The United Nations Convention on the Rights of the Child (UNCRC) is presented and understood as the primary reference point regarding questions of children’s rights. However, the UNCRC is not a neutral instrument deployed to meet the rights of children: it embodies a specific perception of the child, childhood and citizenship. The interpretation of the UNCRC from the point of view of children’s legal status emphasises the autonomy of children; the focus is on the rights that children possess. Conversely, the (...) social-political interpretation of the UNCRC addresses the question of how the rights of children can be realised. It is suggested that distinguishing between these interpretations is essential with regard to questions of pedagogy and education. (shrink)

Non una pacifica esplorazione ma un’avanscoperta bellicosa, in sardonica guerrilla con alcuni baluardi della tradizione filosofica occidentale: le leggi e il linguaggio della metafisica, la concezione stabile e unitaria dell'identità personale, il modello tragico della volontà, il pregiudizio antropocentrico e l’asservimento della natura al dominio della tecnica. Senza la pretesa di comporre un discorso esaustivo o sistematico, Capra recupera soprattutto Nietzsche e il Wittgenstein delle Ricerche Logiche in una (auto)critica comparativa, per mostrare in quali modi il pensiero correlativo delle filosofie (...) orientali possa integrare e talvolta superare le impasse del pensiero antitetico. (shrink)

Anders, Rudi When I see a colourful sunset, my mind goes to a spectacular purple sunset I saw near the Mexican border many years ago. That memory stops me from being fully aware of the scene in front of me. No two sunsets are the same and my memory is stopping me from fully appreciating the spectacle before my eyes. Famous and spectacular places don't work for me because expectations and memories get in the way, but when I walk alone (...) in nature I find my mind stops chattering and I begin to effortlessly notice the shades of green in the foliage, the patterns in the bark on the trees and the sounds and fragrances. It sometimes feels as if am absorbed by the surroundings. When this happens I don't bother with the names of birds or flowers because even that distracts from direct experience. (shrink)

Ignorance usually excuses from responsibility, unless the person is culpable for the ignorance itself. Since a lot of wrongdoing occurs in ignorance, the question of what makes ignorance culpable is central for a theory of moral responsibility. In this article I examine a prominent answer, which I call the ‘volitionalist tracing account,’ and criticize it on the grounds that it relies on an overly restrictive conception of responsibility‐relevant control. I then propose an alternative, which I call the ‘capacitarian conception of (...) control,’ and on the basis of it I advance an account of culpable ignorance that avoids the skeptical upshots of the volitionalist proposal. If correct, my account establishes three important truths: agents can be directly in control of their ignorance, they can be directly responsible for more than actions and omissions, and their moral obligations extend beyond the performance of intentional actions and omissions. (shrink)

Anders, Rudi I enjoy mixing with people who hold different beliefs from mine. Belief is a very complex and rather odd thing. I am particularly interested in the psychology of belief. Sometimes belief is the cause of terrible conflict and suffering.

Osvrt na egsistencijalizam -- Dekadencija osjećenja u građanskoj umjetnosti.

