Rejectionists argue that collective belief ascriptions are best understood as instances of collective acceptance rather than belief. Margaret Gilbert objects to rejectionist accounts of collective belief statements. She argues that rejectionists rely on a questionable methodology when they inquire into the nature of collective belief ascriptions, and make an erroneous inference when they are led to believe that collectives do not really have beliefs. Consequently, Gilbert claims that collective belief statements are best understood as instances of belief. I critically examine (...) Gilbert’s criticisms of rejectionism. I argue that rejectionism is still a viable account of collective belief ascriptions. I also argue that Gilbert’s most powerful criticism provides important insight into what really stands between her and the rejectionists. Gilbert and the rejectionists do not yet agree about what background assumptions can be made in developing an account of collective belief ascriptions. (shrink)

Motor imagery is often used inducing changes in electroencephalographic (EEG) signals for imagery-based brain-computer interfacing (BCI). A BCI is a device translating brain signals into control signals providing severely motor-impaired persons with an additional, non-muscular channel for communication and control. In the last years, there is increasing interest using BCIs also for healthy people in terms of enhancement or gaming. Most studies focusing on improving signal processing feature extraction and classification methods, but the performance of a BCI can also be (...) improved by optimizing the user’s control strategies, e.g., using more vivid and engaging mental tasks for control. We used multichannel EEG to investigate neural correlates of a sports imagery task (playing tennis) compared to a simple motor imagery task (squeezing a ball). To enhance the vividness of both tasks participants performed a short physical exercise between two imagery sessions. EEG was recorded from 60 closely spaced electrodes placed over frontal, central, and parietal areas of 30 healthy volunteers divided in two groups. Whereas Group 1 (EG) performed a physical exercise between the two imagery sessions, Group 2 (CG) watched a landscape movie without physical activity. Spatiotemporal event-related desynchronization (ERD) and event-related synchronization (ERS) patterns during motor imagery (MI) tasks were evaluated. The results of the EG showed significant stronger ERD patterns in the alpha frequency band (8–13 Hz) during MI of tennis after training. Our results are in evidence with previous findings that MI in combination with motor execution has beneficial effects. We conclude that sports MI combined with an interactive game environment could be a future promising task in motor learning and rehabilitation improving motor functions in late therapy processes or support neuroplasticity. (shrink)

Business Ethics: A European Review, EarlyView.

This chapter discusses Kuhn’s conception of the history of science by focussing on two respects in which Kuhn is an historicist historian and philosopher of science. I identify two distinct, but related, aspects of historicism in the work of Hegel and show how these are also found in Kuhn’s work. First, Kuhn held tradition to be important for understanding scientific change and that the tradition from which a scientific idea originates must be understood in evaluating that idea. This makes Kuhn (...) a historicist in a sense we may call conservative. Secondly, Kuhn held that there is a pattern to the development of science. In the light of the fact that he held scientific change to be law-like, we can call this second aspect of Kuhn’s historicism determinist. I discuss the relationship of Kuhn’s historicist historiography to the philosophical purposes he had for his history of science, namely to refute a conception of scientific progress as driven towards increasing truth by something like ‘the scientific method’. I argue that while this determinism refutes certain positivist conceptions of scientific change, it also requires internalism—the view that the causes of scientific change come from within science, not from outside. Consequently, Kuhn’s historiography of science contrasts with that implicit in much of post-Kuhnian science studies. (shrink)

Margaret Gilbert explores the phenomenon referredto in everyday ascriptions ofbeliefs to groups. She refers to this type ofphenomenon as ``collective belief'' andcalls the types of groups that are the bearersof such beliefs ``plural subjects''. Iargue that the attitudes that groups adoptthat Gilbert refers to as ``collectivebeliefs'' are not a species of belief in animportant and central sense, but rathera species of acceptance. Unlike proper beliefs,a collective belief is adopted bya group as a means to realizing the group'sgoals. Unless we recognize (...) that thisphenomenon is a species of acceptance, pluralsubjects will seem prone to changetheir ``beliefs'' for irrelevant reasons, andthus frequently appear to act in anirrational manner. (shrink)

