Tales and Teachings of the Buddha The Jataka Stories in Relation to the Pali Canon. John Garrett Jones. Foreword by Dr I. B. Horner. George Allen and Unwin, London 1979. xvi-216 pp. £6.95.

This paper offers a new way to evaluate counterfactual conditionals on the supposition that actually, there is no time. We then parlay this method of evaluation into a way of evaluating causal claims. Our primary aim is to preserve, at a minimum, the assertibility of certain counterfactual and causal claims once time has been excised from reality. This is an important first step in a more general reconstruction project that has two important components. First, recovering our ordinary language claims involving (...) notions such as persistence, change and agency and, second, recovering enough observational evidence so that any timeless metaphysics is not empirically self-refuting. However, the project of investigating causation in a timeless setting has a greater relevance than its application to timeless physical theory alone. For, as we show, it can be used to model the assertibility conditions of causal claims more generally. (shrink)

Is time necessary for causation? We argue that, given a counterfactual theory of causation, it is not. We defend this claim by considering cases of counterfactual dependence in quantum mechanics. These cases involve laws of nature that govern entanglement. These laws make possible the evaluation of causal counterfactuals between space-like separated entangled particles. There is, for the proponent of a counterfactual theory of causation, a possible world in which causation but not time exists that can be reached by ‘stripping out’ (...) time from the actual world, leaving quantum mechanical laws intact. (shrink)

Nic R. Jones ABSTRACT: The The lack of diversity in academic philosophy has been well documented. This paper examines the reasons for this issue, identifying two intertwining norms within philosophy which contribute to it: the assertion that the Adversary Method is the primary mode of argumentation and the excessive boundary policing surrounding what constitutes “real” ….

This chapter contains section titled: Some Features of Hume's Approach to the Science of Man Structure and Content of “Conclusion of this book” The Rational Justification of Belief Skepticism and Naturalism Notes References Further reading.

This book is for anyone interested in how to build a teacher education program utilizing the arts as one central modality for teaching and learning or for those interested in building some of their program along these lines. Throughout the book you will find reference to the intersection of ethics, aesthetics, and teaching. We provide an integrated program devoted to good learning and the good society. In the book we discuss how the program came to be and the underlying educational (...) thinking that informs the whole program. This section of the book is invaluable for understanding how the reader can build her/his own arts approach to teacher education. The central section of the book is devoted to the specific coursework of the program. Each author describes in detail how she/he leverages aesthetics and art to expand the possibilities of learning and teaching (including a chapter focused on the core competency course, Teaching, Imagination, Creativity) in language and literacy, psychology of education, science education, mathematics education, social studies education, and classroom management including many examples from our teaching. The book ends with a focus group discussion about the program by former students. (shrink)

This chapter focuses on the ethical theories of the early modern philosophers Thomas Hobbes, Justus Lipsius, Descartes, Spinoza, Benjamin Whichcote, Lord Shaftesbury, and Samuel Clarke. The discussions include aspects of Hobbes' moral philosophy that posed a challenge for many philosophers of the second half of the seventeenth century who were committed to philosophy as a form of self-help; Lipsius and Descartes' appropriation of ancient and Hellenistic moral philosophy in connection with changing ideas about control of the passions and the happiest (...) and best life; and the maxim or epigram – a literary form used by moralists to counsel readers on how to best know and govern themselves. (shrink)

Computational neuroscience attributes coloured areas and other perceptual qualia to calculations that are realizable in multiple cellular forms. This faces serious issues in explaining how the various qualia arise and how they bind to form overall perceptions. Qualia may instead be neuroelectrical. Growing evidence indicates that perceptions correlate with neuroelectrical activity spotted by locally activated EEGs, the different qualia correlate with the different electrochemistries of unique detector cells, a unified neural-electromagnetic field binds this activity to form overall perceptions, and this (...) field interacts with sensory circuits to help attentively guide perception. The coloured areas in images may thus be seated in the electrochemistry of unique cells, while constancy mechanisms and other multiply realizable computations just help refine these images behind the scenes. This theory is ultimately testable. (shrink)

