ABSTRACTMemory bias is a risk factor for depression. In two independent studies, the efficacy of one CBM-Memory session on negative memory bias and depressive symptoms was tested in vulnerable samples. We compared positive to neutral CBM-Memory trainings in highly-ruminating individuals and individuals with elevated depressive symptoms. In both studies, participants studied positive, neutral, and negative Swahili words paired with their translations. In five study–test blocks, they were then prompted to retrieve either only the positive or neutral translations. Immediately following the (...) training and one week later, we tested cued recall of all translations and autobiographical memory bias; and also measured mood, depressive symptoms, and rumination. Retrieval practice resulted in training-congruent recall both immediately after and one week after the training. Overall, there was no differential decrease in symptoms or difference in autobiographical memory bias between the tra... (shrink)

RESUMEN Mientras que en las concepciones neoaristotélicas de la virtud y la Bildung el concepto de segunda naturaleza describe la culminación exitosa de la educación humana, Hegel utiliza este término para analizar la naturaleza irremediablemente ambigua, incluso conflictiva, del espíritu. El espíritu solo puede realizarse a sí mismo creando (1) una segunda naturaleza como orden de libertad, perdiéndose a sí mismo, o (2) una segunda naturaleza, es decir, un orden de exterioridad, regido por los automatismos inconscientes del hábito. En la (...) segunda acepción del término, segunda naturaleza refiere a la inversión de sí mismo del espíritu: la libre exposición del espíritu produce un orden objetivo, incontrolable; segunda naturaleza es aquí un término crítico. Por otro lado, la misma inversión de la libre posición [Setzen] en la existencia objetiva es el momento del éxito del espíritu ("absoluto"). El artículo expone esta ambigüedad indecidible de la segunda naturaleza y afirma que su aceptación y desarrollo son las condiciones de una comprensión adecuada de la constitución y las formas de la segunda naturaleza. ABSTRACT While in neo-Aristotelian conceptions of virtue and Bildung the concept of "second nature" describes the successful completion of human education, Hegel uses this term to analyze the inevitably ambiguous and even conflictive nature of spirit. Spirit can only realize itself creating (1) a second nature as an order of freedom, losing itself, or creating (2) a second nature -an order of externality, ruled by the unconscious automatisms of habit. The second meaning of the term, "second nature" refers to spirit's inversion of itself: the free enactment of spirit produces an objective order, uncontrollable; "second nature" is here a critical term. On the other hand, the very same inversion of free positing [Setzen] into objective existence is the moment of the success of ("absolute") spirit. The paper exposes this unspeakable ambiguity of second nature and claims that its acceptance and development are the conditions of an adequate understanding of the constitution and forms of second nature. (shrink)

En un libro reciente McShea y Brandon defienden que la diversidad y la complejidad de la vida se explican, principalmente, por la acción de un principio que llaman “la ley evolutiva de fuerzas cero” o “ZFEL”. Tal principio actuaría de un modo implícito por detrás de muchas explicaciones de la biología, pero nunca habría sido explicitado. Asumiendo que esta idea es interesante, y que los autores en cuestión tienen razón, discutiremos el modo metateórico en que presentan dicho principio, como siendo (...) parte de la teoría de la probabilidad. Esto permite a los autores afirmar que la teoría de la probabilidad brindaría la base reductiva para toda la biología evolutiva (dado que consideran que otros principios, como el de selección natural, también serían parte de la teoría de la probabilidad). Defenderemos que, efectivamente, ZFEL no es propio de la biología únicamente, pero no por formar parte de la teoría de la probabilidad, sino por tratarse de una versión específica del principio de causa común. -/- In a recent book, McShea and Brandon argue that the observed diversity and complexity of life are explainable by a principle they call the “zero-force evolutionary law” or “ZFEL”. Although this principle would be implicit in many explanations given by biologists, it would have never been made explicit. Assuming that this idea is interesting, and that the authors are right, we will discuss the metatheoretical way in which they present said principle, as being a part of probability theory. This allows the authors to claim that probability theory provides the reductive basis for all evolutionary biology. We will defend, in accordance with them, that ZFEL is not a solely biological principle, but not because it is a part of probability theory, but rather because it is a specific version of the principle of common cause. (shrink)

