Volume 37, Issue 1-2, March - June 2024, Page 69-73.

While Russian leaders are clearly dissatisfied with the United States and the European Union, they are not inherently opposed to a liberal world order. The question of Russia's desire to change a liberal international order hangs on the type of liberalism embedded in that order. Despite some calls from within for it to create a new, post-liberal order premised on conservative nationalism and geopolitics, Russia is unlikely to fare well in such a world.

I examine issues tied to the allegeddifficulties of mutual understanding betweenRussia and the West. I show that some of thebackground to these issues lies in thedifference of culturally grounded differencesin perceptual and conceptual schemata. In theWest, a broadly understood Aristotelianism andin Russia Neoplatonism designate dominantattitudes to the world. The Russian `lunar''consciousness, in comparison with the `solar''consciousness of the West, tends by and largeprecipitously to totalize the world, and theexperienced multiplicity of the real isreferred to its imagined center. The differencebetween (...) Russia and the West, limited to somedegree by mutual similarities, can become thebasis of an axiological and intellectualdialogue important for one side and theother. (shrink)

The views on in vitro fertilization within Russian Orthodox Christian society are diverse. One reason for that variation is the ambiguity found in “The Basis of the Social Concept,” the document issued in 2000 by the Russian Orthodox Church and considered to be the primary guidelines for determining the Church’s stance on bioethics. This essay explores how the treatment of infertility reconciles with the Orthodox Christian faith and what methods of medical assistance for infertility may be appropriate for Orthodox Christians. (...) The focus here is on IVF because it is among the most widely used methods to overcome childlessness, and the permissibility of IVF is the object of disagreement among Orthodox. The article defines criteria that can help to discern what is absolutely wrong and must be avoided from what only falls short of the mark, but not very far, for Orthodox Christians. If treatment of the underlying causes of infertility has failed or promises no hope and a husband and a wife do not feel able to carry the Cross of infertility, then from pastoral dispensation they might be blessed to use ethically acceptable variants of IVF. IVF has many variants that are different in their spiritual influence on a person. Orthodox Christians pursuing IVF should seek spiritual guidance and a blessing to pursue IVF. They must not form more embryos than will be transferred in the same cycle. Freezing, discarding, or reduction of embryos is forbidden. Infertile couples ought to use only their reproductive cells. The use of donor gametes is unacceptable. Any embryo formed ought to be transferred into the wife’s womb, and the use of surrogates is impermissible. Only a husband and wife who are able to maintain their marital union and where the wife is still of childbearing age should be blessed to use IVF. (shrink)

The word blat refers to the system of informal contacts and personal networks which was used to obtain goods and services under the rationing which characterised Soviet Russia. Alena Ledeneva's book is the first to analyse blat in all its historical, socio-economic and cultural aspects, and to explore its implications for post-Soviet society. In a socialist distribution system which resulted in constant shortages, blat developed into an 'economy of favours' which shadowed an overcontrolling centre and represented the reaction of (...) ordinary people to the social constraints they faced. In social and economic terms, blat exchanges became vital to the population, and to the functioning of the Soviet system. The book shows that the nature of the economic and political changes in contemporary Russia cannot be properly understood without attention to the powerful legacy of the blat economy. (shrink)

This article presents a retrospective analysis of the evolution of the Russian humanities and social sciences education system, highlighting issues that the current system has faced during the country's repeated transformations in the twentieth century, especially in the 1990s.

At the end of the nineteenth century, Leo Tolstoy and Vladimir Solovyov presented two diametrically opposed modes of thinking and reasoning. The question of which of these two figures emerged as the greatest thinker of the time remains an existential one, with significant ontological, epistemological, and metaphysical implications. This opposition is evident in their differing attitudes towards key topics such as political reality, violence, and morality. While Tolstoy’s philosophical contributions are often underestimated and Solovyov is generally regarded as the “winner” (...) of this intellectual rivalry, this paper seeks to reevaluate Tolstoy’s legacy and his role as a philosopher in the latter half of the nineteenth century. (shrink)

