This chapter contains sections titled: Buddhist Backgrounds Brewing Up a Self Just a Cup of Coffee – or a Karma Macchiato?

In eastern spiritual traditions, samsara has long been associated with the cycle of birth and death. But what are the hidden depths of samsara, and just how far does it go?

The difference between the concepts of saṃsāra e nirvāṇaset forth by the historical Buddha in his first sermon seem to be disputed by the equalization of the two terms effected by Nāgārjuna in a topical passage of his MK. This article, firstly, supports the thesis that the contradiction is just a seeming one and that the relation of difference or identity between the two dimensions depends on the philosophical register, respectively epistemological and ontological, being used - in both cases for (...) soteriological purposes - by the Buddha and Nāgārjuna. Secondly, we wish to prove that, in any case, Nāgārjuna's ontology, far from being a philosophical novelty or an evolution of the thought of the founder of Buddhism, is, on the contrary, one of the possible applications of the "non-self" doctrine - probably the most important and original contribution of Buddhist thought to the history of world philosophy - expounded by the Buddha in his second sermon.La differenza tra i concetti di saṃsāra e nirvāṇastabilita dal Buddha nel suo primo sermone sembra essere messa in discussione dall'equiparazione dei due termini effettuata da Nāgārjuna in un passaggio-chiave delle sue MK. Questo articolo, in primo luogo, difende la tesi che la contraddizione sia soltanto apparente e che la relazione, di differenza o di identità, tra le due dimensioni dipende dal registro filosofico, rispettivamente epistemologico e ontologico, usato - in entrambi i casi per finalità soteriologiche - dal Buddha e da Nāgārjuna. In secondo luogo, cercheremo di provare che, in ogni caso, l'ontologia di Nāgārjuna, lungi dall'essere una novità filosofica o un'evoluzione rispetto al pensiero del fondatore del buddhismo è, al contrario, una delle possibili applicazioni della dottrina del non-sé - probabilmente il contributo più importante e originale del pensiero buddhista alla storia della filosofia universale - esposta dal Buddha nel suo secondo sermone. (shrink)

Une forme de transmigration électronique est en train de s’opérer sous nos yeux. Le Dalaï Lama l’a bien compris, apportant récemment sa bénédiction à un grand projet de « téléchargement de l’esprit » ( mind uploading ). Quel lien entretient ce modèle « numérique » de la transmigration (celui que nous promettent les transhumanistes) avec les formes plus anciennes (brahmanique, bouddhiste, spirite, etc.)? Aurions-nous déjà opéré notre propre transmigration? Basculé dans une autre matrice? Serions-nous tous en train de devenir des (...) esprits sans le savoir? (shrink)

ABSTRACT As has long been recognized, Arthur Schopenhauer’s intellectual encounter with the Orient represents a departure from previous Western philosophers’ approaches to it. What has been less appreciated, however, is that this encounter also marks a pivotal moment in the modern critique of systematic philosophies of history. Since Schopenhauer doubted that there was any logic in history, either in the form of a providential plan or a rationally intelligible structure, he impugned both history’s scientific status and its significance for an (...) understanding of the human condition. Rejecting both Christian eschatology and the modern theory of progress, he opted instead for a transhistorical perspective. This denigration of history, which had far-reaching repercussions in the latter half of the nineteenth century, must be understood in light of Schopenhauer’s engagement with non-Western philosophy. Schopenhauer’s devaluation of the significance of historical difference, in stark opposition to the philosophers of history who preceded him, contributed to his receptivity to non-Western thought; and his belief in the affinity between his own transhistorical perspective and the teachings of Hinduism and Buddhism informed his antagonism to contemporary historical narratives and theories. (shrink)

Este artigo visa fazer um diálogo a respeito do desejo aflitivo por comida, de um lado dialogando com textos da tradição budista tibetana Geluk, e do outro com pesquisas realizadas na área da saúde, especialmente as voltadas à parte biológica-comportamental da alimentação. Bem como, trazer contribuições para a área da saúde, a respeito do desejo aflitivo, que contribui na problemática crescente do sobrepeso, obesidade e doenças associadas no contexto mundial das sociedades desenvolvidas.

The introduction to the topic of this issue is an overview of the research articles authored by Russian, Lithuanian, and Indian scholars on various problems of Mahayana Buddhist philosophy. While explaining the status of the terms “Mahāyāna” and “Hīnayāna,” the author emphasizes that since they are represent the apologetic conceptualizations of Mahayanists, the appellation “Hīnayāna” (“Lesser Vehicle”, etc.) is not recognized either by those Buddhists who are supposed to be characterized by it, or by scholars striving for a neutral appellation. (...) This creates difficulties, including the need for a generally accepted designation for this Buddhist tradition. However, despite the apologetic nature of the Mahāyāna - Hīnayāna opposition, the difference between the two is captured very plausibly. The first one teaches about the individual way of achieving liberation from the cycle of endless rebirths (saṃsāra) through a personal, individual self-perfection (the path of the arhat) leading to enlightenment (bodhi) and nirvāṇa (extinction of passions). The second one develops a full-fledged religion with its own pantheon and rituals, in which nirvāṇa and individual liberation, while remaining, more or less theoretically, the ultimate goal, are pushed to a distant plane. At the same time, the idea of compassion and the ideal of bodhisattva who, having taken a vow to help all living beings to get rid of sufferings, continues to remain in saṃsāra, is put forward in the center. However, despite this major difference a Buddhist discipline known as Abhidharma which consists in analysis and classification of discrete states of consciousness (dharmas), identified in meditation, remains a reference point in both traditions. Three authors touch upon it (Helen Ostrovskaya, Pradeep Gokhale, and Vladimir Korobov). Two of them (Ostrovskaya and Gokhale) focus on the problems of murder and death, and the third one (Korobov) dwells on the methodology of Abhidharma. Vladimir Ivanov offers a new interpretation of the structure of Śāntarakṣita’s treatise “Tattva-saṃgraha” with Kamalaśīla’s “Pañjikā” commentary. Yangutov and Lepekhov explore the specificity of Buddhism reception in China, Tibet, Mongolia, and Russia. Nesterkin publishes for the first time B. Baradiin’s theses for Agvan Dordjiev’s lecture, which exemplifies the Buryat Buddhist Renovationists’ interpretation of Buddhism. Burmistrov analyzes the views of Indian historians of philosophy on the history of Buddhism, Volkova - the concepts of Buddhist ethics in contemporary analytical philosophy. (shrink)

