In this paper the philosophical ideology of eclecticism of Modern times is considered, especially as it has been formulated byJ. Ch.Sturm, and assessment of its contribution to development of philosophical and scientific thought is given. The need of differentiation of eclecticism, syncretism and conciliatorics is proved. Eclecticism is characterized as a progressive for its time current. The decisive impact eclecticism on formation of new scientific outlook is emphasized.

Arina Oriekhova's interview with Professor Serhii Secundant, devoted to Leibniz's concept of time and space, the peculiarities of Michael Fatch's interpretation of this concept, and various historico-philosophical approaches to understanding Leibniz's philosophy as a whole.

This article reveals the critical content of the idea of scientific revolution in Wolff's philosophy and shows Leibniz's contribution to its formation. Although Wolff's goal was to reform the method of philosophizing on the model of Euclid's geometry, which was based on the Cartesian idea of achieving certainty by clarifying concepts, this clarification Wolff in the sense of Leibniz sees in such an analysis of concepts that would accurately establish a connection between them and show the possibility of the object (...) that expresses this concept. Wolff sees the critical meaning of his method in the fact that by analyzing the concepts to link all concepts and statements into a single system, which was based on consistent grounds and would not contain unproven propositions. This would, according to Wolf, remove from philosophy all the concepts, the objects of which were not possible, and statements that could not be proved. Leibniz's idea of concept analysis also formed the basis of his notion of philosophy as the science of the possible. The critical meaning of this concept of philosophy in Wolff, as in Leibniz, was to limit the subject of philosophy only to the realm of the possible. Although the main critical ideas underlying Wolff's philosophical system were formulated by Leibniz, Wolf's system was still the fruit of his genius. Many of his critical ideas were groundbreaking and had a marked influence on the further development of philosophy. These include, first of all, the requirement to preface the construction of a system of philosophy with research the cognitive abilities of the human mind. However, his attempts to build a universal system of knowledge led to the leveling of the critical content of some of Leibniz's demands, which led to the accusation of him and Leibniz of atheism and fatalism. (shrink)

Arina Oriekhova’s interview with Professor Serhii Secundant, devoted to Leibniz’s concept of time and space, the peculiarities of Michael Fatch’s interpretation of this concept, and various historico-philosophical approaches to understanding Leibniz’s philosophy as a whole.

In 1933 Godel introduced a calculus of provability (also known as modal logic S4) and left open the question of its exact intended semantics. In this paper we give a solution to this problem. We find the logic LP of propositions and proofs and show that Godel's provability calculus is nothing but the forgetful projection of LP. This also achieves Godel's objective of defining intuitionistic propositional logic Int via classical proofs and provides a Brouwer-Heyting-Kolmogorov style provability semantics for Int which (...) resisted formalization since the early 1930s. LP may be regarded as a unified underlying structure for intuitionistic, modal logics, typed combinatory logic and λ-calculus. (shrink)

Arina Orekhova’s interview with Professor Serhii Secundant, devoted to Leibniz’s concept of time and space, the peculiarities of Michael Fatch’s interpretation of this concept, and various historico-philosophical approaches to understanding Leibniz’s philosophy as a whole.

Arina Orekhova’s interview with Professor Serhii Secundant, devoted to Leibniz’s concept of time and space, the peculiarities of Michael Fatch’s interpretation of this concept, and various historico-philosophical approaches to understanding Leibniz’s philosophy as a whole.

The purpose of the article is, firstly, to explicate and give a critical assessment of the methodological, epistemological, and philosophical foundations that led to the “rhetorical turn” in modern philosophy, and, secondly, to answer the question of how justified the grounds for such a “rhetorical turn” are. The answer proposed is based on a reconstruction of Eugene Dupréel’s critical arguments that were directed against the “classical philosophy” and their reception in Chaim Perelman’s works during his “turning point” period (1947 – (...) 1949). The article proves that these two scholars’ critique of classical philosophy proceeds from a realistic position, therefore it does not apply to the epistemological principles of idealistic philosophy. Their criticism of the classical theory of progress and the ideal of universally valid knowledge is “axiological” in nature and boils down to a reassessment of all traditional values. As a result of this reassessment, the methodological principles of sophistry (subjectivism, pragmatism, pluralism, relativism, conventionalism, etc.) are actually rehabilitated. The criticism of philosophy that appeals to spoken language and everyday knowledge, is not justified, since it is based on a misunderstanding of the conceptual and constructive nature of the philosophical language. Although the rhetorical analysis of philosophical texts should be recognized as fruitful and useful, rhetoric cannot be an instrument of philosophizing, since the interpretation of values depends on their understanding, which is given by “classical philosophy”. (shrink)

The author proves the crucial role of the reform of philosophical education in the context of the socio-economic crisis. Without this reform, it is impossible to form a new mentality. Respectively, without changing the mentality, other reforms are not possible. Criticizing the Soviet command-and-control system, the author argues that its system remains in the very structure of Ukrainian universities. The reform of philosophical education, according to the author, should lie (1) in the democratization of the educational process and (2) in (...) reorienting this process to develop the ability to philosophize. This goal assumes that the basis of philosophical education should be such disciplines as the history of philosophy and the argumentation theory because they provide an understanding of philosophical problems and teach how to think critically and creatively. (shrink)

