It is imperative that creative techniques be designed for the conduct of active conflict. The failure to explore alternatives to violent force is fostered by an inbred literature which is preoccupied with descriptive analyses of small group conflict or with policy and the implications of nuclear warfare. An entirely new concept is required based upon the union of technique with theory. Psychoanalytic experience with intrapsychic conflict should be brought to bear upon problems of large-scale conflict in a manner not yet (...) attempted. The central questions and their answers may require the fielding of an experimental corps to refine constructive techniques for engaging in conflict. (shrink)

공자가 유학의 학문적 목표를 ‘中節’이라고 하는 행위 원리의 정립에 둔 이래, 앎의 문제는 유학의 핵심 과제가 되었다. ‘중절’은 단순한 대상적 인식의 결과로서 도달할 수 있는 것이 아니라 고도의 판단력을 요구하는 실천적 개념이다. 선진유학에서는 ‘중절’의 행위 원리를 정립하기 위해 知와 智두 가지 방법이 제시되었는데, 지금까지 학계에서는 두 가지 개념을 구분하지 않고 혼용하는 경향이 있었다. 知는 사물에 대한 대상적 인식의 성격이 강하고 智는 선악을 분별하는 선천적 품성의 성격이 강하다. 공자는 시종 知를 언급했지만 실질적으로는 知를 통해 智에 도달할 것을 강조했다. 맹자는 모든 사람은 (...) 선악을 분별하는 智의 본성을 가지고 있다고 보았으며, 올바른 행위 원리는 타고난 智의 품성을 함양하여 현실에서 발현되도록 하는 것이라고 보았다. 반면 순자는 선천적인 품성을 부정하고 오직 知의 누적을 통해서 공동의 행위 원리를 정립하는 일이 중요하다고 보았다. 맹자의 관점은 선천적 품성에 의존하여 내재적 원리를 강조함으로써 원리의 보편성 확보에 한계를 드러내었으며, 순자의 관점은 사람의 주체적 판단을 불신하고 외재적 원리를 강요함으로써 개인에 대한 폭력성을 내포할 위험이 있다. 이러한 한계에도 불구하고, 군집생활의 행위 원리를 정립하기 위해서는 내부와 외부에서 함께 이루어지는 앎의 노력, 즉 智와 知는 여전히 중요한 의미를 갖는다. 특히 독단과 맹신 등 잘못된 앎, 이로 인해 타자에 대한 증오와 폭력이 난무하는 현대사회에서는 앎의 근본 의미에 대한 선진유학의 문제의식을 재음미할 필요가 있다. (shrink)

The paper focuses on the complex relations between aesthetics and phenomenology as they show themselves within the core locus of their interplay—the realm of the visible and the invisible. To do so, the paper examines a specific case study, a Rembrandt painting—A Woman Bathing in a Stream (1654)—through which the discussion illuminates the interconnected and inseparable relationship between aesthetics and phenomenology in relation to Merleau-Ponty’s ontology of the visible and the invisible. The reading addresses both dimensions of the visible: the (...) essential intersubjective aspect of life and its complex visual representation in art. To achieve this, the paper first explores Merleau-Ponty’s late aesthetic ontology—a phenomenology that perceives the aesthetic realm, particularly the visible domain, as originating from human corporeal existence, thereby redefining the act of seeing and the concepts of the visible and the invisible; I show the manner in which invisible elements permeate our visual experience in the Rembrandt painting and in seeing as such. The paper also reveals the unique ontological role of painting and the painter in unveiling the aesthetic world, and in guiding the philosopher toward a vision that true philosophy—phenomenology—must embrace. The paper concludes by rethinking the significance of aesthetics, and especially, the arts, to phenomenological thought, and the necessity of phenomenology to aesthetic thought. (shrink)

