One of the two major parts of Dummett’s defense of intuitionism is the rejection of classical in favor of intuitionistic reasoning in mathematics, given that mathematical discourse is anti‐realist. While there have been illuminating discussions of what Dummett’s argument for this might be, no consensus seems to have emerged about its overall form. In this paper I give an account of this form, starting by investigating a fundamental, but little discussed question: to what view of the relation between deductive principles (...) and meaning is anti‐realism committed? The result of this investigation is a constraint on meaning theoretic assessments of logical laws. Given this constraint, I show that, surprisingly, a consistent anti‐realist critique of classical logic could not rely on the rejection of bivalence. Moreover, a consistent anti‐realist defense of intuitionism must begin with a radical rejection of the very conception of logical consequence that underlies realist classical logic. It follows from these conclusions that anti‐realist intuitionism seems committed to proceeding by proof theoretic means. (shrink)

A long tradition, going back to Aristotle, conceives of logic in terms of necessity and possibility: a deductive argument is correct if it is not possible for the conclusion to be false when the premises are true. A relatively unknown feature of the analytic tradition in philosophy is that, at its very inception, this venerable conception of the relation between logic and necessity and possibility - the concepts of modality - was put into question. The founders of analytic philosophy, Gottlob (...) Frege and Bertrand Russell, held that these concepts are empty: there are no genuine distinctions among the necessary, the possible, and the actual. In this book, the first of two volumes, Sanford Shieh investigates the grounds of this position and its consequences for Frege's and Russell's conceptions of logic. The grounds lie in doctrines on truth, thought, and knowledge, as well as on the relation between mind and reality, that are central to the philosophies of Frege and Russell, and are of enduring philosophical interest. The upshot of this opposition to modality is that logic is fundamental, and, to be coherent, modal concepts would have to be reconstructed in logical terms. This rejection of modality in early analytic philosophy remains of contemporary significance, though the coherence of modal concepts is rarely questioned nowadays because it is generally assumed that suspicion of modality derives from logical positivism, which has not survived philosophical scrutiny. The anti-modal arguments of Frege and Russell, however, have nothing to do with positivism and remain a challenge to the contemporary acceptance of modal notions. (shrink)

Responding to Russell is a constant throughout Wittgenstein's philosophizing. This Element focuses on Wittgenstein's criticisms of Russell's theories of judgment in the summer of 1913. Wittgenstein's response to these criticisms is of first-rate importance for his early philosophical development, setting the path to the conceptions of proposition and of logic in Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus. This Element also touches on further aspects of Wittgenstein's responses to Russell: the rejection of Russell's and Frege's logicisms in the Tractatus, the critique of Russell's causal-behavioristic philosophy (...) of mind in Wittgenstein's 'middle' period, the Russellian origins of notions of privacy dialectically treated in Philosophical Investigations, and the discussion of 'surveyability' of mathematical proof in Remarks on the Foundations of Mathematics, which is, again, a response to Russellian logicism. (shrink)

In this introduction we present the principal themes of the special issue and highlight the main interpretive theses of the contributions.

This article presents a new argument concerning the relation between Kant’s theory of race and aspects of the critical philosophy. It argues that Kant’s treatment of the problem of the systematic unity of nature and knowledge in the Critique of Pure Reason and the Critique of the Power of Judgment can be traced back a methodological problem in the natural history of the period – that of the possibility of a natural system of nature. Kant’s transformation of the methodological problem (...) from natural history into a set of philosophical problems proceeds by way of the working out of his own problem in natural history – the problem of the natural history of the human races – and specifically the problem of the unity in diversity of the human species, in response to which he develops a theory of race. This theory of race is, further, the first developed model of the use of teleological judgment in Kant’s work. The article thus argues that Kant’s philosophical position on the sy... (shrink)