Though coming from different and distinct intellectual traditions, Richard Rorty and Gianni Vattimo are united in their criticism of the metaphysical tradition. The challenges they put forward extend beyond philosophy and entail a reconsideration of the foundations of belief in God and the religious life. They urge that the rejection of metaphysical truth does not necessitate the death of religion; instead it opens new ways of imagining what it is to be religious -- ways that emphasize charity, solidarity, and irony. (...) This unique collaboration, which includes a dialogue between the two philosophers, is notable not only for its fusion of pragmatism and hermeneutics but also for its recognition of the limits of both traditional religious belief and modern secularism. In "Anticlericalism and Atheism" Rorty discusses Vattimo's work _Belief_ and argues that the end of metaphysics paves the way for an anti-essentialist religion. Rorty's conception of religion, determined by private motives, is designed to produce the gospel's promise that henceforth God will not consider humanity as a servant but as a friend. In "The Age of Interpretation," Vattimo, who is both a devout Catholic and a frequent critic of the church, explores the surprising congruence between Christianity and hermeneutics in light of the dissolution of metaphysical truth. As in hermeneutics, interpretation is central to Christianity, which introduced the world to the principle of interiority, dissolving the experience of objective reality into "listening to and interpreting messages." The lively dialogue that concludes this volume, moderated and edited by Santiago Zabala, analyzes the future of religion together with the political, social, and historical aspects that characterize our contemporary postmodern, postmetaphysical, and post-Christian world. (shrink)

In this paper, we argue for an instrumental form of existence, inspired by Hilbert’s method of ideal elements. As a case study, we consider the existence of contradictory objects in models of non-classical set theories. Based on this discussion, we argue for a very liberal notion of existence in mathematics.

Philosophical accounts of moral responsibility are standardly framed by two platitudes. According to them, blame requires the presence of a moral defect in the agent and the absence of excuses. In this chapter, this kind of approach is challenged. It is argued that (a) people sometimes violate moral norms due to performance mistakes, (b) it often appears reasonable to hold them responsible for it, and (c) their mistakes cannot be traced to their moral qualities or to the presence of excuses. (...) In the end, the implications for discussions of moral responsibility are discussed. (shrink)

Politicians and philosophers presenting themselves as the ultimate bearers of truth and reality have created unprecedented technological, cultural, and political framings. This new order conspires to undermine the interpretive practices of open-ended critique, normalizing a sense of threat to preserve control. The greatest emergency has become the absence of emergencies. Tracing an intellectual alliance between academics such as Jordan Peterson and Christina Hoff Sommers and right-wing populist politicians such as Donald Trump and Marine Le Pen, this book denounces framings that (...) make a claim to objectivity. With the help of contemporary thinkers including Bruno Latour, Judith Butler, and Giorgio Agamben, as well as discussion of the Cambridge Analytica whistleblower Christopher Wylie and the emergency of biodiversity loss due to climate change, Santiago Zabala illustrates that the twenty-first-century question is not whether we can be free, but how to be at large - unconstrained by the new realist order. Being at Large demonstrates the anarchic power of hermeneutics, calling for interpretive disruptions of the authoritarian narrative as a way of reclaiming freedom in the age of alternative facts. (shrink)

Respuesta al comentario de Gustavo Caponi. “Ginnobili, Santiago. ‘El estatus fenomenológico de la teoría de la selección natural’”, Ideas y Valores LXII/152 (2013): 319-322.

Emotions are complex reactions that allow individuals to cope with significant positive and negative events. Research on emotion was pioneered by Darwin’s work on emotional expressions in humans and animals. But Darwin was concerned mainly with facial and bodily expressions of significance for humans, citing mainly examples from mammals (e.g., apes, dogs, and cats). In birds, emotional expressions are less evident for a human observer, so a different approach is needed. Understanding avian emotions will provide key evolutionary information on the (...) evolution of related behaviors and brain circuitry. Birds and mammals are thought to have evolved from different groups of Mesozoic reptiles, theropod dinosaurs and therapsids, respectively, and therefore, their common ancestor is likely to be a basal reptile living about 300 million years ago, during the Carboniferous or Permian period. Yet, birds and mammals exhibit extensive convergence in terms of relative brain size, high levels of activity, sleep/wakefulness cycles, endothermy, and social behavior, among others. This article focuses on two basic emotions with negative valence: fear and frustration. Fear is related to the anticipation of dangerous or threatening stimuli (e.g., predators or aggressive conspecifics). Frustration is related to unexpected reward omissions or devaluations (e.g., loss of food or sexual resources). These results have implications for an understanding of the conditions that promote fear and frustration and for the evolution of supporting brain circuitry. (shrink)