What is the significance of GDP per capita to a society? What does it represent conceptually? These questions have been addressed in past decades, engendering extensive explorations of the limitations of the indicator, yet answers have proved problematic or partial. The paper presents the main conclusions so far drawn and builds upon them to present a new reading of the significance of GDP per capita. At the heart of this reading is the view that, while GDP per capita is (...) not indicative of the welfare of individuals, it is indicative of an irreducible ‘group well-being.’ This view, however, requires one to relinquish the belief that only individuals can be ‘well.’ It turns out that the allegedly orthodox view, which sees GDP as a human-centered indicator, requires an unorthodox philosophical standpoint, one that accepts an irreducible group well-being. The paper presents this alternative interpretation and addresses its upsides and limitations. (shrink)

Socrates is still an enigmatic figure of enormous importance in Western culture. This book introduces both some of Socrates' problems and some of the problems about him. It seeks at the same time to advance new views, arguments and information on Socrates' mission, techniques, ethics and later reception. Composed of new essays by different scholars, some of them primarily Hellenstics, some philosophers, it illustrates both the variety of Plato's literary portrayals of Socrates and the diversity of later and present-day approaches (...) to him. Socratic Questions thus confronts the difficulties, philosophical and biographical, presented by dialogues such as Protagoras and Crito and by the Apology of Socrates. From civil disobedience to ethics, this collection provides stimulating discussions of Socrates' life, thought and historical significance. It will be of great interest to all students of ancient Greek history literature and philosophy. (shrink)

Dans la Rome républicaine et impériale, les pleurs accompagnent des événements de la vie privée et publique. Pour agrémenter leurs discours et asseoir leur autorité, des sénateurs, des empereurs et de brillants chefs d’armes n’hésitent pas à verser des larmes quand l’heure est grave. L’effet de leurs sanglots dépend de leur position sociale et de leur renommée : les plaintes d’un aristocrate ont plus de portée que celles d’un simple soldat. Aux femmes, en revanche, les larmes sont souvent interdites (hormis (...) dans le deuil), quand bien même leur « nature » et leur imbecillus animus (Tite-Live, 3, 48, 8) les prédisposent aux pleurs. Le chantage à l’émotion est surtout féminin, pense-t-on. Malgré ses prescriptions de retenue, la philosophie, notamment stoïcienne, n’arrive pas à contrevenir à ce grand usage des larmes, qui est progressivement détourné et revalorisé par les auteurs chrétiens dans leur éloge de la pénitence. (shrink)

Although the “right not to know” is well established in international regulations, it has been heavily debated. Ubiquitous results from extended exome and genome analysis have challenged the right not to know...

This paper is divided into four sections. -/- The first section contains an informal characterization of what may, for the purposes of this discussion, be referred to as the standard interpretation of theological statements. -/- Then, in the second section, I mention two challenges to the commonsense view that theological statements have cognitive content: the quote “falsifiability challenge” and the “ translatability challenge”. -/- Both of these challenges involve an appeal to an empiricist criterion of cognitive content, but I contend (...) that they are nonetheless very different arguments and that clarity about the fundamental issues involved in the question of theology and verificationism cannot be achieved unless these two lines are argument are carefully distinguished. -/- The third section is concerned with the question of the possibility of an empiricist criterion of cognitive significance. The underlying purpose of the discussion will be to arrive derive at an evaluation of the commonly advanced claim that verificationist objections to the meaningfulness of theological language can be refuted by simply arguing that is not possible to formulate an adequate confirmability criterion of cognitive significance. -/- I then conclude by suggesting some responses that seem more promising. (shrink)

This paper raises a pair of objections to the novel libertarian position advanced in Robert Kane's recent book, The Significance of Free Will.The first objection's target is a central element in Kane's intriguing response to what he calls the "Intelligibility" and "Existence" questions about free will. It is argued that this response is undermined by considerations of luck.The second objection is directed at a portion of Kane's answer to what he calls "The Significance Question" about free will: "Why do (...) we, or should we, want to possess a free will that is incompatible with determinism? Is it a kind of freedom 'worth wanting'... and, if so, why?" A desire for "objective worth" has a featured role in his answer. However, a compatibilist can have that desire. (shrink)

