(Shoshana Smith now goes by her married name, Shoshana Brassfield: http://philpapers.org/profile/37640) Descartes famously claims that everything we perceive clearly and distinctly is true. Although this rule is fundamental to Descartes’s theory of knowledge, readers from Gassendi and Leibniz onward have complained that unless Descartes can say explicitly what clear and distinct perception is, how we know when we have it, and why it cannot be wrong, then the rule is empty. I offer a detailed analysis of (...) clear and distinct perception, showing how Descartes answers these questions. Many doubts about the usefulness of the clarity and distinctness rule arise from the mistaken assumption that in clear and distinct perception, like sense perception, we must be able to establish a correspondence between perception and reality before we can have knowledge. I show that Descartes has a different metaphysical picture of clear and distinct perception. Clear and distinct perception is direct perception, typically of essences. On this view, by relying on the intellect instead of the senses, we can have direct perception not only of our own ideas, but also of a mind-independent reality. Because clear and distinct perception is direct perception, problems of correspondence do not arise. My account of clear and distinct perception also yields unique insight into other issues in Descartes, such as the Cartesian Circle and the doctrine of the free creation of the eternal truths. Completed at the University of California, 2005. Dissertation advisers: Janet Broughton, Hannah Ginsborg, Anthony A. Long. ProQuest UMI: 3187156. (shrink)

How are we to understand philosophical claims about sense perception being direct versus indirect? There are multiple relevant notions of perceptual directness, so I argue. Perception of external objects may be direct on some notions, while indirect on others. My interest is with the sense in which ideas count as perceptual mediators in the philosophy of Descartes and Locke. This paper has two broader aims. The first is to clarify four main notions of perceptual directness. (...) The second is to support my contention that in the texts characterizing ideas as immediate objects of perception, Descartes and Locke are invoking the notion of directness I call 'objectual'. This notion is modeled on the way a picture mediates perception of the pictured object. The upshot of my account is that – with respect to the objectual notion of directness – Descartes and Locke each hold an indirect theory of perception. (shrink)

Artykuł ma na celu przedstawienie poglądów Kartezjusza dotyczących związków między postrzeżeniami zmysłowymi a ideami nabytymi. W związku z tym, że zagadnienia te były przez autora Medytacji opracowywane przez wiele lat i ujmowane z odmiennych perspektyw, zestawiam tutaj poszczególne ich ujęcia z najważniejszych pism. Analizy przeprowadzone są zgodnie z chronologią powstawania dzieł, dlatego autor rozpoczyna je od pism fizykalnych, przez metafizyczne i dotyczące anatomii człowieka, by skończyć na psychologicznych. Takie ujęcie tematu pozwala ukazać zmianę podejścia Kartezjusza do omawianego problemu od jego (...) naturalistycznego stanowiska do immanentyzmu. A jednocześnie umożliwia zasygnalizowanie istnienia nieusuwalnego na gruncie jego filozofii rozdarcia między opisywanym przezeń rozciągłym fizykalnym światem a treścią umysłu. (shrink)

There can be little disagreement about whether ideas of sense perception are, for Spinoza, to be classed as passions or actions—the former is obviously the correct answer. All this, however, does not mean that sense perception would be, for Spinoza, completely passive. In this essay I argue argues that there is in the Ethics an elaborate—and to my knowledge previously unacknowledged—line of reasoning according to which sense perception of finite things never fails to contain (...) a definite active component. This argument for activity in sense perception consists of two main parts: first, that ideas we form through sense perception have something adequate in them; second, that the adequate component is actively brought about. Discerning this line of thought connects to—and sheds some new light on—Spinoza’s general way of understanding ideas as entities involving activity. (shrink)

How does Descartes characterize the peculiar way in which each of us is aware of our bodies? I argue that Descartes recognizes a sense of bodily ownership, such that the body sensorily appears to be one's own in bodily awareness. This sensory appearance of ownership is ubiquitous, for Descartes, in that bodily awareness always confers a sense of ownership. This appearance is confused, in so far as bodily awareness simultaneously represents the subject as identical to, (...) partially composed by, and united to her body, without distinguishing these relations. Finally, the appearance of ownership is grounded in multiple other ways in which the body sensorily appears: namely, in the fact that the body appears to be inescapable, modified by bodily sensations, and an object of special concern. (shrink)

Descartes entitled the Sixth Meditation "The existence of material things, and the real distinction between mind and body." But these topics take up only two paragraphs, about one-third of the way into the Sixth Meditation (which is the longest of the six). The other topics in the Meditation partly pertain to the cognitive faculties that a seeker after knowledge must employ: senses, imagination, and intellect. They also concern the mind–body relation: not only is it to be shown that mind (...) and body are distinct, but also that they are “closely joined” together. The joining of mind to body contributes to explanations of the cognitive faculties, for such a joining is, in Descartes’ view, necessary for the operation of sense and imagination, whereas the exercise of the intellect in the pursuit of metaphysical results -- as in his argument for mind–body distinctness -- takes place without the mind interacting with the body. But this still doesn't account for the most sustained discussion in the Sixth Meditation, which concerns the role of the senses in informing us about the world around us. While the trustworthiness of the senses has been under suspicion up to this point in the Meditations, now the senses are rehabilitated. They can serve to acquaint us with the world of bodies, for the purposes of empirical investigation serving natural philosophy but, more usually, for the practical purpose of informing us of potential benefits and harms in our immediate environment. In this regard, Descartes considers the ways in the senses might be subject to local errors or might, if used inappropriately, draw us into systematic error. But the previous results of the Meditations now offer the means for avoiding such systematic error, and the reflections of the Sixth Meditation can guide us toward practical uses of the senses in ways that reduce error. In the end, the senses are found to be trustworthy for the guidance of action, and this trustworthiness extends even to a qualitative experience such as color, which helps us to discriminate among the bodies that we see. (shrink)

This chapter compares rationalist theories of sense perception to previously held theories of perception (especially of vision) and examines rationalist accounts of sensory qualities and sensory representation, of the role of the sense-based passions in guiding behavior, of the epistemological benefits and dangers of sense perception, and of mind–body relations. Each section begins with Descartes, the first major rationalist of the seventeenth century. The other major rationalists, Malebranche, Spinoza, and Leibniz, and also lesser (...) known figures such as Pierre Regis, Jacques Rohault, and Antoine Le Grand, were well acquainted with Descartes' work. Indeed, the first three were each deeply influenced by Descartes in their early years before developing their own philosophical systems, and the latter three were all advocates of Descartes' philosophy (perhaps with slight revision). Each of the major rationalists, while sharing some positions in common, developed a distinctive metaphysics of perception and of the mind–body relation. Earlier sections chart these differences and a final section sums up common features and touches on the continuing significance of their views. (shrink)

This is a short book on a small topic with big ramifications. I call it a small topic because Descartes's account of perception occupies only a corner of his overall philosophical project, which is dominated by his concern to provide a solid metaphysical and epistemological grounding for his science. At the same time, Ott's discussion of sense perception in Descartes comes part and parcel with an account of the theory of ideas in Descartes and (...) later Cartesians, a theory of how to read the Meditations, and an interpretation of Descartes's mind-body dualism, including the similarities and differences... (shrink)