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:Dei Filius I:On God, Creation, and ProvidenceRudi A. Te VeldeIn this essay, I want to share my impressions of the first chapter of the dogmatic constitution Dei Filius of Vatican I. It begins its declaration of the basic truths of Christian faith in a language which is similar, and probably intended to be similar, to that of a solemn confession of faith: "The holy, catholic, apostolic, and Roman church (...) believes and acknowledges that there is one true living God, creator and lord of heaven and earth."1 It reminds one, in some of its formulations, of the Nicene Creed, but with a remarkable difference: here, in the text of the constitution, the object of the confession is formulated as a proposition about God's existence.2 What is said is not, for example, "I believe in one God, the Father almighty"; but the Church believes and holds it to be true that there exists a God. One can notice a subtle shift from a confession of faith to the proclamation of a (rational) truth. The Pope, gathered with all the bishops of the Church, declares that there exists a God, the one and true living God, a doctrinal statement directed, by implication, against those who dare to deny the existence of God. The opening sentence of chapter 1 corresponds with its canon, which says that, "if anyone denies the one true God, creator and [End Page 823] lord of things visible and invisible: let him be anathema."3 Thus the constitution says that the "one, true living God" of the biblical faith exists, that this is a truth, and that, as consequence, the opposed thesis of atheism is false and must be rejected.Who is asserting this truth? Who is speaking and with which authority? The text leaves no doubt about the speaking subject. It is the Church, entitled to speak with authority about matters of faith, because it is the Roman Church, holy, catholic, and apostolic. The Church speaks, in the person of the pope, the legitimate successor of St. Peter, with authority granted to her by God himself through his Son Jesus Christ. In the preface preceding chapter 1 of the constitution, it is said that the Church is appointed by God to be "mother and mistress of nations." Hence:She can never cease from witnessing to the truth of God... and from declaring it, for she knows that these words were directed to her: "My spirit which is upon you, and my words I have put in your mouth, shall not depart out of your mouth from this time forth and for evermore"(Is 59:21).4This gives the pope, sitting in the chair of Peter, the authority of "teaching and defending Catholic truth and condemning erroneous doctrines."5 And the first thing to be declared, as part of the Church's task to proclaim the Catholic truth to all the nations, is to assert the existence of God against the error of atheism.It is important to understand the genre of a dogmatic constitution. It is a document in which the Church, by mouth of the pope together with the bishops, expounds the basic tenets of Christian teaching. The purpose of a dogmatic constitution is to reaffirm the basic truths of Christian doctrine, to clarify the fundamentals of faith in a message to the world. A constitution may be occasioned by actual developments in the world and society, but it speaks as it were from the standpoint of eternity. In case of the constitution Dei Filius, the addressee is the world of the mid-nineteenth century, a time of dominance of scientific reason, of materialism, naturalism, atheism, and not unimportantly, of current forms of idealistic pantheism (Georg Hegel, Friedrich Schelling, the influence of German Idealism in general); what the constitution especially stands opposed to [End Page 824] is the view of supernatural religion as being irrational. For this purpose it wants to reclaim reason and to overcome the disastrous gap between faith and (modern) rationality.The double program underlying the constitution—teaching the Catholic truth and condemning erroneous doctrines—reminds one of the Summa contra gentiles [SCG] of Thomas Aquinas.6 The... (shrink)

I examine the question of whether people are sometimes morally blameworthy for what I call ‘slips’: wrongful actions or omissions that a good-willed agent inadvertently performs due to a non-negligent failure to be aware of relevant considerations. I focus in particular on the capacitarian answer to this question, according to which possession of the requisite capacities to be aware of relevant considerations and respond appropriately explains blameworthiness for slips. I argue, however, that capacitarianism fails to show that agents have responsibility (...) level control over their slips and, consequently, fails to show that it is reasonable to expect agents to avoid this kind of wrongdoing. I conclude that people are typically not blameworthy for their slips, but only regarding the backward-looking, desert-entailing type of blame that has been at issue in this debate. I suggest that ordinary intuitions about blameworthiness for slips can be accommodated by appealing to other types of responsibility and blame. (shrink)

Anders, Rudi Sometimes it is nice to do something totally unconnected to the usual bustle of life, such as a walk in the park. This time I visit a German Lutheran church in Melbourne; I have never entered it before. The exterior and interior consistently retain the traditional design. The bluestone gives it a sense of permanence - timelessness. I rarely like modern churches; mixing modern and traditional never works for me. This church is not large and has an intimate (...) feel to it. The people are all smiles. I like people, regardless of their beliefs. Family groups look like they feel at home, and visitors like me are made welcome. I sit and admire the skill of the craftsmen who attended to every detail in the church. They didn't have the modern machines we take for granted. (shrink)

In this paper I sketch a socially situated account of responsible agency, the main tenet of which is that the powers that constitute responsible agency are themselves socially constituted. I explain in detail the constitution relation between responsibility-relevant powers and social context and provide detailed examples of how it is realized by focusing on what I call ‘expectations-generating social factors’ such as social practices, cultural scripts, social roles, socially available self-conceptions, and political and legal institutions. I then bring my account (...) to bear on the debate about the exculpatory potential of moral ignorance. I show that a prominent position in this debate – the position that denies that moral ignorance exculpates – is grounded on an individualistic and acontextualist conception of moral capacities, moral cognition, and blameworthiness, and that this conception leads those philosophers who endorse it to make a number of questionable claims regarding the ability of ordinary agents to overcome their moral ignorance and the culpability they bear for the latter. I conclude by indicating how my socially situated account addresses the issue of moral ignorance. (shrink)