This chapter examines modality in the history of analytic philosophy. There were, in this history, two principal types of reductionism or eliminativism about modality, and two corresponding phases in the rejection of anti-modal stances. First, the founders of analytic philosophy, Frege, Moore, and Russell, took necessity and possibility to be reducible to more fundamental logical notions, where logic for these thinkers consists of truths about a mind- and language-independent reality extending beyond the empirical world. Against this reductionism, C. I. Lewis (...) and Wittgenstein argued that logic itself requires modal notions. Second, Carnap advanced a pragmatically motivated account of modal terms as expressing pseudo-object properties, which appear to be properties of objects but can be construed as properties of their designations. Quine criticized this account and proposed a thoroughgoing elimination of modality. Quine’s well-known claim that quantifying into modal contexts is unintelligible without resorting to essentialism cannot be fully understood independently of Carnap’s notion of pseudo-object property. Against Quine, Ruth Marcus and Saul Kripke argued for the coherence of modal concepts and their entrenchment in ordinary language and thought, leading to the now dominant view that modal properties are mind- and language-independent features of the world. (shrink)

The central premise of Michael Dummett's global argument for anti-realism is the thesis that a speaker's grasp of the meaning of a declarative, indexical-free sentence must be manifested in her uses of that sentence. This enigmatic thesis has been the subject of a great deal of discussion, and something of a consensus has emerged about its content and justification. The received view is that the manifestation thesis expresses a behaviorist and reductive theory of meaning, essentially in agreement with Quine's view (...) of language, and motivated by worries about the epistemology of communication. In the present paper I begin by arguing that this standard interpretation of the manifestation thesis is neither particularly faithful to Dummett's writings nor philosophically compelling. I then continue by reconstructing, from Dummett's texts, an account of the manifestation thesis, and of its justification, that differ sharply from the received view. On my reading, the thesis is motivated not epistemologically, but conceptually. I argue that connections among our conceptions of meaning, assertion, and justification lead to a conclusion about the metaphysics of meaning: we cannot form a clearly coherent conception of how two speakers can attach different meanings to a sentence without at the same time differing in what they count as justifying assertions made with that sentence. I conclude with some suggestions about how Dummett's argument for global anti-realism should be understood, given my account of the manifestation thesis. (shrink)

In The Metaphysics of Love, however, Stella Sandford argues that an over-emphasis on ethics in the reception of Levinas's thought has concealed the basis and ...

This paper sketches the place of Arthur Pap’s work in the complex history of modality in the analytic tradition of philosophy, contrasting it with that of the early Wittgenstein. They represent two principal paths of the philosophical history of modality that converge in the logical empiricism of the Vienna Circle. Clarifying these paths go some way towards turning aside a myth, with some sway in contemporary philosophy, which occludes a philosophically fruitful view of the philosophical-historical realities of modality in analytic (...) philosophy. (shrink)

Introduction: philosophies of race and ethnicity / Peter Osborne, Stella Sandford -- pt. 1. Ch. 1. Philosophy and racial identity / Linda Martin Alcoff -- ch. 2. Fanon, phenomenology, race / David Macey -- Ch. 3. Primordial being: enlightenment and the Indian subject of postcolonial theory / Chetan Bhatt -- Ch. 4. Race and language in the two Saussures / Robert J.C. Young -- pt. 2. Ch. 5. Unspeakable histories: diasporic lives in old England / Bill Schwarz -- Ch. (...) 6. Race, colonialism and history: China at the turn of the twentieth century / Rebecca E. Karl -- Ch. 7. Ethnicity and species: on the philosophy of the multi-ethnic state in Japanese imperialism / Naoki Sakai -- Ch. 8. On Chineseness as a theoretical problem / Rey Chow -- Ch. 9. Race and slavery: the politics of recovery and reparation / Fran¸ coise Vergés -- Ch. 10. Rewriting the black subject: the black Brazilian emancipatory text / Denise Ferreira da Silva. (shrink)

Written for an introductory series, this book contains the outcome of research into the disputed place of Beauvoir's work within the French philosophical tradition, and the philosophical significance of various of her particular works.

This collection of previously unpublished essays presents a new approach to the history of analytic philosophy--one that does not assume at the outset a general characterization of the distinguishing elements of the analytic tradition. Drawing together a venerable group of contributors, including John Rawls and Hilary Putnam, this volume explores the historical contexts in which analytic philosophers have worked, revealing multiple discontinuities and misunderstandings as well as a complex interaction between science and philosophical reflection.