In this first book-length examination of the Cartesian theory of visual perception, Celia Wolf-Devine explores the many philosophical implications of Descartes’ theory, concluding that he ultimately failed to provide a completely mechanistic theory of visual perception. Wolf-Devine traces the development of Descartes’ thought about visual perception against the backdrop of the transition from Aristotelianism to the new mechanistic science—the major scientific paradigm shift taking place in the seventeenth century. She considers the philosopher’s work in terms (...) of its background in Aristotelian and later scholastic thought rather than looking at it "backwards" through the later work of the British empiricists and Kant. Wolf-Devine begins with Descartes’ ideas about perception in the _Rules _and continues through the later scientific writings in which he develops his own mechanistic theory of light, color, and visual spatial perception. Throughout her discussion, she demonstrates both Descartes’ continuity with and break from the Aristotelian tradition. Wolf-Devine critically examines Cartesian theory by focusing on the problems that arise from his use of three different models to explain the behavior of light as well as on the ways in which modern science has not confirmed some of Descartes’ central hypotheses about vision. She shows that the changes Descartes made in the Aristotelian framework created a new set of problems in the philosophy of perception. While such successors to Descartes as Malebranche, Locke, Berkeley, and Hume accepted the core of his theory of vision, they struggled to clarify the ontological status of colors, to separate what is strictly speaking "given" to the sense of sight from what is the result of judgments by the mind, and to confront a "veil of perception" skepticism that would have been unthinkable within the Aristotelian framework. Wolf-Devine concludes that Descartes was not ultimately successful in providing a completely mechanistic theory of visual perception, and because of this, she suggests both that changes in the conceptual framework of Descartes are in order and that a partial return to some features of the Aristotelian tradition may be necessary. (shrink)

Black Mirror is full of technologies that manipulate people's sensory perceptions. Philosophers of perception explain that our brains actively construct what we sense based on previous knowledge, expectations, and emotions, without us even being aware of this framing. Many Black Mirror episodes illustrate the mistakes that people can make when they misunderstand this framing process. Some episodes suggest that highly effective virtual reality technology could foil the strategies that Descartes recommended for distinguishing hallucinations and dreams from reality. (...) Yet other episodes warn how powerful institutions can punitively wield the power of control over perception. Yet in rare optimistic moments, Black Mirror demonstrates the value of relying on the help of other people to hold firm to deeper truths in the face of forces that would manipulate us. [Or, a slightly longer version with key episode titles: Black Mirror is full of technologies that manipulate people's sensory perceptions. Philosophers of perception explain that our brains actively construct what we sense based on previous knowledge, expectations, and emotions, without us even being aware of this framing. Video playback of perceptions, as in Arkangel, illustrate the mistakes that people can make when they misunderstand this framing process. Playtest and Bandersnatch suggest that highly effective virtual reality technology could foil the strategies that Descartes recommended for distinguishing hallucinations and dreams from reality. In the hands of government, law enforcement, and the military, the total control of perception can be wielded as tool for punishment, as in Men Against Fire and White Bear. But in more optimistic moments, such as at the conclusions of Nosedive and San Junipero, Black Mirror demonstrates the value of relying on the help of other people to hold firm to deeper truths in the face of forces that would manipulate us.]. (shrink)

It is no surprise that the phenomenal qualities of our sensory experience pose recalcitrant philosophical problems for a physical materialist metaphysics. The colors of flowers as we experience them by sight, the taste of a ripe peach, and the smell of fresh-cut grass are undeniably part of the experienced world; yet in their phenomenal mode, they do not seem well-placed in the physicist's world of particles and energy fields. It seems, prima facie, that the metaphysical programs found in earlier science (...) and philosophy were better suited to accommodate these qualities: in the hylomorphic world of the Aristotelians, colors were "real qualities" existing as such in flowers; in the dualistic world of Descartes, colors were displaced from things like flowers to the immaterial mind of the perceiver. The dissertation argues that this intuition about our philosophical heritage is both philosophically confused and historically inaccurate. It betrays a misconception about phenomenal qualities and the problems they pose which results from a failure to distinguish phenomenal qualities from a special subset of sensible qualities that we have come to call "secondary" qualities. Disentangled from the primary-secondary quality distinction, phenomenal qualities include all sensible qualities insofar as they form the experiential contents of our sensory perceptions. So considered, phenomenal qualities invite difficult questions about the representational nature and ontological status of our sensory experience even within the Aristotelian and Cartesian metaphysics. By examining Descartes' and the Aristotelians' theories of sense perception with a focus on these questions we achieve a better understanding of "the problem" of phenomenal qualities, better interpretations of these historical theories of sense perception, and suggestions for reshaping the problem space within which we think philosophically about phenomenal qualities today. (shrink)

Descartes is widely regarded to be the father of modern philosophy and his Meditations is among the most important philosophical texts ever written. _The Routledge Guidebook to Descartes’ Meditations_ introduces the major themes in Descartes’ great book and acts as a companion for reading this key work, examining: The context of Descartes’ work and the background to his writing; Each separate part of the text in relation to its goals, meanings and impact; The reception the book (...) received when first seen by the world; The relevance of Descartes’ work to modern philosophy, it’s legacy and influence. With further reading included throughout, this text follows Descartes’ original work closely, making it essential reading for all students of philosophy, and all those wishing to get to grips with this classic work. This edition revises the earlier guidebook entitled _Descartes and the Meditations_ (2003). It has been thoroughly revised, and contains expanded treatment of the method of doubt, theory of ideas, and new discussion of Descartes' theory of vision. (shrink)

This chapter explains Descartes confusion on sensations, size, shape, position, and motion. Descartes in detail explains that we perceive particular figures or actual bodies affecting our senses much more distinctly than their colours. Descartes construe the perception of position, distance, size, and shape as involving strong intellectual elements and he holds that they differ in this fundamental respect from ordinary perceptions of color, sound, heat and cold, taste, and the like, which are said to consist just (...) in having “sensations” that “arise from the mind-body union.” This position leaves room for uncertainty about what he means when he speaks elsewhere of the near-uselessness of sense perceptions in informing us of particular qualities of bodies, in so far as it opens the possibility of a quite restricted understanding of “sense perception” in these contexts. (shrink)

In the early modern period, many authors held that sensation or sensory reception is in some way passive and that perception is in some way active. The notion of a more passive and a more active aspect of perception is already present in Aristotle: the senses receive forms without matter more or less passively, but the “primary sense” also recognizes the salience of present objects. Ibn al-Haytham distinguished “pure sensation” from other aspects of sense perception, (...) achieved by “discernment, inference and recognition,” which included perception of properties such as size and distance as well as similarity, difference, and beauty. Descartes regarded light and color as experiences passively caused in the mind by bodily processes, but he also included distance, perceived through accommodation and convergence, as an immediately caused sensory idea. On the perception side, most theorists held that size and distance perception occurs through unnoticed psychological operations, whether mediated by judgment or associative processes. Association is, in a sense, passive, as it occurs through nonreflective habit formation. But such habits mark a contribution of the subject to perception and are in that way active. The decision of whether sensation and perception are active or passive is highly sensitive to what counts as activity and to what is included as sensation or perception. There is no simple formula, but the generalization that sensation is for the most part passive and perception for the most part active may stand as an imprecise summary of early modern thought on the topic. (shrink)

