One of the contexts for the development of social capital and spiritual health is cultural capital. The relationship between religion as an independent variable and social capital as a dependent variable has been analysed. This article aims to analyse the role of cultural capital in the development of social capital and spiritual health from the perspective of religion and negative Islamic teachings. This study attempts to answer the question, 'what is the role of cultural capital on the development of social (...) capital and spiritual health from the perspective of negative Islamic teachings?' In this article, an attempt has been made to compare the negative aspect of education in the form of the Qur'anic concept of 'cultivation', with its positive aspect in terms of principles, approach and method, in order to return to the model arising from Qur'anic and mystical teachings. The research method is descriptive and analytical, and data processing is interpretive and critical. Data collection has been performed utilising documentary and library study methods. The research findings demonstrate that 'ethics, science, values, norms, rituals and art' are the most important elements of embodied cultural capital, which are effective in the development of social capital. CONTRIBUTION: Therefore, there is a substantial relationship between religion, negative Islamic teachings, the development of embodied cultural capital and the development of social capital and spiritual health. (shrink)

خواجه نصيرالدين طوسي در زمرة بزرگ‌ترين و پرنفوذترين عالمان مسلمان سدة هفتم هجري به شمار مي‌رود. بخش عمده‌اي آثار وي ناظر به آثار و آراء فخرالدين رازي و در دفاع از فلسفه و ارائة كلامي درست و متين تدوين شده است. خواجه علاوه بر كلام و فلسفه، آثار عرفاني نيز دارد. مشكل مطالة آثار وي اين است كه گاه وي در كلام به مطالبي معتقد شده و در فلسفه از آنها دست برداشته است. وي همچنين با پذيرش محوري‌ترين آموزة عرفان (...) اسلامي، از سطح فلسفة رايج نيز گذشته است. برخي معتقدند كه خواجه نصير نيز مانند عده‌اي ديگر از انديشمندان، دچار تحوّل فكري شده و اين اختلاف‌ها مربوط به دوران‌هاي گوناگون فعاليت علمي و معرفتي وي بوده است. اين مقاله نشان مي‌‌دهد كه خواجه نصير هم ‌زمان همة اين سطوح انديشه را داشته است و نمي‌توان او را دچار تحوّل فكري دانست. درحقيقت، سه سطح طولي انديشه خواجه، به ترتيب عبارتند از: كلام، فلسفه و عرفان. در اين مقاله، با ارائة نمونه‌هايي، وجود اين سه سطح در كار وي، اثبات شده است. (shrink)

حقايق اندماجي مقام ذات، حيثيات، احوال و صفات آن ذات بسيط اند. ازآنجا كه اين حقايق، تفصيل نيافته و تعينات ذات نيستند، در ذات مستهلك اند. حقايق اندماجي، كثرتي بالفعل را در ذات ايجاد نمي كنند و در غيب ذات، مخفي اند؛ يعني ظهور ندارند. اين حقايق، از جهت واحد بر ذات صادق اند، يعني حيثيات جهت واحد ذات هستند. عارفان مكتب ابن عربي، از واژگاني مانند استهلاك، اندماج، استجنان، اجمال، كمون و قوه، براي اشاره به اين حقايق استفاده كرده (...) اند. آنان تبيين هايي دربارة چگونگي حضور اين حقايق در متن ذاتي كه بدان موجودند، ارائه داده و از مثال هايي نيز براي دريافت بهتر آنها استفاده كرده اند. از نظرگاه عرفاني، اين حقايق را بايد داراي نحوه اي ويژه از موجوديت مجازي يا بالعرض دانست. اين نوشتار، از حقايق اندماجي با تأكيد بر مقام ذات بحث مي كند. كمالات و شئون ذاتي مقام ذات، مهم ترين مصداق حقايق اندماجي در عرفان محيي الديني هستند. اما اصل بحث عموميت دارد و دربارة ساير مصاديق اين حقايق نيز جريان دارد. (shrink)

The meaning of a science rooted in the sacred, its contrast to modern science and its pertinence to us today.

