration and pushing science beyond disciplinary silos, this case suggests it can rely on fleeting attention to problems resistant to a quick fix. (shrink)

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:Tract 16:What I Did Not Steal, Must I Now Restore?AnonymousThe field of modern theology is replete with varied, often competing, attempts to craft a comprehensive theology of salvation. One could say many things about this phenomenon, but the difficulty of the task arises largely from the fact that Scripture nowhere gives us a tidy soteriology of that kind. Instead, we have a wide variety of ways of speaking about (...) the unique work of Christ, interpreting his life, death, and resurrection "according to the Scriptures." In keeping with this, we find among the Fathers, and even within single authors, a variety of ways of speaking about salvation and its accomplishment. The Fathers ponder, praise, and marvel at Christ and his work in a variety of literary modes. They sing the praise of the saving triune God in a variety of biblical keys.1 [End Page 313]In this essay, I will look at Christ's offering of his life for our salvation from one particular vantage-point, that of Ps 69:4:What I did not steal,Must I now restore?Ps 69 is a striking Messianic psalm.2 It shows up in explicit quotations or fairly clear allusions at least eight times in the New Testament (Matt 27:34 and parallels; John 2:17; 15:25; 19:28–29; Acts 1:20; Rom 11:9; 15:13; 2 Cor 6:2), several of which are tied to the Passion in the Gospel of John (2:17; 15:28; 19:28–29). It has close parallels with the servant songs in Isaiah. It is widely seen in the Christian tradition as a psalm that speaks of the sufferings of Jesus Christ, a key text for the apostolic authors' interpretation of Christ.3Broadly speaking, Ps 69 falls into the category of a psalm of petition in [End Page 314] the face of enemies.4 The psalmist cries out to God in the midst of severe suffering that threatens to overwhelm him like a flood. He is sunk in deep mire, unable to get a foothold. The foes who surround him outnumber the hairs of his head, and they hate him, he says at first, without cause. Later, he goes on to say that there is, in fact, a cause: his zeal for God's house, which incites his enemies to insult him, mock him, gossip about him. After pleading with God for help, the psalm concludes in a way remarkably similar to the other great psalm that the New Testament takes as a prophecy of Christ's passion, Ps 22, with a great hymn of praise (vv. 30–36). One can imagine this psalm on the lips of Christ, not only on the Cross, but in the garden, where, the author of Hebrews says: "Jesus offered up prayers and supplications, with loud cries and tears, to him who was able to save him from death, and he was heard for his godly fear" (5:7).Verse 4 of Ps 69 does not show up explicitly in the New Testament, but I will argue that it neatly encapsulates one dimension of Christ's redeeming work. On the literal level, the couplet simply states that the psalmist is innocent but is treated as guilty; he might even be quoting a proverb to that effect.5 Viewed in light of Christ's work as depicted in the New Testament as a whole, however, Ps 69:4 fits into the broad typology of Christ as the second, or last, and sinless Adam, who reverses the effect of the first human's sin. I will approach the topic by asking three questions: What was stolen? How was it restored? In what does this restoration consist?What Was Stolen?When Christ cries out in this psalm, "What I did not steal," to what is he referring? What is the stolen good that Christ must now restore? One clear candidate for this is the honor due to God, expressed fundamentally through obedience and worship,6 the honor which Adam failed to offer, choosing [End Page 315] instead to attempt to seize the glory of God for himself.7 Commenting on John 15:29–31, Augustine... (shrink)