Descartes and Boyle were the most influential proponents of strict mechanist accounts of the physical world, accounts which carried with them a distinction between primary and secondary (or sensible) qualities. For both, the distinction is a piece of natural philosophy. Nevertheless the distinction is quite differently articulated, and, especially, differently grounded in the two thinkers. For Descartes, reasoned reflection reveals to us that bodies must consist in mere extension and its modifications, and that sensible qualities as we conceive (...) of them based on sense perception can pertain only to the mind. Just how we are supposed to arrive at this realization is, this essay will argue, a deep puzzle that brings us to the basic assumptions of Descartes' metaphysics. For Boyle, by contrast, while reflection can reveal the unique explanatory status of mechanism, and, thus, the primary/secondary quality distinction, only experience can confirm its truth. Our central focus will be on Descartes, and on the question: How does he intend to remove the sensible qualities from the physical world, how does he strip them from bodies? I will try to show that Descartes has an argument that he takes to show a priori that sensible qualities cannot be attributed to the material world (as foundational qualities, or, as we conceive of them based on sense experience). The argument fails, however, leaving him with at best a partly empirical case for removing the sensible qualities, based on the purported explanatory success of his physics. (shrink)

Descartes and Boyle were the most influential proponents of strict mechanist accounts of the physical world, accounts which carried with them a distinction between primary and secondary (or sensible) qualities. For both, the distinction is a piece of natural philosophy. Nevertheless the distinction is quite differently articulated, and, especially, differently grounded in the two thinkers. For Descartes, reasoned reflection reveals to us that bodies must consist in mere extension and its modifications, and that sensible qualities as we conceive (...) of them based on sense perception can pertain only to the mind. Just how we are supposed to arrive at this realization is, this essay will argue, a deep puzzle that brings us to the basic assumptions of Descartes' metaphysics. For Boyle, by contrast, while reflection can reveal the unique explanatory status of mechanism, and, thus, the primary/secondary quality distinction, only experience can confirm its truth. Our central focus will be on Descartes, and on the question: How does he intend to remove the sensible qualities from the physical world, how does he strip them from bodies? I will try to show that Descartes has an argument that he takes to show a priori that sensible qualities cannot be attributed to the material world (as foundational qualities, or, as we conceive of them based on sense experience). The argument fails, however, leaving him with at best a partly empirical case for removing the sensible qualities, based on the purported explanatory success of his physics. (shrink)

In his Rules for the Direction of the Mind, Descartes elevates arithmetic and geometry to the status of paradigms for all the sciences, because of the potential for certainty in their results. This emphasis on certainty is present throughout the Cartesian corpus, but in the Rules and other early works the substance dualism characteristic of Cartesian philosophy is not as obvious. However, when several key concepts from this early work are considered together, it becomes clear that Cartesian dualism necessarily (...) follows. The most important of these concepts are: Descartes’s rejection of the Scholastic theory of sense data in favor of a telecommunicative theory of perception; his innovative reconceptualization of mathematics in which he treats number and magnitude as interchangeable, making use of the symbolism of algebra; his frequent use of visual metaphors to describe perception in general, as well as other cognitive activity. It is in consideration of this third point that Descartes’s treatment of the imagination shows its importance, for the relationship of the imagination to the intellect parallels that of geometric figures to algebraic formulae. Though the role of the imagination in the Rules seems to make the status of a dualist ontology in this work more ambiguous, this paper will argue that in fact it is precisely in the treatment of imagination that one can find the traces of a fully developed substance dualism. (shrink)

The 18th century witnessed the transformation of aesthetics into an independent philosophical discipline. In this period, two main traditions emerged, based on which we can categorize aesthetic theorists. The first of these is classical or rationalist aesthetics, and the other is empiricist or subjective aesthetics. Because classical/rational aesthetic theories were largely based on Cartesian metaphysics, they also inherited the difficulties faced by Cartesian metaphysics. For Descartes, senseperception is not a reliable mode of cognition and truth only comes out of (...) the ideas of pure understanding. Where Descartes' philosophy came to a dead end was that it could not convincingly explain how the concepts in our minds represent reality that is independent of us. This problem also manifested itself in the rationalist aesthetics. Similarly, the empiricist theory inherited the weaknesses of the empiricist epistemology. The main problem of empiricism was to overcome subjectivism and reach universal principles that make sense of the world surrounding us. To overcome the relativism of the empiricist epistemology, empiricist theoreticians claimed that there is an intuition, a common feeling shared by all human beings. However, this common feeling could not be proven empirically. Diderot created a new aesthetic theory that aimed to reconcile rationalist and empiricist aesthetics by redefining the term perception. This article discusses Diderot's innovative effort to create a new aesthetics free from the limits of rationalism and empiricism. (shrink)

『성찰』에서 확립된 데카르트의 관념 이론에 따르면 관념은 그 자체로 파악되었을 때 거짓일 수 없다. 엄밀한 의미의 거짓은 오직 관념과 사유 밖의 외부 대상 간의 관계를 정립하는 판단에서만 성립하기 때문이다. 하지만 「셋째 성찰」의 한 구절에서 데카르트는 관념이 그 자체로 거짓일 수 있을 가능성을 도입한다. 그는 관념이 사물이 아닌 것을 사물인 것처럼 오표상하는 경우를 예시로 들며, 이런 경우 관념에서 성립하는 거짓을 ‘질료적 거짓’(falsitas materialis)이라고 부른다. 관념에서 성립하는 질료적 거짓 개념은 다음의 두 가지 지점에서 문제적이다. 첫째, 질료적 거짓은 관념이 그 자체로 거짓일 수는 (...) 없다는 데카르트 관념 이론의 대전제와 충돌하는 것처럼 보인다. 둘째, 우리는 질료적 거짓의 혐의를 받는 관념이 무엇을 표상하는지 알 수 없다. 본 논문은 질료적 거짓의 혐의를 받는 관념의 표상적 특징을 ‘이표상’(異表象, dissimilar representation)으로 정식화하여 해당 관념이 물체 안의 다양한 실존에 대한 정보를 제공함을 보여줌으로써, 위의 두 문제에 대한 해결책을 제공한다. (shrink)

'Sense perception in current process thought' was the topic of a workshop organized by the 'Whitehead Psychology Nexus' (for more information see below) at Fontareches in spring 2003. This and earlier Fontareches meetings can be characterized by just a few elements: non-dogmatism, interdisciplinarity and overlapping approaches. Although the convergence point is Whitehead's philosophy, this is intended in the sense of an 'eschaton' rather than a 'telos'. The vivid discussions, occurring in a very thoughtful, yet relaxed, atmosphere in (...) the small village of Fontareches in Southern France, have amply testified for the promising paths and synergies that can emerge in such an environment. This year, the core intention was to examine relations between Whitehead's theory of perception and contemporary psychology. The individual contributions can be sorted into the three areas of philosophy, cognitive science, and mental health/psychoanalysis. Unsurprisingly, the question of temporality was addressed -- explicitly or implicitly -- in most of the papers. (shrink)

This book examines the role that natural philosophy plays in the emergence of Early Modern political thought. Robert J. Roecklein argues that the natural philosophy of Early Modernity, especially its indictment of sense perception, constitutes a major political foundation for the more concrete doctrines of political science developed by Bacon, Descartes, Hobbes, and Spinoza.