The Meno has traditionally been viewed as "one of Plato's earliest and most noteworthy forays into epistemology." In this dialogue, and in the course of a discussion between Socrates and his young interlocutor, Meno, about the nature of virtue and whether it can be taught, “Meno raises an epistemological question unprecedented in the Socratic dialogues.” This question - or rather, dilemma - has come to be known in the philosophical literature as Meno’s Paradox of Inquiry, due its apparently containing an (...) easy-to-detect equivocation of the word ‘know’. Immediately after the paradox, and in an apparent response to it, Socrates recounts a myth: a story told by priests and priestesses about the pre-natal existence and immortality of the soul. From this this myth, Socrates concocts the infamous theory of recollection – a theory according to which the soul has acquired knowledge of everything before it was born, while in a disincarnate state. According to the traditional reading of Meno’s paradox, this theory constitutes Plato’s response to it. The traditional reading has come under fire in recent years by advocates of the epistemological reading (ERM), who argue that the theory of recollection is not Plato’s intended response to the paradox. Instead, they suggest, Plato’s distinction between true belief and knowledge – which appears towards the end of the dialogue – is sufficient for solving the paradox; and as such, it ought to be read as Plato’s response to it. In this thesis, I argue against ERM’s claim that a mere epistemological distinction is all it takes to solve the paradox. To do so, I explore the metaphysics of change in Plato’s ontology. From this, I appeal to our everyday notion of ‘memory’ in order to show that Meno’s paradox, in fact, contains a hidden-premise, which when laid bare, reveals two distinct challenges contained within the argument: a superficial one, and a deeper one. I argue that although it appears at first blush as though the former could easily be dismissed as an equivocation, to which the epistemological distinction between belief and knowledge could provide an answer, the latter cannot. This is because the deeper challenge threatens the very preconditions of knowledge itself – that is to say, it renders cognition impossible – and, as such, it cancels out any effort to provide an epistemological response to the superficial challenge. Hence, unless the deeper-level challenge is satisfactorily disarmed, both challenges remain unanswered. I argue that although the major motivation for the theory of recollection in the Meno is indeed to provide an answer to scepticism about knowledge, nevertheless, it ought to be understood, first, as a theory of cognition – i.e. as a theory about the preconditions and atomic building blocks of knowledge – and not a theory of knowledge per se. This answer comes in the form of a radical theory of the mind and cognition – one that stands in stark opposition to our common-sense views about the mind: a view from which, Plato believed, the paradox arises. Drawing on recent debates between Nativists and Empiricists in the Cognitive Sciences, I argue that it was a great achievement of Plato’s to grasp that our common-sense view about the mind, and its concomitant process of learning, language acquisition and knowledge acquisition, might in fact be at the very root of scepticism about our ability to engage in meaningful philosophical practice, and our ability to acquire objective knowledge – especially, objective moral knowledge. The Meno’s paradox, then – so I contend - is not a puzzle whose solution rests upon merely pointing to an epistemological distinction between true belief and knowledge, as advocates of ERM have suggested. Rather, it is a puzzle about cognition. More precisely, it is a puzzle that targets the rudimentary cognitive stages of initial cognition and truth-recognition - one whose solution entails offering an account of the mind that would make these elementary cognitive processes possible. Accordingly, Plato’s theory of recollection in the Meno ought to be read as an attempt to map the structure of the mind, and as such, to provide an account of cognition. In doing so, he intended to put forward a view about the preconditions of knowledge – the sort of preconditions without which language acquisition and knowledge acquisition would simply not be possible. With this theory, Plato has the beginnings of an argument against the kind of relativism and scepticism prevalent at his time. As such, a correct interpretation of the so-called paradox of inquiry (and Plato’s proposed solution to it via the theory of recollection) should approach it as a puzzle about mind and cognition – and not solely as an epistemological one, as it has previously been treated. (shrink)

MOHAMMED SA, WALTERS KL, LAMARR J, EVANS‐CAMPBELL T and FRYBERG S. Nursing Inquiry 2012; 19: 116–127 [Epub ahead of print]Finding middle ground: negotiating university and tribal community interests in community‐based participatory researchCommunity‐based participatory research (CBPR) has been hailed as an alternative approach to one‐sided research endeavors that have traditionally been conducted on communities as opposed to with them. Although CBPR engenders numerous relationship strengths, through its emphasis on co‐sharing, mutual benefit, and community capacity building, it is often challenging as well. (...) In this article, we describe some of the challenges of implementing CBPR in a research project designed to prevent cardiovascular disease among an indigenous community in the Pacific Northwest of the United States and how we addressed them. Specifically, we highlight the process of collaboratively constructing a Research Protocol/Data Sharing Agreement and qualitative interview guide that addressed the concerns of both university and tribal community constituents. Establishing these two items was a process of negotiation that required: (i) balancing of individual, occupational, research, and community interests; (ii) definition of terminology (e.g., ownership of data); and (iii) extensive consideration of how to best protect research participants. Finding middle ground in CBPR requires research partners to examine and articulate their own assumptions and expectations, and nurture a relationship based on compromise to effectively meet the needs of each group. (shrink)