This chapter outlines the basic elements that underwrite Kant's cosmopolitanism. In doing so, the chapter looks at the moral principles behind Kant's cosmopolitanism and the problem of Kant's cosmopolitan teleology, and develops a brief overview of Kant's more coherent principles of cosmopolitan law. It makes a connection between Kant's critical philosophy and the moral foundations of his cosmopolitanism. By framing Kant's overall cosmopolitan vision, this chapter further explores Kant's theory of history and suggests that it is based on a problematic (...) teleology. The chapter concludes by linking the various aspects of Kant's cosmopolitanism into a single coherent narrative that provides a basis for future developments. (shrink)

PORTER S and O’HALLORAN P. Nursing Inquiry 2012; 19: 18–28 The use and limitation of realistic evaluation as a tool for evidence‐based practice: a critical realist perspectiveIn this paper, we assess realistic evaluation’s articulation with evidence‐based practice (EBP) from the perspective of critical realism. We argue that the adoption by realistic evaluation of a realist causal ontology means that it is better placed to explain complex healthcare interventions than the traditional method used by EBP, the randomized controlled trial (RCT). However, (...) we do not conclude from this that the use of RCTs is without merit, arguing that it is possible to use both methods in combination under the rubric of realist theory. More negatively, we contend that the rejection of critical theory and utopianism by realistic evaluation in favour of the pragmatism of piecemeal social engineering means that it is vulnerable to accusations that it promotes technocratic interpretations of human problems. We conclude that, insofar as realistic evaluation adheres to the ontology of critical realism, it provides a sound contribution to EBP, but insofar as it rejects the critical turn of Bhaskar’s realism, it replicates the technocratic tendencies inherent in EBP. (shrink)