This paper discusses the commitment account of assertion, according to which two necessary conditions for asserting that p are the speaker's undertaking a commitment to justify her assertion in the face of challenges and the speaker's licensing the audience to defer justificatory challenges back to her. Relying on what I call the "cancellation test," and focusing on Robert Brandom's version of the CAA, I show that the latter is wrong: it is perfectly possible to assert that p even while explicitly (...) disavowing the justificatory commitment and while refusing to issue a deferring license. Then I sketch an alternative to the CAA, the trust account of assertion, according to which speakers necessarily present themselves as trustworthy concerning p's truth whenever they assert p. I explain why this is different from undertaking a justificatory commitment, and offer some reasons for thinking that this is a more promising account. (shrink)

In this article I discuss David Shoemaker’s recently published piece “Responsibility: The State of the Question. Fault Lines in the Foundations.” While agreeing with Shoemaker on many points, I argue for a more unified diagnosis of the seemingly intractable debates that plague (what I call) “responsibility studies.” I claim that, of the five fault lines Shoemaker identifies, the most basic one is about the role that the notion of deserved harm should play in the theory of moral responsibility. I argue (...) that the deep divide between those theorists who affirm and those who deny that moral responsibility is essentially about the justification of desert thus understood can be traced to the disagreement about whether the focus on the reactive attitudes by itself entails that moral responsibility has nothing to do with traditional questions about desert and free will. I then show that the seeming intractableness of the other four fault lines Shoemaker identifies is expectable and explicable in light of this more basic disagreement. After this diagnostic work, I conclude by suggesting a solution to the “morass” that has taken over responsibility studies: theorists working in the field should acknowledge that it has effectively bifurcated into two discrete subareas, which I suggest calling “retribution studies” and “interpersonal studies.” -/- . (shrink)

In this chapter I survey the two main families of views about the moral psychology of moral responsibility, i.e., about the mental capacities or psychological functioning that distinguishes responsible agents from non-responsible agents. These are self-expression views, which maintain that responsible agency is essentially about being able to express one's practical stance or moral orientation in conduct; and reasons-responsiveness views, according to which responsible agency requires a suite of powers that make their possessors capable of detecting and responding apppropriately to (...) the moral considerations against their conduct (in the case of wrong actions). I explore different contemporary variants of each of these families of views and assess their weaknesses and strenghts. Finally, I sketch a methodology for settling this debate, the essence of which is to note that the debate about the moral psychology of moral responsibility is ancilliary to a broader debate about the nature of moral responsibility itself and, in particular, about the nature of blame and blaming reactions. On the basis of this methodology, I end up taking sides with a particular variant of the self-expression paradigm. (shrink)

According to a recent newspaper article, 40 million people in the European Union live in anxiety every single day . Apparently only 6% of the population can summon the courage to talk about their anxiety with their doctor. It would seem that doctors have too little time to recognize the signs of what the article calls the “new illness”. Nor are they encouraged to do so by the renowned scientific journals, where the focus is solely on a purely medical treatment (...) for anxiety, or by the pharmaceutical industry, where anxiety is equated with “long-term easy money”. The title of the article immediately struck me, especially since it seemed to be in flat contradiction to its subtitle: “Anxiety as the other side of affluence. Being afraid without knowing why”. Let me first of all try to explain why this contradiction did not really surprise me.It is well known that `anxiety' is traditionally opposed to `fear', where the difference is said to be that fear has a clear object but anxiety does not. One is afraid of something determinate, whereas with anxiety one appears to be afraid without knowing precisely why or what one fears. Yet this distinction is not so straightforward: merely mentioning it is not the same as maintaining it, as can be seen in this frequently cited passage from Freud: “anxiety [Angst] has an unmistakable relation to expectation: it is anxiety about something. It has a quality of indefiniteness and lack of object. In precise speech we use the word `fear' [Furcht] rather than `anxiety' [Angst] if it has found an object”.Freud appears to waver between two possibilities: either anxiety is essentially characterized by indeterminacy and a lack of object, in which case it is literally anxiety for nothing, or anxiety is temporarily undetermined, in which case it is anxiety for something that cannot immediately be named but that could be named and determined with the proper technique or therapy. In this second case — the one Freud clearly prefers — anxiety would be a fear whose object is provisionally undetermined. And indeed, hardly a paragraph further Freud no longer concerns himself with the distinction he just drew and with seeming carelessness sets aside the rules of correct usage which he brought to his readers' attention: “a real danger is a danger that is known, and realistic anxiety is anxiety about a known danger of this sort. Neurotic anxiety is anxiety about an unknown danger. Neurotic danger is thus a danger that has still to be discovered.Analysis has shown that it is a pulsional danger [Triebgefahr]. By bringing this danger which is not known into consciousness, the analyst makes neurotic anxiety no different from realistic anxiety, so that it can be dealt with in the same way”. Neurotic anxiety, then, is only anxiety as long as the danger causing the anxiety is unknown. And Freud's treatment for revealing that danger essentially boils down to turning the neurotic anxiety into a realistic anxiety, or more precisely: to show that the danger, although different in each case, is knowable in principle and so does not betray anxiety but fear! Realistic anxiety already has an object and is therefore fear. Neurotic anxiety has a hidden object which can and must be disclosed: “where there is anxiety there must be something that one is afraid of”.Evidently, “anxiety is not so simple a matter”, as Freud himself wrote and, one could add, experienced in the text from which I have just quoted at length. (shrink)

