The discovery of the molecular structure of deoxyribonucleic acid and the science of molecular biology have profoundly changed medicine’s diagnostic capability and promise to transform the therapeutic realm. When some genetic disorders are diagnosed, physicians can intervene for prevention or treatment. While the basic structure of DNA is the same for all human beings, no two individuals, other than identical twins, have the same DNA sequence. This discovery has had important repercussions in the criminal justice system, where DNA can serve (...) as an identification tool.At the crossroads of these different uses of DNA, there are great concerns about potential misuses of genetic information. Preventing disease, curing illness, and convicting criminals are all seen as worthwhile uses of the technology, but concerns of potential misuse in medicine or in the criminal justice system are not unfounded. A 1998 American Medical Association study showed that 68 percent of patients had fears that their genetic test results would be used against them by their employers or insurers. Others, pointing to racial profiling, have suggested that we may now face genetic profiling. (shrink)

The replication or reproducibility crisis in psychological science has renewed attention to philosophical aspects of its methodology. I provide herein a new, functional account of the role of replication in a scientific discipline: to undercut the underdetermination of scientific hypotheses from data, typically by hypotheses that connect data with phenomena. These include hypotheses that concern sampling error, experimental control, and operationalization. How a scientific hypothesis could be underdetermined in one of these ways depends on a scientific discipline’s epistemic goals, theoretical (...) development, material constraints, institutional context, and their interconnections. I illustrate how these apply to the case of psychological science. I then contrast this “bottom-up” account with “top-down” accounts, which assume that the role of replication in a particular science, such as psychology, must follow from a uniform role that it plays in science generally. Aside from avoiding unaddressed problems with top-down accounts, my bottom-up account also better explains the variability of importance of replication of various types across different scientific disciplines. (shrink)

How can inferences from models to the phenomena they represent be justified when those models represent only imperfectly? Pierre Duhem considered just this problem, arguing that inferences from mathematical models of phenomena to real physical applications must also be demonstrated to be approximately correct when the assumptions of the model are only approximately true. Despite being little discussed among philosophers, this challenge was taken up by mathematicians and physicists both contemporaneous with and subsequent to Duhem, yielding a novel and rich (...) mathematical theory of stability with epistemological consequences. (shrink)

Can quantum theory provide examples of metaphysical indeterminacy, indeterminacy that obtains in the world itself, independently of how one represents the world in language or thought? We provide a positive answer assuming just one constraint of orthodox quantum theory: the eigenstate-eigenvalue link. Our account adds a modal condition to preclude spurious indeterminacy in the presence of superselection sectors. No other extant account of metaphysical indeterminacy in quantum theory meets these demands.

Intertheoretic reduction in physics aspires to be both to be explanatory and perfectly general: it endeavors to explain why an older, simpler theory continues to be as successful as it is in terms of a newer, more sophisticated theory, and it aims to relate or otherwise account for as many features of the two theories as possible. Despite often being introduced as straightforward cases of intertheoretic reduction, candidate accounts of the reduction of general relativity to Newtonian gravitation have either been (...) insufficiently general or rigorous, or have not clearly been able to explain the empirical success of Newtonian gravitation. Building on work by Ehlers and others, I propose a different account of the reduction relation that is perfectly general and meets the explanatory demand one would make of it. In doing so, I highlight the role that a topology on the collection of all spacetimes plays in defining the relation, and how the selection of the topology corresponds with broader or narrower classes of observables that one demands be well-approximated in the limit. (shrink)

The replicability crisis refers to the apparent failures to replicate both important and typical positive experimental claims in psychological science and biomedicine, failures which have gained increasing attention in the past decade. In order to provide evidence that there is a replicability crisis in the first place, scientists have developed various measures of replication that help quantify or “count” whether one study replicates another. In this nontechnical essay, I critically examine five types of replication measures used in the landmark article (...) “Estimating the reproducibility of psychological science” (Open Science Collaboration, Science, 349, ac4716, 2015) based on the following techniques: subjective assessment, null hypothesis significance testing, comparing effect sizes, comparing the original effect size with the replication confidence interval, and meta-analysis. The first four, I argue, remain unsatisfactory for a variety of conceptual or formal reasons, even taking into account various improvements. By contrast, at least one version of the meta-analytic measure does not suffer from these problems. It differs from the others in rejecting dichotomous conclusions, the assumption that one study replicates another or not simpliciter. I defend it from other recent criticisms, concluding however that it is not a panacea for all the multifarious problems that the crisis has highlighted. (shrink)