Russia’s relations with the European Court of Human Rights since the time of Russia’s accession to the Council of Europe have received a lot of attention on the part of academic scholars, practitioners, and media. Research on the ECtHR became especially important in the context of the twentieth anniversary of Russia’s acceptance of ECtHR jurisdiction that coincided with the unprecedented worsening of relations between Russia and the European countries due to the 2014 Crimea annexation. With voices (...) that consistently advocate Russia’s exit from the CoE, we believe it necessary to examine Russia-ECtHR relations as they are presented in the academic narrative. Drawing mostly on Russian-language sources, we want to highlight the variety of overarching themes and arguments relating to the crisis caused by the 2015 Constitutional Court Decision. We would like to examine various dimensions of this “crisis,” in order to be able to conclude whether Russia’s reaction to the Markin case and cases of non-compliance that followed was indeed part of a broader strategy of “backlash against international courts” we are currently witnessing worldwide. In the conditions when Russia’s exit from the Council of Europe is as likely as ever, the possibility of the “snowball effect” on the part of other member states threatens undermine the very raison d’être of the European human rights protection system. (shrink)

This contribution is devoted to frontier theory, the analysis of its conceptual apparatus as well as its topical issues and practical application. We propose a revision of this theory, and confront the usefulness of the term “frontier” with other the similar concepts such as border, boundary and limit. The paper also proposes a typology of frontiers characterized by various aspects; civilization, intercultural, religious, and anthropological, among other. From the standpoint of this discussion, the authors consider the Southern Russian bordering region (...) of the Caspian Sea, today a much conflicted territory. (shrink)

In this article, Mychailo Wynnyckyj details his experience of Russia’s attack on Kyiv in the spring of 2022 and then he argues that the notion of individual rights that lies at the foundation of Western legal and political institutions is incapable of dealing with the collective evil exhibited by the Russian army during their invasion of Ukraine.

Russia's war against Ukraine has had devastating human consequences and destabilizing geopolitical effects. This roundtable takes up three critical debates in connection with the conflict: Ukraine's potential accession to the European Union; the role of Ukrainian nationalism in advancing democratization; and the degree of human rights accountability, not just for Russia, but also for Ukraine. In addition to challenging conventional wisdom on each of these issues, the contributors to this roundtable make a second, critically important intervention. Each essay (...) explores the problem of concealed political and normative commitments within much of the research on Russia's war against Ukraine by unearthing biases intrinsic to particular conceptualizations. The collection also questions the perceived separation between “interests” and “values” that permeates policy analysis. This roundtable further draws attention to the ethical problems that scholars and policymakers bring to policy debates through the occlusion of their preexisting political commitments. It argues for greater transparency around and awareness of the ways in which values, not just evidence, inform research findings and policy positions. (shrink)

One of the most significant changes in the medical professions in Europe is the trend towards feminization. Some of the patterns of gender inequality arising from the feminization of the European medical professions are clearly apparent within the Russian medical profession, which experienced feminization 70 years ago. Yet little is known about the processes by which these patterns of gender inequality emerged and were maintained. This article is based on interviews with female doctors in Voronezh, Russia in 1996. It (...) explores the attitudes of these women to gender divisions within the medical profession. This is placed within the wider context of Soviet and post-Soviet employment and family policies directed at women. It is suggested that the material and ideological focus on women’s role in reproduction had direct implications for the choices women made in relation to paid labour. (shrink)

This article argues that combining elements of the sociological theories of Johann Arnason and Peter Wagner can contribute to an understanding of the causes of the ‘new Cold War’ on the European continent. Comparisons of today’s confrontation between Russia and the West with the original Cold War are largely misleading since the Soviet model of modernity represented a radical alternative to its liberal western version. Unlike the original Cold War, the current ideological confrontation is not connected with a clash (...) of different forms of modernity. Today’s Russia lacks a clear civilizational identity and does not follow an alternative project of modernity. The recent ‘conservative turn’ in Russian politics largely draws on a specific interpretation of European modernity. (shrink)

