ABSTRACTThis article examines accounts of the moral basis of compensatory duties that explain such duties as the continuation, in some way, of the pre-wrong normative situation. I identify, contrast, and assess three versions of this view—duty continuity, right continuity, and reasons continuity. I argue that each version is defensible, once properly articulated. The article responds to a range of objections to these views that have not received much critical attention by their proponents.

This article is in two parts. The first part critically examines the foundations of Weinrib’s theory of corrective justice. It casts doubt upon his claim that private law faces incoherence if it is not entirely based upon corrective justice and questions the normative appeal of that view. The second part makes a variety of critical observations in relation to Weinrib’s corrective-justice-based treatment of particular areas of private law.

This paper provides a taxonomy of the different kinds of theory that may be offered of an area of law. We distinguish two basic types of philosophical accounts in special jurisprudence: nonnormative accounts and normative accounts. Section II explains the two central subspecies of nonnormative accounts of areas of law: (i) conceptual and ontological theories and (ii) reason-tracking causal theories. Section III explores normative theories of areas of law. Normative accounts subdivide into detached and committed normative accounts. Detached or committed (...) normative accounts can be subdivided further into the following cross-cutting categories: (i) pro tanto or all-things-considered, (ii) hyper-reformist or practice-dependent, (iii) taxonomical or substantive. Section IV shows that our taxonomy does not presume a prior commitment to any particular school in general jurisprudence. This paper clarifies methodological confusion that exists in theorizing about areas of law, and contributes to the subfield of thinking generally about special jurisprudence. (shrink)

The contributions to this edited volume engage with John Gardner's philosophical work on private law. The content is divided into three parts. The first part gathers contributions on general theoretical issues that bear upon private law. The second part is concerned with Gardner's well-known views on responding to wrongs and the justification of reparative duties - an issue that spans all of private law. The third part turns to theoretical issues within particular areas of private law. Its focus is Gardner's (...) focus: tort law, but it also includes chapters on contract law and equity. The primary aim of Private Law and Practical Reason is to facilitate a critical assessment of the private law thinking of one of the most important legal philosophers of the last fifty years. Gardner's contributions to private law theory are recognised to be amongst the most significant and philosophically rich. This work assembles a group of contributors with diverse theoretical commitments, many of whom have not directly engaged previously with Gardner's work, and is intended to act as a reference point for central debates in private law theory, such as the role of moral duties, the justification of reparative obligations, and, more broadly, the role of reasons in private law. (shrink)