The Kalama-sutta is frequently cited as proof of the rational and empirical spirit of early Buddhist epistemology, ‘The Buddha’s charter of free enquiry’, according to Soma Thera. A close reading, however, calls that interpretation into question. The Kalamas do not ask what is the truth, and the Buddha does not tell them how to find it. Rather the Kalamas ask ‘Who is telling the truth?’ in what may have been the pursuit of sacred or quasi magical power through the person (...) of a teacher. The Buddha, in turn, encourages them to adopt a set of attitudes and actions, which includes choosing a teacher. The method of evaluation that the Buddha gives, which includes the famous ‘know for yourselves’ is found to be as least as much ethical as it is epistemological and to invoke the opinion of authority and the public. The Buddha here seems to call for a decision that is partly based on faith, and the Kalamas respond not with independent research, but with an act of faith in committing themselves to the Buddha. (shrink)

Bhikkhu Ñ??ananda’s Concept and Reality has exerted a certain influence on Buddhist Studies, from translations of the P?li Nik?yas to interpretations of doctrine. Far beyond proposing translations for papañca and papañca-saññ?sa?kh?, the book lays out a thesis, supported and illustrated by frequent citations from the Nik?yas, concerning the role of concepts and language itself in perpetuating bondage to sa?s?ra. Concepts and language are said to obscure reality in a self-perpetuating cycle that bars us from liberation. The thesis has intuitive force (...) and profound implications for understanding the P?li sources. However, the presentation is flawed by inconsistencies, lack of clarity, and overly interpretive translations of the P?li — it is not even clear in important details precisely what Ñ??ananda’s intended thesis is. The present offering is an attempt at clarifying this seminal work so as to enable building upon it. The given thesis is elucidated, making its problems explicit, and suggesting resolutions, arriving finally with a proposal of what he may have intended. Along the way, I indicate where given support from the Nik?yas is weak. (shrink)

The Brahmaj?la Sutta includes a list of ‘views’ that are wrong in some sense. The present paper turns the focus away from the content of the views to ask in what sense they are problematic, by what criteria they are here found to be so, and, indeed, just what kinds of things the views are. The frameword in which the views are set suggests that what the Buddha finds problematic is not the content so much as the epistemological standpoint, or, (...) more properly, the mode-of-being of which the views are a part: it is the sama?a-br?ma?as who proclaim the views rather than the views per se that are wrong. (shrink)

What does it mean to ‘know’ in the Nik?yas such that simply ‘knowing’ certain things ‘as they really are’ has the power to liberate one from sa?s?ra? In an effort to characterize such ‘knowing’ while minimizing the pr ojection of modern-western pr esupp ositions, the pr esent paper expl ores parallels between concepts of transformational and liberating knowledge in the Nik?yas and the early Upani?ads in an effort to identify epistemological pr esupp ositions curr ent in ancient India. The characterization (...) is contrasted with modern-western common sense notions of factual knowledge in order to highlight features that we may tend to miss or to overl ook. It is arg ued that for the authors of both sets of literature, ordinary opinion is deluded while genuine knowledge holds directly effective power, and that transformative knowledge is a reflexive mode of comportment towards the known, concerned as much with relations as with the entities related. This understanding help s to acc ount for the transformative power of ‘knowledge’ and may have impl ications for the ways we interpr et central doctrines. (shrink)