The Book Aims At The Inner Soul And Accordingly The Essays Are Centered Around Music As A Cosmic Energy And Its Role And Functions In The Game Plan Of Creation.

Data from self-report tools cannot be readily compared between cultures due to culturally specific ways of using a response scale. As such, anchoring vignettes have been proposed as a suitable methodology for correcting against this difference. We developed anchoring vignettes for the Big Five Inventory-44 (BFI-44) to supplement its Likert-type response options. Based on two samples (Rwanda: n = 423; Philippines: n = 143), we evaluated the psychometric properties of the measure both before and after applying the anchoring vignette adjustment. (...) Results show that adjusted scores had better measurement properties, including improved reliability and a more orthogonal correlational structure, relative to scores based on the original Likert scale. Correlations of the Big Five Personality Factors with life satisfaction were essentially unchanged after the vignette-adjustment while correlations with counterproductive were noticeably lower. Overall, these changed findings suggest that the use of anchoring vignette methodology improves the cross-cultural comparability of self-reported personality, a finding of potential interest to the field of global workforce research and development as well as educational policymakers. (shrink)

I examine the epistemic import of collaborative research in science. I develop and defend a functional explanation for its growing importance. Collaborative research is becoming more popular in the natural sciences, and to a lesser degree in the social sciences, because contemporary research in these fields frequently requires access to abundant resources, for which there is great competition. Scientists involved in collaborative research have been very successful in accessing these resources, which has in turn enabled them to realize the epistemic (...) goals of science more effectively than other scientists, thus creating a research environment in which collaboration is now the norm. (shrink)

This paper assesses the role of shadow education (SE), i.e., organised learning activities outside formal schooling, in the lives of secondary school students of different social backgrounds and in different school settings, in a high-stakes context. It draws on multilevel analysis of longitudinal Growing Up in Ireland data, alongside narratives from in-depth case study research in 10 schools. Framed within a social reproduction approach, we show how access to SE as an educational resource is socially stratified, accessible to those with (...) greater levels of family resources, and those attending schools with higher socio-economic student intakes. SE is viewed as an investment, particularly among students with average and above average levels of prior attainment, while high attaining students are less likely to use SE. Perhaps reflecting the normalisation of SE in the Irish context, students do not directly link engagement in such tuition to their socio-emotional wellbeing. (shrink)

My aim is to evaluate a new realist strategy for addressing the pessimistic induction, Ludwig Fahrbach’s (Synthese 180:139–155, 2011) appeal to the exponential growth of science. Fahrbach aims to show that, given the exponential growth of science, the history of science supports realism. I argue that Fahrbach is mistaken. I aim to show that earlier generations of scientists could construct a similar argument, but one that aims to show that the theories that they accepted are likely true. The problem with (...) this is that from our perspective on the history of science we know their argument is flawed. Consequently, we should not be impressed or persuaded by Fahrbach’s argument. Fahrbach has failed to identify a difference that matters between today’s theories and past theories. But realists need to find such a difference if they are to undermine the pessimistic induction. (shrink)

I examine whether or not it is apt to attribute knowledge to groups of scientists. I argue that though research teams can be aptly described as having knowledge, communities of scientists identified with research fields, and the scientific community as a whole are not capable of knowing. Scientists involved in research teams are dependent on each other, and are organized in a manner to advance a goal. Such teams also adopt views that may not be identical to the views of (...) the individual members of the group. (shrink)