This article treats three aspects of Frege's discussions of definitions. First, I survey Frege's main criticisms of definitions in mathematics. Second, I consider Frege's apparent change of mind on the legitimacy of contextual definitions and its significance for recent neo-Fregean logicism. In the remainder of the article I discuss a critical question about the definitions on which Frege's proofs of the laws of arithmetic depend: do the logical structures of the definientia reflect the understanding of arithmetical terms prevailing prior to (...) Frege's analyses? Unless they do, it is unclear how Frege's proofs demonstrate the analyticity of the arithmetic in use before logicism. Yet, especially in late writings, Frege characterizes definitions as arbitrary stipulations of the senses or references of expressions unrelated to pre-definitional understanding. I conclude by examining some options for conceiving of the status of Frege's logicism in light of this apparent tension, and outline a suggestion for a philosophically fruitful way of resolving this tension. (shrink)

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:A Tale of Two ConferencesProfessional Discourse, Music Education, and JusticeEric ShiehThis is an exploration of misunderstandings. Beginning with my own.It is 3:15pm at the Pearson International Airport, Toronto. I am leaving the musica ficta/Lived Realities conference on "Engagements and Exclusions in Music, Education, and the Arts" held at the University of Toronto, January 2008, and this is what I write: "I am thinking about what I am going to (...) take from this conference and I think ultimately it may be a profound sense of disappointment. I do not feel anymore that I am part of a larger community that will support me, or that there is a web of people engaged in justice-oriented practice …."Explicitly addressing issues of equity and social justice in music education, the conference shared similar themes and a similar participant base with a conference held at Teachers College, New York City, in October 2006, titled the "International Conference on Music Education, Equity, and Social Justice," the first of its kind. Yet where I left the Toronto conference with a sense of disappointment, I found myself writing after the New York conference: "Don't forget—the [End Page 203] feeling of urgency … of wanting to engage again in philosophy, and wanting to read again and renew faith with the project of change."The difference that provoked these polar reactions, I contend here, is in part a difference in the research presented at the two conferences—a differing orientation toward issues of social justice as well as toward the music education profession itself. I also argue, however, that the researchers share more similarities than the discourses surrounding the conferences allow and in part the differences perceived are a by-product of professional structures that serve to polarize discourse—structures that are foregrounded in these two conferences. My intent here, then, is not to valorize the NYC conference or disparage the Toronto conference based on my reactions but to read these reactions as problematic, where euphoria can be reactionary and resistance productive, with the understanding that they are heavily limited by my identification as a young, unestablished music practitioner. I begin first by unpacking those reactions through a reading of the differences between the two conferences. Ultimately, I seek the implications of these differences and similarities for research and practice at the intersection of social justice and music education, and argue that my initial reactions are symptomatic of a wider and potentially harmful approach to this work.Justice, Positively and Negatively ConceivedI wish to begin explicating the differences between the two conferences at an oddly revealing detail: the inscriptions featured on the covers of the respective conference booklets and, in the case of the Toronto conference, replicated on the website and call for papers. The NYC conference features a lengthy and hopeful quote by Maxine Greene, worth reproducing in full: "Because it is only through the projection of a better social order that we can perceive the gaps in what exists and try to transform and repair…. This can happen in classrooms, in corridors, in schoolyards, in the streets around."1 Contrast this with the authorless four-word mantra of the Toronto Conference: "Charity is Not Justice," represented as a photograph of graffiti on what looks to be a construction site. The difference is stark: the Greene quote indicates that the NYC conference might seek to project a better social order from which action might arise. The Toronto conference, on the other hand, forcefully declares the project of justice in the negative: it is not charity.It is worth taking a moment to put these two inscriptions in dialogue. There is a way, certainly, that Greene in this quote allows for—and perhaps encourages—charitable work. If a person, for example, believes that a better world includes feeding the homeless, he or she might be moved to open a soup kitchen. Insofar as this is an act of charity (and most people would agree that it is), the mantra of the Toronto conference rejects it outright. Furthermore, the use of a [End Page 204] photograph of presumably authentic graffiti lays claim to a kind of streetwise, oppressed authority that throws a... (shrink)

Philosophers since Aristotle have traditionally held that impossibilities make up the nature of logic. Sanford Shieh investigates an important but underexplored break with this tradition: Frege and Russell questioned whether there really are such things as possibilities or necessities, and sought the foundations of logic elsewhere.