Walton's book is a study of several fallacies in informal logic. Focusing on question-answer dialogues, and committed to a pragmatic rather than a semantic approach, he attempts to generate criteria for evaluating good and bad questions and answers. The book contains a discussion of such well-recognized fallacies as many questions, black-or-white questions, loaded questions, circular arguments, question-begging assertions and epithets, ad hominem and tu quoque arguments, ignoratio elenchi, and replying to a question with a question. In (...) addition, Walton develops several artificial dialogue games and has an excellent discussion of burden of proof in nonlegal contexts. The discussion is for the most part nontechnical and does not presuppose any training in formal logic. It is illustrated with many (sometimes overlong) examples of fallacies drawn from real life--mostly debates in the Canadian House of Commons. . . . Walton's book breaks new ground on a number of issues. Choice This first full-length study of logical fallacies, errors, faults, illicit attacks, blunders, and other critical deficiencies in interrogation and reply has been written in the tradition of informal fallacies in logic. It is especially valuable, readable, and interesting because of the 139 case studies it presents, many of these case studies come from political debates and some from interviews, legal cross-examinations, and other sources. Walton uses these challenging examples of tricky, aggressive, argumentative, or fallacious questions to develop coherent and pragmatic guidelines for criticizing questionable questions (and in some cases their replies) on logical grounds. Among the types of problematic questions analyzed are: the traditional so-called fallacy of many questions, illustrated by the famous Have you stopped beating your wife?; black and white questions; terminologically loaded questions; and questions containing personal attacks. These and other types of problematic questions as well as evasive replies and replying to a question with a question are studied. Critical errors of reasoning are identified and analyzed by developing context-based, normative models of reasonable dialogue in which a questioner must have freedom to ask informative and probing questions, and the respondent must be constrained to give reasonably direct, not overly evasive answers. In this era of negative and evasive political campaigning, with candidates employing skillful tactics of manipulating public opinion to assure election rather than taking clear stands and seriously debating issues in an informed and sincere manner, Question-Reply Argumentation is especially relevant reading for those who take democracy seriously. The methods used reflect a significant shift from earlier semantically based theories to current pragmatic, dialogue-based models, and will be of interest to logicians and linguists. The volume's conclusions should challenge some current preconceptions. Recommended reading for courses in logic, speech communications, linguistics, philosophy of language, areas of political science relating to political discourse and debate, courses on questioning in cognitive psychology, and courses on critical thinking in education. (shrink)

Discusses what I call the “Significance Question” for free will: Why do we, or should we, want to possess a free will that is incompatible with determinism? I argue that there are a number of things that we do, and should, want when we want genuine free will and that these things, properly understood, require an incompatibilist or nondeterminist account. They include genuine creativity, autonomy or self‐legislation, true desert for achievements, moral responsibility in an ultimate sense, being suitable objects of (...) reactive attitudes such as admiration, gratitude, resentment and indignation, dignity or self‐worth, a true sense of individuality or uniqueness as persons, love and friendship, and others. The chapter introduces what I call a “dialectic of selfhood” in order to show why these traits require an incompatibilist account of free will. (shrink)

In their paper “Sixteen Days” Barry Smith and Berit Brogaard try to answer the question: when does a human being begin to exist? In this paper we will address some methodological issues connected with this exercise in ontology. We shall begin by sketching the argument of “Sixteen Days”. We shall then attempt to characterize what is special about the ontological realism of “Sixteen Days” as contrasted to the linguistic constructivism which represents the more dominant current in contemporary analytic philosophy. This (...) will allow us to infer guidelines for assessing the quality of ontological theories of various types. We shall argue that ontological parsimony, groundedness, faithfulness to ordinary language, consistency with science, coherence, and fruitfulness are at least part of the adequacy criteria for such theories. These criteria will then be applied to the theory presented in “Sixteen Days”, and they will lead us to some revisions of this theory as well as to some reflections on its ethical implications. (shrink)

The purpose of this article is to begin to renew the theme of nature as a central, even unavoidable, question for philosophizing today. Furthermore, the argument is made that this question is most productively posed as a question concerning ethical life. Texts by Aristotle, Kant and Höderlin are considered. Attention to Heidegger's concerns with technology also serves to guide the issues here.

