The late Rabbi Shlomo Freifeld possessed the enviable ability to relate to a wide range of people. The genuineness of his caring for others, his rock-solid convictions and fluent expression created a magnetic personality few could resist. His ch.

This study in English of Hegel's political philosophy presents an overall view of the development of Hegel's political thinking. The author has drawn on Hegel's philosophical works, his political tracts and his personal correspondence. Professor Avineri shows that although Hegel is primarily thought of as a philosopher of the state, he was much concerned with social problems and his concept of the state must be understood in this context.

Moral reflection and deliberation on both deception and manipulation is hindered by lack of agreement on the precise meanings of these concepts. Specifically, there is disagreement on how to understand their relation vis-à-vis each other. Curiously, according to one prominent view, all deceptions are instances of manipulations, while according to another, all manipulations are instances of deceptions. This paper makes that implicit disagreement explicit, and argues that both views are untenable. It concludes that deception and manipulation partially overlap, and takes (...) further steps in delineating the border between these concepts. The paper ends with the conclusion that moral judgments regarding either manipulation or deception cannot be transferred wholesale from the one concept to the other just by virtue of the relations between the concepts. (shrink)

Ever since the discovery of Marx's Early Writings, most of the literature concerned with Marx's intellectual development has centred around the so-called gap between the 'young' Marx, who was considered to be a humanist thinker, and the 'older' Marx, who was held to be a determinist with little concern for anything outside his narrow theory of historical materialism. Dr Avineri claims that such a gap between the 'young' and 'older' Marx did not exist. He supports his claim by a detailed (...) study of the whole corpus of Marx's writing on social and political thought. (shrink)

Beneficence and respect for autonomy are two of the most fundamental moral duties in general and in bioethics in particular. Beyond the usual questions of how to resolve conflicts between these duties in particular cases, there are more general questions about the possible forms of the interactions between them. Only recognition of the full spectrum of possible interactions will ensure optimal moral deliberation when duties potentially conflict. This paper has two simultaneous objectives. The first is to suggest a typological scheme (...) of all possible modes of interaction; these will be classified under the “discrete,” “semi-discrete,” and “non-discrete” categories, according to whether the meaning and/or forms of expression of each duty are treated as independent from or rather as constrained by the other. The second objective is to show that all logical possibilities of interaction indeed have real expressions in medical ethics, to provide clear illustrations of each, and in particular to stress those that have usually escaped recognition. (shrink)

Libertarian paternalism's notion of “nudging” refers to steering individual decision making so as to make choosers better off without breaching their free choice. If successful, this may offer an ideal synthesis between the duty to respect patient autonomy and that of beneficence, which at times favors paternalistic influence. A growing body of literature attempts to assess the merits of nudging in health care. However, this literature deals almost exclusively with health policy, while the question of the potential benefit of nudging (...) for the practice of informed consent has escaped systematic analysis. This article focuses on this question. While it concedes that nudging could amount to improper exploitation of cognitive weaknesses, it defends the practice of nudging in a wide range of other conditions. The conclusion is that, when ethically legitimate, nudging offers an important new paradigm for informed consent, with a special potential to overcome the classical dilemma between paternalistic beneficence and respect for autonomy. (shrink)

section 1. Medical ethics -- section 2. Technology -- section 3. Social and business issues -- section 4. Ritual -- section 5. Women -- section 6. Israel -- section 7. Kashrut -- section 8. Jewish identity and marriage -- section 9. Shabbat and holiday.

It is widely agreed that deception of the enemy can be morally permissible in war. However, the question of the morally acceptable limits to deception in war has barely been explored in contemporary ethics. This paper defends the thesis that there are no moral limits on military deception per se, that is, no limits based on the ethics of truthfulness. Rather, all moral restriction against deception in war is based on another moral principle: military deception is morally unacceptable only when (...) it violates the principle of not harming those who do not intend to harm us. (shrink)

Combining two results from machine learning theory we prove that a formula is NIP if and only if it satisfies uniform definability of types over finite sets (UDTFS). This settles a conjecture of Laskowski.

Recent years have seen a shift in the approach to religious life among members of the Israeli Religious Zionist and the American Modern Orthodox communities. The trend towards spirituality, and to Hasidic teachings and practices in particular, is noteworthy and deserving of exploration. A range of leading American and Israeli thinkers - rabbis and philosophers, anthropologists and theologians - weigh in on these trends.