Anders, Rudi The articles in AH I like best are the ones with which I disagree to a greater or lesser degree, because they force me to re-think and clarify my position. One such article was by John Perkins, titled 'Let's admit that Islam is a problem'. Although the article is very well-written, and I admire John's fact-finding regarding Islam, I think he misses the elephant in the room. Namely, Christian Europe and North America killed far more people than Islam (...) ever did. Buddhist and Shinto Japan did shocking things in the last world war. Jews in Israel ignore the rights of Palestinians. The atheist communist Soviet Union was as bad as Christian Czarist Russia. There is gross injustice in Hindu India. I don't think Islam should be singled out as a problem. I agree that religion can be a problem but the many atheist dictators, for example: Napoleon Bonaparte, Mussolini and Stalin, are also a problem, so atheism as such is not a guarantee of justice. (shrink)

Anders, Rudi Mental conditioning is like gravity; it feels so normal and ever-present that it often goes unnoticed, but it influences much human behaviour. I am not free when I am not aware how my ideas and attitudes are absorbed from my culture, family, the media and peers. It takes courage to stand alone.

Many philosophers think that a necessary condition on moral blameworthiness is that the wrongdoer can reasonably be expected to avoid the action for which she is blamed. Those who think so assume as a matter of course that the expectations at issue here are normative expectations that contrast with the non-normative or predictive expectations we form concerning the probable conduct of others, and they believe, or at least assume, that there is a clear-cut distinction between the two. In this paper (...) I put this widespread assumption under scrutiny and argue that it’s mistaken: although predictive and normative expectations are indeed distinct, there is no sharp separation between them. On the contrary, predictive expectations can have a substantial bearing on normative expectations in two related ways: they can recalibrate what is reasonable to expect of agents when responsibility attributions are at stake and they can help to uncover previously undetected excusing conditions. I illustrate my claims with the famous bystander effect from social psychology and show that it yields predictive expectations that affect normative expectations in these two ways. (shrink)

An important recent debate in the philosophy of action has focused on whether there is a persistence requirement on intention and, if there is, what its proper formulation should be. At one extreme, Bratman has defended what I call Strong Persistence, according to which it’s irrational to abandon an intention except for an alternative that is better supported by one’s reasons. At the other extreme, Tenenbaum has argued that there isn’t a persistence requirement on intention at all. In the middle, (...) philosophers like Broome, Ferrero, and Paul have defended persistence requirements with varying degrees of stringency while agreeing that Bratman’s proposed requirement is too strong. In this paper I side with Bratman in defending Strong Persistence. I argue, however, that Bratman’s own argument in favor of it is defective and an easy prey to the multiple objections that have been leveled against it. I thus offer in its place a “first-personally addressed constitutivist argument” whose aim is to show to the minimally reflective agent the kind of commitment involved in deciding and forming an intention in situations of incomparability—which are taken to be the litmus test for persistence requirements—and the persistence rational requirement governing it. Along the way I respond to the objections against Strong Persistence and explain why my argument represents an improvement over Bratman’s. (shrink)