We are preoccupied with memory and psychological continuity in what it would mean to survive one’s death, and so are challenged when our memories fade. If we test the philosophical focus on continuity with theological expectations of transformation, we can look for what emerges, rather than what is lost, even in the most memory-ravaging conditions.

The shape of a life hypothesis holds, very roughly, that lives are better when they have an upward, rather than downward, slope in terms of momentary well-being. This hypothesis is plausible and has been thought to cause problems for traditional principles of prudential value/rationality. In this article, I conduct an inquiry into the shape of a life hypothesis that addresses two crucial questions. The first question is: what is the most plausible underlying explanation of the significance of a life’s (...) shape? The second question is: given its most plausible explanation, what does the shape of a life hypothesis teach us about the nature of prudential value? (shrink)

A Question of Voice: Philosophy and the Search for Legitimacy offers an explicit and comprehensive consideration of voice as a complex of rethinking aspects of the history of philosophy through issues of power, as well as contemporary issues that include and involve the desire for and the dynamics of legitimacy, for individuals and communities. By identifying voice as a significant theme and means by which and through which we might better engage some important philosophical questions, Ron Scapp hopes (...) to expand traditional philosophical discussion and discourse regarding questions about validity, legitimacy, empathy, and solidarity. He offers an innovative perspective that is informed and guided by multiculturalism, ethnic studies, queer studies, feminism, and thinkers and critics such as bell hooks, Barbara Christian, Angela Davis, Jacques Derrida, Michel Foucault, among others. A Question of Voice is an American investigation, but also suggests questions that emanate from contemporary continental thought as well as issues that arise from transnational perspectives-an approach that is motived by doing philosophy in an age of multiculturalism. (shrink)

The purpose of the article is to argue for the significance of a clarified goal of health care for the setting of priorities. Three arguments are explored. First, assessment of needs becomes necessary in so far as the principle of need should guide the priority-setting. The concept of health care need includes a goal component. This component should for rational reasons be identical with the goal of health care. Second, in order to use resources efficiently it is necessary to assess (...) the effects of health care. It is not, however, a question of assessing whether there is an effect but a question of assessing whether there is the right effect. And what constitutes the right effect can only be determined in relation to the goal of the enterprise. Third, the health sector involves several groups of actors such as politicians, administrators, doctors, nurses, physiotherapists, occupational therapists, educationists and patients. It is common knowledge that successful teamwork requires an understanding of a common goal. The article ends with an example of a goal chosen from ethics. (shrink)

This essay delineates and analyzes two kinds of questions that sport ethicists tend to ask: questions about athletic excellence and questions about justice. To pass ethical judgements when delving into questions concerning athletic excellence, sportspeople rely largely on a sport’s internal values, primary skills, or sport-specific athletic excellences. In contrast, questions about justice do not and should not include the reference or application of principles derived from the nature of a sport. Instead, sportspeople must refer (...) to general theories, most often based on the rights and obligations of fellow citizens. There are multiple benefits to pointing out this distinction. First, it can help sportspeople and sport philosophers recognize the normative standards most appropriate within specific debates. Second, the distinction may explain why some disputes in sport philosophy remained unresolved. Finally, and perhaps most significantly, an awareness of the differences between these types... (shrink)

Mason on the question: "What are the most important unsolved questions in political philosophy and/or related disciplines and what are the prospects for progress?" Political philosophy rarely, if ever, solves problems once and for all. Old problems usually persist despite attempts to resolve them, and even when they are successfully resolved, new ones arise from the ashes of the old. In my view, however, it would be a mistake to conclude from this that political philosophy makes no progress. We (...) should not measure progress in terms of problems solved or questions answered, but rather in terms of improved understanding. Progress occurs though clarifying the question that is being asked and by coming to a better understanding of which answers to that question are coherent. I think considerable progress has been made in the study of justice, in the sense that we understand the issues much better, though there are still many that we do not understand very well, for example, issues to do with the moral significance of national or state boundaries, and the issue of when justice requires people to bear the costs of their behaviour. I do not doubt that progress, in the sense of improved understanding, will be made on these issues as they come to the forefront of political philosophy. (shrink)