I defend an alternative reading of §56 of Frege's Grundlagen, one that rescues Frege from Dummett's charge that this section is the weakest in the whole book. On my reading, Frege is not presenting arguments against the adjectival strategy. Rather, Frege presents the definitions in §55 in order to convince his reader that numbers must be objects. In §56 Frege suggests that these definitions contain two shortcomings that adequate definitions of numbers must overcome. And these short-comings, he argues, can only (...) be avoided if numbers are objects. Further, I have argued that my alternative reading defuses three of Dummett's four criticisms of §56, consequently challenging Dummett's claim that this section should be stigmatized as the weakest in the whole book. Nevertheless, I am inclined to agree with Dummett that the adjectival strategy is more robust than Frege suggests. Frege's arguments seem far from conclusive. Thus, it may be that the adjectival strategy can provide us with definitions that can do everything we can expect from adequate definitions of numbers. (shrink)

The anti-realist argument from underconsideration focuses on the fact that, when scientists evaluate theories, they only ever consider a subset of the theories that can account for the available data. As a result, when scientists judge one theory to be superior to competitor theories, they are not warranted in drawing the conclusion that the superior theory is likely true with respect to what it says about unobservable entities and processes. I defend the argument from underconsideration from the objections of Peter (...) Lipton. I argue that the inconsistency that Lipton claims to find in the argument vanishes once we understand what the anti-realist means when she claims that scientists are reliable. I also argue that collapsing the distinction between relative and absolute evaluations, as Lipton recommends, has its costs. Finally, I briefly examine Richard Boyd's influential defence of realism. (shrink)

I argue that van Fraassen’s selectionist explanation for the success of science is superior to the realists’ explanation. Whereas realists argue that our current theories are successful because they accurately reflect the structure of the world, the selectionist claims that our current theories are successful because unsuccessful theories have been eliminated. I argue that, unlike the explanation proposed by the realist, the selectionist explanation can also account for the failures of once successful theories and the fact that sometimes two competing (...) theories are both equally successful. (shrink)

Christian ethical practice has historically fallen short, when we consider the histories of European colonial violence from the sixteenth century and the transatlantic slave trade in Africans. Today, Christian ethics can fail to uphold a standard of resistance to contemporary evils, including racial injustice. To what extent can Christian ethics break with this history and be saved? This article considers the ongoing colonial tendencies of Christian ethics and theological education in Britain, before considering the centrality of decolonisation, primarily ‘of the (...) mind’. In the latter part, it turns to examples of anti-colonial Christian ethics, in the work of Robert Beckford, Anthony Reddie, Anupama Ranawana and Anderson Jeremiah. It ends by giving attention to what decolonisation might mean in religious and theological education, as we seek to create spaces for learning in which all people's bodies, minds and voices are welcomed and honoured. (shrink)

David Hull accounts for the success of science in terms of an invisible hand mechanism, arguing that it is difficult to reconcile scientists' self-interestedness or their desire for recognition with traditional philosophical explanations for the success of science. I argue that we have less reason to invoke an invisible hand mechanism to explain the success of science than Hull implies, and that many of the practices and institutions constitutive of science are intentionally designed by scientists with an eye to realizing (...) the very goals that Hull believes need to be explained by reference to an invisible hand mechanism. Thus, I reduce the scope of Hull's invisible hand explanation and supplement it by appealing to a hidden hand explanation. (shrink)

I aim to clarify the relationship between the success of a theory and the truth of that theory. This has been a central issue in the debates between realists and anti-realists. Realists assume that success is a reliable indicator of truth, but the details about the respects in which success is a reliable indicator or test of truth have been largely left to our intuitions. Lewis (Synthese 129:371–380, 2001) provides a clear proposal of how success and truth might be connected, (...) comparing a test of success of our theories to medical tests with low rates of false positives and false negatives. But, contrary to what Lewis claims, I argue that it is not enough for the realist to undercut the claim that success is not a reliable indicator of truth. Rather, the realist must show that our current best theories are likely true. Further, I argue that tests in science are unlike medical tests in a number of important ways. (shrink)