This book is about the nature of sensory perception. Contributions focus on five questions, i.e.: (1) What distinguishes sensory perception from other cognitive states? Is it true, for instance, that perceptual content, in contrast to the phenomenal content of sensations like pain, always depends on the perceivers conceptual resources? (2) How do we have to explain the intentionality of perceptual states? (3) What is the nature of perceptual content? (4) In which sense do the objects of sensory (...) perception depend on the constitution of the perceiver? How, for instance, do secondary qualities like colours, sounds and smells depend on the perception of human subjects? (5) How can we account for the intentionality of misperceptions? These questions are addressed through the interpretation of classical historical texts as well as in the context of systematical reflections. With contributions by Margaret Atherton, Michael Ayers, Peter Baumann, Martha Brandt Bolton, Thomas Grundmann, Gary Hatfield, Rolf-Peter Horstmann, Andreas Kemmerling, Bertram Kienzle, Martine Nida-Rümelin, Dominik Perler, Jay F. Rosenberg, Katia Saporiti, Ralph Schumacher, Gerald Vision, and Russell Wahl. (shrink)

Descartes first invokes the errors of the senses in the Meditations to generate doubt; he suggests that because the senses sometimes deceive, we have reason not to trust them. This use of sensory error to fuel a sceptical argument fits a traditional interpretation of the Meditations as a work concerned with finding a form of certainty that is proof against any sceptical doubt. If we focus instead on Descartes's aim of using the Meditations to lay foundations for his (...) new science, his appeals to sensory error take on a different aspect. Descartes's new science is based on ideas innate in the intellect, ideas that are validated by the benevolence of our creator. Appeals to sensory error are useful to him in undermining our naïve faith in the senses and guiding us to an appreciation of innate ideas. However, the errors of the senses pose problems in the context of Descartes's appeals to God's goodness to validate innate ideas and natural propensities to belief. A natural tendency to sensory error is hard to reconcile with the benevolence of our creator. This paper explores Descartes's responses to the problems of theodicy posed by various forms of sensory error. It argues that natural judgements involved in our visual perception of distance, size and shape pose a problem of error that resists his usual solutions. (shrink)

In this essay I explore the controversial issue of sense perception in the Zhuangzi 莊子. Although scholars have not explicitly addressed this aspect of the Chinese text, a common assumption is that the Zhuangzi proposes a mysticism that undermines sense perception in favour of a transcendent self. After an overview of this interpretation, and after analysing some key passages of the text that deal with heart fasting (xinzhai 心齋), sitting and forgetting (zuowang 坐忘) and skill mastery, (...) I demonstrate that some interpreters of the Zhuangzi read the text as if it has a metaphysical bent, recommending that sense perception be transcended as a prerequisite to perfection. In contrast, my thesis is that the text does not propose a withdrawal from the senses and from the world, but rather warns about the danger of abiding to doctrinal knowledge, which has the consequence of a person losing their responsive awareness. Indeed, in the Zhuangzi, sense perception is not an impediment on the way to a supersensible reality, but an integral part of one's own being in the world. Through my analysis, I object to the idea that the Zhuangzi proposes a mystical union with something not immediately available, which moreover needs to be achieved by transcending the lived world that is encountered through sense perception. My view is that such a move not only postulates union with a transcendent entity, it also forces a dualism between a person's capacities. This is problematic because the Zhuangzi does not point to another world–in a two worlds theory–where one must ideally attain the condition of a transcendent self. On the contrary, in rejecting a univocal ethos, the text suggests one should keep responding to changing circumstances without turning one's perceptual awareness into entrenched habits. Thus, the Zhuangzi shows how sense perception should be seen, not as a “problem” but as an ethical possibility through which the univocity of doctrinal knowledge can be undermined. (shrink)

The concept of innateness is central to Descartes's epistemology; the Meditations display a new, non-Aristotelian method of acquiring knowledge by attending properly to our innate ideas. Yet understanding Descartes's conception of innate ideas is not an easy task, and some commentators have concluded that Descartes held several distinct and unrelated conceptions of innateness. In Descartes on Innate Ideas, Deborah Boyle argues that Descartes's remarks on innate ideas in fact form a unified account. Addressing the further (...) question of how Descartes thinks innate ideas are known, the author shows that, for Descartes, thinkers have implicit knowledge of their innate ideas. Thus she shows that the actual perception of these innate ideas is, for Descartes, a matter of making them explicit, turning the intellect away from sense-perceptions and toward pure thought. The author also provides a new interpretation of the Cartesian "natural light," an important mental faculty in Descartes's epistemology. (shrink)

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:Descartes on Love and/as ErrorByron WillistonBut if this medicine, love, which cures all sorrow With more, not only be no quintessence, But mixed of all stuffs, paining soul, or sense, And of the sun his working vigour borrow, Love’s not so pure, and abstract, as they use To say, which have no mistress but their Muse, But as all else, being elemented too, Love sometimes would contemplate, (...) sometimes do.1One of philosophy’s most enduring questions is inspired by Plato’s Euthyphro: do we love something because it is lovable, or is it lovable because we love it?2 Perhaps nowhere is this problem more intractable than in Descartes’s theory of love. In his view love is the concrete attempt on the part of humans to develop an ethical reciprocity which ideally fulfils the need both to discover and to create value. The strict disjunction of the Platonic question is to this extent somewhat misleading because Descartes is genuinely challenged by the respective demands of both sides of the question. It would therefore be a mistake to fasten on one side of this distinction to the utter exclusion of the other.But the temptation to do precisely this with Descartes is strong indeed. This is a temptation which extends even to ethical matters, in which Descartes seems loathe to subordinate the search for certainty to merely contingent practical demands. In addressing the problem of moral weakness he writes, for [End Page 429] example, that “the strength of the soul is inadequate without knowledge of the truth.”3 The call to live in the light of certain truths—moral or otherwise—is so persistent a theme for him that the burden of proof would seem to be on those who want to claim that this is nevertheless not so in certain areas. The bulk of this paper is thus devoted to showing that, despite some appearances, Descartes is not concerned overmuch with the problem of attaining certainty and avoiding error in love judgments. He wants us to see love as a complex psycho-physical phenomenon which cannot be reduced to the desire to obtain true judgments about the world.To focus the discussion I examine Irving Singer’s philosophy of love as presented in The Nature of Love and especially his hermeneutic distinction between “appraisal” and “bestowal,” a distinction which maps felicitously onto the Platonic disjunction as sketched above. Singer criticizes the Cartesian theory of love as excessively “appraisive,” that is, as relying too heavily on an objective standard as guarantor of the worth of beloved objects. I maintain on the contrary that this interpretation distorts what Descartes’s texts tell us. By arguing that the will, with no necessary input from the appraising intellect, is paramount in love judgments, I show that love for Descartes is largely an imaginative means of “bestowing” value which as such does not require either the guidance or the corroboration of objective criteria. The bestowal theory warrants, rather, the free subjective creation of value. The distinction which Singer uses to criticize Descartes is thus turned to Descartes’s favor.I. Before getting to that argument, however, we need to examine the place which love as a specific passion has within the overall economy of the third notion primitive,4 that is, the union of body and soul as distinct from the treatment of these elements as mutually separate. Passions are for Descartes a species of thought. In a general sense all “perceptions” are passions of the soul. They represent the world to the will which then acts in some way on them (“action” is taken as the other species of thought). Now of these perceptions generally considered, some are caused by the external objects of the senses5 and some by the natural appetites and affections of the body.6 There are, however, those perceptions “whose effects we feel as being in the soul itself....”7 These are strictly speaking the “passions” of the soul; and despite our not always being able to locate their proximate cause,8 they may be stimulated by the [End Page 430] “fortuitous movement of the spirits,”9 by intellectual judgments, or by external... (shrink)

