"The Eternal City, Rome offers endless insights through its millennia of history, its centrality to European art and religion, and the generations of travelers that have sought it out. This book from philosopher Scott Samuelson offers readers a thinker's tour of Rome. Samuelson shows how people have made sense of Rome as a scene of human nature and then envisioned the good life-philosophers such as Lucretius and Seneca, but also poets and artists such as Horace and Caravaggio, filmmakers like (...) Fellini, and adventurers like Rosa Bathurst. He roots these explorations and visions in the city of Rome itself: Samuelson introduces us to some of the most famous sites in Rome by sharing illuminating moments in their histories; and he discusses great works of art to be found in Rome by getting to the heart of the knotty ethical and emotional questions they pose. And, practicing philosophy in place, he tackles head-on the profound questions that most tours of Rome only bracket: What does it mean to see the Forum through the eyes of Cicero? Does all this art about God really signify anything? Should visitors really be impressed by these incredible sites built on the slaughter and domination of others? What does all this history tell us about who we are? And, most important, how can an afternoon Negroni help us find the good life? Samuelson's aim is to provide an eclectic guide to Rome and happiness-a portable approach, blending history and philosophy, for tourists and dreaming readers alike"--. (shrink)

Sharrad, Scott After the Census in 2011, the Australian Bureau of Statistics under took a major review of the questions it asks, how it asks them and how it presents them on Household Forms. Consequently, there was a large campaign around the question, 'What is the person's religion?' The push was on to either change the wording, split the question or to bring the 'no religion' option to the top of the list.

Sharrad, Scott; Bartholomeusz, David; Henderson, Stewart.

Sharrad, Scott The Council of Australian Humanist Societies has been in existence for over 50 years and in that time it has been kept running by some incredibly committed individuals. Over that time, the way CAHS and organised Humanism in general have operated in Australia has remained more or less the same. Indeed, in the September 1975 issue of the Australian Humanist - just 10 years after the formation of CAHS - Chairman Nick Stenning was lamenting the lack of (...) volunteers at the national level and real communication between state societies; a common complaint that is still to be heard around the traps today. (shrink)

Atrial natriuretic peptides appear to elicit their actions in some target tissues by binding to a novel cell‐surface transmembrane protein which possesses both peptide binding and guanylate cyclase activities. Ligand binding stimulates enzyme activity to produce increased intracellular concentrations of cyclic GMP which, in turn, mediates the cell's physiological response.

This chapter is about personhood in relation to ethics and to conciliar Christian theology, and how concepts of personhood may discriminate against profoundly cognitively disabled human beings. (By ‘conciliar Christian theology’ I mean the Christian theology that is articulated in, or endorsed by, the first seven ecumenical councils.) -/- I believe we can learn several things about personhood by looking at these two topics together. By examining ancient and medieval concepts of personhood and some modern conceptions of personhood we gain (...) a better grasp of the variety of concepts and what substantive work they were intended to do. By becoming familiar with (part of) the history of concepts of personhood we are better situated to appreciate and judge the theoretical work that these concepts were intended to do and what consequences they have in ethical and theological theorizing. -/- In the first section I tell a select history of moral philosophers theorizing about personhood and discuss these in relation to human beings with profound cognitive disability. I focus on John Locke, Immanuel Kant, and Mary Anne Warren. In the “When Personhood Is Discriminatory” section I argue that concepts of personhood, especially modern concepts of personhood, are typically used in a manner that discriminates against human beings with profound cognitive disabilities. I give two arguments against discriminatory uses of personhood, the Moral Shift Argument and the Argument against Exclusive Personhood. Although the Moral Shift Argument is deductively valid, it probably has little persuasive power over those who do not share the moral belief that profoundly cognitively disabled human beings are equal members of the moral community. However, the Argument against Exclusive Personhood has more argumentative force because it denies the claims that personhood is “self-evident” and that it is “obvious” to everyone. In the following section I survey a select history of concepts of personhood in order to establish the claims that concepts of personhood are not self-evident and are not obvious to everyone. This history of personhood goes back to ancient and medieval Christian theorizing and debating about personhood. It shows that concepts of personhood are not “self-evident” but rather are theoretical posits that are posited in theory construction in order to explain certain putative theological facts. Given that personhood is a theoretical posit and is not “self-evident,” moral philosophers who aim to determine the extent of the moral community on the basis of a supposedly “self-evident” concept of personhood are not justified in doing so. Moreover, given the Argument against Exclusive Personhood, philosophical theologians who wish to articulate models of the Trinity or Incarnation that are consistent with the seven ecumenical councils will find that they, like moral philosophers, are not justified to assume, or to insist on, modern personhood for their models of the Trinity or Incarnation. My overall conclusion, then, is that modern personhood is bad for ethics and unnecessary for conciliar ecumenical Christian theology. (shrink)

