Im vorliegenden Beitrag geht es – angesichts der enormen gesellschaftlichen Verbreitung von Quantifizierungstechniken und -imperativen im digitalen Zeitalter – um psychische Bedeutungen des digitalen Messens, Zählens und Vergleichens und um die Faszination für diese Operationen. Mit Blick auf eine sozio- und psychoanalytisch ausgerichtete Hermeneutik der Zahl werden erste Ergebnisse des Forschungsprojekts »Das vermessene Leben« erörtert. Eine der zentralen Fragen ist dabei, wie sich Merkmale digitaler Quantifizierung mit psychischen Dispositionen verbinden, spezifische Bewältigungs- und Abwehrmuster auslösen oder welche Rolle etwa die Externalisierung (...) von Affekt- oder Norm-Regulationen spielt. Schließlich wird nachgezeichnet, wie daraus neue Konstellationen und kulturelle Vorstellungen von Normalität und Pathologie hervorgehen können. (shrink)

States of emergency are declared frequently in all parts of the world. Their declaration routinely implies a suspension of basic constitutional rights. In the last half century, it has become the norm for constitutions to contain an explicit ‘emergency constitution’, i.e., the constitutionally safeguarded rules of operation for a state of emergency. In this paper, I ask whether inclusion of an emergency constitution can be legitimized by drawing on social contract theory. I argue that there are important arguments, both against (...) and in favor of constitutionalized emergency provisions, and that social contract theory—as applied by economists—can be of some help when deciding whether to have, or not to have an emergency constitution. This paper introduces a novel argument for justifying emergency constitutions. It argues that they can serve as a commitment mechanism protecting both citizens and politicians from overreacting to rare but significant threats. (shrink)

Elected politicians—legislators and, in some systems, members of the executive—can choose to exercise authority themselves or to delegate that authority to any number of agencies. Such delegation of power can occur at the constitutional stage, but is most common at the post-constitutional stage. Two categories of delegation can be distinguished: domestic delegation to agencies within the legislators’ jurisdiction, and international delegation to supranational or international bodies. While some research has been done on domestic delegation, especially in the context of delegation (...) to administrative agencies in the U.S., as well as on delegation to supranational bodies, especially with regard to the E.U., these activities have not been analyzed within a unified framework. This paper attempts to inquire into these issues and provide a general picture of the decision-making process regarding whether to delegate authority and to which body to transfer the authority. The past decade has been a period of rapid change in Central and Eastern Europe. Almost all of these countries have either passed entirely new constitutions or substantially modified the old ones. This is a unique situation in which constitutional delegation of powers can be performed almost simultaneously with post-constitutional delegation. The constitutional process in Israel is very different. It has been underway for fifty years. However, it can also be characterized by simultaneous constitutional and post-constitutional choices. In this paper, we examine such delegation choices in nine countries. We describe the main differences among these countries with regard to delegation of power, try to trace their origins and analyze their effects on delegation of powers. One question raised is what are the ramifications of a quasi-simultaneous constitutional and post-constitutional choice? Have constitutional rules been chosen in anticipation of the necessary compatibility with the rules of international organizations that one wants to join? Has membership in international organizations led to a boost in credibility of those governments concerned? (shrink)