The current ecological crisis is a matter of urgent global concern, with solutions being sought on many fronts. In this book, Seyyed Hossein Nasr argues that the devastation of our world has been exacerbated, if not actually caused, by the reductionist view of nature that has been advanced by modern secular science. What is needed, he believes, is the recovery of the truth to which the great, enduring religions all attest; namely that nature is sacred. Nasr traces the historical (...) process through which Western civilization moved away from the idea of nature as sacred and embraced a world view which sees humans as alienated from nature and nature itself as a machine to be dominated and manipulated by humans. His goal is to negate the totalitarian claims of modern science and to re-open the way to the religious view of the order of nature, developed over centuries in the cosmologies and sacred sciences of the great traditions. Each tradition, Nasr shows, has a wealth of knowledge and experience concerning the order of nature. The resuscitation of this knowledge, he argues, would allow religions all over the globe to enrich each other and cooperate to heal the wounds inflicted upon the Earth. (shrink)

Accession Number: ATLA0001712108; Hosting Book Page Citation: p 71-86.; Language(s): English; General Note: Bibliography: p 86.; Rev from an article in The Islamic quarterly.; Issued by ATLA: 20130825; Publication Type: Essay.

In discussing the intricate and somewhat complex relationship between Shiʻism and Sufism, both in principle and essence or in their metahistorical reality as well as in time and history, we need hardly concern ourselves with the too often repeated criticism made by certain orientalists who would doubt the Islamic and Quranic character of both Shiʻism and Sufism. Basing themselves on an a priori assumption that Islam is not a revelation and, even if a religion, is only a simple ‘religion of (...) the sword’ for a simple desert people, such would-be critics brush aside as un-Islamic all that speaks of gnosis and esotericism, pointing to the lack of historical texts in the early period as proof of their thesis, as if the non-existent in itself could disprove the existence of something which may have existed without leaving a written trace for us to dissect and analyse today. The reality of Shiʻism and Sufism as integral aspects of the Islamic revelation is too blinding to be neglected or brushed aside by any would-be historical argument. The fruit is there to prove that the tree has its roots in a soil that nourishes it. And the spiritual fruit can only be borne by a tree whose roots are sunk in a revealed truth. To deny this most evident of truths would be as if we were to doubt the Christian sanctity of a St Francis of Assisi because the historical records of the first years of the Apostolic succession are not clear. What the presence of St Francis proves is in reality the opposite fact, namely, that the Apostolic succession must be real even if no historical records are at hand. The same holds true mutatis mutandis for Shiʻism and Sufism. In this paper in any case we will begin by taking for granted the Islamic character of Shiʻism and Sufism and upon this basis delve into their relationship. In fact Shiʻism and Sufism are both, in different ways and on different levels, intrinsic aspects of Islamic orthodoxy, this term being taken not only in its theological sense but in its universal sense as tradition and universal truth contained within a revealed form. (shrink)

In this paper, I explore one line of argument for the Humean Theory of Reasons, the view that all normative reasons are based on desires. Then, I suggest a way to block that argument inspired by Aquinas’s discussions on choice, will, and indeterminacy of reason alone.

An inventory of his entire oeuvre provides detailed information on the extant manuscripts. The volume furthermore includes editions of nine of his writings.

In this paper, I offer a reconstruction of Ghazālī's encounter with scepticism in the Deliverance from Error. For Ghazālī, I argue, radical scepticism about the possibility of knowledge ensues from intellectualist assumptions about the nature of justification. On the reading that I will propose, Ghazālī holds that foundational knowledge can only be justified via actions that lead to transformative experiences.

According to a common interpretation, most explicitly defended by Onora O’Neill and Patricia Kitcher, Kant held that epistemic obligations normatively depend on moral obligations. That is, were a rational agent not bound by any moral obligation, then she would not be bound by any epistemic obligation either. By contrast, in this paper, I argue that, according to Kant, some epistemic obligations are normatively independent from moral obligations, and are indeed normatively absolute. This view, which I call epistemicism, has two parts. (...) First, it claims that in the absence of other kinds of obligations, rational agents would still be bound by these epistemic obligations, i. e., that the latter are normatively independent. Second, it claims that, no matter what other obligations are at stake, rational agents are bound by these epistemic obligations, i. e., the normativity of these epistemic obligations is absolute in that it cannot be undercut by any moral or other sort of obligation. The argument turns on an exploratory reading of Kant’s remarks in “What Is Orientation in Thinking?” (1786) about the maxim of “thinking for oneself” as the “supreme touchstone of truth”. In contrast to O’Neill and Kitcher, I argue that if we interpret this maxim as stating the unifying principle of theoretical and practical reason, then we must interpret it as stating an epistemic, and not merely practical imperative. This result, I argue, vindicates epistemicism and illuminates interesting lessons about Kant’s conception of the category of “epistemic” norms. Further, it helps us make headway with Kant’s enigmatic remarks about the unity of practical and theoretical reason in the Groundwork, the first and second Critiques, and the Lectures on Logic. On my proposal, principles of the practical and theoretical uses of reason are unified through a formal epistemic principle. (shrink)

This volume gathers together the numerous essays by the Iranian metaphysician and ontologist, Seyyed Hossein Nasr, on Islamic philosophers and the intricate ...