In Matthew 24, Jesus prophesied to his disciples about ‘wars and rumours of wars’ and other eschatological birth-pangs to prepare them in advance on how they are to be responding to eschatological events as they would be unfolding in the interim of his ascension and his promised Parousia. What then does Jesus mean by enlisting ‘wars and rumours of wars’ in this eschatological era to be functioning as ‘the beginning of birth-pangs’ and how should Christians be responding to wars and (...) rumours of wars as eschatological birth-pangs? Employing the redaction exegetical method, this study focuses on interpreting Matthew 24:6−8 to explain what Jesus most probably meant as he enlisted ‘wars and rumours of wars’ as eschatological birth-pangs; and with special reference to the Russia–Ukraine war that broke out on 24 February 2022, recommends from the Olivet prophecy how Christians are to be righteously responding to ‘wars and rumours of wars’ as eschatological birth-pangs. Contribution: This study explored Matthew 24:6−8 to unveil what Jesus means by enlisting wars and rumours of wars as eschatological birth-pangs. With special reference to the Russian military invasion of Ukraine, theological highlights were recommended on how Christians are to be responding to war and war rumours as end-time birth-pains. (shrink)

The fragility of the post-war international order is threatened not only by Russia’s full-scale invasion of Ukraine, but even more tellingly, by the decisions that Western nations, the European Union, and NATO make in response to Russian aggression. This paper frames Western responses to Russia’s invasion of Ukraine within what Reinhart Koselleck calls ‘the sediments of time’ or Zeitschichten that contain different temporalities, speeds, and directions. Koselleck’s approach of parsing the ‘sediments of time’ is a heuristic device for (...) understanding how Western responses to the war in Ukraine are framed by very different historical markers. Just as one might parse the grammatical components of a sentence in order to understand its meaning, so one might parse Western responses within different historical timescales that include Zeitenwende, déjà vu, interregnum, and Never Again. (shrink)

Russia’s October 1917 revolution had an international vector along with its domestic one. The idea of transforming not only a single country but the entire world into a dictatorship of the proletar...

Since the time of Ivan the Terrible, the history of Russia has been a succession of astonishing flights and falls. The sacrifices made by the Russian narod on the altar of development are so great, and the achievements so incommensurate with the efforts expended, that a number of questions must arise: Why do things happen this way? Why does Russia not develop "normally"? And what is "normal" development? Is it possible for Russia, and under what conditions? What (...) are the causes of the oddities in Russian development? (shrink)

The article analyzes responses to Russia’s full-scale invasion of Ukraine by philosophers on the left, like Balibar and Zizek, and feminist philosophers, such as Butler and Hark. A large-scale war in Europe proved to be a challenge for a number of feminist, pacifist, and leftist certainties, and this challenge was presented in philosophy and feminist theory as a series of antinomies that do not imply a simple solution. Some leading contemporary philosophers believe that Ukraine should stop resisting aggression in (...) the face of the threat of a world nuclear war or if the conflict turns into a war of extermination. An alternative solution was suggested by some left and feminist philosophers who argued that a true Ukrainian victory over an authoritarian aggressor would amount to preserving and empowering democracy in Ukraine, and that this was possible only on the basis of building broad transnational anti-Putin alliances, including alliances with the representatives of all forces opposing Putin in Russia and Belarus. (shrink)

As a mono-energy-economy, Russia’s fortunes are closely linked to the price of energy. That same link explains why when energy prices hit record highs, there was such strong public support for Vladimir Putin. But when energy prices plummeted in late 2008, Russia found itself with an economic downturn which brought with it, factory closings, worker layoffs and political grumbling. Because of Russia’s inexperience with economic upheaval, Russia is likely to go through greater turmoil and political uncertainty (...) if not unrest, than more traditional market economies which over the years have had to learn how to deal with economic cycles of this sort. (shrink)

Since the collapse of the Soviet Union, Moscow has become a global city with a vibrant urban and cultural life-one of the most expensive capitals in the world with famous clubs and restaurants, as well as one of the most popular destinations for city workers and diplomats. Has corruption been instrumental in Moscow's development? The answer is complicated and in many ways a matter of definitions. It depends on whether one considers informal practices-inherited from Soviet times as well as new (...) ones-as corrupt and how one conceptualizes corruption. I will illustrate some of these complications for the case of the Soviet practice of blat, explain its "monetization" and its evolving relationship with corruption in the post-Soviet transition, and analyze the role of informal networks in present-day Russia. (shrink)