The relationships between various modal logics based on Belnap and Dunn’s paraconsistent four-valued logic FDE are investigated. It is shown that the paraconsistent modal logic \, which lacks a primitive possibility operator \, is definitionally equivalent with the logic \, which has both \ and \ as primitive modalities. Next, a tableau calculus for the paraconsistent modal logic KN4 introduced by L. Goble is defined and used to show that KN4 is definitionally equivalent with \ without the absurdity constant. Moreover, (...) a tableau calculus is defined for the modal bilattice logic MBL introduced and investigated by A. Jung, U. Rivieccio, and R. Jansana. MBL is a generalization of BK that in its Kripke semantics makes use of a four-valued accessibility relation. It is shown that MBL can be faithfully embedded into the bimodal logic \ over the non-modal vocabulary of MBL. On the way from \ to MBL, the Fischer Servi-style modal logic \ is defined as the set of all modal formulas valid under a modified standard translation into first-order FDE, and \ is shown to be characterized by the class of all models for \. Moreover, \ is axiomatized and this axiom system is proved to be strongly sound and complete with respect to the class of models for \. Moreover, the notion of definitional equivalence is suitably weakened, so as to show that \ and \ are weakly definitionally equivalent. (shrink)

N4-lattices provide algebraic semantics for the logic N4, the paraconsistent variant of Nelson's logic with strong negation. We obtain the representation of N4-lattices showing that the structure of an arbitrary N4-lattice is completely determined by a suitable implicative lattice with distinguished filter and ideal. We introduce also special filters on N4-lattices and prove that special filters are exactly kernels of homomorphisms. Criteria of embeddability and to be a homomorphic image are obtained for N4-lattices in terms of the above mentioned representation. (...) Finally, subdirectly irreducible N4-lattices are described. (shrink)

We describe a general logical framework, Justification Logic, for reasoning about epistemic justification. Justification Logic is based on classical propositional logic augmented by justification assertions t: F that read t is a justification for F. Justification Logic absorbs basic principles originating from both mainstream epistemology and the mathematical theory of proofs. It contributes to the studies of the well-known Justified True Belief vs. Knowledge problem. We state a general Correspondence Theorem showing that behind each epistemic modal logic, there is a (...) robust system of justifications. This renders a new, evidence-based foundation for epistemic logic. As a case study, we offer a resolution of the GoldmanRed Barns in Justification Logic. Furthermore, we formalize the well-known Gettier example and reveal hidden assumptions and redundancies in Gettier’s reasoning. (shrink)

The interview focuses on the status of historico-philosophical science in the USSR, including comparative analysis of education at Moscow University and in provincial universities. Models of socialization, social elevators, level of professionalism, ideological control, as well as the Soviet heritage in the academic practices of independent Ukraine are discussed.

We compare the logic HYPE recently suggested by H. Leitgeb as a basic propositional logic to deal with hyperintensional contexts and Heyting-Ockham logic introduced in the course of studying logical aspects of the well-founded semantics for logic programs with negation. The semantics of Heyting-Ockham logic makes use of the so-called Routley star negation. It is shown how the Routley star negation can be obtained from Dimiter Vakarelov’s theory of negation and that propositional HYPE coincides with the logic characterized by the (...) class of all involutive Routley star information frames. This result provides a much simplified semantics for HYPE and also a simplified axiomatization, which shows that HYPE is identical with the modal symmetric propositional calculus introduced by G. Moisil in 1942. Moreover, it is shown that HYPE can be faithfully embedded into a normal bi-modal logic based on classical logic. Against this background, we discuss the notion of hyperintensionality. (shrink)

We define a novel interpretation R of second order arithmetic into Explicit Mathematics. As a difference from standard D-interpretation, which was used before and was shown to interpret only subsystems proof-theoretically weaker than T 0 , our interpretation can reach the full strength of T 0 . The R-interpretation is an adaptation of Kleene's recursive realizability, and is applicable only to intuitionistic theories.

'Ontological Semantics' introduces a comprehensive approach to the treatment of text meaning by computer, arguing that being able to use meaning is crucial to the success of natural language processing applications.

This article addresses the relationship between ontology and politics in Jean-Luc Nancy’s theory of democracy by probing the implications of his latest ontological innovation, the concept of struction. We argue that Nancy’s democracy is a mode of politics that makes the radical pluralism of struction legitimate, opening and guarding a political space for the coexistence of the incommensurable. From this perspective, and despite Nancy’s own skepticism about the concept of biopolitics, the notion of struction opens a pathway for theorizing democracy (...) in a biopolitical key as the regime of coexistence of radically incommensurable forms of life in the absence of any coordinating principle. We nonetheless take issue with Nancy’s prescription for democracy to remain devoid of any political affirmation of its own. Instead, we suggest that the prescriptive content of democracy consists in the affirmation of the contingency of all the forms of life that coexist in it, which implies their freedom, equality, and comm... (shrink)