In this paper, I put forth a novel interpretation of how the third categories under each heading in the table of categories are derived. Drawing on a passage from the first Critique and a letter to Schultz, I argue that in order to derive these categories, a special act of the understanding is required. I propose that we interpret this special act as consisting of an application of the third logical function under the corresponding heading that unites the combination of (...) the first and second categories so as to produce the third. (shrink)

In this review, I discuss recent advances in philosophical and psychological approaches to self-control. The review is divided in 4 parts, in which I discuss: a) different conceptions of self-control; b) standard methods for studying it; c) some models of how self-control is exercised; and d) the connections between self-control and other relevant psychological constructs. The review was originally commissioned by the John Templeton Foundation to provide an informative overview that would knit together different strands of current debates in the (...) field. It is meant to be useful to well-informed audiences, as well as new-comers to the discussion. (shrink)

The past decade has seen a flurry of social scientific research on the use of racial categories in human genetics research. This literature has critically analyzed how U.S. race relations are being shaped by and themselves shaping research on human biological difference and disease. Recent work, however, suggests that the particular configurations of science and ethnoracial politics in the US are not exportable. Instead, research on human biology in other contexts reveals the importance of not just racial categories, but national, (...) ethnic, regional and linguistic classifications of bodies and communities... (shrink)

ABSTRACT:The distinction between what I call nonelective obligations and discretionary obligations, a distinction that focuses on one particular thread of the distinction between perfect and imperfect duties, helps us to identify the obligations that carry over from principals to agents. Clarity on this issue is necessary to identify the moral obligations within “shareholder primacy”, which conceives of managers as agents of shareholders. My main claim is that the principal-agent relation requires agents to fulfill nonelective obligations, but it does not always (...) require discharging discretionary obligations. I show that the requirement to fulfill nonelective obligations is more far-reaching than has been acknowledged by most defenders and critics of shareholder primacy. But I also show that managers are not bound by certain discretionary obligations like charity, showing that their moral obligations are more circumscribed than the obligations that apply to human beings in general. (shrink)

In everyday life, we think of skepticism as the position of a stubborn person who has higher epistemic standards than others. Hence, the skeptic is someone who defends extravagant ideas. Some skeptics may deny that climate change is real, while others claim that the first moon landing did not take place. Contemporary philosophers think of skepticism in a different way. In their view, skepticism is the conclusion of a paradoxical argument about epistemic statuses like knowledge and reasons. A paradoxical argument (...) is a logically valid argument that, starting from seemingly plausible premises, reaches an absurd conclusion. We introduce two skeptical arguments. The regress argument purports to show that we lack reasons to believe any claim whatsoever because the search for those reasons inevitably leads to an infinite regress. The underdetermination argument seeks to prove that we lack reasons to believe that there are chairs, trees, other people, and so on; it supports that conclusion by citing skeptical hypotheses, including the idea that we might be dreaming (Descartes 1641) or the suggestion that we could be brains in a vat connected to a supercomputer that mimics the pattern of neural activity that would be produced if we were perceiving external objects (Putnam 1981). (shrink)

Philosophers of perception are familiar with the argument from illusion, at least since Hume formulated it to challenge a naïve form of realism. In this paper, I present an analogous argument but in the domain of action. It focuses on slips, a common kind of mistake. But, otherwise, it is structurally similar. The argument challenges some contemporary views about the nature of action inspired by Wittgenstein. The discussion shows how thinking about these common mistakes helps illuminate aspects of human agency (...) that tend to be overlooked whenever too much emphasis is placed on the rationality of human actions. (shrink)

The scholarship on meaningful work has approached the topic mostly from the perspective of the subjective experience of the individual worker. This has led the literature to under-theorize, if not outright ignore, the cultural and normative dimension of meaningful work. In particular, it has obscured that a person’s ability to find meaning in her life in general, and her work in particular, is typically anchored and dependent on shared institutions and cultural aspirations. Reflecting on the future of work, particularly on (...) the dangers posed by the threat of technological unemployment, helps us recognize this cultural and normative dimension of meaningful work. I argue that a world with few work opportunities is a world devoid of a core structuring ideal around which our society has organized itself and, as such, will strain our ability to make sense of what it means to find life meaningful. To make this case I show that work operates as a central organizing _telos_ around which our contemporary lives gravitate. Work touches everyone and everything, defining the rhythms of our days and weeks and providing a center of gravity around which our lives are structured. Work constitutes a central dimension of human flourishing. Through work we provide for our material needs, develop our skills and virtues, build community, and contribute to the common good. As such, work constitutes a central organizing ideal in contemporary Western societies, a fact has significant normative force and plays an important role in our finding work meaningful. (shrink)