In matters of distributive justice, we assume that it is important how benefits and burdens are distributed among different people. But what, precisely, is important about this? In particular, what, from the point of view of justice, is ultimately at stake in what distributions come about? T. M. Scanlon has been coy about what his contractualist moral theory might imply for justice.[ii] Yet his conception of morality bears directly on this question of stakes. The significance of distribution then depends on (...) independently valuable relations of recognition. Distribution has no fundamental importance per se. This in turn has significant implications for how philosophical reasoning about justice in distribution must proceed. In recent years, many egalitarians have proceeded as though a distribution can be just by its very nature, in and of itself. The basic aim of the theory of distributive justice is to say what this intrinsically just distribution is.[iii] What is ultimately at stake in matters of distributive justice, it is suggested, is whether or not a certain intrinsically valuable distributional pattern comes about. Scanlon ’s theory implies that this cannot be right: a distribution, taken as such, cannot be owed, and so cannot be justice. Or at least this follows given the platitude about justice, due to Aristotle, that justice is, by nature, giving each his or her due.[iv] The platitude tells us that to distribute justly is simply to give to each individual what he or she is due or owed, as determined by an independent conception of what this is. According to Scanlon ’s independent conception of “what we owe to each other,” no individual can be owed a distribution across persons, as such. We are at most each owed our respective shares—only what we can reasonably ask for on our own behalf. (shrink)

The significance of enset for thefood and livelihood security of ruralhouseholds in Southwestern Ethiopia, where thiscrop is the main staple, raises two majorquestions. The first concerns the relatedissues of household food security andlivelihood security and the contribution of theenset farming and food system in achievingthese. The second deals with the issue ofbiodiversity in enset cultivation. What roledoes biodiversity play in food and livelihoodsecurity and how is it perceived and measured?To answer the latter question, it is necessaryto look at the issue (...) of classification of ensetvarieties, comparing indigenous and scientificclassifications. In answering the questions, aninterdisciplinary approach is used, and bothetic and emic perspectives are applied. Agender perspective is applied as well becauseof the gendered division of labor in ensetcultivation and the gendered nature ofindigenous knowledge. The analysis draws mainlyon the findings of a recent study on ensetcultivation in Ethiopia [Negash PhD thesis,Wageningen University, The Netherlands]. Thefindings show that enset farming guaranteeshousehold food security to a large extent, butthat household livelihood security depends onthe cultivation of additional crops andhousehold ownership of livestock and otherassets. It was also found that maximizingdiversity in enset is of importance to farmers,and that the farmers' classification of ensetvarieties yields a finer grid than theclassification of enset clones on the basis ofmolecular analysis. (shrink)

The ever-present possibility of death forces upon us the question of life's meaning and for this reason death has been a central concern of philosophers throughout history. From Socrates to Heidegger, philosophers have grappled with the nature and significance of death. In "Annihilation", Christopher Belshaw explores two central questions at the heart of philosophy's engagement with death: what is death; and is it bad that we die? Belshaw begins by distinguishing between literal and metaphorical uses of the term and (...) offers a unified and biological account of death, denying that death brings about non-existence. How our death relates to the death of the brain is explored in detail. Belshaw considers the common-sense view that death is often bad for us by examining the circumstances that might make it bad as well as the grounds for thinking that one death can be worse than another. In addition, Belshaw explores whether we can be harmed after we die and before we were born. The final chapters explore whether we should prevent more deaths and whether, via cryonics, brain transplants, data storage, we might cheat death. Throughout Belshaw shows how questions of personhood and life's value are bound up with our views on the sense and significance of death. "Annihilation's" in-depth analysis and insightful exposition will be welcomed not only by philosophers working on the metaphysics of death but also by students and scholars alike looking for a foundation for discussions of the ethics of abortion, euthanasia, life-support and suicide. (shrink)

Standard accounts of the senses attempt to answer the question how and why we count five senses ; none of the standard accounts is satisfactory. Any adequate account of the senses must explain the significance of the senses, that is, why distinguishing different senses matters. I provide such an explanation, and then use it as the basis for providing an account of the senses and answering the counting question.