O presente estudo pretende salientar o trânsito das grandes formulações da concepção da temporalidade na tradição hindu: do tempo (kāla) à sua compreensão como instantâneo (kṣaṇa). Num ponto preliminar, salientam-se as condições linguísticas do pensar indo-europeu e a "gramática" sanscrítica a propósito do tempo. Sublinham-se de seguida os enquadramentos rituais e míticos, tanto ligados com a ciclicidade (saṃsāra), como com o imutável e eterno (ānantya). Depois percorrem-se, de forma sintética, os vários "sistemas" filosóficos salientando respectivamente: a concepção metafísica (no Vedānta (...) e Mīmānsā), a recorrência e irrealidade já num plano gnosiológico (no Sāṃkhya e no Yoga), e a formulação psicológica (tanto no Vaiśeṣika, como no Nyāya, além disso presente no Jainismo). Enfim, na última parte, faz-se menção aos principais traços característicos da doutrina budista da instantaneidade (muito característica sobretudo das escolas "subitistas"). Valoriza-se conclusivamente esta instância de um "agora" também como lição da espiritualidade hindu em geral. (shrink)

Jiva.--Samsara.--Karman.--Naman und Brahman.--Yoga.--Prajna paramita.--Trivarga. Schakti. Maya.

Darwin's Hypothesis Nonviolence Samsara The Noble Road to the Eight Virtues Respect for Life The Infinite, the Absolute, the Eternal The Will The Narrow Door The Author 127 127 128 130 131 131 132 132 135 ...

This research attempts to evaluate the hermeneutic characteristics of catuṣkoṭi (tetralemma) in the ‘Nirvāṇa’ Chapter of the _Mūlamadhyamakakārikā_ (Ch. 25), focusing on the identity thesis between nirvāṇa and saṃsāra. Regarding the structure of the tetralemma posited by Nāgārjuna (ca. 150-ca. 250), this study criticizes the dialectical interpretation of Robinson and Kajiyama from the perspective of Siderits and Katsura’s semantic approach to the extent that it does not deny ultimate truth. This sets it apart from the semantic view presented by Siderits (...) and Garfield (J Indian Philos 41:655–664, 2013). To support this position, the commentaries of Piṅgala (ca. 4C) and Candrakīrti (ca. 600–ca. 650) are also used, along with Nāgārjuna’s _Vigrahavyāvartanī_. From this standpoint, the meaning of non-duality of nirvāṇa and saṃsāra is evaluated, in the sense that both are negated in the ultimate sense, as opposed to the metaphysical view, which interprets the tetralemma in a dialectical way. Siderits and Katsura suggests that, as in the case of nirvāṇa, “just as the four lemmas applying to saṃsāra is rejected, ultimately there is no such state as saṃsāra,” because it is empty of its intrinsic nature. Following this line of reasoning, the thesis of Tathāgata in 25.17 and 25.18 can also be interpreted semantically as “there is no real distinction between before and after death, due to the absence of intrinsic nature (_svabhāva_) in Tathāgata.” Likewise, the semantic approach here negates the four propositions of nirvāṇa and saṃsāra only, as operated when clinging to identity. (shrink)

The Asvaraja story relates the adventures of a caravan of merchants shipwrecked on an island of demonesses and rescued by a flying horse, the asvaraja, ‘king of horses’. The Simhala story continues this narrative to include the chief merchant, Simhala, being followed home by a demoness, who tries to get him back before seducing and eating the king. Simhala is crowned king and invades the island. Each story has many versions, both Mahayana and non-Mahayana. This paper examines five key versions: (...) birth story with ‘ocean of samsara’ metaphor; political and quasi-historical narrative of the invasion of Sri Lanka by the Sinhalese; warning that ‘all women are demonesses’; glorifi cation of the bodhisattva Avalokitesvara; and Newar warning of the dangers of travelling to Tibet. Each version reveals some of the issues that its community is preoccupied with. (shrink)

Life is a mask through which the universe expresses itself. One of the major themes in the Dune novels is what Friedrich Nietzsche calls self‐overcoming. This is an internal struggle against one's own physical, mental, and moral limits, in pursuit of a more powerful form of self‐expression. Hinduism says we're all born into samsara, the unending cycle of birth, death, and rebirth. In effect we're all players in the repertory theater of the cosmos, and director is the dharma, the (...) cosmic law behind both nature and morality. In the end, Hinduism says, we all reap what we sow. Self‐examination and self‐sacrifice in the name of self‐overcoming. But it's not selfish, as Nietzsche's philosophy is so often thought to be. (shrink)

In this paper I argue that Buddhism and humanistic-Marxism have much in common, and that they really are quite complementary in many ways. Early on I cite the Dalai Lama and some remarks he makes in relation to Buddhism and Marxism—remarks that seem not to make a distinction between orthodox-Marxism and humanistic-Marxism. I then go on to give a brief sketch of some of the central aspects of humanistic-Marxism; and in doing 50 I draw from a number of well-known Eastern (...) European philo-sophers. Among other things, I focus on the relation between the early and late Marx, "praxis", 'free conscious activity", historical materialism, the spiritual dimension in Marx and its role in social transformations, etc. After a brief indication of the Buddhist "four noble truths", I bring out that both Marx and Buddha are deeply concerned about human suffering; but that there is an important difference in emphasis with respect to the external and internal Factors associated with human suffering. I go on to bring out that both perspectives agree that there is no creator God, or eternal soul; and that both perspectives see reality as process in character. For each perspective this means that things are what they are by virtue of the dynamic interrelations they have with other things. whether directly and indirectly. I bring out that both perspectives begin their analysis of the human condition with the given situation in which human beings find themselves, and that both perspectives see human beings as the makers of themselves, but that they do so in somewhat different ways. Also both perspectives see human beings as making themselves on the basis of the ways they have made themselves in the past, but as doing so in ways that are not fatalistic. In this connection I compare the Buddhist view of karma, and an overlapping view of social karma in Marx. Also I discuss Buddhism ancj Marxism with respect to the notion of the ego-self, and the question of whether there are many different forms of the ego-self; and if so, how such different forms might come about, and what this would mean in relation to the Buddhist notion of ''samsara". Finally,! point to a way that humanistic-Marxism could consistently acknowledge a possible transcendence of the ego-self. In passing I point out that the notion of "unalienated spirituality" in Marx has much in common with the Buddhist notion of "enlightenment". (shrink)