Questions about perception remain some of the most difficult and insoluble in both epistemology and in the philosophy of mind. This controversial but highly accessible introduction to the area explores the philosophical importance of those questions by re-examining what had until recent times been the most popular theory of perception - the sense-datum theory. Howard Robinson surveys the history of the arguments for and against the theory from Descartes to Husserl. He then shows that the objections (...) to the theory, particularly Wittgenstein's attack on privacy and those of the physicalists, have been unsuccessful. He argues that we should return to the theory sense-data in order to understand perception. In doing so he seeks to overturn a consensus that has dominated the philosophy of perception for nearly half a century. (shrink)

In this highly original of realism, David Kelley argues that perception is the discrimination of objects as entities, that the awareness of these objects is direct, and that perception is a reliable foundation for empirical knowledge. His argument relies on the basic principle of the 'primacy of existence, ' in opposition to Cartesian representationalism and Kantian idealism.

Several studies have approached sense perception in the encyclopaedias of Thomas of Cantimpré, Bartholomew the Englishman and Vincent of Beauvais. Yet a systematic overview and comparison of the arrangement of sense perception in these encyclopaedias is still lacking. The overview offered here shows that all encyclopaedias place sense perception beside expositions on psychology and anatomy. There are, however, significant differences in how they treat the objects of sensation. In the case of Bartholomew and Vincent, (...) I argue, these differences reflect two different readings of Aristotle. (shrink)

There is more evidence for Empedocles than for any early Greek philosopher before Democritus, yet the details of his philosophy remain controversial and often hopelessly obscure. Jaeger called Empedocles a ‘philosophical centaur’, which aptly sums up the seeming disparity between the and the There is no agreement about the famous simile to illustrate respiration, generally known as the Clepsydra, and the stages and nature of the cosmic cycle continue to be disputed. Perhaps we can never be certain about these aspects (...) of Empedocles' thought, for the evidence fails at every crucial point and the imaginative reconstructions which have to serve are unlikely to win universal acceptance. It may then appear hazardous to discuss the fragments concerned with thinking and sense-perception, for these too are riddled with problems. I do so prompted partly by the timely reprint of J. I. Beare's book, Greek Theories of Elementary Cognition, and also because this feature of Empedocles has been touched on by modern scholars but not studied in any detail. At the same time the significance of the is greatly affected by how we interpret the theory of sense-perception and thinking. (shrink)

How are we to understand philosophical claims about sense perception being direct versus indirect? There are multiple relevant notions of perceptual directness, so I argue. Perception of external objects may be direct on some notions, while indirect on others. My interest is with the sense in which ideas count as perceptual mediators in the philosophy of Descartes and Locke. This paper has two broader aims. The first is to clarify four main notions of perceptual directness. (...) The second is to support my contention that in the texts characterizing ideas as immediate objects of perception, Descartes and Locke are invoking the notion of directness I call ‘objectual’. This notion is modeled on the way a picture mediates perception of the pictured object. The upshot of my account is that – with respect to the objectual notion of directness – Descartes and Locke each hold an indirect theory of perception. (shrink)

The problem of skepticism is the fundamental epistemological problem Descartes addresses. He introduces three forms of it, each embedded in a possible error-scenario. The first possibility is that, since my sense perception is sometimes misperception, my sensory experience in any given case may not reflect how things are outside my experience. The second possibility is that maybe I am dreaming when I think I am awake. And the third possibility is that maybe I am deceived in all (...) my ideas and beliefs by a powerful demon. The third is the most radical, far-reaching, and potent of the error-scenarios Descartes discusses. Unlike the first two, it threatens knowledge of all kinds. So, if Descartes is to defeat skepticism in a fundamental and comprehensive way, he must eliminate that possible scenario. (shrink)

In this paper I consider the relation between Descartes' psychology of vision and the cognitive science approach to psychology (henceforth CS). In particular, I examine Descartes' the Optics (1637) in the light of David Marr's (1982) position in CS. My general claim is that CS can be seen as a rediscovery of Descartes' psychology of vision. In the first section, I point to a parallel between Descartes' epistemological revolution, which created the modem version of the problem (...) of perception, and the cognitive revolution. These fundamental revolutions in theoretical psychology were both inspired and legitimated by a revolution in mathematics. They took place in accordance with one of Marr's maxims: “To the desirable via the possible”. In the second section, I demonstrate that in the Optics, Descartes explains perception of metrical properties in a way that — on a detailed level — is in accordance with how Man argues that complex information processing systems have to be explained: both Descartes and Man emphasize the co-ordination of logical and physical analysis. In the third section, I claim that Descartes' arguments for a sharp distinction between mechanical transmission of sense data (sensation) and non-mechanical inferences on those sense data (thinking) are sound arguments seen from Man's position in CS. Descartes' arguments are based on his logical and physical analysis. Malebranche's radicalized version of Cartesian dualism turns Descartes' empirically-based assumption that mechanisms cannot realize inferences into a metaphysical assumption. In the final section, I argue that this metaphysical assumption contributes to an understanding of perception as a non-symbolic, non-inferential bottom-up process in mainstream monistic and mechanistic scientific psychology until the cognitive revolution. (shrink)

Descartes’ accounts of sensory perception have long troubled his interpreters, for their lack of clear and explicit statements on some fundamental issues. His readers have wondered whether he allows spatial sensory ideas (spatial qualia); whether sensory ideas such as color or pain are representations and, if so, what they represent; and what cognitive value Descartes attributed to sense perception. Recent discussions take differing stands on the questions just mentioned, and also disagree over Descartes’ account (...) of the externalization of sensory qualities, on the origin and correct analysis of the “material falsity” he attributes to some sensory ideas, and on the value of the “teachings of nature.” Such disagreement should not be surprising, for although sensory perception was an important topic for Descartes, his treatment of these particular issues is not systematic – or at least not apparently so. Generally, there are no proof texts that unequivocally settle questions about Descartes’ views on spatial qualia, the representationality of sensory ideas, their cognitive value, externalization, material falsity, and the status of the teachings of nature. Yet these questions and topics naturally arise from matters about which Descartes is explicit and (reasonably) consistent, regarding the role of the senses in philosophy and everyday life and concerning the nature of minds and ideas. It is, therefore, worthwhile to ask what his positions might have been. This chapter develops answers by considering Descartes’ systematic doctrines on the nature of the mind and its ideas and by combing his statements on sensation and perception for hints about how to apply such principles. The first section reviews some key texts. Succeeding sections develop positions on representationality, cognitive value, externalization, material falsity, and the teachings of nature. Ultimately, I favor an interpretation in which, for Descartes, all sensory ideas represent by resemblance, different kinds of sensory ideas vary in cognitive value, externalization arises through spatial localization, and, with sensory ideas of color and the like, as materially false they do not intrinsically misrepresent but afford occasion for false judgments, which arise as merely apparent, and so not actually legitimate, teachings of nature. (shrink)