Traditionally, logic has been the dominant formal method within philosophy. Are logical methods still dominant today, or have the types of formal methods used in philosophy changed in recent times? To address this question, we coded a sample of philosophy papers from the late 2000s and from the late 2010s for the formal methods they used. The results indicate that the proportion of papers using logical methods remained more or less constant over that time period but the proportion of papers (...) using probabilistic methods was approximately three times higher in the late 2010s than it was in the late 2000s. Further analyses explored this change by looking more closely at specific methods, specific levels of technical engagement, and specific subdisciplines within philosophy. These analyses indicate that the increasing proportion of papers using probabilistic methods was pervasive, not confined to particular probabilistic methods, levels of sophistication, or subdisciplines. (shrink)

I provide a formally precise account of diachronic emergence of properties as described within scientific theories, extending a recent account of synchronic emergence using similarity structure on the theories’ models. This similarity structure approach to emergent properties unifies the synchronic and diachronic types by revealing that they only differ in how they delineate the domains of application of theories. This allows it to apply also to cases where the synchronic/diachronic distinction is unclear, such as spacetime emergence from theories of quantum (...) gravity. In addition, I discuss two further case studies—finite periodicity in van der Pol oscillators and two-dimensional quasiparticles in the fractional quantum Hall effect—to facilitate comparison of this approach to others in the literature on concepts of emergence applicable to the sciences. My discussion of the fractional quantum Hall effect in particular may be of independent interest to philosophers of physics concerned with its interpretation. (shrink)

Merely approximate symmetry is mundane enough in physics that one rarely finds any explication of it. Among philosophers it has also received scant attention compared to exact symmetries. Herein I invite further consideration of this concept that is so essential to the practice of physics and interpretation of physical theory. After motivating why it deserves such scrutiny, I propose a minimal definition of approximate symmetry—that is, one that presupposes as little structure on a physical theory to which it is applied (...) as seems needed. Then I apply this definition to three topics: first, accounting for or explaining the symmetries of a theory emeritus in intertheoretic reduction; second, explicating and evaluating the Curie-Post principle; and third, a new account of accidental symmetry. (shrink)

The role or function of experimental and observational replication within empirical science has implications for how replication should be measured. Broadly, there seems to be consensus that replication’s central goal is to confirm or vouchsafe the reliability of scientific findings. I argue that if this consensus is correct, then most of the measures of replication used in the scientific literature are actually poor indicators of this reliability or confirmation. Only meta-analytic measures of replication align functionally with the goals of replication. (...) I conclude by addressing some objections to meta-analysis. (shrink)

The first section of this chapter discusses the one essay Davidson wrote specifically about the theory of literature, including his criticisms of Kripke's account of names in fiction. The second section describes his intentionalism, anticonventionalism, and account of metaphor. The third section discusses to what extent Davidson's views are taken into account by contemporary literary theorists, such as Michaels and Fish. After discussing how texts are prima facie different from speech, the fourth section presents some problems for Davidson's account of (...) texts, using Biblical texts as examples. The fifth section speculates on a Davidsonian response to those problems. (shrink)

We implement a recent characterization of metaphysical indeterminacy in the context of orthodox quantum theory, developing the syntax and semantics of two propositional logics equipped with determinacy and indeterminacy operators. These logics, which extend a novel semantics for standard quantum logic that accounts for Hilbert spaces with superselection sectors, preserve different desirable features of quantum logic and logics of indeterminacy. In addition to comparing the relative advantages of the two, we also explain how each logic answers Williamson’s challenge to any (...) substantive account of determinacy: For any proposition p, what could the difference between “p” and “it’s determinate that p” ever amount to? (shrink)