In this essay, I elaborate a reading of the Buddhist allusions throughout T.S. Eliot's poetry as being not confessions of Buddhist faith or merely syncretic experiments, but rather ‘conceptual rhymes’ with the crisis of personal connection that preoccupies Eliot across multiple texts. In the Buddhist concepts of pratītya-samutpāda, śūnyatā, saṃsāra, and the pretas, Eliot finds thematic resonances with his own emotional and psychological concerns and so alludes to these concepts in ‘The Fire Sermon’ section of The Waste Land and ‘Burnt (...) Norton’ of Four Quartets as part of his characteristic poetic collage. By examining the connection between Eliot's personal poetic practice and the cross-cultural traditions upon which he drew, my argument intervenes in a long-standing debate regarding the meaning of Asian religio-philosophical influences in the poet's key texts. Moreover, by close reading the third movement of ‘Burnt Norton’ for Buddhist allusions, I attempt to refocus scrutiny of Buddhism in Eliot from the oft-discussed ‘Fire Sermon’ section of The Waste Land to Eliot's later Four Quartets, which remains under-examined for its Buddhist influences by scholars who instead attend to the latter text's more pronounced Vedic references. (shrink)

Heidegger attempted a “hermeneutics of human experience” that, by switching from the ontic to the ontological dimension, yet maintaining a phenomenological εποχη would bring to light the true meaning of being and, by the same stroke, ascertain the structures of being in human experience. It is now well known that Heidegger drew from Buddhism. However, in human experience being and its structures appear to be ultimately true, and since Heidegger at nopoint went beyond samsara, he failed to realize the (...) phenomenon of being to be one of the two essential aspects of the most basic of delusive phenomena, which is the threefold apparitional structure produced by the threefold thought structure (Tibetan, ’khor-gsum), and therefore, instead of achieving a genuinely ontological understanding of being and its structures, he came to the wrong view of identifying being (the understanding of which was a priori in a somehow non-Kantian sense that will not be discussed here) with truth and taking the ontological structures of samsara to be somehow given. The problem is that he used the term Being (das Sein) roughly as a synonym of Buddha-nature, Tao and so on: whereas the latter is unthinkable and inexpressible, for Heidegger the word “being” is not an empty word, for it has its “appellative force.” In fact, for him it is not a mere sound or written sign that brings nothing to our mind; on the contrary, it causes us to immediately conceive something, and what we thus conceive manifests in our experience as a (non-Kantian) phenomenon. (shrink)

The present paper is the third in a series dedicated to uncovering the canonical sources of Aśvaghoṣa’s Buddhacarita and, to the extent possible, the monk-poet’s sectarian affiliation. Whereas parts I and II focused on Chapter 16’s indebtedness to (Mūla)sarvāstivāda Vinaya and/or Sūtra literature, this third part inquires into the sources of Aśvaghoṣa’s account of the Buddha’s enlightenment in Chapter 14 (whose first 31 verses have been preserved in their Sanskrit original). Detailed analysis reveals this chapter’s intimate relationship with T. 189, (...) a (Mūla)sarvāstivāda (?) biographical sūtra extant in Chinese translation only, but also with textual materials that have come to belong to Mūlasarvāstivāda literature and, as already demonstrated by Kajiyama Yūichi, with the Nagar(opam)asūtra of the Saṃyuktāgama. Among these likely sources, some provide a lively description of the five destinies, others relate to the iconographic prescriptions laid down for drawing the so-called Wheel of saṃsāra/existence, while yet others spell out the doctrine of dependent origination. The detailed comparison of these materials is followed by an admittedly speculative attempt to assess the relationship between these sources. (shrink)

He who has seen everything empty itself is close to knowing what everything is filled with. Emptiness is probably the most important philosophical and religious concept of Mahayana Buddhism. Its precise meaning has been explained differently by different schools and in different Buddhist cultures, but almost all Mahāyāna Buddhists would agree with the following characterization: Philosophically , emptiness is the term that describes the ultimate mode of existence of all phenomena, namely, as naturally ‘empty’ of enduring substance, or self-existence : (...) rather than being independently self-originated, phenomena are dependently originated from causes and conditions. Emptiness, thus, explains how it is that phenomena change and interact as they do, how it is that the world goes on as it does. Religiously , emptiness is the single principle whose direct comprehension is the basis of liberation from samsāra, and ignorance of which, embodied in self-gasping is the basis of continued rebirth – hence suffering – in samsāra. (shrink)

Buddhism teaches that the diversity of living beings in the world is caused and upheld by intentional acts performed in this and previous lives by karmic trajectories, beings whose continuity through rebirths is not dependent on a transcendent substratum such as a self (ātman), and that the order of beings in the world exactly correlates with the consequences of acts (karrnan) operative for their present life. The central Buddhist doctrine of dependent co‐arising (pratītya‐samutpāda) shows how these karmic trajectories are sustained (...) by twelve conditions, the primary of which is ignorance. The goal of Buddhists is ultimately to transcend rebirth and attain nirvāṇa. This is possible because the world is both a rebirth realm and a realm in which awakening from ignorance can be attained. The natural world of living beings is a moral order and this moral order functions in a physical setting. The physical setting of the rebirth system is the cosmos as the abode of beings, and the beings participating in the rebirth system constitute the world of living beings. These together constitute the world of rebirth (saṃsāra). By nature in this article is understood that part of the cosmos that constitutes the physical setting of humans and the world of non‐human beings also living there – that is, animals and plants. This is, one should note, only a very small part of the Buddhist cosmos, which consists of a huge number of world systems, and which is immense in time and space and eternally manifests and dissolves. (shrink)

Vedānta endeavours to base itself essentially on the facts of experience—in the fullest sense of the term. It recognizes the occurrence of everyday experience and the so-called fact of evil, but it refuses to view them as real. The real, it says, like Hegel, does not exist, and that which exists is not real. Evil is only an “existent"—as all this Samsara is—but not the ultimate Real. But it will be at once objected that if evil is an appearance, (...) a Maya, why should this appearance appear at all? If it has no foundation in reality, how and why does it occur at all? Further, how can anything be known as real unless it should appear ? Reality must appear. (shrink)