Whilst the distinction between French and Anglo-American feminism was always rather dubious two specific linguistic differences between French and English have nevertheless determined two streams of feminist thought, and complicated the relation between them. Since the 1960s, English-language feminisms, in so far as they are distinctive, have centrally either presupposed or explicitly theorized the category of gender, for which there is no linguistic equivalent in French. At the same time, much (although not all) that came to be categorized as ʻFrenchʼ (...) feminism has been articulated around the category of le féminin, for which there is no ready equivalent in English, although there is an obvious translational choice: ʻthe feminineʼ. Various Anglo-American feminisms have made consideration of what have been seen as feminine attributes and values central to their critical and reconstructive projects, but it is not this (adjectival) sense which is at issue here in the translation of le féminin, a noun. For despite the fact that the French and English words connote differently (in particular, le féminin also covers most of what is meant by the English ʻfemaleʼ), ʻthe feminineʼ, as a direct translation of the different and specific uses of le féminin in various French discourses, has become a common category in English-language feminist discourse, specifically English-language feminist philosophy of a ʻcontinentalʼ disposition, where it is often presumed to be both the proper object of such a philosophy and the proper goal of feminism. But is it? Or what exactly is at stake in making it so? Is ʻthe feminineʼ a necessary or useful category for feminism today? (shrink)

What happens when well-defined disciplines meet or are confronted with transdisciplinary discourses and concepts, where transdisciplinary concepts are analytical tools rather than specifications of a field of objects or a class of entities? Or, if disciplines reject transdisciplinary discourses and concepts as having no part to play in their practice, why do they so reject them? This essay addresses these questions through a discussion of the relationship between philosophy – the most tightly policed discipline in the humanities – and what (...) I will argue is the emblematically transdisciplinary practice of feminist theory, via a discussion of interdisciplinarity and related terms in gender studies. It argues that the tendency of philosophy to reject feminist theory in fact correctly intuited that the two defining features of feminist theory – its constitutive tie to a political agenda for social change and the transdisciplinary character of many of its central concepts – are indeed at odds with, and pose a threat to, the traditional insularity of the discipline of philosophy. It argues, further, that feminist theory operates with what we should now recognise as a set of transdisciplinary concepts – including, sex, gender, woman, sexuality and sexual difference – and that the use of these concepts in feminist philosophy has been the most far-reaching continuation in the late 20th/early 21st centuries of the critique of philosophy initiated by Marx and pursued by ‘critical theory’. This puts feminist philosophy in a difficult position: its transdisciplinary aspects open it up to an unavoidable contradiction. Nonetheless, this is a contradiction that can and must be endured and made productive. In order to draw out the specificity of the concept of transdisciplinarity at issue the essay begins with a discussion of attempts to define inter- and transdisciplinarity, particularly in gender studies. Arguing for the transdisciplinary origin of the concept of gender, it then suggests one way of understanding its function as a critical concept, before making explicit how this leads to the historical antagonism between traditional philosophy and the critical, transdisciplinary concept of gender and with feminist theory more generally. (shrink)