The 1990s are marked by a change of major landmarks in the cultural-historical self-awareness of the peoples of Russia, Europe, and perhaps the entire world. Not long ago at all, "post-Soviet" social science was celebrating its liberation from the "formation" dogma in favor of a civilizational approach. This meant, first, a way out of the socialist ghetto, which had been shut off from the rest of the world and had defended this isolation with the thesis of an "irreconcilable struggle (...) between two worlds," two lifestyles, and so forth. (shrink)

China, the most populous country in the world after India with 1.4 billion people, shares a 4200 km (2600 mi) border with Russia, the country with the world’s largest geographical territory, roughl...

In this article, I consider the historical stages of development of nanotechnology in Russia as well as the political framework for this. It is shown that early federal nanotechnology programs in Russia date back to the 1990s and that since the mid-2000s, nanotechnology has attracted the increasing attention of government. I characterize the formation of the political landscape and the basic institutions for the promotion of nanotechnology in relation to the adoption of the Russian Federation president’s initiative “Strategy (...) of Nanoindustry Development” in 2007. The evaluative part of the article deals with three aspects: (a) bibliometric to assess Russian research output in nanotechnology, (b) scientific cadre to assess the research capacity of Russia in the long term, and (c) economical to consider the early results and prospects of the domestic nanoindustry. To construct the scientometric indicators, I used the Science Citation Index Expanded and some internal databases. The texts of program documents and available reports served as the source of economic information. (shrink)

The paper argues that the philosophy that was taught in Orthodox schools of the Polish-Lithuanian Commonwealth in late 16th – early 17th century and then became the ideological basis for the Moscow “Latinism” can be attributed to so-called Second scholasticism. The main features of Second scholasticism are the rejection of predestination in theology, usage of probabilistic approaches in logic and ethics and confrontation with absolutism in politics. These features made Second scholasticism unacceptable for absolute monarchies emerging in Europe (including the (...) Russian Empire) which utilized universal rationalism of the early Enlightenment as an ideological basis. Both in Western Europe and in Russia Second scholasticism became “a zone of cultural exclusion”. However prevalence of Second scholasticism in Orthodox schools of the Polish-Lithuanian Commonwealth concurred with making up of the Ukrainian cultural originality and in many respects defined characteristic features of the Ukrainian mentality. (shrink)

Russian philosopher Pyotr Chaadaev (1794–1856) declared Russia to be a non-place in both space and time, a singular nothingness without history, topos, or footing, without relation or attachment to the world-historical tradition culminating in Christian-European modernity. This paper recovers Chaadaev’s conception of nothingness as that which, unbound by tradition, constitutes a total, even revolutionary ungrounding of the world-whole. Working with and through Chaadaev’s key writings, we trace his articulation of immanent nothingness or the void of the Real as completely (...) emptying out the mechanisms of history and tradition, thereby putting also into question the basic conceptual machinery of modernity. Chaadaev’s position appears, as a result, not only as a neglected genealogical element to contemporary critiques of modernity and its logic of reproduction through tradition and futurity but also as a contribution to the ongoing critical rethinking of this logic in contemporary theory. (shrink)

The purpose of this article is to identify how modern Russia can build good relationships between multiple Russian religions and the state. At present there are many obstacles standing in the way of achieving this goal. The article includes a great many statistics, and discusses political, social, and religious views of the issue.The working Russian Constitution provides major legal provisions for democratic relationships between religions and the state. The law “On Freedom of Conscience and Religious Associations” (1997) clarified constitutional (...) provisions. It should not forgotten that Russia is a secular state claiming to respect all religions. No doubt the supremacy of Orthodoxy in Russia after 1721 and the extreme atheism that arose in the Soviet Union after 1917 influenced people’s minds greatly. While the countries in Western Europe were moving from religiosity to secularism, Russia was developing the other way around. But while respecting all religions, Russia should not forget to be mindful of extremism. Religious associations themselves are likewise uneasy about the danger presented by certain mystic, neo-pagan, and destructive sects. The author argues that the best compromise between religions and the modern Russian state canonly be achieved on the basis of equality and freedom. (shrink)