Since the wide corpus of Chan 禪 literature includes a significant number and a consistent variety of ironic features such as puns, wordplay, extravagant acts, and so forth, a clarification of the role and functions of irony is especially relevant to this framework. The idea of the present essay is that irony works in Chan Buddhism as a functional strategy purposely employed in textual compositions and oral communication. Analysing the Blue Cliff Record, one of the most influential and significant texts (...) in the history of East Asian Buddhism, I individuated three functions of irony that clarify its role in the wider context of Chan rhetoric. Specifically, these functions consist in performing a rhetoric of self-desecration, inducing amusement, and instilling doubt. Upon defining the notion of irony, the current essay expounds on these functions with reference to the text, then the role of irony in the Blue Cliff Record is finally identified as a hermeneutic device. (shrink)

In Being and Time the broken piece of equipment (§ 16) or the dead body of an Other (§ 47) were seen as resulting from a process of transition (Übergang) between an original state and a position not so removed from it that one had to do with something entirely different. ‚The Origin of the Work of Art‘ takes a more radical approach: rather than leading toward a ‚no longer, but not yet‘, the movement here is toward a ‚no longer, (...) but already‘. Hence its famous thesis: either art is at work, or it is no longer art and already a mere object of art, a piece of art. Contrary to those of Heidegger’s readers who have suggested that his earlier views on transition would have saved him some of the (i.e. political) trouble the art essay runs into, the present paper aims to show that both the earlier and the later view fail to come to terms with what happens in transition as such. This is illustrated by an analysis of the corpse (ad BT § 47), and of junk (ad BT § 16) and leads us to a different approach to what is at stake in art and in the kind of Darstellung exemplified by it. (shrink)

This article outlines a genealogical profile of an elusive doctrinal concept that, after being discussed in several Mahāyāna sutras, had a significant impact on East Asian Buddhist traditions. This notion is known as ‘playful samādhi’, in Chinese youxi sanmei 遊戲三昧, which translates to Sanskrit vikrīḍita samādhi. The compound youxi 遊戲 (‘playful’ – ‘at play’) was cited in Chinese sutras and Buddhist documents, in renowned and widely diffused collections of gongans/kōans 公案, was expounded and commented on by Dōgen Zenji 道元禅師 (1200–1253) (...) in its Japanese version yuge 遊戲 and was explored by modern scholars and interpreters as Ryōsuke Ōhashi 大橋良介 and Wu Rujun 吳汝均, who compares youxi 遊戲 with Schiller’s Spieltrieb. Given the significance of ‘playful samādhi’ across different epochs and cultures, I believe a clarification of the term is especially needed. Furthermore, explicit reference to contemporary scholarship on play studies can help uncover its philosophical implications, shedding new light on a complex notion that defies a univocal interpretation and reunites in its semantic field both the aesthetic and religious dimensions. (shrink)

Introduction: Talking 'bout my generation -- Part I: Looking for difference -- Levinas, multiculturalism, and us -- In respectful contempt : Heidegger, appropriation, facticity -- Whistling in the dark : two approaches to anxiety -- Part II: After Levinas -- The price of being dispossessed : Levinas' God and Freud's trauma -- The mortality of the transcendent : Levinas and evil -- Is ethics fundamental? : questioning Levinas on irresponsibility -- Part III: After Heidegger -- Intransitive facticity : a question (...) to Heidegger -- Demons and the demonic : Kierkegaard and Heidegger on anxiety and sexual difference -- Dissensus communis : how to keep silent "after" Lyotard -- Conclusion: In search of visibility. (shrink)

The invocation and necessity of a forgiveness process have become complicated and multifaceted within the South African society with its realities of crime, poverty, racism, injustice and abuse. The rhythms of forgiveness compel us to identify our present situation. Individuals, as well as larger social groups, should begin to reflect on the importance of forgiveness to deal with transgression, violence, revenge and bitterness. I suggest that forgiveness within the Christian doctrine needs to be situated and embodied in specific habits and (...) practices of Christian life within the South African society. In response, people in South Africa are called to remember past transgressions while pursuing the repairing and healing of the brokenness and separations in relationships by embodying forgiveness. It directs the importance of the Church’s prophetic task to proclaim the boundless gift of a constructive and transformative relationship with God, one another and God’s creation. Practising forgiveness includes a process of seeking to embody Christian forgiveness that involves the transformation of people’s lives, their world and their capability to restore communion within the field of social relations. (shrink)