Anyone who is not a deontological absolutist regarding truthfulness will readily agree with Christopher Meyers’s thesis that there are cases in which...

Alan Turing’s 1950 imitation game has been widely understood as a means for testing if an entity is intelligent. Following a series of papers by Diane Proudfoot, I offer a socio-technological interpretation of Turing’s paper and present an alternative way of understanding both the imitation game and Turing’s concept of intelligence. Turing, I claim, saw intelligence as a social concept, meaning that possession of intelligence is a property determined by society’s attitude toward the entity. He realized that as long as (...) human society held a prejudiced attitude toward machinery—seeing machines a priori as mindless objects—machines could not be said to be intelligent, by definition. He also realized, though, that if humans’ a priori, chauvinistic attitude toward machinery changed, the existence of intelligent machines would become logically possible. Turing thought that such a change would eventually occur: He believed that when scientists overcome the technological challenge of constructing sophisticated machines that could imitate human verbal behavior—i.e., do well in the imitation game—humans’ prejudiced attitude toward machinery will have altered in such a way that machines could be said to be intelligent. The imitation game, for Turing, was not an intelligence test, but a technological aspiration whose realization would likely involve a change in society’s attitude toward machines. (shrink)

Shlomo Pines The Philosophical Purport of Maimonides' Halachic Works and the Purport of The Guide of the Perplexed Maimonides' principal halachic works, ...

A central debate in the ethics of deception concerns the moral comparison among the three media through which deception is executed: lying, falsely implicating, or nonlinguistic deception. The two prominent views are that lying is morally worse or that the choice of medium is morally insignificant. This article refutes both and argues for a new position. The article first presents a theory on the moral significance of the medium of deception as such: it argues that the medium of communication affects (...) the reliability of beliefs formed through it, which amounts to gradations in the warrant of truth of different media. Breach of lower warrant of truth is a lesser breach of trust; it therefore deserves lighter condemnation. Consequently, the article shows that, morally speaking, lying is either worse than or equal to falsely implicating and that there is no a priori gradation between nonlinguistic deception and the two linguistic media. (shrink)

Zealous nudging can deteriorate into paternalistic bullshitting. To the extent that William Simkulet’s paper is a reminder against that danger, it does us good service.1 Simkulet, however, makes the far bolder claims that nudging just is bullshitting and that—since bullshitting deviates from truthfulness, and truthful disclosure is essential for valid consent—nudging invalidates informed consent. These bolder claims involve a set of errors. The problem starts with Simkulet’s formal definition of ‘bullshit’, which says that conveying x while intending one’s audience to (...) believe y is sufficient for bullshit. This, however, is not true since the bullshitter’s not caring whether x is true is constitutive of bullshitting, and hence a necessary condition. Why, we then ask, must such lack of care be the case with the doctor who nudges? It is at least prima facie easy and intuitive to think of scenarios in which the ethical doctor is staunchly committed to telling the truth while simultaneously acting on additional motives regarding the expected effects of what is said. If the doctor cares about saying only truths, he is not a bullshitter. Having communicative motivations that transcend the trivial motive of transmitting the truth of the literal content of what is said is normal and indeed normative in conversations of regular people.2 …. (shrink)

ABSTRACTThis paper introduces the category of ‘non-deceptive manipulation that causes false beliefs’, analyzes how it narrows the traditional scope of ‘deception’, and draws moral implications.

The nonidentity problem is a deep puzzle challenging the moral intuition that what is bad must be bad for someone. The first part of the paper constructs a new theory of harming, whereas the second part builds on the conclusions of the first to offer a new solution to the NIP. The first part discusses the neglected question of when a burden inflicted in the context of overall benefitting can be discretized as a separate entity—only when it can, is it (...) possible to identify the burden as harm, and only then is it possible to harm in bringing into overall good existence. The second part explains how, in those cases where creating is indeed harming, we can use the logic of concept expansion to construct a concept of wronging that applies to creation cases. (shrink)

This monument of rabbinical exegesis written at the end of the twelfth century has exerted an immense and continuing influence upon Jewish thought. Its aim is to liberate people from the tormenting perplexities arising from their understanding of the Bible according only to its literal meaning. This edition contains extensive introductions by Shlomo Pines and Leo Strauss, a leading authority on Maimonides.