The Good Place is based on the idea of an afterlife. The writers of The Good Place are certainly aware of the ways in which monotheistic traditions understand the afterlife. Rather than reflecting the Abrahamic religious traditions, the metaphysics of The Good Place share similarities with the Asian religions of Hinduism and Buddhism. The idea that earthly actions have consequences for the afterlife mirrors the notion of karma, “the moral law of cause and effect” believed by both Hindus and Buddhists. (...) The Good Place mirrors the Hindu tradition not only in reincarnation but also in the identification of the right “aims” or “goals” of life. In The Good Place, each character, in his or her own way, prepares for their release from the cycle of samsara, and each has come to accept reality as it is, accepting whatever their afterlives throw at them. (shrink)

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:BOOK REVIEWS 327 conceptual impositions and consider nirvana in the light of its own "intentional infrastructure." Interpreted as doctrine, nirvana is a wooden category; as a path, subtle and paradoxical, a factor celebrated in the later Mahayana texts (samsara is nirvana; nirvana is samsara). In pleading for sensitivity to context, Welbon maintains that the Buddha was not a philosopher, much less a nineteenth-century one, but a saint (...) and a "genius as a soteriological tactician": Depending on the context and in particular the needs of the individual(s) to whom he spoke, his emphasis varied. To those full of self, his message was expressed negatively. To those full of fear, the message expressed confidence. To those full of suffering, the message expressed hope. (p. 300) Nirvana's "meanings," then, are many, and include "both annihilation and bliss, negation and affirmation, nonexistence and existence" (p. 302). Yet the author's primary concern is not simply to advance one more theory of nirvana, lined up beside the rest; it is rather to elucidate the role of theory in its relation to intercultural and history of religions data. Interpretations are themselves phenomena whose intentionality, context, or history must be clarified. The differences between the scholars surveyed in this book stem not so much from varying conclusions about given data as from differences of premise and method; they are differences of questions rather than answers. Nirvana, a religious ultimate without the conception of deity, has indeed been a classic stumbling block to Western theories. The encounter, Welbon suggests, documents not only a history of methodological shortcomings, but "the fragile and inadequate nature of our understanding of what religion itself may be" (p. 301). WILLIAM E. PADEN University of Vermont Hamann's Socratic Memorabilia, A Translation and Commentary. By James C. O'Flaherty. (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins Press, 1967. Pp. xv+229. $7.50) Johann Georg Hamann, Philosophy and Faith. By W. M. Alexander. (The Hague: Martinus Nijhoff, 1966. Pp. xii+212. Gld. 28.25) America continues to contribute more than a fair share to the study of Hamann ---even though the Hamann News-Letter, edited by James C. O'Flaherty, had to stop appearing in 1963. It is now the same O'Flaherty who opens wide the gates for the study of Hamann in the English-speaking world by translating the Socratic Memorabilia and providing an introduction and explanatory notes. The Memorabilia without doubt offer the best first approach to Hamann. t But so great is the obscurity of Hamann that it is by no means sure that the Memorabilia have now become an exotericum. Before reviewing O'Flaherty's book I shall therefore present the content of the Memorabilia. If only we had simple blow-by-blow accounts of all of his writings before we embark on a wholesale interpretation! a For decades they were available in Reclams Universalbibliothek (in c. 1914 at a price of about three cents) and have now (August, 1968) been republished (together with Hamann's Aesthetica in nuce) with excellent notes and a commentary by Sven-Aage Jorgensen (present price: about twenty cents). In 1959 F. Blanke published another amply annotated edition with an extensive thorough commentary. 328 HISTORY OF PHILOSOPHY The purpose of the Memorabilia is to "convert" two friends of Hamann, Kant and Berens, from Enlightenment to Christianity (the two tried to do the opposite to Hamann) and to defend himself and his Christianity from their criticisms. To do so, Hamann decides to use philosophic rather than religious language. In so doing he will present himself as another Socrates, because, as Hamann sees it, it was the mission of Socrates to lead the Athenians to the unknown God, thus prefiguring the mission of St. Paul, and because Socrates opposed the then "enlighteners," viz., the Sophists. In so doing he furthermore compares some of his own character traits (for which he was blamed by Kant and Berens) and some events in his life with Socratic ones. But as he compares (equates) Socrates with the prophets and with Jesus, he by the same token compares (equates) himself with them. Of course, Hamann knows that the Enlightenment also admired Socrates. But it did so for entirely wrong reasons: they praised... (shrink)

The article seeks a confrontation between phenomenology - in its husserlian and existential forms - with indian philosophy, Particularly the nyaya--Vaisesika, Samkhya--Vedanta and buddhist schools. Confrontation with husserlian phenomenology is carried through under three headings: (a) methodology, (b) theory of the 'eidos' and (c) the notion of transcendental subjectivity. Despite close affinities, Indian thought is found to lack the dialectics of intention and fulfillment and the supposed temporality and historicity of transcendental subjectivity. The existential concepts of 'sorge' and 'geworfenheit' are (...) set beside the indian concepts of 'duhkha' and 'samsara', The concepts of freedom and nothingness are contrasted, The notion of 'karma' evaluated. Some major trends of modern indian thought, Especially that of k.C. Bhattacharyya, Are then set in this entire context. (shrink)

Resumen: Este artículo tiene el propósito de examinar el significado de lo sagrado en una religión como el Budismo, donde no hay una idea de Dios como tal o ningún ser sobrenatural. En cambio, hay prácticas íntimas elaboradas para lograr la iluminación. El artículo tiene dos partes. La primera analíza los lugares sagrados en el Budismo, considerando así dos conceptos importantes el samsara y el nirvana. En la segunda parte se trata de los lugares sagrados en el Budismo comparando (...) dos estructuras espaciales: la estupa como representativa de una estructura vertical y el manadala como horizontal. Tomando como fundamento la yuxtaposición de estos, aparentemente, conceptos y estructuras opuestas, el artículo revela que en términos del Budismo lo verdaderamente sagrado es lo no-sagrado: este es un término que trasciende la oposición sagrado-profano y expresa la visión específica budista de la no-dualidad. Palabras claves: Budismo; sagrado-profano; no-dualidad. (shrink)