Domain experts regularly teach novice students how to perform a task. This often requires them to adjust their behavior to the less knowledgeable audience and, hence, to behave in a more didactic manner. Eye movement modeling examples (EMMEs) are a contemporary educational tool for displaying experts’ (natural or didactic) problem‐solving behavior as well as their eye movements to learners. While research on expert‐novice communication mainly focused on experts’ changes in explicit, verbal communication behavior, it is as yet unclear whether and (...) how exactly experts adjust their nonverbal behavior. This study first investigated whether and how experts change their eye movements and mouse clicks (that are displayed in EMMEs) when they perform a task naturally versus teach a task didactically. Programming experts and novices initially debugged short computer codes in a natural manner. We first characterized experts’ natural problem‐solving behavior by contrasting it with that of novices. Then, we explored the changes in experts’ behavior when being subsequently instructed to model their task solution didactically. Experts became more similar to novices on measures associated with experts’ automatized processes (i.e., shorter fixation durations, fewer transitions between code and output per click on the run button when behaving didactically). This adaptation might make it easier for novices to follow or imitate the expert behavior. In contrast, experts became less similar to novices for measures associated with more strategic behavior (i.e., code reading linearity, clicks on run button) when behaving didactically. (shrink)

Domain experts regularly teach novice students how to perform a task. This often requires them to adjust their behavior to the less knowledgeable audience and, hence, to behave in a more didactic manner. Eye movement modeling examples (EMMEs) are a contemporary educational tool for displaying experts’ (natural or didactic) problem‐solving behavior as well as their eye movements to learners. While research on expert‐novice communication mainly focused on experts’ changes in explicit, verbal communication behavior, it is as yet unclear whether and (...) how exactly experts adjust their nonverbal behavior. This study first investigated whether and how experts change their eye movements and mouse clicks (that are displayed in EMMEs) when they perform a task naturally versus teach a task didactically. Programming experts and novices initially debugged short computer codes in a natural manner. We first characterized experts’ natural problem‐solving behavior by contrasting it with that of novices. Then, we explored the changes in experts’ behavior when being subsequently instructed to model their task solution didactically. Experts became more similar to novices on measures associated with experts’ automatized processes (i.e., shorter fixation durations, fewer transitions between code and output per click on the run button when behaving didactically). This adaptation might make it easier for novices to follow or imitate the expert behavior. In contrast, experts became less similar to novices for measures associated with more strategic behavior (i.e., code reading linearity, clicks on run button) when behaving didactically. (shrink)

I examine two challenges that collaborative research raises for science. First, collaborative research threatens the motivation of scientists. As a result, I argue, collaborative research may have adverse effects on what sorts of things scientists can effectively investigate. Second, collaborative research makes it more difficult to hold scientists accountable. I argue that the authors of multi-authored articles are aptly described as plural subjects, corporate bodies that are more than the sum of the individuals involved. Though journal editors do not currently (...) conceive of the authors of multi-authored articles this way, this conception provides us with the conceptual resources to make sense of how collaborating scientists behave.Keywords: Collaborative research; Authorship; Multi-authored articles; Responsibility; Reward system; Plural subject. (shrink)

Realists and anti-realists disagree about whether contemporary scientists are epistemically privileged. Because the issue of epistemic privilege figures in arguments in support of and against theoretical knowledge in science, it is worth examining whether or not there is any basis for assuming such privilege. I show that arguments that try to explain the success of science by appeal to some sort of epistemic privilege have, so far, failed. They have failed to give us reason to believe (i) that scientists are (...) prone to develop theories that are true, (ii) that our current theories are not apt to be replaced in the future, and (iii) that science is nearing its completion. (shrink)

Though many agree that we need to account for the role that social factors play in inquiry, developing a viable social epistemology has proved to be difficult. According to Longino, it is the processes that make inquiry possible that are aptly described as "social," for they require a number of people to sustain them. These processes, she claims, not only facilitate inquiry, but also ensure that the results of inquiry are more than mere subjective opinions, and thus deserve to be (...) called "knowledge." In this paper, I (a) explain Longino's epistemology, and (b) defend it against charges that have recently been raised by Kitcher, Schmitt, and Solomon. Longino rightly recognizes that not all social factors have the same (adverse) affect on inquiry. She also recommends that we distinguish knowledge from mere opinion by reference to a social standard. (shrink)

In this paper, I draw jointly upon a Foucauldian ethical discourse and the example of the so-called ‘Manchester school’ of Foucauldian labour process theory (LPT) to question the political/ethical aspirations and effects of critical management studies. Specifically, I question the ethics and effects of LPT researchers’ relationships with those they/we research. I organize the discussion around four Foucauldian ethical themes or feelings. I thread these ethical themes throughout the paper to argue that, though Foucauldian LPT may be understood to abstractly (...) resonate with these themes, its contribution is seriously undermined through the authors’ lack of attention to ways of embodying this ethics in relations with the researched. By not embodying these commitments, the marriage between Foucault and LPT risks being read more as a marriage of convenience than commitment. And, further, a marriage that reproduces a politically problematic ‘modernist/positivist’ self–other separation or divorce between researcher and researched. (shrink)