Let ???? be a computable structure and let R be a new relation on its domain. We establish a necessary and sufficient condition for the existence of a copy ℬ of ???? in which the image of R (¬R, resp.) is simple (immune, resp.) relative to ℬ. We also establish, under certain effectiveness conditions on ???? and R, a necessary and sufficient condition for the existence of a computable copy ℬ of ???? in which the image of R (¬R, resp.) (...) is simple (immune, resp.). (shrink)

Tetens is usually considered the main representative of English empiricism in 18th-century German philosophy. In order to find out how fair this characterization is, the authors turn to the analysis of the critical foundations of the project of reform of metaphysics proposed by Tetens in his early article “Reflections on Some Reasons Why There Are So Few Settled Truths in Metaphysics” (1760). Having analyzed the arguments of this article, the authors prove: 1) Tetens's project for the reform of philosophy fully (...) fits into the tradition of German "methodical" philosophy, 2) it is based on the methodological and epistemological principles of the philosophy of Leibniz and Wolf, and is aimed at substantiating the basic provisions of Leibniz's metaphysics, 3) Tetens's “observing method” is rooted in the philosophy of Leibniz and Wolf, and not in the tradition of English empiricism. (shrink)

Two traditions have had a great impact on the theoretical and experimental research of perception. One tradition is statistical, stretching from Fechner's enunciation of psychophysics in 1860 to the modern view of perception as statistical decision making. The other tradition is phenomenological, from Brentano's “empirical standpoint” of 1874 to the Gestalt movement and the modern work on perceptual organization. Each tradition has at its core a distinctive assumption about the indivisible constituents of perception: the just-noticeable differences of sensation in the (...) tradition of Fechner vs. the phenomenological Gestalts in the tradition of Brentano. But some key results from the two traditions can be explained and connected using an approach that is neither statistical nor phenomenological. This approach rests on a basic property of any information exchange: a principle of measurement formulated in 1946 by Gabor as a part of his quantal theory of information. Here the indivisible components are units (quanta) of information that remain invariant under changes of precision of measurement. This approach helped to understand how sensory measurements are implemented by single neural cells. But recent analyses suggest that this approach has the power to explain larger-scale characteristics of sensory systems. (shrink)

Veritism is the thesis that the truth is the fundamental epistemic good. According to Duncan Pritchard, the most pressing objections to veritism are the trivial truths objection and the trivial inquiry problem. The former states that veritism entails that trivial truths are as important as deep and important truths. The latter is a problem that a veritist must prefer trivial inquiry that generates many trivial truths to the serious inquiry with the hope but no guarantee to discover some deep and (...) important truth. Both objections arise from the inability of veritism prima facie to properly rate the different types of truths. Pritchard's solution is to approach the truth from the perspective of the intellectually virtuous inquirer who would prefer weighty truth over trivial truth. In my commentary, I criticise the proposed solution as circular reasoning. The necessary virtue for an intellectually virtuous inquirer is that they would prefer the weighty truth over the trivial one and at the same time, the weighty truth is superior because it is the goal for intellectually virtuous inquirer. I suggest another path to substantiate veritism in the face of the two sibling objections. I argue that truth is the fundamental epistemic good as it makes the epistemic realm practically valuable more than any other epistemic good. The weighty truths are preferable to the trivial ones because the practical value of the deep and important truths is usually higher. The suggested path goes away from the attempts to prove the epistemic value of truth only within the epistemic realm, yet I argue it does not compel the intellectually virtuous inquirer to seek the truth only for the sake of practical reasons. (shrink)

The article aims at reconstructing some fundamental aspects of Pletho's aesthetical views by investigating the ontological foundations of the plethonian concept of beauty. In a first step, the analysis concentrates on one extant fragment from the Laws, in which Pletho provides his definition of the concept of beauty. Here its definition in terms of an ,,ontological comparative" is combined with the platonic notions of the limit and the limitless . In the next step, the article shows the position of peras (...) and apeiron in the plethonian ontology: the pair appears as Hera and Poseidon at the very top of the plethonian pantheon. After a brief analysis of the several ways in which Pletho explains their union, in the last step, the article shows that Poseidon is brought explicitly in connection with the notion of beauty in a variety of extant texts. Thus the union of Poseidon and Hera is shown to be both effective at the root of the plethonian universe and to be central for the Plethonian concept of beauty. Beauty thus becomes a constitutive trait of the plethonian universe. (shrink)

It was shown in the previous work of the author that one can avoid the paradox of minimal logic { ϕ , ¬ ϕ } ¬ ψ defining the negation operator via reduction not a constant of absurdity, but to a unary operator of absurdity. In the present article we study in details what does it mean that negation in a logical system can be represented via an absurdity or contradiction operator. We distinguish different sorts of such presentations. Finally, we (...) consider the possibility to represent the negation via absurdity and contradiction operators in such well known systems of paraconsistent logic as D.Batens's logic CLuN and Sette's logic P 1. (shrink)

And so that there may be less difficulty in understanding what I shall say on this matter, I should like that those not versed in anatomy should take the trouble, before they read this, to have cut up before their eyes the heart of some large animal that has lungs—for it is in all respects sufficiently similar to the heart of man….