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:172. THE HUME LITERATURE FOR 1981 The Hume literature from 1925 to 1976 has been thoroughly covered in my book Fifty Years of Hume Scholarship : A Bibliographical Guide (Edinburgh University Press, 1978; jê9.50), which also lists the main earlier writings on Hume. Publications of the years 1977 to 1980 were listed in Hume Studies for the last four Novembers. What follows here will bring the record up to (...) the end of 1981. Readers are invited to inform me of any omissions, and to send me offprints of their own articles and reviews. The intention is to maintain a complete bibliographical record of critical work on Hume, by the regular publication in Hume Studies of an annual bibliography covering the previous year, with addenda consisting of items omitted through ignorance in previous years. References to recently-appearing reviews (of books from earlier lists) are given at the end. The following abbreviations of journal titles are used here: APQAmerican Philosophical Quarterly JHIJournal of the History of Ideas JHPJournal of the History of Philosophy JPJournal of Philosophy PASProceedings of the Aristotelian Society PBPhilosophical Books PQPhilosophical Quarterly PRPhilosophical Review RIPReview Internationale de Philosophie RMReview of Metaphysics TLSTimes Literary Supplement Other abbreviations should be obvious enough, and mainly fol· low the British Standard (no. 4148). BAGOLINI, L. 'Legal Obligation in Hume', Hume Studies 7, 85-93. BAIER, A. 'Frankena and Hume on Points of View', The Monist 64, 342-58. BATTERSBY, C. 'An Enquiry concerning the Humean Woman', Philosophy 56, 303-12. 173. BEAUCHAMP, T. L. & ROSENBERG, A. Hume and the Problem of Causation, (xxv, 340 pp.) New York. [PB 23 (1982) 129-48 (Mackie, Flew, Beauchamp & Rosenberg) ] BOTWINICK, A. 'Hume on Is-Ought', Auslegung 8, 19-30. BURNS, R. M. The Great Debate on Miracles, esp. chs. 6-8. Lewisburg, London & Toronto. COSTA, M. J. 'Hume and Justified Belief, Can. J. Phil. 11, 219-28. CRONIN, R. Shelley's Poetic Thoughts, 77-83. London. DE MARTELAERE, P. 'Hume's "Gematigd" Scepticisme: Futiel of Fataal', Tijdschrift voor Filosofie 43, 427-64. DILMAN, I. Studies in Language and Reason, chs. 4-5. London. FARR, W. Hume and Kant: Studienbuch zum Erkenntsnisproblem. (250 pp.) Freiburg & Munich. FEINSTEIN, R. 'Some Problems in Humean Philosophy', Ind. phil. Q. 8, 527-32. FLAGE, D. E. 'Hume's Relative Ideas', Hume Studies 7, 55-73. GARCIA ROCA, J. Positivismo e Ilustración : La filosofía de David Hume. (304 pp.) Valencia. GARRETT, D. 'Hume's Self-Doubts about Personal Identity', PR 90, 337-58. GUPTA, B. 'Scepticism: Ancient "East" and Modern "West"', Ind. phil. Q. 9, 29-44. HAAKONSSEN, K. The Science of a Legislator, the Natural Jurisprudence? of David Hume and Adam Smith. Cambridge. HALL, R. 'The Hume Literature for 1980', Hume Studies 7, 184-90. íiARRISON, J. Hume's Theory of Justice. (xxvi, 304 pp.) Oxford. [THES no. 440 (3 Apr. 1981) 15] IMLAY, R. A. 'Hume's Of Scepticism with regard to reason: A Study in Contrasting Themes', Hume Studies 7, 121-36. JOHNSON, 0. A. 'Hume's "True" Scepticism', Pacific phil. Q. 62, 403-10. JONES, G. E. 'Vindication, Hume, and Induction', Can. J. Phil. 12, 119-29. 174. KING, J. 'Hume's Classical Theory of Justice', Hume Studies 7, 32-54. KULENKAMPFF, J. 'David Hume (1711-1776)', in 0. Hoffe, Klassiker der Philosophie, vol. 1, 434-56. Munich. LOEB, L. E. From Descartes to Hume, sec. 39 (354-63). Ithaca & London. MACLEOD, A. "Rule-Utilitarianism and Hume's Theory of Justice', Hume Studies 7, 74-84. MAHER, P. 'Probability in Hume's Science of Man', Hume Studies 7, 137-53. MALHERBE, M. 'Les études humiennes: anatomie et problèmes1, Archives de Philosophie 44, 637-71. MILLER, D. Philosophy and Ideology in Hume's Political ThoughtT (218 pp.) Oxford. [London Rev, of Bks 4 (1982), no. 7, 22-4; PB 23 (1982) 206-9] MONTEIRO, J. P. 'Hume's Conception of Science', JHP 19, 327-42. NEWMAN, R. 'Hume on Space and Geometry', Hume Studies 7, 1-31. NIELSON, H. A. 'Inference and Experience in Hume's Enquiry', Phil. Res. Archives 7, no. 1471. NORTH, T. 'What if I'm Indifferent?', Phil. Investigations 4, 24-37. PAPPAS, G. S. 'On McRae's Hume', Hume Studies... (shrink)

In standard interpretations of the history of socialism, the cosmological and providential side of nineteenth century socialist thought tends to be ignored. What still today is often considered the core of socialist reasoning was its preoccupation with the claims of producers, its championing of the cause of the working class, its critique of political economy. In the twentieth century, the most characteristic goal of socialist parties - at least until the advent of Tony Blair - has been the socialisation of (...) the means of production. The particular association of socialism with a language of productivism - with work, producers, the character of labour, and a critique of political economy - goes back to the commentaries of the 1830s and 1840s. Adolphe Blanqui, the brother of the famous revolutionary, in his History of Political Economy in Europe published in 1837, described Fourier and Owen as 'utopian economists',1 while Lorenz von Stein in his Der Sozialismus und Kommunismus des heutigen Frankreichs, first published in 1842, defined socialism as a theory which made work the sole basis of.. (shrink)