I examine in this paper deification and demonisation – the social attribution of absolute ‘Good’ and ‘Evil’ to individuals or individual entities. Specifically, I unpack ways that evilness and goodness have become personified in the figure of the chief executive officer in contemporary, particularly US, business culture. Showing both the readily accessible and widely used nature of these religious tropes, I nevertheless argue that both deification and demonisation have ethically and politically disempowering effects for organisational members, the wider citizenry, and (...) for critique within the field of business ethics. (shrink)

I compare the epistemic culture of Wikipedia with the epistemic culture of science, with special attention to the culture of collaborative research in science. The two cultures differ markedly with respect to (1) the knowledge produced, (2) who produces the knowledge, and (3) the processes by which knowledge is produced. Wikipedia has created a community of inquirers that are governed by norms very different from those that govern scientists. Those who contribute to Wikipedia do not ground their claims on their (...) reputations as knowers, for they stand to lose nothing if and when their contributions are found to be misleading or false. And the immediacy of the medium encourages gossip and jokes. Hence, though we have some reason to believe that an invisible hand aids scientists in realizing their epistemic goals, we cannot ground our confidence in what is reported on Wikipedia on the fact that an invisible hand ensures quality. Nor is the information on Wikipedia aptly justified in a manner similar to the way testimony can be justified. (shrink)

In the past years motor imagery turned out to be also an innovative and effective tool for motor learning and improvement of sports performance. Whereas many studies investigating sports MI focusing on upper or lower limbs involvement, knowledge about involved neural structures during whole-body movements is still limited. In the present study we investigated brain activity of climbers during a kinesthetic motor imagery climbing task with different difficulties by means of functional near infrared spectroscopy. Twenty healthy participants were split into (...) two groups according to their climbing skill level. The aim of the current study is investigating neural correlates of a whole-body sports MI task with an additional focus on skill level dependency. Climbing experts and non-experts imagined bouldering an “easy” and “difficult” route from a first-person perspective while hemodynamic responses were recorded simultaneously. We found significant differences between the two climbing routes, easy and difficult within participants as well as between the two groups of different climbing skill levels. Overall beginners showed increased hemodynamic responses compared to experts in all defined regions of interest supporting the claim of the neural efficiency hypothesis. Even though climbing is a complex, coordinated movement of upper and lower limbs we found a stronger activation focus of the upper limbs, especially of the dominant hand-area, while the foot area seems to be deactivated or inhibited simultaneously. Summarizing, these findings provide novel insights into brain activation during the imagery of a whole-body movement and its relation to climbing expertise. (shrink)

The goal of this study was to implement a Riemannian geometry -based algorithm to detect high mental workload and mental fatigue using task-induced electroencephalogram signals. In order to elicit high MWL and MF, the participants performed a cognitively demanding task in the form of the letter n-back task. We analyzed the time-varying characteristics of the EEG band power features in the theta and alpha frequency band at different task conditions and cortical areas by employing a RG-based framework. MWL and MF (...) were considered as too high, when the Riemannian distances of the task-run EEG reached or surpassed the threshold of the baseline EEG. The results of this study showed a BP increase in the theta and alpha frequency bands with increasing experiment duration, indicating elevated MWL and MF that impedes/hinders the task performance of the participants. High MWL and MF was detected in 8 out of 20 participants. The Riemannian distances also showed a steady increase toward the threshold with increasing experiment duration, with the most detections occurring toward the end of the experiment. To support our findings, subjective ratings and behavioral measures were also considered. (shrink)

It has often been remarked that science is a young man's game. Thomas Kuhn, for example, claims that revolutionary changes in science are almost always initiated by either young scientists or those new to a field. I subject Kuhn's hypothesis to testing. I examine 24 revolutionary scientific figures mentioned in The Structure of Scientific Revolutions to determine if young scientists are more likely to make revolutionary discoveries than older scientists. My analysis suggests that middle-aged scientists are responsible for initiating more (...) scientific revolutions than young scientists, given the proportion of each group in the total population of scientists. I argue that the popular myth about the correlation between youth and scientific discovery fails to take into account the proportion of young scientists in the population of scientists. (shrink)

