A.P. Martinich's interpretation that in Leviathan Thomas Hobbes believed that the laws of nature are the commands of God and that he did not rely on the Bible to prove this has been criticized by Greg Forster in this journal (2003). Forster uses these criticisms to develop his own view that Hobbes was insincere when he professed religious beliefs. We argue that Forster misrepresents Martinich's view, is mistaken about what evidence is relevant to interpreting whether Hobbes was sincere or not, (...) and is mistaken about some of Hobbes's central doctrines. Forster's criticisms are worth discussing at length for at least three reasons. He takes the debate about Hobbes's sincerity to a new level of sophistication; his misinterpretations of Hobbes may become accepted as correct; and his criticisms raise issues about the proper method of interpreting historical texts. (shrink)

v. 1. Einai kai phainesthai -- v. 2. Einai kai anthrōpinē pragmatikotēs -- v. 4. Einai kai anthrōpinē praxis.

The most searching elaboration of the detective image of the historian has come from the pen of R. G. Collingwood. His short detective story "Who Killed John Doe?" implied that, in spite of the often tentative nature of the question-answer process in a successful historical investigation, the pieces of the puzzle fit together and their coherence becomes self-evident. The predominance of physical evidence in Collingwood's detective story had its counterpart in his research on Hadrian's Wall. In examining the questions raised (...) by his investigations, and distinguishing between direct and circumstantial evidence, Collingwood was able to formulate a comprehensive theory concerning the date of the Wall's construction, the purpose of the Wall, the date of the related turf wall at Birdoswald, the chronological position of the fourteen forts along the Wall, and the role and date of the Vallum following the Walls' course. The pattern of research into the mysteries of Hadrian's Wall has hardly conformed to the linear, step-by-step schema of Collingwood's logic of question and answer. As with much detective work, it has embodied its share of informed guesswork, mistaken inference, false leads, and fortuitous revelations. (shrink)

This work is the first to demonstrate the differences and similarities between Plato's myths and the traditional kind of which he was critical. It also actively demonstrates the extent to which his own myths support or undermine the philosophical ideas of the dialogues in which they are set. It offers new arguments and criticism on point of detail concerning modern interpretations.

Gilligan’s (1982) refinement of Kohlberg’s theory on moral development operates on two theses: (1) females, more so than males, reach moral decisions based on the personalities of the relevant individuals; and (2) female behaviors stemming from moral decisions are based upon “care” and “responsibility for others.” This article accepts the first thesis but argues that the second is incorrect. That is, self-interest—i.e., aiding “blood” kin and/or carefully monitoring reciprocity—rather than “altruism” is argued to be the operant dynamic in forging distaff (...) morality and resultant behavior. Six empirical examples are presented as contraindicative of Gilligan’s second thesis. Finally, it is suggested that selection for the psychological traits of independence and the mastery of subtle social chess yielded ancestral females who had more descendants—us—than did females with alternative profiles. (shrink)

Some implications of Tomasello et al.'s theory derive from incorporating a variant of a common assumption that humans are biologically adapted to take an intentional stance in relation to conspecifics. I argue that, rather than being cued, intentions and other dispositional states may be inferred logically from an evolved commitment to determinism and evidence of state-dependent behavior.

There is no agreement at all, however, among translators, editors, and scholars, as to what is the number of problems that Aristotle proposes, nor what are the relations of importance among them. The list is given sometimes as fourteen or fifteen, sometimes as six, as nine, as twelve, as eight, and various other numbers. To a reader remembering the meticulous detail with which Aristotle told his students just how to construct topical notebooks and outlines, it seems quite unthinkable that he (...) could have poured this maze of problems over his audience like a bath-attendant, and left them to shift for themselves in discovering its intended organization. A priori, therefore, we would expect some indication within Aristotle's text of the coordination and subordination of his set of problems. (shrink)

ABSTRACT William Blake's poem Jerusalem, like all Perennial utopias, achieves a dialectical synthesis of the ideal and the actual through the narrative focalization of a religious experience at the level of character, one that is at once transhistorical and universal. By reading the poem through the lens of the Perennial paradigm, we discover that the temporal aspects of Jerusalem are intimately tied to the religious dimensions of Blake's utopian vision. In addition to giving us a new way to understand the (...) well-documented distinctiveness of Blake's religious message, the Perennial paradigm shows Blake's soteriology in Jerusalem to be utopian rather than salvationist. Because of the ultimately subjective nature of apprehension of the Divine Vision, Blake's utopian thought is not “clearly a forward-directed anticipatory and visionary concept,” as Magnus Ankarsjö has recently argued. Blake does not rally the reader towards some “ensuing peaceful millennium” but rather to find enlightenment in the eternal moment. In light of Blake's suspicion of ratiocination, combined with his deliberate use of narrative focalization of Albion's religious vision, reading Jerusalem as a Rational utopia grounded in Judeo-Christian of notions of Apocalypse is to miss Blake's core religious message. (shrink)

In _Opposition to Philosophy in Safavid Iran_ Ata Anzali and S.M. Hadi Gerami offer a critical edition of what is arguably the most erudite and extensive critique of philosophy from the Safavid period. The editors’ extensive introduction offers an in-depth analysis that places the work within the broader framework of Safavid intellectual and social history.