A large number of legal rules create an obligation to prevent, repair or otherwise mitigate damage to human health or the environment. Many of these rules require that a legally relevant causal relation between human behaviour and the damage at issue is established, and in the establishment of causal relations of this kind scientific information is often pressed into service. This thesis examines this specifically legal use of scientific information. It shows that many legally relevant causal relations cannot be established (...) in this way. It also shows that the legal strategy for dealing with epistemic difficulties by relaxing the standard of proof is of limited value in tackling this problem. Consequently, the legal rules focused upon are less efficient tools for combating damage to human health and the environment than their appearances suggest. Other legal means to achieve this aim should therefore be considered. The thesis begins by presenting a framework which can be used to solve some important problems with communication and the division of labour that arise when scientific information is used to answer legal questions. This framework recognizes both epistemological and ontological differences between law and science. The latter are differences between the kinds of entity which are relevant in distinct theoretical contexts; the former, by contrast, are differences between applicable standards of proof. In subsequent parts of the thesis this framework shapes the discussion of the question: To what extent can legally relevant causal relations, involving legally significant entities, be established through the application of scientific information about other, scientifically relevant entities and legal standards of proof. The thesis concludes with a discussion of some of the ways in which the legal regulation could, potentially, be adapted, so as to counteract damage to human health and the environment more efficiently. (shrink)

The question of when or if a nation should intervene in another country’s affairs is one of the most important concerns in today’s volatile world. Taking John Stuart Mill’s famous 1859 essay “A Few Words on Non-Intervention” as his starting point, international relations scholar Michael W. Doyle addresses the thorny issue of when a state’s sovereignty should be respected and when it should be overridden or disregarded by other states in the name of humanitarian protection, national self-determination, or national security. (...) In this time of complex social and political interplay and increasingly sophisticated and deadly weaponry, Doyle reinvigorates Mill’s principles for a new era while assessing the new United Nations doctrine of responsibility to protect. In the twenty-first century, intervention can take many forms: military and economic, unilateral and multilateral. Doyle’s thought-provoking argument examines essential moral and legal questions underlying significant American foreign policy dilemmas of recent years, including Libya, Iraq, and Afghanistan. (shrink)

The term of practice plays an important role in MacIntyre’s philosophy. He uses it in two different ways: either generally as contrasted with theory, or as a specifically defined term within his Neo-Aristotelianism. These two meanings are independent from each other. The paper is a reconstruction of MacIntyre’s argument concerning the notion of practice in its general sense and as related to the concept of theory. First, it analyses practice as opposed to theory, and its Marxist roots; second, it outlines (...) the post-Marxist revolutionary “Benedictine” vision of MacIntyre’s Thomistic Aristotelianism; third, the issue in question is exemplified via the mutual relationship between political philosophy and politics; finally, several implications of the author’s argument are suggested. The paper claims that those engaged in elaboration, critique and implementation of political and/or moral theories may benefit from MacIntyre’s insightful account of the significance of practice for theory. (shrink)