In the philosophical works of Emmanuel Levinasʼs early career, it is in a phenomenology of Eros that he claims to have uncovered the site of what he calls ʻtranscendenceʼ. This is no small claim. According to the argument of the later Totality and Infinity (1961), the history of Western philosophy is to be thought as the history of the ʻphilosophy of the sameʼ. Within this polemical generalization almost the whole of Western philosophy is characterized as a totalizing discourse which aims (...) to reduce everything to the categories of a thematizing consciousness. Conceptual structures are employed (or presupposed) in order to make diverse phenomena commensurable within a system, and according to Levinas this operation always constitutes a reduction of what is ʻotherʼ to the order of the ʻsameʼ. In agreement with a certain transcendentalism which is itself implicated in Levinasʼs critique, these structures of thought are then equated with consciousness itself; the thematizing project is one of mastery in which noemata will of necessity conform to noesis, in which the object is constituted for and by the subject. The experience of transcendence, so rare in this version of philosophyʼs history, is the experience of whatever is and truly remains other than me, recalcitrant to mastery through conceptualization and to the transcendental project of the subject to construe everything as originating from within itself. If, then, it is first of all in the erotic relation that the possibility of the experience of transcendence is said to arise, Eros can in no sense be dismissed as an unimportant or peripheral theme for Levinas, and a full investigation is warranted, especially given the current interest in Levinasʼs work, interest which is not limited to the discipline of philosophy. Furthermore, as the notion of Eros is closely associated, textually and conceptually, with what Levinas calls ʻthe feminineʼ, critical attention has been excited amongst feminist scholars of various persuasions, with claims – both positive and negative – being made for Levinasʼs significance as a resource for feminist philosophy and feminist politics. If assertions of a ʻLevinasianʼ feminism, no matter how qualified, tend to rest on the idea that Levinasʼs phenomenology of Eros, and analyses of ʻthe feminineʼ mark a break in or a new departure from a ʻmasculinistʼ tradition, this article seeks, in part, to argue to the contrary. (shrink)

What is sex? Some feminists have harboured suspicions about this form of question, given its philosophical (or ‘metaphysical’1) pedigree. But philosophy no longer has the disciplinary monopoly on it. Indeed, with regard to sex, the more interesting task today is to pose and to attempt to answer the question from within a transdisciplinary problematic. For the question requires a theoretical response capable of recognizing that it concerns a cultural and political (and therefore neither a specifically philosophical nor a merely empirical) (...) problem. It requires an account of sex which is theoretically satisfying whilst being both adequate to and critical of everyday experience; a critical-theoretical account capable of embracing the everyday experience of sex, its lived contradictions. This article represents a first attempt to construct a transdisciplinary concept of sex to this end. It traces a line from Simone de Beauvoir’s The Second Sex to some recent attempts to define ‘sex’ and various related but importantly different concepts, and ends by proposing an answer to the question ‘What is sex?’ that draws on the philosophy of Immanuel Kant. For our transdisciplinary efforts will of necessity spring from some specific discipline(s) while not remaining confined within them, and not allowing them to remained confined within themselves (which has been something of a problem for philosophy, historically). (shrink)

In this paper I advance an account of the necessity of logic in Wittgenstein’s Tractatus. I reject both the “metaphysical” reading of Peter Hacker, who takes Tractarian logical necessity to consist in the mode of truth of tautologies, and the “resolute” account of Cora Diamond, who argues that all Tractarian talk of necessity is to be thrown away. I urge an alternative conception based on remarks 3.342 and 6.124. Necessity consists in what is not arbitrary, and contingency in what is (...) up to our arbitrary choice, in the symbols we use, in how we picture or model the world. Necessity is not a mode of truth of propositions, but lies in the requirements of their intelligibility. I argue that this conception is implicit in certain “resolute” readings and in some of their critics. Both sides of the dispute are committed to certain logical features of language or thought, patterns of symbolizing constitutive of intelligibility that are not up to us to institute or alter. This conception of non-arbitrary patterns of symbolizing, I argue, is what logical syntax in the Tractatus consists in. I also argue that the well-known Tractarian view of propositions as truth-functions of elementary propositions can be understood in terms of patterns of norms governing our making sense with the affirmation and denial of propositions. (shrink)

What does the study of Plato’s dialogues tell us about the modern meaning of ‘sex’? How can recent developments in the philosophy of sex and gender help us read these ancient texts anew? _Plato and Sex _addresses these questions for the first time. Each chapter demonstrates how the modern reception of Plato’s works Ð in both mainstream and feminist philosophy and psychoanalytical theory Ð has presupposed a ‘natural-biological’ conception of what sex might mean. Through a critical comparison between our current (...) understanding of sex and Plato’s notion of genos, Plato and Sex puts this presupposition into question. With its groundbreaking interpretations of the Republic, the Symposium and the Timaeus, this book opens up a new approach to sex as a philosophical concept. Including critical readings of the theories of sex and sexuation in Freud and Lacan, and relating such theories to Plato’s writings, _Plato and Sex_ both questions our assumptions about sex and explains how those assumptions have coloured our understanding of Plato. What results is not only an original reading of some of the most prominent aspects of Plato’s philosophy, but a new attempt to think through the meaning of sex today. (shrink)