In a recent article in this journal, Kowalik argues that compulsory vaccination unjustifiably infringes on the autonomy of vaccine refusers. While accepting Kowalik’s central premises, we argue that, when appropriately expanded in scope, autonomy considerations do not undermine the justifiability of compulsory vaccination. Vulnerable individuals—including the very old, the very young and those with compromised immune systems—face an omnipresent risk of contracting a potentially fatal vaccine-preventable illness and are thus prevented from accessing public goods by coercive pressure. Consequently, when we (...) consider an appropriately broad scope of autonomy constraints, autonomy considerations do not undermine the case for mandating vaccination. (shrink)

The nature and consistency of John Locke's views about liberty and suspension, as well as their bearing on what is now called determinism, remain matters of controversy and sometimes, despair. This chapter explains what it is that "determines the will" according to John Locke. It begins by explaining the central terms Locke employs and the meanings he assigns them. Next, the chapter cites and discusses some of the main doctrines that he formulates using that terminology. In light of these explanations, (...) the chapter analyzes two recent interpretations of Locke's doctrines about liberty, suspension, and the will. The first of these, offered by Vere Chappell, convicts Locke of inconsistency; the second, offered by Gideon Yaffe, proposes away to acquit him. Finally, drawing on the lessons of those examinations, the chapter presents and develops a consistent and more satisfying interpretation of Locke's treatments of liberty and suspension in relation to the will. (shrink)

This chapter explores several episodes in the eighteenth-century discussion of the metaphysics of mind. It begins with Locke’s suggestion that it would not be impossible for God to “superadd” the power of thought to matter. It then describes the debate about Locke’s suggestion between Samuel Clarke and Anthony Collins, and considers Hume’s discussion of the immateriality of the soul in relation to that debate. Next it presents Berkeley’s philosophy of immaterialism as a way of protecting the mental from reduction to (...) the physical. Then it gives an account of the materialist arguments of Hartley and Priestley, and concludes with a summary of Reid’s criticisms of those arguments. (shrink)

At a time when agri-food biotechnologies are receiving a surge of investment, innovation, and public interest in the United States, it is common to hear both supporters and critics call for open and inclusive dialogue on the topic. Social scientists have a potentially important role to play in these discursive engagements, but the legacy of the intractable genetically modified (GM) food debate calls for some reflection regarding the best ways to shape the norms of that conversation. This commentary argues that (...) agri-food scholars interested in promoting a more constructive agri-food biotechnology discussion could do so by blending key insights, as well as guarding against key shortcomings, from the fields of science communication and science and technology studies (STS). Science communication’s collaborative and translational approach to the public understanding of science has proven pragmatically valuable to scientists in academia, government, and private industry, but it has too often remained wedded to deficit model approaches and struggled to explore deeper questions of public values and corporate power. STS’s critical approach has highlighted the need for multi-stakeholder power-sharing and the integration of diverse knowledge systems into public engagement, but it has done little to grapple with the prevalence of misinformation in movements against GM foods and other agri-food biotechnologies. Ultimately, a better agri-food biotechnology conversation will require a strong foundation in scientific literacy as well as conceptual grounding in the social studies of science. The paper concludes by describing how, with attention to the structure, content, and style of public engagement in the agri-food biotechnology debates, social scientists can play a productive conversational role across a variety of academic, institutional, community-level, and mediated contexts. (shrink)

What is the relation between moral reasons and reasons of “political necessity”? Does the authority of morality extend across political decision-making; or are there “reasons of state” which somehow either stand outside the reach of morality or override it, justifying actions that are morally wrong? This chapter argues that attempts to claim a contra-moral justification for political action typically suffer from a fundamental confusion – a confusion about the nature and expression of practical justification. The author aims to bring two (...) new things to the debate. A first aim is to show how light can be shed on this issue by examining a question that philosophers have discussed in isolation from it: the question of the relationship between moral reasons and reasons pertaining to personal well-being. This gives us a better appreciation of the range of available views about the relation of the moral to the political; more importantly, it helps to explain the fundamental challenge to the idea that there could be contra-moral justification of political action. However, it also provides us with guidance for thinking about the ways in which that challenge might be answered. There is, after all, a case to be made for thinking that some political actions can be justified even though they remain morally wrong. And those actions are of great importance to national and international politics today. (shrink)

This volume of contributed, previously unpublished essays focuses on general theoretical, meta-ethical and aesthetic issues in philosophy and the ways in which ...