An Edge Discussion of BEYOND BELIEF: Science, Religion, Reason and Survival Salk Institue, La Jolla November 5-7, 2006.

There are an abundance of business ethics resources on the Internet. This paper details Internet resources with the following categories: Ethics Associations and Institutes, Ethics Journals, University Ethics Centers, Business Professions’ Code of Conduct, Business Codes of Conduct, and Ethics Cases.

Paul Ricoeur’s most widely read book, The Symbolism of Evil, examines the structure of a will that has succumbed to evil and discloses its meaning through a study of symbols and myths. This edited collection explores a wide range of themes that resonate with topics in contemporary philosophy and religion.

Throughout his career Paul Ramsey returned repeatedly to the seminal works of Augustine to clarify both the foundations of Christian moral thought and its application to problems of social ethics. The paper argues that in the course of developing his own thought Ramsey moved from merely using the insights of Augustine to a genuinely Augustinian theological position, balancing the pastoral responsibilities of the theologian to the community with the demand for faithfulness to the integrity of the Christian tradition. In the (...) process Ramsey produces a reading of Augustine both critically compelling in its own right and theologically promising for moral reflection in that tradition. (shrink)

The political contours of social actions appear not only in the relationships between cultural actors but in the artifacts that surround them. This is increasingly the case as digital technology becomes the vehicle for education. This article focuses on the rhetoric that accompanies such educational technology. All too often, both the hype and the criticism surrounding technology in education implicitly accept that digital machines and media represent the impending future. However, if technology is understood as the instantiation of enduring social (...) relations, then it must always represent the sociopolitical configurations of the past, however recent that past is. Seen in this light, technology does not drive change so much as it resists it. Technology becomes a tool of maintenance, not innovation. This article spins out how this might be the case and accompanies the arguments with concrete instances of how this is being played out in public schooling. (shrink)

Commenting on the role of psychoanalysis at the time of the posthuman, Véronique Voruz notes dryly that “posthumanismposthumanism is a discourse that brings people together in a conversation where nobody knows what the other is saying, but everyone believes they understand each other to a sufficient degree for a conversation to take place”. “Posthumanismposthumanism” is both symptom and signifiersignifier and thus organizes a social bondsocial bond, at least between academics where the jouissancejouissance or pleasure of discourse compensates for the lacklack (...) of meaning. This is both fortunate and ironic because one of the features of posthumanismposthumanism is precisely the decline and even absence of traditional forms of social bondsocial bond, that is to say those organized by signifiers. In this era of planetary-scale technology, the social bondsocial bond is pre-eminently mediated by objects organized in informationinformation networks. The posthuman “internet of things” provides the paradigm of communicationcommunication in which everything is “chipped” and rendered equivalent: humans, animalsanimal and machines. All are objects that relay readable datadata leaving open the question of whether there is another face to these objects that is unreadable, and whose register therefore in psychoanalytic terms would not be meaning but jouissancejouissance. (shrink)

Este artigo discute artigos fundamentais da influência de Platão e Aristóteles em Santo Tomás.