The days when Frege was more footnoted than read are now long gone; still, until very recently he has been read rather selectively. No doubt many had an inkling that there’s more to Frege than the sense/reference distinction; but few, one suspects, thought that his philosophy of mathematics was as fertile and intriguing as the present collection demonstrates. Perhaps, as Paul Benacerraf’s essay in this collection suggests, logical positivism should be held partly responsible for the neglect of this aspect of (...) Frege’s thought, since it contributed to the following common impression of Frege’s philosophy of mathematics: Frege’s project was to reduce arithmetic to logic, in order to provide an empiricist account of mathematical knowledge; Russell’s paradox showed that this was not possible, and that the best that can be done is to reduce arithmetic to set theory; so, Frege’s logicism is demonstrably a philosophical dead end. (shrink)

European Journal of Philosophy, EarlyView.

This book is a study of the philosophy of arithmetic in one of the most significant periods of its history—from Frege to Carnap—prefaced by an account of Kant. Potter aims at a philosophical history, a story told from an explicit interpretative perspective. These theories of arithmetic are seen as attempts to account for its “source of content” and “source of concepts.” Potter never explains these terms; I take the former to be the thing that, when we have knowledge of it (...) or insight into it, provides the ultimate justification for pure and applied arithmetical discourse. That is, Potter’s principal concern is both ontological and epistemological: what determines, and how do we know, the truth of the statements that express our putative arithmetical knowledge? The criterion of success of a theory of arithmetic is how well it explains arithmetic’s simultaneous necessity or apriority and empirical applicability. Potter divides the theories he discusses into four main types, determined by their accounts of the “source of content” and “concepts”: sensibility, thought, language, and the world. At the end, Potter finds that none succeeds in accounting for all of arithmetic: at best some capture the infinity of the natural numbers, but none gives the “source” of arithmetical concepts. But the “similarities … between the scopes of the various approaches” suggest a Gödelian moral for Potter’s tale: the philosophy of arithmetic must treat concepts of “thought structures or … contents,” where “reflection upon the meanings” of “propositions about these mental objects” is needed for their proofs. (shrink)

In this paper I attempt to clarify a relatively little-studied aspect of Michael Dummett's argument for intuitionism: its use of the notion of ‘undecidable’ sentence. I give a new analysis of this concept in epistemic terms, with which I resolve some puzzles and questions about how it works in the anti-realist critique of classical logic.

This chapter examines the apparent proximity between Schopenhauer’s and Freud’s views on the nature and importance of what is called, amongst other things, ‘sexuality’, the ‘sexual impulse’, the ‘sexual instinct’ or ‘the ‘sexual drive’. It argues, against the idea that Freud's conception is basically borrowed from Schopenhauer, for the originality of Freud’s early theory of sexuality and suggest that the significance of this theory, apart from its obvious psychiatric and social import, lies in its possible contribution to a philosophical anthropology. (...) The chapter returns to the first, 1905 edition of the Three Essays on the Theory of Sexuality to argue for the originality of Freud’s conception of the sexual drive, in relation to both his philosophical and his psychiatric predecessors. It argues that Freud’s terminological shift in the Three Essays from the Geschlechtstrieb to the Sexualtrieb, both of which Strachey translates as ‘sexual instinct’ is evidence of a theoretical shift. Examining the notion of the Geschlechtstrieb in Freud’s predecessors and its relation to presumptions about the difference between the sexes allows the distinctiveness of Freud’s conception of the Sexualtrieb and thus his theory of sexuality to stand out. After examining the claims in the literature concerning the relation between Schopenhauer and Kant on the question of sexuality, it lays out the conception of the Geschlechtstrieb in Freud’s immediate psychiatric predecessors and its connection to the treatment of the same topic in Kant, Schopenhauer and Hartmann. It then demonstrates, with reference to Freud’s shift to the use of the term Sexualtrieb, how Freud develops a conception of the sexual drive and of sexuality that is quite different to the conception of the Geschlechtstrieb in Schopenhauer et al. The chapter ends by suggesting how Freud’s theory of sexuality is a contribution to a philosophical anthropology based on considerations quite foreign to his predecessors. (shrink)