This article explores the usefulness of Latin American philosopher Enrique Dussel's work for film-philosophy, as the field increasingly engages with a world of cinemas. The piece concludes with an analysis of two films with an ecological focus, Trolljegeren/Troll Hunter (2010) and The Hunter (2011). They are indicative of a much broader emerging trend in ecocinema that explores the interaction between humanity and the environment in relation to world history, and which does so by staging encounters between people and those ‘nonhuman’ (...) aspects of the Earth excluded by coloniality/modernity (e.g. animals, animal-spirits, mythological creatures, shaman, the very Earth itself). The interdisciplinary concerns of this work place it at the intersection of the latest research into a world of cinemas (in particular the various moves to understand films beyond the national paradigm now increasingly labelled the ‘transnational turn’; alongside growing concerns with how cinema helps us engage with ecology); and the need to broaden our philosophical grasp of the world. This latter point requires engagement with thinkers from beyond the Eurocentric canon of Western thought that currently dominates philosophy, and equally shapes film-philosophy. Dussel's philosophy is shown to provide a perspective capable of illuminating the intertwined nature of human and planetary history evident in these films, in a manner that is extremely pertinent to our global situation. Thus it is shown to be more useful than approaches to similar groupings of films which draw on, for example, speculative realism, when it comes to providing a cine-ethics appropriate to the Anthropocene. (shrink)

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:Hume Studies Volume XXVI, Number 1, April 2000, pp. 171-177 Hume's Revised Racism Revisited AARON GARRETT John Immerwahr's brief note "Hume's Revised Racism" is doubtless one of the most intriguing recent discussions of Hume and racism.1 Immerwahr presents a thesis as to why Hume revised a footnote originally added to his essay "Of National Characters" (hereafter "ONC") in 1753. In this note I will examine and dispute Immerwahr's (...) thesis, which I believe can be shown to be seriously flawed. It is important to do so, as Immerwahr's note has been quoted a number of times in books and articles on Hume, and his thesis has been taken as gospel without sufficient examination of the grounds for his claims.2 As a consequence, Immerwahr's thesis is in danger of becoming a stubborn belief, even if not properly supportable. The controversy about Hume's racism centers on one infamous footnote added to the essay "Of National Characters" in the 1753-1754 edition of Essays and Treatises on Several Subjects. Why should we care about one footnote? We should care because the footnote seems to go against the image of a philosopher we thought we knew, and whom we likely esteem. In addition, it is shockingly bigoted. It reads in its entirety: I am apt to suspect the negroes, and in general all the other species of men (for there are four or five different kinds) to be naturally inferior to the whites. There never was a civilized nation of any other complexion than white, nor even any individual eminent either in action or speculation. No ingenious manufactures amongst them, no arts, no Aaron Garrett is at the Department of Philosophy, Boston University, 745 Commonwealth Avenue, Boston, MA 02215, USA. e-mail: garrett@bu.edu 172 Aaron Ganett sciences. On the other hand, the most rude and barbarous of the whites, such as the ancient Germans, the present Tartars, have still something eminent about them, in their valour, form of government, or some other particular. Such a uniform and constant difference could not happen, in so many countries and ages, if nature had not made an original distinction betwixt these breeds of men. Not to mention our colonies, there are Negroe slaves dispersed all over Europe, of which none ever discovered any symptom of ingenuity; tho' low people, without education, will start up amongst us, and distinguish themselves in every profession. In Jamaica, indeed, they talk of one negroe as a man of parts and learning; but 'tis likely he is admired for very slender accomplishments, like a parrot, who speaks a few words plainly.3 The footnote was not present in the 1748 edition of the Essays, Moral and Political, or Three Essays, Moral and Political, where ONC first saw light. In the 1768 edition there is one very minor alteration (from "tho' low people" to "though low people"). In the 1770 edition the footnote becomes an endnote, M,4 and there are again a few minor changes (from "betwixt these breeds of men" to "between these breeds of men"; from "of which never discovered" to "of whom never discovered"; for "'tis likely he is admired," read "it is likely he is admired") and one interesting substantive change (for "admired for very slender accomplishments," read "admired for slender accomplishments"). The most important change from the 1753 version of the note is in the 1777 posthumous edition, which Hume had corrected before he died. Hume rewrote the first two lines of 177OM, to read in 1777M: I am apt to suspect the negroes to be naturally inferior to the whites. There scarcely ever was a civilized nation of that complexion, nor even any individual eminent either in action or speculation.5 In "Hume's Revised Racism," Immerwahr argues that it is likely that Hume, after reading James Beattie's "Essay On Truth" and in light of his criticisms, revised the footnote in the 1777 edition of ONC. Immerwahr cites two pieces of evidence, a letter from Hume to Strahan to which he refers but does not quote, and Beattie's criticisms of Hume, which Hume may have read (although how much of it he read... (shrink)