A standard reaction to the problem of evil is to look for a greater good that can explain why God (with the traditional attributes) might have created this world instead of a seemingly better one which has no (or less) evil. This paper proposes an approach we call the Moral Progress Approach: Given the value of progress, a non-perfect world containing evil may be preferable to a perfect world without evil. This makes room for the possibility that this world, with (...) all its evil, may be preferable to a world with less evil. We argue that our proposal is different from apparently similar views such as soul-making theodicy. (shrink)

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:Reviewed by:Marx and Laozi: A Dialectical Synthesis by James ChambersReza Adeputra Tohis (bio)Marx and Laozi: A Dialectical Synthesis. By James Chambers. Switzerland: Palgrave Macmillan, 2023. Pp. xvii + 449, Hardcover €129.99, ISBN 978-3-031-40980-6.James Chambers’s Marx and Laozi: A Dialectical Synthesis (hereafter Marx and Laozi) attempts to connect the thoughts of Karl Marx, the philosopher and socialist revolutionary, with Laozi, the legendary founding figure of Daoism. Although they come from (...) vastly different cultural and philosophical backgrounds, in Marx and Laozi Chambers seeks to demonstrate that there is a dialectical synthesis between Marx’s materialist thought and Laozi’s aesthetic philosophy. The author’s primary aim is to explore the possibility of establishing a constructive dialogue between these two distinct traditions of thought. While acknowledging that the main challenge of his endeavor lies in the fundamental differences between Marx’s materialist perspective on social life and Laozi’s aesthetic approach to personal harmony, Chambers suggests that these seemingly unrelated views can actually complement each other, arguing that a dialectical approach can indeed render these differences complementary, leading to a more comprehensive perspective on philosophical and social issues. This approach positions Laozi as a “philosopher-artist,” complementing Marx’s role as a “philosopher-scientist.”Chambers employs a methodology that involves analyzing key texts from Marx and Laozi’s Daodejing through a dialectical lens. The author also uses this hermeneutical approach to find common ground between the key concepts of these two thinkers, such as dialectical materialism in Marx’s philosophy and Dao in Laozi’s teachings. Chambers does not fail to highlight the importance of understanding the historical and cultural contexts of each philosopher to uncover deeper meanings in their works.Marx and Laozi is divided into thirteen chapters, each exploring different aspects of Marx’s and Laozi’s thought. The Introduction provides an essential foundation for understanding the author’s approach to reading and interpreting three major thinkers: Hegel, Marx, and Laozi. Chambers emphasizes the need for readers to recognize that Marx and Laozi have very different characteristics in their methodologies and philosophical aims. Marx, with his dialectical materialist approach, focuses on history and social change through class struggle. In contrast, Laozi focuses on personal harmony and offers a more comprehensive [End Page 1] philosophical outlook encompassing concepts such as Dao and Wu Wei (non-action). Hegel is introduced as a crucial mediator in the dialogue between Marx and Laozi. Chambers argues that without understanding how Hegel views the world through idealism, it is difficult to fully appreciate how Marx developed his scientific materialism as a response to Hegel’s idealism. Here, Hegel serves as both an antagonist and a foundation for the subsequent development of Marx’s thought (pp. 3–22).Chapter 2, titled “Hegel’s Idealism,” further explores how Hegel developed his concept of idealism, particularly how this idealism relates to change and the fear of change. Chambers investigates how Hegel views the finite and infinite as interrelated concepts in a type of dialectics. This discussion is crucial to explaining how Marx adopted some of Hegel’s concepts, altering them to support his own more materialist views. The author also discusses how Hegel’s interpretation of reality is often misunderstood as mentalistic, while in fact Hegel perceives reality as dialectical, where what is real is a synthesis resulting from the dialectical interaction between idea and matter. This point is significant for understanding Marx’s subsequent critiques and revisions of dialectics within his materialist framework, where matter is considered more primary than ideas (pp. 49–69).Chapter 3, “Hegel’s Confrontation with Laozi,” critiques Hegel’s interpretation of Laozi, arguing that Hegel failed to capture the essence of Dao and Wu Wei. This is hardly surprising within the context of Western philosophy, especially considering that it is heavily centered on logic and abstract categories, and thus cannot easily accommodate notions such as Dao and Wu Wei. Hegel regarded Laozi as a figure trapped in unstructured mysticism, whereas, according to Chambers, Laozi actually offers a rich approach to understanding the cosmos and the role of individuals within it. This section is also critical towards what the author takes to be Hegel’s Eurocentric... (shrink)