We study and compare two combinatorial lowness notions: strong jump-traceability and well-approximability of the jump, by strengthening the notion of jump-traceability and super-lowness for sets of natural numbers. A computable non-decreasing unbounded function h is called an order function. Informally, a set A is strongly jump-traceable if for each order function h, for each input e one may effectively enumerate a set Te of possible values for the jump JA, and the number of values enumerated is at most h. A′ (...) is well-approximable if can be effectively approximated with less than h changes at input x, for each order function h. We prove that there is a strongly jump-traceable set which is not computable, and that if A′ is well-approximable then A is strongly jump-traceable. For r.e. sets, the converse holds as well. We characterize jump-traceability and strong jump-traceability in terms of Kolmogorov complexity. We also investigate other properties of these lowness properties. (shrink)

Ettore Regàlia.--Herbert Spencer.--F. C. S. Schiller.--Giorgio Hegel.--Giorgio Berkeley.--Giovanni Ruskin.--Rodolfo Eucken.--Federico Nietzsche.--Carlo Michelstaedter.--Giambattista Vico.--Enrico Bergson.--Giovanni Vailati.--Otto Weininger.--Mario Galderoni.--Ciuang-tse.--La Toscana e la filosofia italiana.--Nota bibliografica (p. 351) Indice alfabetico.

Proposing a new interpretation of Being or, which amounts to the same, of the history of philosophy, is among the most difficult tasks a philosopher can set for himself. It is much easier to describe a particular philosopher’s understanding of Being or a theme in a particular epoch in the history of philosophy, because other established interpretations are available upon which one may rely to justify his own contribution, if only by contrasting it to others. This, after all, is what (...) distinguishes a philosopher from a professor of philosophy and, again, a thinker from an academic: while the latter is anxious to describe as clearly as possible, the former is interested in shedding new light.Although Lee Braver’s text seems to belong to the latter category, it actually fits into the former, as the ordering of the title and the subtitle of his work indicates. If this order were reversed, the text itself would, perhaps, be poorer, in that it would indicate a simple reconstruction of the history of continental anti-realism; although such history is also one of Braver’s objectives, it is not the most significant feature of his book. Braver’s main contribution lies in analyzing “in a newly created vocabulary” (i.e. the vocabulary of Hegel. (shrink)

A daring marriage of philosophical theory and practical politics, this collection is the first of Gianni Vattimo's many books to combine his intellectual pursuits with his public and political life. Vattimo is a paradoxical figure, at once a believing Christian and a vociferous critic of the Catholic Church, an outspoken liberal but not a former communist, and a recognized authority on Nietzsche and Heidegger as well as a prominent public intellectual and member of the European parliament. Building on his unique (...) position as a philosopher and politician, Vattimo takes on some of the most pressing questions of our time: Is it still possible, long after Nietzsche proclaimed the death of God, to talk of moral imperatives, individual rights, or political freedom? Are these values still relevant in today's world? Tackling these crucial issues, Gianni Vattimo argues that nihilism is not the absence of meaning but a recognition of a plurality of meanings; it is not the end of civilization but the beginning of new social paradigms. Commonly associated with the pessimistic belief that all of existence is meaningless, nihilism, as a philosophical principle, is far less sensational -- it is the ethical doctrine that there are no moral absolutes or infallible natural laws, that "truth" is inescapably subjective. Because the conditions for equality and liberty are not "naturally" given, society must actively create these ideals or it will inevitably fall prey to irrationality, prejudice, and oppression. Vattimo contends that the infighting, timidity, and confusion that have overtaken contemporary liberal thought and politics are the products a prolonged and indulgent mourning over the loss of the transcendental father figure -- any institution or power structure that defines truth, knowledge, and reality. Until humanity overcomes its need for external authority -- whether it be organized religion, the nation-state, or free-market capitalism -- emancipation will remain unattainable. Collecting fourteen of Vattimo's most influential essays on ethics, politics, and law, _Nihilism and Emancipation_ is a provocative reevaluation of meaning, values, and the idea of freedom in Western culture. (shrink)