Marking the 50th anniversary of one among this philosopher's most distinguished pieces, Blumenberg's Rhetoric proffers a decidedly dialogic and diversified interaction with the essay polyvalently entitled 'Anthropological Approach to the Actuality and Topicality (or Currency, Relevance) of Rhetoric' (Anthropologische Annäherung an die Aktualität der Rhetorik), first published in 1971. Following Blumenberg's lead, the contributors consider and tackle their topics rhetorically, 'in utramque partem vel in plures'--treating (inter alia) the variegated discourses of Phenomenology, the History of Philosophy, Anthropology, and the téchne (...) itself from a plurality of viewpoints. Quasi in actu--as a mise en abyme of this rhetorical method par excellence--said accent on approaching any matter polyperspectivally is reflected in the proceedings of the live(ly) discussions having taken place in preparation for the present volume. Along with the diachronically extensive, disciplinarily diverse essays, this publication of the actual academic interplay--notably in the current lingua franca--will facilitate, and is to conduce to, further scholarship with respect to Blumenberg and the art of rhetoric. (shrink)

The idea that there are some things which we should not talk about is most commonly dealt with in the context of debates about rights to free speech, and other contexts in which the value of talking is typically understood in instrumental terms. This paper explores ways of grounding that idea which do not depend upon instrumental values, in particular in the context of self-revelatory and confessional talk.

Cet ouvrage rend hommage au Professeur Claude JOURNÈS, ancien Président de l'Université LUMIERE Lyon 2 et membre fondateur du mouvement Critique du droit. Les Mélanges offerts au Professeur Claude JOURNÈS ont retenu cette approche, utilisant le droit comme un outil de mise en perspective critique de l'ordre social et de l'ordre politique. Après un hommage au Doyen JOURNÉES (P. BLACHÈR) et l'évocation des ambitions et perspectives du mouvement critique Du droit (S. BASSET ou J. MICHEL), l'ouvrage se construit en deux (...) temps. La première partie, intitulée « Le droit critique de l'ordre social », regroupe des réflexions sur le pouvoir médical (F. DEMICHEL), sur les crimes coloniaux (A. MAHIOU), sur la dimension anthropologique du vocabulaire juridique (M.-C. HATTI) et sur le contrôle policier (M. SAOUDI), le tout ouvrant sur la possibilité d'un humanisme séculier (H. PUEL). La seconde partie, « Le droit critique de l'ordre politique », entend montrer comment le droit porte en lui une conception du pouvoir et de l'autorité. Les études explorent des pistes très diverses mêlant les finances publiques (J.-L. ALBERT), les renseignements (C. ARROUDJ), l'histoire du droit (J.-L. AUTIN, J.-C GENIN), l'histoire de la doctrine (H. GOURDON), les institutions politiques (P. BACOT, A.-S. MESCHERIAKOFF, R. CHARVIN), les institutions territoriales (J.-J. GLEUAL, H. OBERDORFF, R. PAVRE), la littérature (S. CAPORAL, G. HARE) ou les nouvelles technologies (G. PROTIÉRE). II ressort de l'ensemble que, loin d'être un simple outil technique, le droit est un puissant instrument de modélisation sociale et de justification du pouvoir. Inversant la logique dominante, la perspective critique du droit dévoile les limites d'une telle conception et rappelle que le droit, comme tous les construits sociaux, est le produit de luttes politiques et de rapports de force. En ce sens, à l'instar des valeurs défendues par le dédicataire de cet ouvrage, l'ordre critique du droit est un appel à contester les évidences, condition d'une conception plus ouverte et pluraliste de l'ordre juridique. (shrink)

Theories on World origin and Human Nature.

Predstavlenie ob "obraze Bozhiem" v svi︠a︡shchennom Pisanii -- Poni︠a︡tie "obraz Bozhiĭ" v svi︠a︡shchennom Predanii -- Lichnye svoĭstva Boga i cheloveka v svi︠a︡shchennom Pisanii -- Poni︠a︡tie "obraz Bozhiĭ" i lichnye svoĭstva -- Analiz sootnoshenii︠a︡ poni︠a︡tiĭ "lichnostʹ" i "obraz Bozhiĭ" v pravoslavii -- "Idei︠a︡ lichnostnogo bytii︠a︡ v russkoĭ bogoslovskoĭ mysli XIX veka".

This paper aims to trace the evolution of Bachelard's thought as he gropes toward a concrete formulation of a philosophy of the imagination. Reverie, the creative daydream, occupies the central position in Bachelard's emerging metaphysic, which becomes increasingly “phenomenological” in a manner reminiscent of Husserl. This means that although Bachelard does not use Husserlian terms, he appropriates the following features of (Husserlian) phenomenology: 1. a desire to “embracket” the initial (rationalistic) impulse; and 2. an aspiration to apprehend in its entirety, (...) the creative epiphany of an image. Ultimately, this paper aims to show that there is a sense in which Bachelard's metaphysical concerns in his poetics are an outgrowth of (rather than radical break from) his earlier scientific and epistemological concerns. What results in reverie is an aesthetic intentionality providing a metaphysic of the imagination: the aesthetic object, such as fire or water, is an object only insofar as it enables/calls forth a subject to enter into a receptive, self-aware and cosmic state of being; subject-ness and object-ness are intimately and archetypally intertwined. Bachelard's “new poetics” results from his transplantation/cross-fertilization of the general epistemology of the “new scientific spirit” on to/across his aesthetics. (shrink)