The field of socio-legal research has encountered three fundamental challenges over the last three decades - it has been criticized for paying insufficient attention to legal doctrine, for failing to develop a sound theoretical foundation and for not keeping pace with the effects of the increasing globalization and internationalization of law, state and society. This book examines these three challenges from a methodological standpoint. It addresses the first two by demonstrating that legal sociology has much to say about justice as (...) a kind of social experience and has always engaged theoretically with forms of normativity, albeit on its own empirical terms rather than on legal theory's analytical terms. The book then explores the third challenge, a result of the changing nature of society, by highlighting the move from the industrial relations of early modernity to the post-industrial conditions of late modernity, an age dominated by information technology. It poses the question whether socio-legal research has sufficiently reassessed its own theoretical premises regarding the relationship between law, state and society, so as to grasp the new social and cultural forms of organization specific to the twenty-first century's global societies. (shrink)

In such civilizations the cosmological sciences integrate the diverse phenomena of Nature into conceptual schemes all of which reflect the revealed ...

One of the fundamental problems of Theoretical Mysticism is the explanation of the world as being something other than God after having accepted the Unity of Existence. This paper seeks to present, after having explained certain necessary premises, the theory of manifestation as one that can explain and analyze multiplicity. In this article we especially seek to solidify the relation of such claims to mystics in general and to the adherents of the Ibn ‘Arabian school of thought in particular. This (...) is especially important because in some of the works of many specialists in this field we find that some unrealistic claims have been definitively attributed in to the Great Sheikh. The only way to counteract such false claims, in any field, including Theoretical Mysticism, is to make it binding upon ourselves to delve into the views of others in a cautious way. We must take the apparent meanings of the sayings of the mystics as a proof in this matter. Therefore the method of research of the writer of this article is to relate the sayings of the Great Sheikh and his commentators while commentating upon and analyzing them as well. (shrink)

In this paper, we propose three lines of argumentation against Nannini’s eliminativist approach towards consciousness and the Self. First, we argue that the premises he uses to argue for eliminativism can equally well be used to draw a completely different conclusion in favor of naturalistic dualism according to which phenomenal consciousness irreducibly emerges from a physical substrate by virtue of certain psychophysical laws of nature. Nannini proposes that in contrast to dualistic theses which represent the manifest image of the world, (...) eliminativism represents the world’s scientific image just as classical physics and theories of relativity respectively represent the world’s manifest image and scientific image. And if developments in a scientific field reveal a conflict between these two images we should always vote for the scientific image. In our second line of argument, we challenge this claim by comparing two rival interpretations of quantum mechanics, i.e. the Copenhagen and Bohmian interpretation of quantum mechanics. Finally, we argue that Nannini’s identification of consciousness and the Self as illusions does not shed any light on the hard problem of consciousness since illusions themselves are instances of phenomenal experiences and need to be explained. (shrink)

The Ismaili is one of the sub-sects of Shiite sect which in addition to being involved in some specific events in the history of different regions in the world of Islam from India to Iran and North Africa has been able to form governments. The record of Ismaili’s presence in Azerbaijan goes back to the third century A.H and the ruling period of Mosafer and Sajian in the fourth century A.H that continued to Seljuqs and Ilkhanids periods. Upon Mongol attacks (...) the center of Immamat moved to Azerbaijan, during 8 and 9th century A.H and this coincided with the Nezari Ismaili’s internal evaluations in Iran. The level of Ismaili sect’s presence in and its contribution to Azerbaijan between 4th and 10th century A.H is assessed here through a descriptive-analytic method and library studies. (shrink)

This collection of essays by one of the best known contemporary Muslim scholars writing in English covers many facets of Islamic life and thought. The author has brought together studies dealing with the practical as well as intellectual aspects of Islam in both their historical and contemporary reality. The contemporary significance of themes such as religion and secularism, the meaning of freedom, and the tradition of Islamic science and philosophy is given particular attention.