First collected in Italy in 1985, _Art's Claim to Truth_ is considered by many philosophers to be one of Gianni Vattimo's most important works. Newly revised for English readers, the book begins with a challenge to Plato, Aristotle, Kant, and Hegel, who viewed art as a metaphysical aspect of reality rather than a futuristic anticipation of it. Following Martin Heidegger's interpretation of the history of philosophy, Vattimo outlines the existential ontological conditions of aesthetics, paying particular attention to the works of (...) Kandinsky, which reaffirm the ontological implications of art. Vattimo then builds on Hans-Georg Gadamer's theory of aesthetics and provides an alternative to a rationalistic-positivistic criticism of art. This is the heart of Vattimo's argument, and with it he demonstrates how hermeneutical philosophy reaffirms art's ontological status and makes clear the importance of hermeneutics for aesthetic studies. In the book's final section, Vattimo articulates the consequences of reclaiming the ontological status of aesthetics without its metaphysical implications, holding Aristotle's concept of beauty responsible for the dissolution of metaphysics itself. In its direct engagement with the works of Gadamer, Heidegger, and Luigi Pareyson, _Art's Claim to Truth_ offers a better understanding of the work of Vattimo and a deeper knowledge of ontology, hermeneutics, and the philosophical examination of truth. (shrink)

In _Basic Concepts_, Heidegger claims that "Being is the most worn-out" and yet also that Being "remains constantly available." Santiago Zabala radicalizes the consequences of these little known but significant affirmations. Revisiting the work of Jacques Derrida, Reiner Schürmann, Jean-Luc Nancy, Hans-Georg Gadamer, Ernst Tugendhat, and Gianni Vattimo, he finds these remains of Being within which ontological thought can still operate. Being is an event, Zabala argues, a kind of generosity and gift that generates astonishment in those who experience (...) it. This sense of wonder has fueled questions of meaning for centuries-from Plato to the present day. Postmetaphysical accounts of Being, as exemplified by the thinkers of Zabala's analysis, as well as by Nietzsche, Dewey, and others he encounters, don't abandon Being. Rather, they reject rigid, determined modes of essentialist thought in favor of more fluid, malleable, and adaptable conceptions, redefining the pursuit and meaning of philosophy itself. (shrink)

Theories of emotional justification investigate the conditions under which emotions are epistemically justified or unjustified. I make three contributions to this research program. First, I show that we can generalize some familiar epistemological concepts and distinctions to emotional experiences. Second, I use these concepts and distinctions to display the limits of the ‘simple view’ of emotional justification. On this approach, the justification of emotions stems only from the contents of the mental states they are based on, also known as their (...) cognitive bases. The simple view faces the ‘gap problem’: If cognitive bases and emotions (re)present their objects and properties in different ways, then cognitive bases are not sufficient to justify emotions. Third, I offer a novel solution to the gap problem based on emotional dispositions. This solution (1) draws a line between the justification of basic and non-basic emotions, (2) preserves a broadly cognitivist view of emotions, (3) avoids a form of value skepticism that threatens inferentialist views of emotional justification, and (4) sheds new light on the structure of our epistemic access to evaluative properties. (shrink)

This paper defends a version of the Simple View, the claim that someone intentionally φs only if the person intends to φ. To do this, I raise a problem for Bratman’s classic argument (1984, 1987) against it. The problem brings into focus an evaluative dimension behind the View, whose recognition allows for an improved version of it. With this improved version, I then go on to answer other criticisms that have been raised to it.

El objetivo de este artículo es compartir con la comunidad académica el resultado de investigación de la tesis doctoral de filosofía intitulada La parresía como heterotopía en el último Foucault: otro modo crítico y específico de ser, pensar, decir y vivir. En efecto, intento esbozar el itinerario de la obra del úlltimo Foucault como una genealogía de la parresía, que recoge las conclusiones más relevantes de cuatro años de indagación. Finalmente, resalto la retrospectiva y la prospectiva de la parresía foucaultiana (...) como un arte integral de vivir a partir del cuidado de sí, desarrollado por sus autores más estudiosos y otras corrientes contemporáneas afines a este tópico. Todo converge en la “heterotopía” como ese tetraédrico otro modo crítico y específico o línea de fuga: ser, pensar, decir y vivir, que culmina con una relectura desde el ámbito latinoamericano como una propuesta pertinente altermundialista focalizada en una “cuidadanía” —más que ciudadanía— ética en todos los ámbitos humanos, sobre todo el que más nos compete: el educativo. (shrink)

In the Doctrine of Virtue, Kant draws an analogy between the physical forces of repulsion and attraction and the moral forces of respect and love. I argue that we should interpret this passage as endorsing a moral version of the balancing argument from his natural philosophy. There, Kant argues that purely repulsive and attractive bodies respectively face problems of total dispersion and collapse. I argue that purely respectful and loving humans respectively face analogous problems of total moral dispersion and collapse. (...) I conclude by drawing some significant implications of this moral balancing argument for contemporary theorizing about moral interactions, relationships, and communities. (shrink)