The article provides a historical and philosophical analysis of the deportation of many Russian intellectuals abroad in 1922. It is known that such a vicious deed on the part of the Soviet authorities, in fact, turned out to be an act that saved many Russian intellectuals either from starvation or from repression and death in the camps. It is also widely known that the cultural activities of Russian emigrants after their arrival in the West were varied and intense. The article (...) also emphasizes that expulsion and its significance for the destinies of the country and the emigrants themselves remained a "blank spot" for a long time. It was only in the 1990s that research into the events of the 1922 exile, both in Russia and abroad, started to change. The author draws attention to the fact that the very nature of examination of the expulsion of the Russian intelligentsia has also changed over the years. At the beginning of studies in the 1990s, it was purely archival works aimed at recovering emigrants' cultural heritage and returning "forgotten" names. Over the last decade, we may observe a more critical reading of this heritage, supposing a more precise reconstruction of facts and contexts and a broader analysis of the significance of events in the history of the early 1920s. The study of the various cultural activities of the Russian migr intelligentsia allows us to strike a conversation on Russian philosophy, its peculiarity and originality, the mutual influences of the Russian and European philosophical traditions, and the meaning and significance of Soviet philosophy relevant again. (shrink)

Western perceptions of Russia have a long history, starting from the earliest reports in the fifteenth century. For some Westerners Russia appeared as a utopian, harmonious society. For others it appeared as an ideal monarchy. Some, however, saw it as a despotic Asian state. The Western images of Russia from the fifteenth through the seventeenth centuries were thus mixed and ambiguous. The positive image of Russia as the ideal Biblical society that stood outside of history somewhat (...) blurred the differences between Russia and the West. In contrast, for an increasing number of Westerners, especially from the more advanced proto-capitalist countries, Russia was part of the non-Western world, thus emphasizing its difference from the West. Russia was thus assimilated into the Western image of the Orient where repulsion combined with fascination, until, under the impact of Romanticism in the nineteenth century, its foreignness was articulated in terms of civilizational and religious differences. (shrink)

The correctness of application of orientalist discourse of E. Said to the colonial policy of the Russian Empire is analyzed in the article on the example of P. I. Rychkov research. By studying integration of Bashkirs in the structure of the Russian state, the author came to the conclusion that Russia’s policy in the East was based on the experience of the management of non-Russian peoples, which was developed in the 16-17th centuries. The establishment of ‘cultural distance‘ is typical (...) only for a small group of educated administrators of past-Petrine era. Most of the officials of the region, as in the preceding period, and during the time of Rychkov and Tatishchev preferred to rely on traditional methods of Bashkir management, which was developed in the period of their voluntary accession. Managerial stereotypes of 16-17th centuries, had significant influence on policy towards South-Eastern peoples of Russia even in the 19th century. The Russian administration inherent in the desire to integrate the non-Russian peoples in the General class structure of the state on the basis of analogies or correspondences, the objective of which was social and cultural rapprochement of the two societies. (shrink)

The article discusses the heuristic and methodological potential of historical sociology as one of the most dynamically developing disciplines of modern social and scientific knowledge. It is argued that this area of research is functionally capable of taking on the role of today's analytical philosophy of history in the form of integrity and, at the same time, the operational reflection of the historical experience of our country. The article points out the deficient nature of previous conceptualizations of the domestic past (...) from the point of view of historical sociology. First, the development of this discipline in the West is briefly analyzed, starting with the classics of world sociology. The qualitative and quantitative growth of historical and sociological research in the second half of the 20th century—which led to a significant expansion of the explanatory repertoire of macrosociology—is highlighted. Next, the ambivalent position of historical sociology in Russia is discussed, where—despite the existing interest in its methodological categories and substantive results—a full-fledged institutionalization of this sociological discipline has not yet occurred. Thus, a conclusion is made about the existence of a serious local tradition of interest in historical-sociological synthesis, starting with the classics of historiography and pioneers of Russian sociology at the turn of the 19th and 20th centuries. At the same time, substantial progress is highlighted on the part of the domestic social-scientific community in the reception of the achievements of world-historical sociology at the beginning of the 21st century. The next section shows the particular relevance of modern historical-sociological approaches to the problematization of the past in the context of the domestic epistemological situation. A number of the most promising thematic complexes in modern Russian academia are highlighted. In conclusion, we highlight issues concerning framework research and scientific organization faced by historical sociology in Russia. (shrink)