This thesis explores Epicurus' attempt to establish sense-perception as the primary or basic means by which we can gain knowledge about the world. In It is argued that it was this aim, along with his belief that perceptions are all equal in trustworthiness, which lead him to maintain "All perceptions are true", this being the thesis that all sense-perceptions present states of affairs which actually obtain. The heart of the thesis is then a discussion of how Epicurus (...) dealt with apparent counter-examples to "All perceptions are true", which aims to establish that, for him, all such counter-examples are in fact instances of being mistaken about what is being presented. The thesis then discusses Epicurus' account of how people are able to trust the judgements they make on the basis of sense-perceptions, and how knowledge of the perceptible world serves as a basis for making judgements about the non-evident.. (shrink)

In this essay I explore the controversial issue of sense perception in the Zhuangzi 莊子. Although scholars have not explicitly addressed this aspect of the Chinese text, a common assumption is that the Zhuangzi proposes a mysticism that undermines sense perception in favour of a transcendent self. After an overview of this interpretation, and after analysing some key passages of the text that deal with heart fasting (xinzhai 心齋), sitting and forgetting (zuowang 坐忘) and skill mastery, (...) I demonstrate that some interpreters of the Zhuangzi read the text as if it has a metaphysical bent, recommending that sense perception be transcended as a prerequisite to perfection. In contrast, my thesis is that the text does not propose a withdrawal from the senses and from the world, but rather warns about the danger of abiding to doctrinal knowledge, which has the consequence of a person losing their responsive awareness. Indeed, in the Zhuangzi, sense perception is not an impediment on the way to a supersensible reality, but an integral part of one’s own being in the world. Through my analysis, I object to the idea that the Zhuangzi proposes a mystical union with something not immediately available, which moreover needs to be achieved by transcending the lived world that is encountered through sense perception. My view is that such a move not only postulates union with a transcendent entity, it also forces a dualism between a person’s capacities. This is problematic because the Zhuangzi does not point to another world – in a two worlds theory – where one must ideally attain the condition of a transcendent self. On the contrary, in rejecting a univocal ethos, the text suggests one should keep responding to changing circumstances without turning one’s perceptual awareness into entrenched habits. Thus, the Zhuangzi shows how sense perception should be seen, not as a “problem” but as an ethical possibility through which the univocity of doctrinal knowledge can be undermined. (shrink)

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:Descartes’ Natural Light ReconsideredDeborah Boyle1. INTRODUCTIONThe “natural light” occupies an important position in Descartes’ Third Meditation, where the meditator invokes it to provide the premises needed for his proof for the existence of a non-deceiving God. Descartes also refers to the natural light throughout his Replies to the Objections to the Meditations and in the Principles of Philosophy. Yet he says almost nothing about what the (...) natural light is supposed to be, apparently assuming that his readers already know what he means. English-speaking commentators on Descartes have said little about the natural light,1 and although French commentators have paid slightly more attention to this topic, they have nonetheless provided no detailed analysis of the concept of the natural light and the role it plays in Descartes’ Meditations.2In 1973, however, John Morris published an article entitled “Descartes’ Natural Light” in the Journal of the History of Philosophy, later reprinted in Eternal Truths and the Cartesian Circle.3 Morris argues that “the understanding can be regarded in an active and a passive sense, ”4 and that the natural light should [End Page 601] be equated with the passive function of the intellect. The natural light, he asserts, isa power of cognition, which contrasts with the “active” power of conceiving. Unlike this power, it does not form ideas, or bring them to consciousness. Instead, it simply gives a click of recognition when a true idea is brought before it.5However, the textual evidence for Morris’ interpretation of the natural light is slender, and in fact the texts support a quite different reading. I shall point out some problems with Morris’ reading, and offer the beginnings of an alternative account.2. ACTIVITY, PASSIVITY, AND THE MINDIn the Fourth Meditation, Descartes draws a distinction between two faculties of mind: intellect and will. Intellect, he says, allows him “to perceive the ideas which are subjects for possible judgements” (CSM II 39/AT VII 5),6 while the will “simply consists in our ability to do or not do something (that is, to affirm or deny, to pursue or avoid)” (CSM II 40/AT VII 57). Although he does not say so in the Fourth Meditation, Descartes suggests in two 1641 letters to Regius that the intellect is passive and the will is active; strictly speaking, he says, “understanding [intellectio] is the passivity of the mind and willing [volitio] is its activity” (CSMK III 182/AT III 372). A few months later, he writes that “we should use the term ‘action’ for what plays the role of a moving force, like volition in the mind, while we apply the term ‘passion’ to what plays the role of something moved, like intellection [intellectio] and vision in the same mind” (CSMK III 199/AT III 454–5). And in the Passions of the Soul Descartes states that while volitions are actions, “the various perceptions or modes of knowledge present in us may be called its passions, in a general sense” (CSM I 335/AT XI 342).In his early work, the Rules for the Direction of the Mind, Descartes does refer to “actions of the intellect.”7 If we do not allow for changes in Descartes’ thinking, we might assume that at the time of the Meditations, too, he would be willing to speak of “actions of the intellect.” But Descartes provides no account of the [End Page 602] will in the Rules; thus any activity he might have attributed to the mind would have to be included in the role of the intellect. In the Meditations, Descartes’ philosophy of mind has expanded to provide a place for the will, which can take over the active functions previously assigned to the intellect.John Morris’ reading of the role of the natural light in the Meditations takes as its starting point a passage in the Rules where Descartes claims that the intellect itself, the cognitive power or vis cognoscens, has both active and passive functions; it is, he says, sometimes like a seal, sometimes like wax.8 After describing the various functions of the cognitive power, Descartes concludes that “according to its different functions, then, the same power is... (shrink)

The Buridanian view of the concrete cognition as the general characteristics of sense perception was adopted by Jodocus Trutfetter and Bartholomaeus Arnoldi of Usingen. This theory was not accepted merely on the basis of authority, but it was argued against the competing view, which appeared as legitimate inside the late medieval school of via moderna.