Preimplantation genetic diagnosis (PGD) is available where there is a 'significant risk of a serious genetic condition being present in the embryo', the criteria established by the Human Fertilisation and Embryology Authority (HFEA) and Human Genetics Commission (HGC). There are a number of controversies about this practice, notably to what extent people can agree on the term 'serious' and whether 'serious' should only mean 'serious for the possible child' or whether it might also, or sometimes instead, mean 'serious for the (...) prospective parents'. This paper moves into different controversial territory by considering the scope of reproductive autonomy beyond selection against serious genetic conditions. Here I consider the argument that parents might actually be morally required to select children with what are sometimes called 'enhanced' features or traits to select 'the best' as this has been described. Reflection on the realities and costs of an attempt to use in vitro fertilization (IVF) and PGD to select 'the best' possible child rebuts the argument in favour of any such 'maximizing' duty on behalf of prospective parents. (shrink)

Prior to the initiation of spontaneous movement, evoked potentials can be seen to precede awareness of the impending movement by several hundreds of milliseconds, meaning that this recorded neural activity is the result of unconscious processing. This study investigates the neural representations of impending movement with and without awareness. Specifically, the relationship between awareness and ‘idling’ cortical oscillations in the beta range was assessed. It was found that, in situations where there was awareness of the impending movement, pre-movement evoked potentials (...) were associated with a decrease in beta range oscillations. In contrast, when awareness of the impending movement was not present, the onset of the pre-movement potential was associated with tonic levels of beta range oscillations. A model is considered where by distributed neural activity remains outside of conscious awareness through the persistence of tonic slow wave cortical oscillations. (shrink)

One of the most influential branches of nineteenth-century American feminism was a resistance movement committed to the idea that the key to social reform was the recognition and maintenance of human differences. This approach, which became central to American pragmatism, had its roots in a tradition of American women writers including Lydia Maria Child. This paper examines Child's work and focuses on her conception of pluralism and its role in sustaining diverse communities.

In the wake of a war against the United States and the displacement of his people from their lands at the confluence of the Rock and Mississippi Rivers, the Sauk leader, Black Hawk, prepared an autobiography published in 1833. At the center of his work was an attempt to offer his readers a strategy that would make it possible for the Sauk and other Native peoples to coexist with the Americans of European descent who had come to the Mississippi valley. (...) The autobiography, from this perspective, represents more than another statement of a Native American ''worldview.'' Instead, it offers an assessment and a response to a crisis of survival. At issue for Black Hawk are neither property rights nor the troubles of communication between cultures, but rather ways of seeing and understanding the place that sustained the life of his people. Here, the land is not merely something valued, but rather the ground that organizes the meaning of things and events. It is the breakdown of this logic of place, both within the Native community and outside it, that precipitated the disastrous war and it is the recovery of this logic through the narrative of Black Hawk's autobiography that he raises the possibility of cultural survival. This paper reexamines Black Hawk's project and provides resources for reading it both as philosophy and as an instance of a conception of place that can contribute to ongoing efforts to promote the coexistence of cultural differences in the land of Black Hawk's people. (shrink)

In recent years, scholars have shown renewed interest about the ways in which Paul’s letters utilize divine conflict traditions. In Romans 5–8 and 16:20a Paul frames the human predicament in terms of cosmic conflict and adapts divine conflict traditions, but other passages also reflect the apostle’s adaptations of these motifs. This essay will first consider the broad contours of portrayals of God as warrior in Israel’s Scriptures. Discussion will then focus on vocabulary and themes in Rom 1:18–32 and 11:25–32 to (...) demonstrate that in these texts Paul also works with images related to divine conflict. Considering these passages from Romans alongside the divine conflict traditions of earlier voices–especially the Israelite prophets–assists in understanding Paul’s comments on wrath and judgment and assists in understanding Paul’s comments on wrath, judgment, and deliverance. (shrink)