Background: Guidelines for breaking bad news are largely directed at and validated in oncology patients, based on expert opinion, and neglect those with other diagnoses. We sought to determine whether existing guidelines for breaking bad news, particularly SPIKES, are consistent with patient preferences across patient populations. Methods: Patients from an online community responded to 5 open-ended and 11 Likert-scale questions identifying their preferences in having bad news delivered. Patient participants received a diagnosis of cancer, lupus, amyotrophic lateral sclerosis, multiple sclerosis, (...) HIV/AIDS, or Parkinson’s disease. Additionally, we surveyed all 14 English-curriculum Canadian medical schools regarding resources used to teach breaking bad news. Results: Ten of 12 responding schools used the SPIKES model. Preferences of 1337 patients were consistent with the recommendations of SPIKES. There was one exception: Most patients disagree that empathetic physical touch is important and some described apprehension. Responses were consistent across disease states. Content analysis of 220 open-ended patient responses revealed 16 patient-important themes. Themes were largely addressed by the SPIKES guidelines, but five were not: ensuring timely follow-up is planned; offering informational sheets about the diagnosis; offering contact information of support organizations, with some patients preferring patient support groups while others preferring counselors; and conveying a sense of determination to aid the patient through the diagnosis. The four most patient-important components of SPIKES were physicians conveying empathy, taking their time, explaining the diagnosis and its implications, and asking the patient if they understand. Conclusion: SPIKES is the most commonly taught framework for breaking bad news in Canadian medical schools. This is the first work to demonstrate that the existing guidelines in breaking bad news such as SPIKES largely reflect the perspectives of many patient groups, as assessed by quantitative and qualitative measures. We highlight the most important components of SPIKES to patients and identify five additional suggestions to aid clinicians in breaking bad news. (shrink)

At the intersection of social and virtue epistemology lies the important, yet so far entirely neglected, project of articulating the social dimensions of epistemic virtues. Perhaps the most obvious way in which epistemic virtues might be social is that they may be possessed by social collectives. We often speak of groups as if they could instantiate epistemic virtues. It is tempting to think of these expressions as ascribing virtues not to the groups themselves, but to their members. Adapting Margaret Gilbert's (...) arguments against individualist accounts of collective beliefs, I show that individualist accounts of group virtues are either too weak or too strong. I then formulate a non-individualist account modeled after Gilbert's influential account of collective beliefs. A crucial disanalogy between collective traits and beliefs, I argue, makes the success of this model unlikely. I conclude with some questions with which the future work on collective epistemic virtues should engage. (shrink)

Reasons are not the same. Normative reasons need to be distinguished from non-normative reasons. Then, due to some considerations, we have to draw a distinction between explanatory reasons and motivating reasons. In this paper, I focus on a rather implicit assumption in drawing the explanatory-motivating distinction. Motivating reasons are mostly characterized as those reasons that the agent takes to be normative. This may imply that the agent always knows the reasons their motivating reasons. This I call the infallibility or transparency (...) assumption. This suggests that there is some sort of report condition on motivating reasons. In contrast, one may ask whether it is possible for the agent to be mistaken about what their motivating reasons are. I argue that we can distinguish motivating reasons and satisfy the motivations for the explanatory-motivating distinction without committing to this infallibility assumption. I briefly sketch a character-based approach to motivating reasons as an alternative. Next, I argue that, in addition to being important on its own, this account has implications for other debates. I illustrate this by mentioning cases such as recalcitrant actions as well as critically discussing one kind of counter-example presented against the guise of the good thesis. (shrink)

While there is general agreement about the list of epistemic virtues, there has been much controversy over what it is to be an epistemic virtue. Three competing theories have been offered: evaluational externalism, evaluational internalism, and mixed theories. A major problem with internalism, the focus of this paper, is that it disconnects the value of epistemic virtue from actual success in the real world (the Disconnection Problem). Relying on a novel thesis about the relation of “trying” and “exercise of virtue,” (...) James Montmarquet (1993; 2000) has offered, to my knowledge, the only solution to this problem. In this paper, I evaluate this solution by deriving from it an important implication and arguing that, if examined in the light of the recent work on self-control in philosophy and psychology, this implication proves problematic. I conclude by drawing a general lesson about the prospects of internalism and suggesting that in the absence of a satisfactory solution to the disconnection problem, externalism and mixed theories become more attractive. (shrink)