Western philosophy has mainly developed in accordance with the three laws of identity, noncontradiction and excluded middle, also known as “laws of thought”. Since Zen Buddhism often violates these apparently indisputable logical principles, a superficial reading may induce the idea that Zen Buddhism is a completely irrational, illogical doctrine. In this essay, I argue that Zen Buddhism is not absurd or illogical. Conversely, it relies on a different logic, which is perfectly consonant with the Buddhist view of the world.

This article proposes a more culturalist and variegated conception of the individual than that presented by individualization theorists. Inspired by the approach of the individual advocated by Émile Durkheim, Talcott Parsons and John Meyers, it first outlines the general script of the individual-as-actor that informs modern individualism as well as the generic characteristics that are routinely attributed to persons such as agency and free will. It subsequently reconstructs three predominant interpretations of this general script, i.e. utilitarian, moral and expressive individualism. (...) For each variant, the intellectual genesis and overall definition of the institutionalization in specific societal domains and the dominant articulations in social theory are briefly presented. With this threefold distinction, the aim is to synthesize the extensive literature on individualism and to show the sociological strengths of approaching subjectivity in terms of institutionalized scripts. (shrink)

My title echoes Levinas' 1951 “Is ontology fundamental?” – a seminal piece that paved the way for his justly famous Totality and Infinity and Otherwise than Being. I suggest that the characteristically enthusiastic, uncritical reception of these works may not be due primarily to their originality and sheer intellectual brilliance, but rather to something in Levinas' position that deeply resonates with the spirit of our times and our preoccupation with the fate of “the Other.” My claim, however, is that accepting (...) a Levinassian ethics, in which the Other has priority over the self, comes at too high a price, for it implies definitions of otherness and selfhood that fail to address precisely the problems that prompted preoccupation with otherness in the first place. I suggest that our struggles with racism, sexism, cultural bias point to frictions in (inter-)subjectivity that are inappropriately ethicized when treated, ala Levinas, simply as examples of an unwillingness to open up to the Other. In Levinas' universe, it is impossible not to hear the Other's appeal, but I argue that this view ignores the existence of a dimension of selfhood that cannot be absorbed into intersubjectivity. A metaphysical loneliness is thus implied here that our age seems unwilling to bear, preferring to cover it up with an ethics that makes us always responsible – that is, in response, connected to the Other. I develop this criticism by analyzing what I call a non-privative notion of irresponsibility whose roots are neither ethical nor ontological. (shrink)

Confronted with the face of the Other, the subject according to Levinas loses all its titles. But by the same token it also reaches its truest and most proper core. Indeed, what properly constitutes a subject cannot be understood outside the horizon ofthat ('initial') dispossession. A horizon which for Levinas ultimately refers to the Good which has chosen us before we could choose it: it is thanks to this prior unfreedom that we can at all be free. But what if (...) there would be more than one 'Good' and hence more than one 'dispossession'? Through an analysis of the concepts of 'face' and 'form', I will show why Levinas cannot raise that question and in what sense there is a price to be paid for that omission. (shrink)

v. I. Cycles, causality, ecology -- v. II. Evolution & appendices.

Non‐reflectivist real self views claim that people are morally responsible for all and only those bits of conduct that express their true values and cares, regardless of whether they have endorsed them or not. A phenomenon that is widely cited in support of these views is inverse akrasia, that is, cases in which a person is praiseworthy for having done the right thing for the right reasons despite her considered judgment that what she did was wrong. In this paper I (...) show that non‐reflectivist real self views are problematic by focusing on the related but neglected phenomenon of inverse enkrasia, which occurs when an agent commits wrongdoing by following a mistaken evaluative judgment that, unbeknownst to her, runs contrary to her true values and cares. Intuitively, inverse enkratics are blameworthy for their actions although the latter don't express their real selves; therefore, non‐reflectivist real self views are false. I assess the implications of this result for the viability of the quality of will paradigm and conclude that the latter survives unscathed to the problems besetting real self views. The lesson is that defenders of the quality of will paradigm should stop talking about real selves altogether. (shrink)