Alongside Richard Rorty, Hilary Putnam and Jacques Derrida, Stanley Cavell is arguably one of the best-known philosophers in the world. In this state-of-the-art collection, Alice Crary explores the work of this original and interesting figure who has already been the subject of a number of books, conferences and Phd theses. A philosopher whose work encompasses a broad range of interests, such as Wittgenstein, scepticism in philosophy, the philosophy of art and film, Shakespeare, and philosophy of mind and language, Cavell has (...) also written much about Henry Thoreau and Ralph Waldo Emerson. Including contributions from Hilary Putnam, Cora Diamond, Jim Conant and Stephen Mulhall, this book is a must-have for libraries and students alike. (shrink)

This article comprises a critical examination of some aspects of the English-language comparative literature on Heidegger and East Asian thought. It questions both its transcendental conceptual ground – the conditions of possibility for the comparative exercise – and its account of Heideggerʼs philosophy itself. For the comparative literature, I will argue, can only make its specific claims, sympathetic to the Heideggerian philosophical project, with a reading of that project that represses most of what is fundamental to Heideggerʼs conception of philosophy (...) and almost everything that we know about his politics. Furthermore, in its emphasis on the ancient it facilitates the repression of the history of Heideggerian fascism in modern East Asian, and particularly Japanese, thought. The point of this critical examination of the comparative literature is not, however, to expose a misreading of Heidegger. It is to reveal what is at stake in the mobilization of the imaginary geopolitical and geophilosophical unities of ʻthe Eastʼ and ʻthe Westʼ in relation to Heideggerʼs political-philosophical thinking of ʻthe Westʼ. Accordingly, I will look first at the claims typical in the advocatory comparative literature and then at the problematic conceptual ground of the comparison, both in terms of its immanent logic and its relation to Heideggerʼs conception of the history of philosophy. (shrink)

I argue that Charles Travis’s interpretation of Frege, in Frege: The Pure Business of Being True, as consistent with Travis’s conception of occasion-sensitivity does not in fact require any modal notions, and so is consistent with the amodalist interpretation of Frege I elaborate in Necessity Lost.

This paper examines the metaphors of 'preformation' and 'epigenesis' in Kant's Critique of Pure Reason and his other references to and various uses of theories of biological generation. It asks what these metaphor are meant to do, philosophically, and whether the idea of epigenesis, in particular, can help explain the specificity of transcendental idealism in relation to empiricism, or whether it illuminates anything concerning the status or the function of the categories. Discussing the most important interpretations of the epigenesis metaphor (...) in the Critique of Pure Reason by Philip Sloan, Günter Zöller and John Zammito, this paper suggests an alternative interpretation of the generative metaphorics surrounding Kant’s presentation of the spontaneous production of the pure concepts by the understanding. Placing the single reference to epigenesis in Critique of Pure Reason in the context of the book’s larger set of metaphors of generation, birth and biological ancestry, this paper argues that the generative model for the production or origin of the categories is in fact that of parthenogenesis, and that this is the only generative model that could have secured the epistemic status and legitimacy of the categories in the Critique of Pure Reason for Kant. This argument also reveals the gendered imaginary subtending Kant’s transcendental idealism and allows us to consider the implications of the parthenogenic model for Kant’s transcendental idealism in this light. (shrink)

This chapter discusses translators’ efforts to render the grammatical gender of Plato’s Greek in passages of the Republic, and to translate his terms noting differences between men and women with terms associated with the identity-defining concepts of sex and gender. It argues that the translation of 'genos' as 'sex' reveals less about the source text than about the role of the concept of sex in the translating culture. A discussion of a similar controversy in contemporary translation shows how debates over (...) the French translation of 'gender' as genre are embroiled in issues of national identity. The chapter demonstrates how translation and its analysis may simultaneously express and contest cultural assumptions about sex and gender. (shrink)