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:On the Conceivability of Artificially Created EnlightenmentPaul Andrew PowellPointsman can only possess the zero and the one. He cannot, like [Roger] Mexico, survive anyplace in between.... [H]e imagines the cortex of the brain as a mosaic of tiny on/off elements.... [E]ach point is allowed only the two states:... [o]ne or zero.... [B]rain mechanics assumes the presence of these bi-stable points....If ever the Anti-pointsman existed, Roger Mexico is the man.... (...) How can Mexico play, so at his ease, with these symbols of randomness and fright? Innocent as a child, perhaps unaware—perhaps—that in his play he wrecks the elegant rooms of history.—Thomas Pynchon, Gravity's RainbowWhen I first read about the Dalai Lama's remark that "if all the external conditions and the karmic action were there, a stream of consciousness might actually enter into a computer,"1 I couldn't help but wonder if a computer could then attain enlightenment. The answer, at first, seemed simple and obvious (though perhaps distasteful for some): if the machine was self-aware, sentient, and conscious, then it would be only reasonable to assume that it could also attain enlightenment. Yes, simple and obvious, of course, but this takes for granted some very large and complex issues. After all, what makes for self-awareness, sentience, and consciousness to begin with, and how would we manufacture them in a machine?If we take a moment to think about the creation of artificial enlightenment the paradox becomes clear. In order to manufacture enlightenment, we must first manufacture samsara, because for a Buddhist, enlightenment is the "event" of deconstructing the problematic natures of "self," sentience (suchness), and consciousness, all of which are samsaric illusions. "Self," sentience, and consciousness represent the prerequisites of samsara/Nirvana, realized or unrealized, artificial or organic. They represent the prerequisites of desire. They represent the prerequisites for the illusion of death and birth. And thus they represent the truly salient issues that must be addressed before we can assemble our complicated hard (and soft) ware. Interestingly, because computational information consists of a conceptualized, dualistic [End Page 123] binary system of ones and zeroes, and because the nature of Nirvana/samsara also consists of a conceptualized, dualistic system of "self"/"other," technology, in theory anyway, may probably be capable of manufacturing a facsimile of samsara, if only because computational information is, by its very nature, samsaric to begin with. Of course, all this demands that consciousness, self-awareness, and sentience be a function of information processing. Personally, I believe they are, and that, in fact, the words information and samsara are synonymous with one another. Thus it follows that information technology will most certainly be capable of manufacturing the prerequisites, at least, of enlightenment. If that blunt statement strikes you as utterly preposterous, technically impossible, or even offensive, you might want to first read any number of excellent texts describing the future of artificial intelligence (AI). Two of the best popular books on the subject are Robot by Hans Moravec and The Age of Spiritual Machines by Ray Kurzweil. These will assuage your doubts concerning the soft problem, or, as it is sometimes called, the nuts-and-bolts problem.With these considerations in mind, let's see what we can come up with.In order to arrive at what you are not You must go through the way in which you are not.—T.S. Eliot, "East Coker" (The Four Quartets)For most Buddhists, enlightenment can be defined as seeing through the illusion of the self and experiencing unadulterated suchness. In the words of Master Wolfgang Kopp, "The seer, the seen, and the process of seeing are one. The thinker, the thought, and the process of thinking fall together into one and multiplicity melts away. There is neither inside, nor outside in this state. There is only 'suchness,' tathata."2 So, enlightenment is suchness, or, things as they are, revealed as all that there is. As engineers of enlightenment, it would appear then that are at least two components we need to build into our machine: an illusionary "self" and suchness, or things as they are. As we shall see, the... (shrink)

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:Losing the Self:Detachment in Meister Eckhart and Its Significance for Buddhist-Christian DialogueCharlotte RadlerThe purpose of this article is to probe Meister Eckhart's concepts of self—or, rather, no-self—detachment, and indistinct union, and their positive implications for Buddhist-Christian dialogue. I will examine potential affinities between Eckhart and Buddhist thought with the modest hope of identifying areas in Eckhart's mysticism that may present themselves as particularly ripe for Buddhist-Christian conversations.On April 15, (...) 1329, Pope John XXII issued the bull "In agro dominico" that condemned tenets of Meister Eckhart's teaching. Pope John XXII, who had also dealt harshly with the spiritual Franciscans, was truly concerned about Eckhart's seductive impact on the uneducated in the pews.1 Eckhart's claim that every human's true identity, attainable through detachment, is divine must have created dreams in some of an unmediated experience of and union with the divine, and nightmares in others of the bypassing of the Church's structures, sacraments, and hierarchies.Eckhart, a University of Paris teacher and a preacher, bases his mysticism in part on Proclus and Dionysius the Areopagite. Similarly to Proclus, Eckhart proposes that the soul's circular journey runs from the nothingness of the God beyond God, the God beyond the Trinity, into the somethingness of the world, and back to the nothingness of the God beyond the God. There is a firm ontological link between the One, the Trinity, and creation, which means that creation in its core is Trinitarian and One. In his interpretations of Job 22:14 and Ps. 61:12, Eckhart demonstrates that God is never static as One or Three or creation, but God is at once dialectically One and flowing out into the persons of the Trinity and flowing over into creation.2 This continuity between the Creator and creature, time and eternity, sanctifies creation and transience in all its grittiness and overcomes a duality between Creator and creature similar to the interpretation of samsara and nirvana (conditioned reality is Boundless Openness in Mahayana thought). Furthermore, Eckhart maintains that the One, as transparent and transcendent nothingness, encompasses and penetrates all. The wondrous truth, for Eckhart, is that we are truly all in all, just like the center of the circle is everywhere and its circumference nowhere.3 [End Page 111]To his audience, Eckhart repeatedly underscores that the soul is ontologically rooted in the nothingness of the divine unity and is thus in its deepest essence divine. In fact—and here we find profound resonances with tenets of Buddhist thought such as the concept of no-self (anatta or anatma)—the self's only true existence is the divine nothingness. Contrary to such thinkers as Thomas Aquinas, Eckhart focuses on the principal existence of things in the godhead and maintains that the human being does not possess a true substantial existence or "I" apart from God.4 Hence, the "I" or self can never constitute the foundation of reality. Because of the human being's absolute ontological dependence on God, Eckhart can assert that "where God is, there is the soul, and where the soul is, there is God."5 In his writings, Eckhart therefore differentiates between the true existence that creatures have in their original cause, the esse virtuale, and the particular and ephemeral existence that creatures possess in themselves, the esse formale.6 Thus, instead of autonomy and possessive individualism, "theonomy" implies the realization of the human being's full potential.While the autonomous, individual self is a form of negative nothingness or no-self, it paradoxically constitutes the greatest attachment for the human being. The clinging to the self causes what David Tracy refers to as an individual and cultural terror of transience.7 In the journey toward union, the soul must carefully release itself from all its attachments and detach itself from all its possessiveness. Eckhart's existential letting-go and letting-be imply the profoundest respect for existence itself as well as recognition of the ontological interconnectedness of all life.One of the foremost representatives of the apophatic tradition, Eckhart hooks up the praxis of apophasis to the notion of detachment, the stripping away of... (shrink)