In this article, I argue that queer women – especially cis and trans lesbians – have more in common than contemporary fissures either allow for or acknowledge. Lesbians who recognised their queer sexuality in the 1970s have in common with trans women the shared condition of being, in the words of the 1970s radical feminist Marilyn Frye, ‘spat summarily out of reality’. We also share the experience of refusing to accept this condition. I make this argument by manoeuvring away from (...) questions of gender identity and focusing instead on gender’s ontoformativity: the astonishing, welcome and transformative fact that new social realities are brought into being by new social practices. I turn to experimental writing to explore this matter. Through this medium, the cis lesbian poet Nicole Brossard and the trans lesbian poet Trace Peterson wrote themselves into worlds, languages and social orders that refused to acknowledge their existence. Brossard was writing in 1970s Montreal, Peterson in early twenty-first-century New York, but what they have in common, indeed what radical lesbian theory from the 1970s shares with contemporary theorising by trans women, is the insight that identifying with men is expected. It is in identifying with women that we are most at risk. (shrink)

According to Richard Rorty , irony and solidarity are attitudes which work against rather than promote one another. From Rorty s perspective, irony is an inappropriate response to the discovery of our contingency. It prevents us from developing the ethnocentric attitude which Rorty advocates on the grounds that it allows for a sense of solidarity that is not in conflict with the ideal of negative freedom. As I will briefly indicate in the body of this article, the problem with this (...) proposal is that it leaves out of consideration a different type of irony which, instead of requiring external ethnocentric correction, could help us in correcting some of the biases in Rorty s self-avowed ethnocentrism. (shrink)

In this paper I investigate which of the main conditions proposed in the moral responsibility literature are the ones that spell trouble for the idea that Artificial Intelligence Systems could ever be full-fledged responsible agents. After arguing that the standard construals of the control and epistemic conditions don’t impose any in-principle barrier to AISs being responsible agents, I identify the requirement that responsible agents must be aware of their own actions as the main locus of resistance to attribute that kind (...) of agency to AISs. This is because this type of awareness is thought to involve first-person or de se representations, which, in turn, are usually assumed to involve some form of consciousness. I clarify what this widespread assumption involves and conclude that the possibility of AISs’ moral responsibility hinges on what the correct theory of de se representations ultimately turns out to be. (shrink)

In this paper I revisit Gregory Kavka’s Toxin Puzzle and propose a novel solution to it. Like some previous accounts, mine postulates a tight link between intentions and reasons but, unlike them, in my account these are motivating rather than normative reasons, i.e. reasons that explain (rather than justify) the intended action. I argue that sensitivity to the absence of possible motivational explanations for the intended action is constitutive of deliberation-based intentions. Since ordinary rational agents display this sensitivity, when placed (...) in the toxin scenario they will believe that there is no motivational explanation for actually drinking the toxin and this is why they can’t form the intention to drink it in the first place. I thus argue that my Motivating-Explanatory Reason Principle correctly explains the toxin puzzle, thereby revealing itself as a genuine metaphysical constraint on intentions. I also explore at length the implications of my account for the nature of intention and rational agency. (shrink)

I should like to thank Professor Rorty for the care that he took in replying to my question and for kindly remembering that we had a similar discussion before. Although I do not recall all the details of that exchange1, I remember leaving him as puzzled as I am now by his renewed impression that my resistance to part of his work has a Levinasian provenance. Hence I could only welcome the invitation by the editors of Ethical Perspectives to include (...) in this issue an English translation of a recent piece in which I tried to clarify my resistance to Levinas.Oddly enough, as will become clear in the course of the following pages, at least part of my opposition to Levinas seems to be motivated by an attempt to do justice to what I consider to be Rorty’s major point in his Contingency, Irony and Solidarity: the idea that people are dependent on what he there aptly calls ‘final vocabularies’ — the set of words to which they have recourse when trying to justify their actions or their beliefs or even the meaning of their lives. Such vocabularies, I take it, were not meant to be ‘final’ in the sense that they could never change, but “in the sense that if doubt is cast on the worth of these words, their user has no non-circular argumentative recourse”.Hence Rorty’s idea that, as he puts it in the present paper, the West in approaching the non-West should “get rid of rationalistic rhetoric” and rather think of itself as “someone with an instructive story to tell.” The West, that is, should not give up what Rorty believes to be of prime importance in its own story , but merely detach from it that part which Rorty thinks it doesn’t need in order to remain in touch with that story and which can only cause embarrassment to those who find themselves in other stories.The story of the West is for Rorty but another final vocabulary — and thus, as they all are, a “product of time and chance” — but the realization of this contingency should not lead to the ironist’s conclusion that what is contingent is not worth living for. Since Rorty thinks that contingency does not exclude commitment, he finds himself at odds both with the ironist’s despair that there is nothing which is not contingent, and with the ‘metaphysician’s’ hope that we could still get in touch with something ‘bigger than us’. (shrink)