I provide a brief précis of Aaron Zimmerman’s book, Belief: A Pragmatic Picture, then explore two possible problems for the view. The first concerns whether the account of belief can successfully intervene in the debate between those who hold emotions are partly constituted by evaluative beliefs and those who deny this. The second concerns whether the view can explain that distinctive form of white ignorance that is manifest in an unwillingness to draw relatively obvious action-guiding beliefs from widely shared information. (...) Thinking about cases of this kind raises the question of whether Zimmerman’s account is problematically individualist, because of downplaying the importance of converging on an account of belief given the role of belief attribution in a suite of critical practices that are essential to communities of inquiry. If we, collectively, must commit to converging on an account of belief, but different accounts serve the interests of different groups, then the meta-level thesis that we should choose an account on pragmatic grounds raises the question of whose interests such an account should serve. (shrink)

In his celebrated paper of 1931 [7], Kurt Gödel proved the existence of sentences undecidable in the axiomatized theory of numbers. Gödel's proof is constructive and such a sentence may actually be written out. Of course, if we follow Gödel's original procedure the formula will be of enormous length.Forty-five years have passed since the appearance of Gödel's pioneering work. During this time enormous progress has been made in mathematical logic and recursive function theory. Many different mathematical problems have been proved (...) recursively unsolvable. Theoretically each such result is capable of producing an explicit undecidable number theoretic predicate. We have only to carry out a suitable arithmetization. Until recently, however, techniques were not available for carrying out these arithmetizations with sufficient efficiency.In this article we construct an explicit undecidable arithmetical formula,F(x, n), in prenex normal form. The formula is explicit in the sense that it is written out in its entirety with no abbreviations. The formula is undecidable in the recursive sense that there exists no algorithm to decide, for given values ofn, whether or notF(n, n)is true or false. MoreoverF(n, n)is undecidable in the formal (axiomatic) sense of Gödel [7]. Given any of the usual axiomatic theories to which Gödel's Incompleteness Theorem applies, there exists a value ofnsuch thatF(n, n)is unprovable and irrefutable. Thus Gödel's Incompleteness Theorem can be “focused” into the formulaF(n, n). Thus some substitution instance ofF(n, n)is undecidable in Peano arithmetic, ZF set theory, etc. (shrink)

In their article, Pavarani and colleagues offer a vision of evolutionary bioethics that focuses on innovation and empirical research as a means to enrich the field of bioethics. Empirical bi...