The _Mahāparinirvāṇamahāsūtra_ (MPNMS) is arguably the earliest Buddhist scripture available to propound the doctrine of the _tathāgatagarbha_. However, the notion of “empty/emptiness” (_śūnya/śūnyatā_) in this important scripture has been underexplored. This paper identifies four distinct yet interrelated senses of the term “empty/emptiness” in the portion of the MPNMS shared between its two Chinese translations and the Tibetan translation. First, the term “empty” has the mundane sense of “desolate”, which describes how the world would appear to the Buddha’s disciples after his (...) passing. Second, “empty/emptiness” pertains to the idea of lacking a self and is considered an expedient or preliminary teaching to the ultimate doctrines on the self and the _tathāgatagarbha_ in the MPNMS. Third, “empty/emptiness” signifies non-existent/non-existence, which is sometimes termed “nothing whatsoever” (_ākiṃcanya_) or “absolute emptiness” (_atyantaśūnyatā_). This notion is vehemently rejected by the MPNMS as a proper description of the actual state of the Buddha and the _tathāgatagarbha_. Fourth, “empty” refers to the relational property of being free from certain contents. In particular, the liberation of buddhas is declared to be empty in that it is free from the entire _saṃsāra_, which is the only sense of the term that receives full endorsement in the MPNMS. (shrink)

This paper discusses a somewhat neglected reading of the second chapter of Nāgārjuna’s Mūlamadhyamakakārikā, arguing that the main focus of a crucial part is a particular theory of properties and their relation to individuals they instantiate, rather than the refutation of specific assumptions about the nature of space and time. Some of Nāgārjuna’s key arguments about motion should be understood as argument templates in which notions other than mover, motion, and so forth could be substituted. The remainder of the discussion (...) of motion does not serve quasi-Zenonian purposes either but uses motion as a principal example of change and considers the soteriological problems of the subject moving (gati) through transmigratory existence (saṃsāra). I attempt to show how this interpretation coheres with Nāgārjuna’s overall philosophical project. (shrink)

A basic teaching of classical Sāṃkhya is that repeated embodiment is the result of an individual’s ignorance of the distinction between prakṛti and puruṣa. The only exception to this is the ṛṣi Kapila, legendary founder of Sāṃkhya, who was born with innate knowledge of this distinction. It is this knowledge that leads to liberation from saṃsāra when it is acquired. This brings up the question, why was Kapila incarnated in the first place? If he already possessed this knowledge, what need (...) did he have for further experience of prakṛti’s activity? The classical commentators on the Sāṃkhyakārikā give various accounts of the nature and origin of Kapila, but they do not directly address this question. However, the evidence of one commentary, the Yuktidīpikā, does provide clues to the reason behind Kapila’s incarnation. In this article, I argue that the author of the Yuktidīpikā views Kapila as a direct embodiment of prakṛti’s soteriological potential for all puruṣas. (shrink)

This essay attempts to clarify the position of Nāgārjuna in the history of Buddhist philosophy by comparing the concept of emptiness in the Pāli Nikāyas and the Mūlamadhyamakakārikā. It is argued that the identity of samsāra with nirvāna, the emptiness of svabhāva of all dharmas, and the equating of emptiness and dependent arising are not revolutionary innovations of Nāgārjuna or the second turning of the wheel of Dharma, but orthodox philosophical moves entailed by the teachings of early Buddhism.

Vedānta is one of the oldest philosophical systems. While there are many detailed commentaries on Vedānta, there are very few mathematical descriptions of the different concepts developed there. This article shows how ideas from theoretical computer science can be used to explain Vedānta. The standard ideas of transition systems and modal logic are used to develop a formal description for the different ideas in Vedānta. The generality of the formalism is illustrated via a number of examples including saṃsāra, Patañjali’s Yogasūtras, (...) karma, the three avasthās from the Māṇḍūkya Upaniṣad and the key difference between advaita and dvaita in relation to mokṣa. (shrink)

From the perspective of the present day, Puritan-inspired capitalism seems to have succeeded globally, including in India. Connected to this, short-term profit-orientation in management seems to constrain the scope of different management approaches in a tight ideological corset. This article discusses the possibility of replacing this Puritan doctrine with the crucial elements of Indian philosophy: Karma and samsara. In doing so, the possibility of revising the guiding principles in capitalist management becomes conceivable, namely the monetary focus of profit-orientation and (...) its short-term orientation. This perspective allows a detachment of the concept of profit from the realm of money, as the seemingly only objectifiable measure of profit. Furthermore it allows a removal of the expectation that every “investment” has to directly “pay off”. A karmic view offers management a possible facility for being more caring about the needs and fates of other stakeholders, as profit-orientation would no longer be attached as a factual constraint to merely accumulate money. (shrink)

The aim of the article is to define the tendencies of elaboration of ethical problems in early medieval exegetical texts - treatises of post-canonical Abhidharma. Ethics as a specific philosophical discipline concerning morals was not specifically developed because of cosmological character of Buddhist philosophy. Explication of the ethical discourse presented in treatises of eminent early medieval Indian Buddhist exegetics Vasubandhu, Asaṅga and Yaśomitra showed that specific for ethics questions on the highest good, sense of human life, the nature and sources (...) of morals, freedom of will etc. were solved in post-canonical period. According to the religious doctrine they interpreted the highest good as the benefit of liberation from the fetches of suffering. The Buddha’s moral instructions known as prātimokṣa is aimed at the attainment of the highest good. Therefore the essence of morality has nothing to do with saṃsāra, and human society forming and perishing in cosmic cycles cannot be the source of moral norms. According to historiosophical myth, human beings get the first instructions on righteous behavior in deep antiquity from charismatic Universal ruler coming to the world as the forerunner of the Buddha. He explains ontological contrariness of the good and the evil but is not the Teacher of the truth. Freedom of will cannot manifest itself spontaneously in a human being attached affectively to saṃsāra. Such an individual falsely takes his ignorant self-will for the freedom of will. Hearing the sermons of salvific teaching is the condition for the rising of free will impulse. (shrink)