_Purpose._ This research involves revealing the methodological significance of the anthropological understanding of values for conducting modern scientific research. _Theoretical basis._ Philosophical anthropology acts as an epistemological basis for answers to ontological questions that are part of the structure of such problems in modern science as the construction of a scientific picture of the world, the ordering of data of natural attitude, and anthropocosmism. The ontological basis for the formation of the anthropological theory of values is the teaching of (...) Wilhelm Leibniz, Immanuel Kant, Rudolf Lotze, and Martin Heidegger. _Originality._ The creation of a scientific picture of the world, the research of natural attitude, and an anthropological approach to cosmology carried out from the viewing angle of the philosophy of values show the close mutual conditioning of these scientific issues. A successful determination of one’s value positions by a scientist-researcher is impossible without his/her agreeing with his/her picture of the world with the prevailing ideas about the world in their society. Such ideas are studied by anthropocosmism, which researches not so much the world in itself, but a view of this world from the standpoint of the existing state of society and the main intentions of its development. _Conclusions._ The value attitude of scientists at a certain stage of the development of scientific knowledge forms their picture of the world, which has the form of self-explanatory scientific provisions. The facts of modern physics must always, one way or another, receive their legitimation through the world of the human natural attitude. Even the unobservable characteristics of the microcosm are explained by appealing to knowledge about the observable characteristics of the world. The anthropocentric nature of cosmology is determined by the fact that in modern philosophy, the values of a person explain not only the way of one’s cognition but also the way of one’s inclusion in the world. (shrink)

In this paper, I examine the question of how to nurture and develop conscientiousness thinkers and future citizens of diverse liberal-democratic societies from the perspective of virtue epistemology. More specifically, I examine this question in terms of how public schools might frame engagement with religious perspectives in the classroom. I begin by distinguishing between good and bad conscientiousness through an exploration of current work in the field of virtue epistemology. I then follow Kenneth Strike in his defense of the need (...) for a more robust engagement with religious perspectives as a liberal educational imperative. I argue that basing a framework for engagement on VE, particularly the notion of subjective justification, has significant benefits. My main interest in developing a framework for what I deem to be a necessary supplemental dimension of citizenship education focused on religious engagement is in underlining the responsibility that liberal educators have in regulating what is often a highly contentious and unfortunately caddish debate surrounding religion and the religious. I conclude that by eschewing this responsibility educators are potentially missing out on significant resources for supporting the liberal-democratic educational agenda. (shrink)

Chandra Mohanty, in introducing the phrase “feminism without borders,” acknowledges that she is influenced by the image of “doctors without borders” and wants to highlight the multiplicity of voices and viewpoints within the feminist coalition. So the question of agency assumes primary significance here. But answering the question of agency becomes harder once we try to accommodate this multiplicity. Take, for example, the practice of veiling among certain Muslim women. As many third-world feminists have pointed out, although veiling can't simply (...) be perceived as an expression of women's oppression, it can't be perceived as an expression of “free agency” either since what is required for true feminist agency is women's ability to “formulate choices” and not simply to make choices. In this paper I argue that this ability includes two related abilities: first, to develop a perspective of self that acknowledges and accepts its own grounding in its given intersectionalities; second, to realize that its interdependencies and interconnectivities enable a sense of continuity and solidarity that works collaboratively toward consensus without sacrificing or stifling all differences. My main argument is that feminist self-consciousness informed by Buddhist mindfulness gives us opportunities to articulate clearly and to cultivate both of these abilities. (shrink)

In this paper I explore the epistemic significance of practical reasons to inquire. I have in mind the range of practical reasons one might have to do such things as collect (additional) evidence, consult with various sources, employ certain methods or techniques, double-check one’s answer to a question, etc. After expanding the diet of examples in which subjects have such reasons, I appeal to features of these sorts of reason in order to question the motivation for pragmatic encroachment in epistemology. (...) Once we reject pragmatic encroachment, it can seem that we are forced to treat practical reasons to inquire as having no distinctly epistemic significance. This is not so; I conclude by sketching an alternative account of what the epistemic significance of such reasons might be. (shrink)

Consider the hypothesis H that a defendant is guilty, and the evidence E that a majority of h out of n independent jurors have voted for H and a minority of k:=n-h against H. How likely is the majority verdict to be correct? By a formula of Condorcet, the probability that H is true given E depends only on each juror's competence and on the absolute margin between the majority and the minority h-k, but neither on the number n, nor (...) on the proportion h/n. This paper reassesses that result and explores its implications. First, using the classical Condorcet jury model, I derive a more general version of Condorcet's formula, confirming the significance of the absolute margin, but showing that the probability that H is true given E depends also on an additional parameter: the prior probability that H is true. Second, I show that a related result holds when we consider not the degree of belief we attach to H given E, but the degree of support E gives to H. Third, I address the implications for the definition of special majority voting, a procedure used to capture the asymmetry between false positive and false negative decisions. I argue that the standard definition of special majority voting in terms of a required proportion of the jury is epistemically questionable, and that the classical Condorcet jury model leads to an alternative definition in terms of a required absolute margin between the majority and the minority. Finally, I show that the results on the significance of the absolute margin can be resisted if the so-called assumption of symmetrical juror competence is relaxed. (shrink)