Significant advancements towards a future of big data genomic medicine, associated with large-scale public dataset repositories, intensify dilemmas of genomic privacy. To resolve dilemmas adequately, we need to understand the relative force of the competing considerations that make them up. Attitudes towards genomic privacy are complex and not well understood; understanding is further complicated by the vague claim of ‘genetic exceptionalism’. In this paper, we distinguish between consequentialist and non-consequentialist privacy interests: while the former are concerned with harms secondary to (...) exposure, the latter represent the interest in a private sphere for its own sake, as an essential component of human dignity. Empirical studies of attitudes towards genomic privacy have almost never targeted specifically this important dignitary component of the privacy interest. In this paper we first articulate the question of a non-consequentialist genomic privacy interest, and then present results of an empirical study that probed people’s attitudes towards that interest. This was done via comparison to other non-consequentialist privacy interests, which are more tangible and can be more easily assessed. Our results indicate that the non-consequentialist genomic privacy interest is rather weak. This insight can assist in adjudicating dilemmas involving genomic privacy. (shrink)

The nocebo effect, the mirror-phenomenon to the placebo effect, is when the expectation of a negative outcome precipitates the corresponding symptom or leads to its exacerbation. One of the basic ethical duties in health care is to obtain informed consent from patients before treatment; however, the disclosure of information regarding potential complications or side effects that this involves may precipitate a nocebo effect. While dilemmas between the principles of respect for patient autonomy and of nonmaleficence are recognized in medical ethics, (...) there has not yet been an ethical discussion focused on the potential dilemma raised by the nocebo effect of informed consent. This dilemma is especially pernicious, since it involves a direct causality of harm by the caregiver that is unparalleled by other potential harmful effects of information disclosure. This paper articulates the dilemma of the NEIC and offers a seminal ethical analysis. (shrink)

Le Tractatus particulares est un ouvrage en quatre parties attribué à Abraham Ibn Ezra (ca. 1089-ca. 1161), qui nous est parvenu en deux traductions latines. Le présent article montre que, malgré les attestations dans les incipits et les explicits des deux traductions latines, le Tractatus particulares ne peut pas être un ouvrage authentique d’Ibn Ezra, ni un recueil d’écrits de sa plume. L’essentiel du Tractatus particulares est constitué de traductions de l’arabe en hébreu, réalisées bien après la mort d’Ibn Ezra (...) et associées à son nom par la suite. L’article entend aussi montrer que la source hébraïque du Tractatus particulares était sans doute conçue comme un ouvrage astrologique complet, une sorte d’encyclopédie astrologique médiévale. (shrink)

Rationality and Logic J. Kekes i It is a basic assumption of the Western intellectual and moral tradition that rationality is a central value. ...

After centuries of military powerlessness, Jews in the twentieth century began to ask themselves fundamental questions of military ethics. Wars -- including current conflicts in Israel -- are inherently brutal. How, then, should Jews respond to Arab terror attacks before they had an army to protect them? What does Judaism say about the bombing of Dresden, the Warsaw Ghetto uprising, or rebelling against British control of the land of Israel? Is "land for peace" a moral option? What about preemptive attacks (...) in 1967 or after 9/11? Can we fight terrorists in urban settings while protecting our soldiers, avoiding non-combatants, and preserving our public image? Ethics of our Fighters tells the story of these political dilemmas and moral debates. It draws from the pivotal historical moments of the last one hundred years to weave together the most important ideas of contemporary ethicists with the insights of the greatest rabbinic scholars. This book systematically presents, for the first time, a holistically Jewish perspective on military ethics. (shrink)

Ideas of nudging, choice architecture, and libertarian paternalism have sparked much controversy. Some find in them a long-sought optimal harmonization of the commitments to beneficent, welfare-increasing influence and to respecting persons, whereas people on the opposite end see in them an especially sinister form of control. One area in which these ideas are of greatest importance is health care, where improving people's decisions, under the constraint of respect for persons, is a vital concern. Nudging Health: Health Law and Behavioral Economics, (...) edited by Glenn Cohen, Holly Fernandez Lynch, and Christopher Robertson, is the first book dedicated to this important topic. This anthology of twenty-four chapters, with section introductions and a foreword by Cass Sunstein, presents a wide spectrum of perspectives on both the promise and the difficulties in applying choice architecture to health care. The short and readable chapters, written for the book, cover questions of public health law and policy, clinical practice, medical ethics, and political philosophy. They present a synopsis of the types of questions that nudging brings up in health care broadly construed, offer new analyses, and provide much fodder for thought. (shrink)