In this paper, I argue that Book II, Chapter viii of Locke' Essay is a unified, self-consistent whole, and that the appearance of inconsistency is due largely to anachronistic misreadings and misunderstandings. The key to the distinction between primary and secondary qualities is that the former are, while the latter are not, real properties, i.e., properties that exist in bodies independently of being perceived. Once the distinction is properly understood, it becomes clear that Locke's arguments for it are simple, valid (...) and (in one case) persuasive as well. (shrink)

The concept of emergence is commonly invoked in modern physics but rarely defined. Building on recent influential work by Jeremy Butterfield, I provide precise definitions of emergence concepts as they pertain to properties represented in models, applying them to some basic examples from space-time and thermostatistical physics. The chief formal innovation I employ, similarity structure, consists in a structured set of similarity relations among those models under analysis—and their properties—and is a generalization of topological structure. Although motivated from physics, this (...) similarity-structure-based account of emergence applies to any science that represents its possibilia with models. (shrink)

This review concerns the notions of physical possibility and necessity as they are informed by contemporary physical theories and the reconstructive explications of past physical theories according to present standards. Its primary goal is twofold: first, to motivate and introduce a range of accessible issues of philosophical relevance around these notions; and second, to provide extensive references to the research literature on them. Although I will have occasion to comment on the direction and shape of this literature, pointing out certain (...) lacunae in argument or scholarly attention, I intend to advance no overriding thesis or point of view, aside from the selection of issues I deem most interesting. (shrink)

In this two-part essay, we distinguish several senses in which general relativity has been regarded as “locally special relativistic.” Here, in Part 1, we focus on senses in which a relativistic spacetime has been said to be “locally (approximately) Minkowskian.” After critiquing several proposals in the literature, we present a result capturing a substantive sense in which every relativistic spacetime is locally approximately Minkowskian. We then show that Minkowski spacetime is not distinguished in this result: every relativistic spacetime is locally (...) approximately every other spacetime in the same sense. In Part 2, we will consider “locally specially relativistic” matter theories. (shrink)

In this two-part essay, we distinguish several senses in which general relativity has been regarded as “locally special relativistic.” In Part 1, we focused on senses in which a relativistic spacetime may be said to be “locally (approximately) Minkowskian.” Here, in Part 2, we consider what it might mean to say that a matter theory is “locally special relativistic.” We isolate and evaluate three criteria in the literature and show that they are incompatible: matter theories satisfying one will generally violate (...) others. We then consider what would happen if any of those criteria failed for a given theory. (shrink)

Recently, we (Synthese, 199(5–6):13247–13281, 2021) proposed Kripke-like semantics for two quantum logics of interderminacy. These logics expand the vocabulary of standard Birkhoff-von Neumann propositional quantum logic with a pair of modal operators interpreted as “it is (in)determinate that”, allowing them to express in the object language statements such as “it is indeterminate that system S is spin-up in the x-direction”, as well as statements of any logical complexity involving ascriptions of (in)determinacy. We present an axiomatization of a logic closely related (...) to one of these quantum logics of indeterminacy and prove that this axiomatization is sound and complete with respect to the Kripke-like semantics. We then prove that this logic is decidable. (shrink)

In this collection of essays Samuel Wheeler discusses Derrida and other “deconstructive” thinkers from the perspective of an analytic philosopher willing to treat deconstruction as philosophy, taking it seriously enough to look for and analyze its arguments. The essays focus on the theory of meaning, truth, interpretation, metaphor, and the relationship of language to the world. Wheeler links the thought of Derrida to that of Davidson and argues for close affinities among Derrida, Quine, de Man, and Wittgenstein. He also (...) demonstrates the propinquity of Plato and Derrida and shows that New Criticism shares deconstruction’s conception of language. Of the twelve essays in the collection, four are published here for the first time. The fundamental resemblance between Derrida and such analytic thinkers as Quine, Wittgenstein, and Davidson, the author argues, is that they deny the possibility of meanings as self-interpreting media constituting thoughts and intentions. Derrida argues that some form of magic language has determined the very project of philosophy, and his arguments work out the consequences of denying that there are such self-interpreting mental contents. In addition, Derrida and Davidson agree in denying any “given.” Without a given, questions about realism and idealism cease to have a point. Derrida and Davidson are both committed to the textuality of all significant marks, whether in neurons or on paper. They argue that there is no mode of representation more direct than language. (shrink)