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:_Russell_ journal (home office): E:CPBRRUSSJOURTYPE2502\REVIEWS.252 : 2006-02-27 11:52  Reviews REPLY TO PINCOCK S S Philosophy / U. of Southern California Los Angeles,  -,  @. write to correct errors in Christopher Pincock’s review of my discussion of IRussell. First, according to Pincock, I attempt to “undermine Moore’s views on ethics in Part One, [and] Russell’s conception of analysis in Part Two” by charging them with a pre-Kripkean (...) conflation of necessity with apriority and analyticity. Not so. Although I do show that such conflation had negative consequences for the views of several philosophers, Moore and Russell are not among them. Moore’s error—which marred the defence of his thesis that conclusions about goodness are never consequences of purely descriptive premisses —was in tacitly assuming that all necessary/a priori relations among concepts arise from definitions (see my : –). A similar problem occurs in Russell, but only tangentially in connection with one possible route to his problematic principle () in Our Knowledge of the External World, the critique of which was not a part of any attack on his general conception of analysis (: –). () If the occurrence of sense-data constitutes verification of S, then S must be (at least partly) about sense-data.  Philosophical Analysis in the Twentieth Century, Vol. : The Dawn of Analysis (Princeton: Princeton U. P., ), pp. –.  Russell, n.s.  (winter –): – (at ).  Except when otherwise indicated, all references to OKEW will be to the revised,  Allen and Unwin edition. Although this was the edition I used in writing my chapter on OKEW, my bibliographical citation was a confused amalgam of different editions. The work was originally published in  by Open Court; there was a second printing in ; and in  Allen and Unwin re-issued it by purchasing extra sheets of the  printing, and binding them. In , Russell revised the work, which Allen and Unwin then published as a revised edition. That edition is identical to the Routledge paperback edition now in print and used by students. (Russell revised the  edition again for Norton’s  edition, which was reset for the Mentor paperback.) Except at one point, which I will identify later, the difference between the  and the  editions doesn’t affect my dispute with Pincock. Thanks to the editor, Kenneth Blackwell, for kindly sharing his extensive knowledge of the bibliographical history with me, and to Ross Scimeca, the head librarian at the incomparable Hoose Philosophy Library at , for furnishing me with copies of the editions I needed to sort this out. _Russell_ journal (home office): E:CPBRRUSSJOURTYPE2502\REVIEWS.252 : 2006-02-27 11:52 Reviews  Evidently, Pincock has confused the error about definition, which I expose, with a pre-Kripkean conflation of necessity with apriority and analyticity, which is not mentioned in Parts One and Two. This is a blunder. The advances in our understanding of crucial logical, semantic, epistemological, and modal notions which I identify as paramount achievements of the analytic tradition are not limited to those made by Kripke. To suggest otherwise is a distortion. Second, Pincock errs when he objects that in citing () as a source for the view that sense-data statements give the content of material-object statements, I ascribe “some form of latent verificationism” to Russell. If the objection is that Russell was no verificationist—since he didn’t hold that S is meaningful only if S is verifiable—the reply is that I never suggested otherwise. What I said is that () together with () Verification always consists in the occurrence of sense-data constituted a historical precursor to verificationism (: ). Perhaps, then, Pincock objects to my reconstruction of Russell’s argument: since (i) truths of physics and common sense are known by being verified, (ii) it follows from () and () that our knowledge of them is knowledge of sense-data. Perhaps, Pincock thinks that Russell would reject (i). Citing Russell … if there is any knowledge of general truths at all, there must be some knowledge of general truths which is independent of empirical evidence, i.e. does not depend upon the data of sense. (OKEW, pp. –; OKEW, p. ) Pincock concludes that scientific knowledge, for Russell, is justified partly by sense-data, and partly by associated logical principles about relations... (shrink)

This essay will argue that this position advanced by Shusterman rests ultimately on a misconception of Gadamer's notion of interpretation, and as such, is not a strong challenge to Gadamer's insights concerning the process of human understanding. Shusterman's emphasis on understanding being pre-reflective and interpretation being conscious disavows Gadamer's analysis that they are identical in so far as they both refer to an individual's situatedness in tradition and its concurrent impacts on the production of meaning. In order to demonstrate how (...) this is so, this essay will first examine some of Shusterman's; key arguments and conceptualizations in regard to the "hermeneutic universalism" espoused by individuals such as Gadamer. The ways that the Gadamerian notion of understanding can be maintained in light of Shusterman's critique will be illustrated. In all, Gadamer's notion of understanding will be shown to highlight the role of the traditional "prejudices" always given to the subject that inform his or her acts of understanding; this "substratum" to any act of understanding/interpretation will in turn be seen to facilitate the acts of understanding Shusterman points to as counterexamples. (shrink)