Continuing Keith Ward's series on comparative religion, this book deals with religious views of human nature and destiny. The beliefs of six major traditions are presented: the view of Advaita Vedanta that there is one Supreme Self, unfolding into the illusion of individual existence; the Vaishnava belief that there is an infinite number of souls, whose destiny is to be released from material embodiment; the Buddhist view that there is no eternal Self; the Abrahamic belief that persons are essentially embodied (...) souls; and the materialistic position that persons are complex material organisms. Indian ideas of rebirth, karma, and liberation from samsara are critically analysed and compared with semitic belief in the intermediate state of Sheol, Purgatory or Paradise, the Final Judgement and the resurrection of the body. The impact of scientific theories of cosmic and biological evolution on religious beliefs is assessed, and a form of 'soft emergent materialism' is defended, with regard to the soul. In this context, a Christian doctrine of original sin and atonement is presented, stressing the idea of soterial, as opposed to forensic, justice. Finally, a Christian view of personal immortality and the 'end of all things' is developed in conversation with Jewish and Muslim beliefs about judgement and resurrection. (shrink)

Both Mahāyāna and mainstream Buddhism agree that a buddha's compassion is “great” when compared with ordinary compassion. The Western study of Buddhist ethics has focused on how selflessness, emptiness, interconnection, or a matrix of interrelativity serve as more compelling ontological perspectives for compassion. However, Mahāyāna and Abhidharma sources agree that higher philosophical perspectives contribute to compassion by revealing more subtle types of suffering, providing the wisdom necessary to relieve suffering, and enabling the ability to remain in samsāra. Concepts such as (...) the universal desire to avoid suffering, svaparārtha, and merit‐making, richly elaborated in narrative literature, are the primary bases of Buddhist ethics. The power of Western fantasies of Buddhist pacifism has obscured a far more nuanced ethics of violence than has yet been explicated. (shrink)

Two models of human perfection proposed by Nietzsche and the Buddha are investigated. Both the overman and the arahant need practice and individual effort as key to their realization, and they share roughly the same conception of the self as a construction. However, there are also a number of salient differences. Though realizing it to be constructed, the overman does proclaim himself through his assertion of the will to power. The realization of the true nature of the self does not (...) lead the overman to seek the way to be released from saṃsara as does the arahant. On the contrary, he rejoices in the eternally recurring situation. The arahant, however, has totally relinquished any attachment to the self, constructed or otherwise. The arahant does not care about the Eternal Recurrence, as he only focuses on the present moment. Finally, they are both beyond good and evil, but in a substantively different way. (shrink)

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:Masao Abe: A Bodhisattva’s VowJames FredericksAbout ten years ago, I enjoyed a fine Japanese lunch with my friend and teacher, the late Masao Abe. I gathered with him and his wife, Ikuko, in a traditional restaurant in Kyoto. Abe Sensei had been somewhat pensive and withdrawn for most of the meal. Mrs. Abe and I had been bantering about how late the tsuyu rains had been that year and (...) the effect it was having on Kyoto’s hydrangea. Suddenly Sensei began to speak with an unusual tone of voice, as if saying something of great importance to no one in particular. “It is not enough,” he said. Mrs. Abe and I fell silent and attentive. He repeated himself in the same voice: “It is not enough.” I knew immediately what my teacher was talking about. In his old age and after a long and distinguished career of teaching and lecturing about Zen in the West, Abe Sensei was talking about a Buddhist teaching dear to his heart, “the standpoint of emptiness.” Out of politeness, I did not want to indicate that I understood his meaning so directly and sat wondering what I should say in response. Finally, I settled on something like this: “I will continue to study; Sensei, please continue to teach.” I spoke in the most formal Japanese I could muster out of respect for my teacher and friend.Sitting on the tatami mats in that restaurant in Kyoto was not the only time that Sensei has ever said “it is not enough.” In April 1942, four months after the beginning of the Pacific War, Masao Abe entered Kyoto Imperial University to study philosophy of religion. He was twenty-seven years old, buffeted by criticism for not enlisting in the military, and fearful of the power of nihilism at work in his homeland. In Kyoto, he was much attracted by the lectures of Tanabe Hajime, who was already filled with foreboding over Japan’s impending defeat and looking to Pure Land Buddhism for guidance. Tanabe’s comment “Amida is not far from here” brought Abe to weep inconsolably in the realization that it was he who was moving away from Amida even as Amida was moving toward him. Even still, Sensei would eventually find the Pure Land path “not enough” for resisting the forces of nihilism in the world and in himself.After the war, Abe joined a Zen meditation group that met at Myōshinji in Kyoto. The group was directed by Hisamatsu Shin’ichi, a Zen layman and lecturer on Buddhism at the university. In December 1951, Abe had a violent encounter with Hisamatsu that people still talk about. Zen had begun to erode Abe’s Pure Land faith and the threat of nihilism had returned in force. One evening, in great agitation, [End Page 115] Abe rose from his meditation pillow and lunged toward Hisamatsu screaming, “Is this the true self?” He was restrained briefly and then left the room. Later, Abe said in despair, “I cannot find anyplace where I can stand,” and Hisamatsu answered him straight away: “Stand right at that place where there is no place to stand.” This is what Abe Sensei called “the standpoint of emptiness.” Abe would eventually teach at great universities in the United States and Europe and become one of the leading figures in the dialogue among Buddhists and Christians. At the heart of all of this has been his unwavering commitment to expounding the standpoint of emptiness. Unwavering, that is, until that day in Kyoto over lunch when he said, “It is not enough.”Of Buddhism’s many impressive teachings, the bodhisattva ideal must be one of the most wondrous. A bodhisattva is one who, in the quest for enlightenment, has come to the threshold of nirvana itself. Ready to enter into bliss, the bodhisattva renounces nirvana and turns back to samsara. This return to samsara takes the form of a vow to work skillfully for the benefit of every sentient being. In the bodhisattva’s vow, Buddhism teaches a great and paradoxical truth. Since attachment is the birthplace of sorrow, wisdom requires that attachment be renounced. In the quest for liberation from... (shrink)