The stopping rule for a sequential experiment is the rule or procedure for determining when that experiment should end. Accordingly, the stopping rule principle (SRP) states that the evidential relationship between the final data from a sequential experiment and a hypothesis under consideration does not depend on the stopping rule: the same data should yield the same evidence, regardless of which stopping rule was used. I clarify and provide a novel defense of two interpretations of the main argument against the (...) SRP, the foregone conclusion argument. According to the first, the SRP allows for highly confirmationally unreliable experiments, which concept I make precise, to confirm highly. According to the second, it entails the evidential equivalence of experiments differing significantly in their confirmational reliability. I rebut several attempts to deflate or deflect the foregone conclusion argument, drawing connections with replication in science and the likelihood principle. (shrink)

In this paper, I attempt to clarify the nature and purpose of Berkeley's criticisms of Shaftesbury's and Hutcheson's ethical systems in the third chapter ofAlciphron, explaining the extent to which those criticisms rely on the truth of idealism and considering whether Berkeley or his philosophical opponents have the better of the arguments. In the end, I conclude that some of Berkeley's criticisms are based on confusion and misunderstanding, others are likely contradicted by the empirical evidence, and yet others are unconvincing. (...) At the same time, the criticisms reveal that Berkeley's metaphysical and ethical views are, perhaps surprisingly, significantly intertwined. (shrink)

Matthew Leisinger (2020) argues that previous interpretations of John Locke’s account of akrasia (or weakness of will) are mistaken and offers a new interpretation in their place. In this essay, we aim to recapitulate part of this debate, defend a previously articulated interpretation by responding to Leisinger’s criticisms of it, and explain why Leisinger’s own interpretation faces textual and philosophical problems that are serious enough to disqualify it as an accurate reconstruction of Locke’s views. In so doing, we aim to (...) shed further light on Locke’s views on the various ways in which humans are prone to err in their pursuit of happiness. (shrink)

In the 17th century, there was a lively debate in the intellectual circles with which Locke was familiar, revolving around the question whether the human mind is furnished with innate ideas. Although a few scholars declared that there is no good reason to believe, and good reason not to believe, in the existence of innate ideas, the vast majority took for granted that God, in his infinite goodness and wisdom, has inscribed in human minds innate principles that constitute the foundation (...) of knowledge, as well in practical as in theoretical matters. It was in opposition to the latter group, which included Descartes, leading Anglican divines, and the Cambridge Platonists, that Locke directed his attack upon innate ideas in the first book of the Essay.1 In the minds of those who weighed in on one side or the other, the importance of the controversy related to epistemological, moral, and religious doctrines. At the epistemological level, innatists (or, as I will also call them, nativists) held that all knowledge of the natural and supernatural world available to humans is based on fundamental “speculative” axioms, theoretical principles that neither require nor are capable of proof. These principles, such as the causal principle – that nothing comes from nothing – or the principle of non-contradiction – that nothing can both be and not be at the same time, were taken to be both universal and necessary, and hence impossible to derive from experience. To the mind of an innatist, if these principles are not based on experience and are not (as chimerical ideas were thought to be) constructed out.. (shrink)

Based on three common interpretive commitments in general relativity, I raise a conceptual problem for the usual identification, in that theory, of timelike curves as those that represent the possible histories of particles in spacetime. This problem affords at least three different solutions, depending on different representational and ontological assumptions one makes about the nature of particles, fields, and their modal structure. While I advocate for a cautious pluralism regarding these options, I also suggest that re-interpreting particles as field processes (...) offers the most promising route for natural integration with the physics of material phenomena, including quantum theory. (shrink)

Samuel C. Wheeler, III; The Extension of Deconstruction, The Monist, Volume 69, Issue 1, 1 January 1986, Pages 3–21, https://doi.org/10.5840/monist19866913.

India, the world's largest democracy of 1 billion people, went to the polls in September 1999. In this article the director of the Evangelical Fellowship of India Commission on Relief and Development offers a critical reading of India's journey in building a nation state, and the challenge this represents to evangelicals to present a public face for the Christian faith in such a context. The article is a prelude to a larger and longer study he is undertaking, which the editors (...) hope to include a future issue of Transformation. (shrink)