The exclusion of Russia from the Bologna process creates serious challenges for the higher education system. The beginning reform will affect the whole institution of higher learning of our country. This, in turn, opens up new opportunities to improve the efficiency of the entire system. The introduction of three basic elements, namely: a bank of pedagogical ideas, a triple helix model and a system for introducing creative technologies into the educational process, can allow us to form a qualitatively new (...) level of training of specialists in the country. (shrink)

There is an increasing number of female migrants among the international migrants in Russia. The purpose of this study is to identify the social risks female migrants face. Statistics and data from surveys were analyzed, interviews were held with experts providing practical assistance to women and focus groups were conducted with female migrants. The employment sector in which young female migrants face the most risks and are likely to work illegally is commercial sex services. The social risks are mainly (...) related to a lack of knowledge about the culture, their illegal status; risky behavior is also a big issue. The conclusion is that the social risks are linked to the gender asymmetry existing in the labor market and to the more vulnerable position of women with regard to sexual exploitation and trafficking. (shrink)

This paper brings together the late Freud’s concept of the death drive and Dostoevsky’s vision of primordial suffering in order to analyze anti-Ukrainian and pro-Ukrainian trends in today’s Russia. The paper encourages embracing the suffering that the death drive entails, instead of escaping it through the narrative of Russia’s ‘greatness’.

This article presents the understanding of Eurasianism as an expression of Russia’s essence in the works of N.S. Trubetskoi, P.P. Suvchinskii, P.N. Savitskii, and L.P. Karsavin. We use the cognitive category “historical collective individuality” for a more complete and deeper understanding of Eurasianism as a set of views and approaches, as well as a certain specialized social community of its representatives. The use of this category allows us to reveal Eurasianism as an area of ideas expressing the essence of (...) Russia. N.S. Trubetskoi considers Russian-Turanian unity to be just such an expression of that essence; for P.N. Savitskii, it is the circle of “European and Asiatic/Asian cultures”; for P.P. Suvchinskii, Russia’s great testament is the unification of the people and the intelligentsia under the “all-resolving dome of the Orthodox Church”; and for L.P. Karsavin, Russia’s essence consists in its development as a Eurasian subject or a collective person. In addition, the category of historical collective individuality allows us to reveal Eurasianism as a “gold reserve of life” for Eurasians in exile. Thus, the unity of metaphysics and life sought in Russian philosophy is achieved. We draw conclusions about the historicity of the Eurasianist collective individuality. (shrink)

A. Poleev. Constitutional order in Russia. Enzymes, Revised print edition 2020.

The article offers an attempt to understand the present state of Kant’s legacy in Russia on the threshold of the Tercentenary. An explanans is found in the metaphors of “ tabula rasa ” and “unplowed virgin soil,” first used by Leibniz in relation to Russia in his letters and memoranda addressed to tsar Peter I and other members of the Russian elite, which became the country’s “absolute metaphors to live by” up to present time. Several known and unknown (...) episodes from the history of the reception of Kantian ideas, his followers in Russia, and the transformation of the urban environment of Kant’s life in Königsberg, as it was becoming Kaliningrad, are presented through the prism of this metaphor. Without hoping to make specific recommendations of any use from such metaphorical grounds, this study aims to emphasize the depth, interconnectedness, and basic, metaphysical tension of the relationship between Europe and Russia, which cannot be terminated at will by either side, or by a third party. In a situation where the sides are doomed to dialog, Kant, appropriated by Russia as its “subject,” occupies the unique position of mediator of philosophical understanding and peaceful action. (shrink)