This lucid overview of the Buddhist path takes the perspective of the three "vehicles" of Tibetan Buddhism: the Hinayana, Mahayana, and Vajrayana. While these vehicles are usually presented as a historical development, they are here equated with the attitudes that individuals bring to their Buddhist practice. Basic to them all, however, is the need to understand our own immediate condition. The primary tool for achieving this is meditation, and The Essence of Buddhism serves as a handbook for the various meditative (...) approaches of Buddhist practice. Beginning with the Four Noble Truths, Traleg Rinpoche incorporates the expansive vision of the bodhisattva path and the transformative vision of Tantra. The final chapters present the transcendent view of Mahamudra. This view dispenses with all dualistic fixations and directly realizes the natural freedom of the mind itself. Along the way, the author provides vivid definitions of fundamental concepts such as compassion, emptiness, and Buddha-nature, and answers common questions: Why does Buddhism teach that there is "no self"? Are Buddhist teachings pessimistic? Does Buddhism encourage social passivity? What is the role of sex in Buddhist Tantra? Why is it said that "samsara is nirvana"? Does it take countless lifetimes to attain enlightenment, or can it be achieved in a moment? (shrink)

The paper aims to examine the meaning of sacredness in such a religion as Buddhism where there is no idea of God or any supernatural being. Instead, there are elaborated inner practices for achieving enlightenment. The paper consists of two parts. The first one analyses the place of the sacred in Buddhism considering the two important concepts of samsara and nirvana. The second part discusses sacred places in Buddhism comparing two different space structures: stupa as representative for a vertical (...) structure and mandala for a horizontal one. On the base of juxtaposing these seemingly opposite concepts and structures the paper reveals that in terms of Buddhism the real sacredness is non-sacredness: a term that transcends the opposition sacred-profane and expresses the specific Buddhist vision of non-duality.Key words: Buddhism; sacred-profane; non-duality. (shrink)

Abstractabstract:This article explores the specific profiles of the understanding of ultimate reality in Christianity, Islam, and Buddhism to ask whether there are points of contact between the Christian-Muslim and the Christian-Buddhist conception of divine reality. Thereby, the soteriological interest of Christian trinitarian thinking and the differences to the apophatic thinking in Islam but also the personal understanding of divine reality and the transnumeric unity of God come into view. Moreover, there are Muslim positions that assign the instances of divine Word (...) and divine Spirit as eternal prestige and attributive to the essence of God, whereby a new basis for discussion could be gained. On the other hand, the differences between Buddhist thinking of emptiness and Christian apophatism boil down to the question of whether nirvāṇa as the unconditioned (asaṃskṛta) of transcendent reality (lokottara) as a notborn (ajātaṁ), a not-brought-to-being (abhūtaṁ), a not-conditioned (asaṇkhataṁ) may be understood as a reality that is not separate from, but distinct from saṃsāra. Then emptiness or "śūnyatā is non-śūnyatā (aśūnyatā); therefore, it is ultimate śūnyatā (atyanta-śūnyatā)" (Abe). In this way, Buddhist thinking of emptiness can come into conversation with Christian thinking of self-emptying (kenosis). Muslim and Buddhist thinking on the subject of transcendence invite Christians to accentuate the apophatic side of the divine, and to locate the Trinitarian differentiation both within the divine and in the history of salvation in a cataphatic movement. With these indications, the difference between the Christian, Islamic, and Buddhist galaxies of thinking ultimate reality is not abolished, but points of contact and possible mutual suggestions become visible, which allow a further and deepening conversation. (shrink)

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:China and Contemporary Millenarianism—Something New under the SunBenjamin I. SchwartzOne of the most obvious remarks one can make about contemporary China is that China has no reason to be excited about contemporary Western millenarianism. If by "millenarianism" one refers to an apocalyptic transformation of the entire human condition based on the Christian calendar, then there is no reason for Chinese, Jews, and Moslems, who have their own historic visions, (...) to find any significance in the history of the last millennium. At the end of the first millennium or the beginning of the second, China was at a high point in its civilization. To the extent that apocalyptic tendencies could be found in either its high or its popular culture, these tendencies were the focus of Buddhism or religious Daoism. They were not tied to specific calendars, and in an Indian spirit they spoke in terms of "kalpas," which might last for hundreds of millions of years—or might occur next week.In addition, it should be noted—as has been pointed out by Professor Landes and others—that the notion that there was an all-consuming preoccupation with an impending apocalypse in the year A.D. 1000 is highly debatable. Among the more scholarly members of the clergy in medieval times there were already modes of thinking that, under the influence of Islamic and Jewish philosophers, were pointing in the direction of a non-apocalyptic scholastic philosophy.In all cultures down through the ages, an apocalyptic vision of deliverance has promised relief from the vast burden of human suffering and despair—a vision that would be recognized as such even by those who sought no apocalyptic solutions and who continued to believe that our this-worldly life still promised compensatory satisfactions, limited as these might be. They would not accept the Theravada/ Hinayana Buddhist belief that even what we call our individual pleasures are a function of our individual sufferings. According to that belief, our love of our children or our wives is poisoned by our acute awareness of the transient nature of their existence. Release from the world of samsara can be attained only by escaping the world of individuated samsara into the ineffable world of Nirvana.Turning to the book of Ecclesiastes in the Old Testament, we find that the author, who represents an amalgam of Greek and Hebrew wisdom, is not an apocalyptist and still hopes that we will garner certain satisfactions from our lives as individuals in this mundane existence. Yet his disappointment, suffering, and exasperation over human vanities and duplicities often correspond to the catalogue of sufferings in the Theravada scriptures. But, like the Theravada Buddhists, he believes that in this world of ignorance (avidya) there is also "nothing new under the sun." In the endless generations of individual human lives, every mode of human ignorance and suffering has certainly existed in the endless cycle of samsara. It is nevertheless true that in the total attention on every aspect of human life from the techno-economic side, [End Page 193] we find a totally new way of neutralizing the age-old causes of human suffering. Gautama Buddha regarded our ordinary individual pleasures as poisoned by suffering, by the realization that individual pleasures soon fade away. Yet Prozac seems to continue to work without producing anxiety. Here, indeed, we have something new under the sun!In fact, the new technological-economic millenarianism does indeed represent something different from the nineteenth- and twentieth-century technological and economic transformations that seemed to offer the possibility of a steady amelioration of the human condition. Nineteenth-century technological and economic meliorism could be related to older forms of what might be called "materialistic" improvement. Yet nineteenth-century materialistic progressivism continued to be linked to other ethical concerns not only by Christian beliefs but also by many of the secular ideologies of nineteenth-century Europe. There were entire ideologies of socialism, liberalism, anarchism, romanticism, nationalism, et cetera, which continued to be deeply distressed by the non-"materialistic," ethical consequences of techno-economic progress. Techno-economic progress has not, after all, prevented the Holocaust, the Gulag, and the horrors of two world wars. On the contrary, it has raised... (shrink)