I examine the value and limitations of Kuhn’s Structure of Scientific Revolutions. In the interests of developing a social epistemology of science, I argue that we should draw on Kuhn’s later work, published in The Road since Structure. There, Kuhn draws attention to the important role that specialty formation plays in resolving crises in science, a topic he did not discuss in Structure. I argue that we need to develop a better understanding of specialty research communities. Kuhn’s later work provides (...) a research agenda for those who want to study scientific specialization. I briefly discuss some recent studies that promise to provide valuable insight into the social structure of science. (shrink)

I present a history of Kuhn’s discovery of paradigms, one that takes account of the complexity of the discovery process. Rather than emerging fully formed in Structure , the concept paradigm emerged through a series of phases. Early criticism of Structure revealed that the role of paradigms was unclear. It was only as Kuhn responded to criticism that he finally articulated a precise understanding of the concept paradigm. In a series of publications in the 1970s, he settled on a conception (...) of a paradigm as a concrete exemplar that functions as a guide to future research. (shrink)

This paper explores two questions central to understanding the nature of formulaic sequences: (1) What are they for? and (2) What determines how many there are? The “Communicative Impact” model draws into a single account how language is shaped by cognitive processing on the one hand and socio-interactional function on the other: Formulaic sequences play a range of coordinated roles in neutralizing unanticipated perturbations in the cognitive management of language, so the speaker's socio-interactional goals can still be achieved. One role (...) involves compensatory actions to sustain fluency. However, these actions are themselves context-sensitive, so the balance of types of formulaic sequence will vary according to situation. The model applies equally to temporary cognitive pressure and chronic problems such as dementia and limited linguistic competency in a foreign language. (shrink)

The literature on collective belief and collective intentionality has grown rapidly and is now quite extensive. Philosophers have applied the concepts of “collective belief” and “collective intentionality” in a variety of contexts, including political and legal contexts as well as scientific contexts, specifically to model the behavior of research teams and scientific specialties.

There has been a growing concern over establishing norms that ensure the ethically acceptable and scientifically sound conduct of clinical trials. Among the leading norms internationally are the World Medical Association's Declaration of Helsinki, guidelines by the Council for International Organizations of Medical Sciences, the International Conference on Harmonization's standards for industry, and the CONSORT group's reporting norms, in addition to the influential U.S. Federal Common Rule, Food and Drug Administration's body of regulations, and information sheets by the Department of (...) Health and Human Services. There are also many norms published at more local levels by official agencies and professional groups.Any account of international standards should cover both scientific and ethical norms at once – the two are conceptually intertwined. Recent sources recognize that “[s]cientifically unsound research on human subjects is unethical in that it exposes research subjects to risks without possible benefit.”. (shrink)

Kuhn's Structure of Scientific Revolutions has been enduringly influential in philosophy of science, challenging many common presuppositions about the nature of science and the growth of scientific knowledge. However, philosophers have misunderstood Kuhn's view, treating him as a relativist or social constructionist. In this book, Brad Wray argues that Kuhn provides a useful framework for developing an epistemology of science that takes account of the constructive role that social factors play in scientific inquiry. He examines the core concepts of (...) Structure and explains the main characteristics of both Kuhn's evolutionary epistemology and his social epistemology, relating Structure to Kuhn's developed view presented in his later writings. The discussion includes analyses of the Copernican revolution in astronomy and the plate tectonics revolution in geology. The book will be useful for scholars working in science studies, sociologists and historians of science as well as philosophers of science. (shrink)

It is widely assumed that it is the anti-realist who stakes his case on evidence from the history of science. I argue that realists have failed to recognize the need to collect evidence from the history of science to support their methodological claims, and anti-realists do not rely on evidence from the history of science to the extent that many suggest.

Philip Kitcher rejects the global pessimists' view that the conclusions reached in inquiry are determined by the interests of some segment of the population, arguing that only some inquiries, for example, inquiries into race and gender, are adversely affected by interests. I argue that the biases Kitcher believes affect such inquiries are operative in all domains, but the prevalence of such biases does not support global pessimism. I argue further that in order to address the global pessimists' concerns, the scientific (...) community needs criticism from people with diverse interests and background assumptions. (shrink)