Descartes is often thought to bifurcate sensory experience into two distinct cognitive components: the sensing of secondary qualities and the more or less intellectual perceiving of primary qualities. A closer examination of his analysis of sensory perception in the Sixth Replies and his treatment of sensory processing in the Dioptrics and Treatise on Man teIls a different story. I argue that Descartes offers a unified cognitive account of sensory experience according to which the senses and intellect operate (...) together to produce a fundamentally imagistic representation of the world in both its primary and secondary quality aspects. At stake here is not only our understanding of the cognitive structure of sensory experience but the relation of sense and intellect more generally in the Cartesian mind. The deep bifurcation in the Cartesian mind is not between the sensory perception of primary and secondary qualities but between sensory perception and purely intellectual perception. (shrink)

The chapter presents a contradiction on the disposition of Descartes as a scholar. First, the chapter states that Descartes believes in knowledge as the clear and distinct perception of propositions by the intellect; knowledge in the strictest sense is certain, indeed indubitable, and grounded in the purely rational apprehension of truth. But it is also generally recognized that Descartes was a serious experimenter, at least in his biology and his optics, and that in these areas, (...) at least, he seemed to hold that knowledge requires an appeal to experience and experiment. To the 20th-century philosopher this looks a bit puzzling: how can Descartes be both a rationalist, who sees knowledge as deriving from the intellect, and an experimentalist, who sees experiment and observation as essential to the enterprise of knowledge? This is the puzzle that the chapter would like to address. It argues that not only is there no contradiction here, but that the appeal to experience is an essential part of the method for constructing a deductive science. (shrink)

This chapter proposes to take the first few steps toward understanding the problematics of imagination in Descartes. It aims to show that in writings preceding the Regulae, Descartes conceived imagination as the chief faculty in the work of cognition, indeed the chief faculty for unifying knowledge. In this light the Regulae appears not simply as an early formulation of the principles of method, but as the tension-filled outcome of an attempt to think through the heuristic and cognitive competencies (...) of imagination on the basis of a human psychology strongly correlated with human physiology. Although the inadequacies of this attempt ultimately led to the cognitive demotion of imagination, there are nevertheless reasons for thinking that the early framework, shaped by the primacy of imagination, was not so much rejected as transformed in Descartes' mature work. The chapter further explains that imagination is the foundation of physics and mathematics and that it is both corporeal and spiritual. In addition imagination also serves as agent of all intelligent perception and the chief faculty for rising to higher level of spiritual truths. It further explains phantasia, a crucial organ of the brain where images occur, either derived from the senses, memory or from the intellect. (shrink)

In this article I analyze the similarities between St. Augustine's and Descartes' philosophy. In particular I consider their spiritual conceptions of mind, God, and cognition theory. The most important similarities between both thinkers concern the dualism of substances, cogito/dubito theory, and the conception of immortal human soul, like a thinking thing (res cogitans). Other similarities concern matter conceived as a theoretical construct of extension without thinking, cognition theory and mature knowledge, problems of falsehood and truth, theory of soul and (...) senses perception, theory of mathematical eternal truths, the role of mathematics in nature description, their understanding the biological and spiritual points of view, the relation between human soul and body, limited human and unlimited intellect of God, intention and decision making, and also being and nothingness. The main feature presented in both theories is theocentrism and the role of God. Both conceptions belong to Christian Platonism, then have an anti-Aristotelian character, and can be considered as examples of the philosophy of mind. (shrink)

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:Reviewed by:Descartes’s Concept of MindJoanna ForstromLilli Alanen. Descartes’s Concept of Mind. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 2003. pp. xv + 355. Cloth, $65.00.Descartes's Concept of Mind takes as its task that of redressing "the distortions of Descartes's concept of human mind and thinking caused by the Cartesian myth that Ryle justly sought to correct, but that his gripping caricature has helped keep alive" (x). Offering (...) a close reading of the text in its philosophical and historical context and examining its place in contemporary literature, Alanen develops Descartes's philosophy of mind, broadly construed, with a focus on the embodiment of the human mind.Alanen sees Descartes's philosophy of mind as "the result of an ongoing struggle to adjust some basic views about human nature, thought and agency rooted in experience and tradition to the new picture of the universe" (8). Taking this perspective reveals a greater continuity in his fundamental views. Changes, she suggests, are a matter of emphasis, subject matter, and perspective. She grants Descartes's dualism and his view of the mind-body union and chooses to focus instead on the mind as embodied.In developing the analysis Alanen takes a somewhat chronological approach in her seven chapters. Chapter one is a prehistory of Descartes's philosophy of mind focusing on his unpublished, early writings. She looks at his early intellectual ambitions and interests beginning with mathematics and a science of nature and then expanding into metaphysics. The distinctive views of his later work are formed, according to Alanen, during this time. In chapter two, three different perspectives about the nature of man are distinguished: man as an object of mechanistic physics, man as mind or intellect and so an epistemic subject, and man as a real union between the mind and body. She focuses on the third, as it is the real union that has been overlooked or misconstrued by most. How this union is to [End Page 115] be conceived, and the epistemological implications of it are explored. By highlighting the consequences of Descartes's distinction between the mind and the body in terms of knowledge, Alanen directly confronts Ryle and his legacy. In short, because we cannot expect to have knowledge of the mind—body union, we cannot conceive it—there is no category mistake to be made. She elaborates much more in the chapter.Chapters three, four and five, are centered on the writings from 1637-44. Here Alanen focuses on Descartes's notion of thinking and modes of thoughts. The way that thinking is defined, its intentional and representative nature, and the status of sensations as mental phenomena are carefully explored in light of discussions of these issues in contemporary literature and in the literature of Descartes's time. The issues are complex, but the writing is clear and easy to follow. Her discussions of representation, sense perception, and material falsity are particularly good in these chapters.Chapters six and seven reflect the issues that Princess Elisabeth raised: emotions, will, and related moral issues. These two chapters are perhaps the most significant in the book. Chapter six centers on The Passions. The passions depend on the union of the mind and body and do not consist in thought alone. Alanen sees them as a subclass of thoughts. She examines carefully the intentionality of emotions, the distinction between action and passions, and the functions attributed to the body and the soul. She raises a number of questions, some of which chapter seven begins to answer, and others which are left to challenge the reader. Chapter seven is about free will and virtue. Alanen places Descartes's conception of the will and agency in the context of the debate between the voluntarists and the intellectualists. She considers the ancient and medieval antecedents, with a focus on the Stoics as she develops her analysis. She also includes a good discussion of Descartes's contemporaries, and their reactions to his work. Her inclusion of secondary literature is well done. One is left with a better understanding of the complexities of Descartes's understanding of human nature and free will.Overall, Alanen's book is an excellent contribution to... (shrink)

Several studies have approached sense perception in the encyclopaedias of Thomas of Cantimpré, Bartholomew the Englishman, and Vincent of Beauvais. A comparative analysis of these encyclopaedias shows that all of them arrange sense perception in accordance with the expositions on the soul and with human and animal anatomy. Yet there are significant differences in how they treat the objects of sensation: Thomas does not refer to them at all, Bartholomew considers them to be “accidents,” and Vincent (...) deals with them separately when discussing the features of the sensible world. These differences, I argue, respond to two different readings of Aristotle. (shrink)