We have seen that despite Feferman's results Gödel's second theorem vitiates the use of Hilbert-type epistemological programs and consistency proofs as a response to mathematical skepticism. Thus consistency proofs fail to have the philosophical significance often attributed to them.This does not mean that consistency proofs are of no interest to philosophers. We know that a ‘non-pathological’ consistency proof for a system S will use methods which are not available in S. When S is as strong a system as we are (...) willing to entertain seriously then a consistency proof for it will yield no epistemological gain. But in other cases philosophers might argue that the proof uses methods which are merely different rather than stronger than those available in the system in question. This claim has been made, for example, in the case of the constructive consistency proofs for elementary number theory. Similar philosophical investigations can be made on relative consistency proofs, since these differ from each other in the principles they employ. For example, most relative consistency proofs can be carried out within elementary number theory, but without using the theory of real numbers, no one has been able to prove the consistency of Quine's ML relative to that of his NF.What about the consistency of all mathematics or of some strong system for set theory? How do we answer the skeptic? Since here a convincing proof is not possible, we have established that the skeptic demands too much. We cannot be certain that our axioms are free from contradiction and must treat them as hypotheses which may be abandoned or modified in the face of further mathematical experience. This attitude is taken by many foundational workers who also go on to voice opinions about thelikelihood that various systems are consistent. Since these opinions are variously supported by appeals to the clarity of the mathematical concept formalized, the existence or non-existence of ‘weird’ models for the system and actual empirical experience with the system, this is surely a fruitful area for philosophical research. (shrink)

The views of Quine and Strawson on the significance of 'mass terms' are rehearsed, and the metaphysical status of substances, in the chemist's sense, is considered. It is urged that the ontological dichotomy of particulars and universals is not adequate to accommodate such substances, which are in a sense to be explicated concrete but non-particular.

In this article, I address the question of violence with respect to the phenomenological difference between the transcendental and the empirical field. In the first part, I phenomenologically address the notion of violence, developing a concept required for an account of the phenomenon of violence. Thus, I correlate it with the notion of vulnerability, arguing that violence cannot be understood irrespective of vulnerability. However, a proper phenomenological account has to indicate the subjective conditions of possibility of a phenomenon as it (...) is given in experience. Therefore, we should ask: what is the status of violence when we are talking about the transcendental field? This question leads to the second part of my article, where I address the notion of violence from the perspective of the difference between the pure and the empirical ego, as it has been traced out by Husserl. If from the point of view of an empirical ego the concept of violence is meaningful, from the point of view of the transcendental ego it seems to be absurd. This is particularly significant, because Husserl is talking about the transcendental ego as being immortal. The pure ego is thus invulnerable and this means that violence—understood from the point of view of both the violating subject and the violated one—is something that cannot be linked to the transcendental field. The question that arises—how is violence possible on the empirical level, since it is impossible on the transcendental level?—is a question to which Husserl cannot respond. (shrink)

Every choice we make is set against a background of massive ignorance about our past, our future, our circumstances, and ourselves. Philosophers are divided on the moral significance of such ignorance. Some say that it has a direct impact on how we ought to behave - the question of what our moral obligations are; others deny this, claiming that it only affects how we ought to be judged in light of the behaviour in which we choose to engage - the (...) question of what responsibility we bear for our choices. Michael Zimmerman claims that our ignorance has an important bearing on both questions, and offers an account of moral obligation and moral responsibility that is sharply at odds with the prevailing wisdom. His book will be of interest to a wide range of readers in ethics. (shrink)