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:Reviewed by:Descartes’s Dualism by Marleen RozemondSteven J. WagnerMarleen Rozemond. Descartes’s Dualism. Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1998. Pp. xx + 279. Cloth, $24.00.Rozemond gives particular attention to questions of mind-body distinctness vs. union and to the status of sensory ideas. Her historical emphasis, backed by impressive scholarship, is Descartes’s relation to the late scholastics. Rozemond is clear, alert to detail, and fair-minded. While the text is too (...) long (esp. in chapters 4–5), this study is indeed rich, its scope and architecture justified.Any good reading of a philosopher is defined—both enhanced and limited—by certain decisions. I have mentioned one of Rozemond’s: her account of Descartes’s dialogue with such predecessors as Suárez and Fonseca sheds important light. It makes one ask, further, whether standard histories are not just as wrong to ignore scholastic concerns in, say, Hobbes, Spinoza, and Locke. Yet Rozemond is less helpful with issues that make more sense when we read forward from the 1640s, not back. An historian also sets a level of philosophical engagement. One chooses between presenting a meaningful narrative, and struggling with the endless problems of detail that can both doom [End Page 678] a philosophical position and give it life. Rozemond inclines toward narrative, often stopping just short of hard questions. Yet she shows curiosity and intelligence throughout. As in the first case, another decision would not have been better or worse but simply yielded a different kind of history.Fundamental is a third choice. A philosopher’s thought may appear as an orderly structure; or as a mix of fixed points and shifting, inconsistent tendencies. Most of us are trained to the former style of representation (although we let philosophers “develop” over time). Rozemond’s Descartes, too, turns out this way. He occupies definite positions. Within each position he knows whether Ρ is a premise for Q, vice versa, or neither. This way of presenting a body of thought, i.e., as a determinate structure admitting logical assessment, is an indispensable tool for historians. Its value in any particular case is, however, a matter of judgment. Rozemond attacks textual problems with skill, often improving decisively on the competition, but the going looks smoother than it is. Sometimes she carries the privilege of selective reading too far. At other times, she overlooks the poor mutual fit of separately smooth solutions, or rests with an outcome that could not have satisfied Descartes. Some examples:1. There is an old question how far Descartes goes towards proving dualism in the Second Meditation, how much is left for the Sixth. Rozemond basically champions the Second Meditation. Although some texts favor this, she ignores important contrary passages. Her reconstruction of the “argument from separability” also fails completely to carry over to Descartes’s alternate proof (AT VII, 85–6) from the indivisibility of mind.2. Rozemond identifies (“pure”) intellection with thought or mind (56). This leaves a problem how sensation could be a mode of thought, given that for her sensations differ from pure thoughts in being ‘modes of the mind as united to the body’ (201, emphasis mine). She remarks that sensations are not ‘straightforward modes of the mind’; yet her earlier chapters have no place for obscure modal hybrids and indeed require the tidy metaphysical scheme that is now denied.3. Although Rozemond handles Descartes’s anti-empiricism well, the discussion of empty space (95–7) no sooner suggests than it drops a crucial question. Descartes traces belief in the void to a childhood prejudice according to which all bodies are perceptible; rejecting the prejudice is supposed to remove support for the hypothesis of the void. But can Descartes really pick up the doctrine of childhood prejudice, an anti-Aristotelian weapon, and turn it against the radically different atomist framework? Rozemond passes on the attendant philosophical and textual problems (cf. 133–7).4. Rozemond’s extensive treatment of sensory perceptions and qualities rewards study (particularly on the importance, for dualism, of problems about body). But she misses the chance for more. Her Descartes firmly “places sensory qualities in the mind.” The real one struggled repeatedly over whether sensory ideas can or must... (shrink)

James J. Gibson is one of the best known and perhaps most controversial visual theorists of the twentieth century. Writing in the vein of the American functionalists, and immersed in their profound sense of pragmatism, Gibson sought to establish a more rigorous foundation for the study of vision by reworking its most fundamental concepts. Over the five decades of his distinguished career, Gibson brought new clarity to the old problems of the tradition. He offered an alternative theory of (...) class='Hi'>perception - one that could accommodate the experimental insights of contemporary research programs. He characterized this new theory as a version of direct perception in order to distinguish it from the traditional indirect approach of Rene Descartes. On Descartes' account, our perceptual awareness of reality comes through the representations we have formed of it within ourselves. In contrast, Gibson's theory of direct perception states that the environment contains all of the information needed to specify its properties. Hence, perceiving these properties is a matter of detecting the information available in the environment. This theory avoids the difficulty of explaining how the mind organizes holistic perceptions from atomic sensations. In what follows, I will attempt to make good these claims by situating the concept of "structure" at the heart of the ecological program. I will argue that this concept is significant precisely because it allows Gibson to locate the moving, perceiving body at the heart of meaningful perceptual experience; an experience which emerges in the dynamical structures that cross the body and the world. (shrink)

This paper’s aim is to try to answer the critiques made by Leibniz against Descartes’ theory of perception. The first of these critiques concerns the so-called ‘idea-picture’. The answer to this critique will be given on the basis of the Cartesian theory of ‘causal dissimilarity’ between the object of perception and the sensations brought about by it. The second critique refers to the qualia, that is, the supposed disconnection and arbitrariness between the content of the mental representation (...) (the idea) and its material reference. The answer to this critique will be given by means of the psychophysical correlation that Descartes calls ‘institution of nature’. Finally, the last critique relates to the insensibles perceptions. In order to answer this critique, it will be showed that Descartes held that matter is infinitely divisible and consequently he defended that there are many portions of bodies whose perception escapes the reach of our senses. Keywords: Theory of perception; Mechanism; Qualia; Institution of Nature. (shrink)

The recent literature has seriously challenged, and in my view defeated, the traditional representationalist interpretation of Descartes. One contributor to it, John Yolton, has recently extended its arguments to argue that the traditional representationalist interpretation of Locke must be relinquished as well, that Locke, following the Cartesian path of Arnauld, held a semiotic theory of ideas which “de-ontologized” them and construed them as signs or cues in the direct perception of physical objects. The Cartesian support for this view, (...) especially in La Dioptrique, has been questioned by R.F. McRae, who argues that “if Locke accepts Descartes' theory of vision, then Descartes' conception of sensations as signs provides no support for the direct realist interpretation of Locke.” My aim here is not to resolve the representationalism issue, but to show the irrelevance to it of the kinds of questions the Yolton-McRae exchange raises concerning sense perception. I shall try to show that there stems from Descartes a single account of those questions the essentials of which are embedded in theories falling on both sides of the representationalism issue. That single account involves a theory of judgment and vision, especially of distance, which in the case of Malebranche and Berkeley, even involves the same confusions. (shrink)

RésuméDans cet article, je soutiendrai que divers philosophes du kalām s'accordent à dire que la perception sensorielle dépasse les processus physiques dans les organes sensoriels. Il peut se passer quelque chose dans nos yeux lorsque nous voyons une pomme rouge, mais voir une pomme rouge ne s'y réduit pas. Nous verrons que certains philosophes du kalām soutiennent que la perception sensorielle est semblable à une prise de conscience ou à une conscience de l'objet de la perception, et (...) qu'elle est, par conséquent, distincte du processus physique dans les organes sensoriels. Un groupe ira jusqu’à accepter que la perception sensorielle ne dépend même d'aucun processus physique dans le corps. Un autre groupe acceptera que la perception sensorielle présuppose diverses conditions physiques, mais il considérera néanmoins la perception sensorielle comme quelque chose de distinct de l'occurrence de ces conditions. Je suggère que ces théories non réductionnistes de la perception sensorielle sont la raison pour laquelle les philosophes arabo-islamiques, à partir du XIe siècle, rejettent systématiquement la théorie aristotélico-avicennienne de la perception sensorielle. (shrink)