A prominent position about moral responsibility claims that a necessary condition on accountability blame is that, at the time of action, the agent must be sufficiently reasons-responsive so as to be capable of acting differently by following the pertinent moral reasons and thus avoid wrongdoing. Call this the Accountability with Avoidability view (or AWA). In this paper I aim to show that AWA is false by doing three things. First, I argue that it badly contradicts moral commonsense concerning the moral (...) responsibility of a particularly egregious kind of wrongdoer. Second, I show that AWA’s three most prominent rationales—based on the notions of desert, demands, and excuses—all fail to support a robust reasons-responsiveness requirement on accountability. Finally, I sketch an alternative conception of accountability—accountability without avoidability—that dispenses with robust reasons-responsiveness and appeals instead to the capacity of agents to convey moral meaning through their conduct as the key element in the moral psychology of responsible agency. (shrink)

I have been teaching an undergraduate course called “Ethics and Animals” for almost a decade now. It counts as a core course for the ethics certificate at my university, and is housed in my home department, Women’s Studies, so there is some presumption of feminist or progressive content. I have the syllabi from all these years laid out in front of me on my desk. What strikes me immediately is that the turnover of the reading list is at least 75 (...) percent, and sometimes even 100 percent, from year to year. Early on, I see Singer (1975) and Regan (1983), Adams (1990), DeGrazi (2002), Francione (1996), Singer and Regan again, Linzey (1987), Haraway (1989), Francione again, Wolfe (2003), Derrida (2008), Waldau (2006) .. (shrink)

This article discusses Thomas Aquinas's view on the ‘utility’ of prayer in the light of the doctrine of creation ex nihilo. ‘Creatio ex nihilo’ means, among other things, that nothing can exist that is not caused by the universal power of God. The universal causality of creation implies that God cannot receive from the world or react to any activity on our part. This claim of divine immutability throws into question the intelligibility of prayer: does it make sense to pray (...) to God when his providence is certain and immutable? I argue that the God Thomas conceives is not the God of the ancient régime, the sovereign deity of absolute power who is in charge of everything; on the contrary, it is a God who grants the secondary causes within the world their own power and operation. The human activity of prayer belongs to this sphere of ‘second causes’, through which God realizes his providential plan. God's providence provides good things to us, one of which is the fulfillment of our prayers. (shrink)

In this essay, I draw the discourses around bestiality/zoophilia into the realm of queer theory in order to point to a new form of animal advocacy, something that might be called, in shorthand, loving animals. My argument is quite simple: if all interdicts against bestiality depend on a firm notion of exactly what sex is (and they do), and if queer theory disrupts that firm foundation by arguing that sexuality is impossible to define beforehand and pervades many different kinds of (...) relations (and it does), then viewing bestiality in the frame of queer theory can give us another way to conceptualize the limitations of human exceptionalism. By focusing on transformative connections between humans and animals, a new form of animal advocacy emerges through the revolutionary power of love. (shrink)

Transcendence, Levinas tells us, is not a failed immanence. It presupposes an Exteriority that cannot be integrated into a totality. Such is its excellence: a surplus that rends Being's monism and allows for a pluralism that is not a "missed union". In the first sections of this article I show how the ethical relation with the Other is the only one that, for Levinas, satisfies the conditions he thus imposes on a metaphysical — i.e. transcendent — relation. I subsequently link (...) this 'return' to Plato's idea of a 'Good beyond Being' to the problem of Evil. If Evil is the refusal of the Good, we should, of course, first understand what it means that, as Levinas contends, the Good has chosen us before we could choose it. Are we to think of this 'election' as a command or as an invitation? Concretely: is the appeal of the Other something one cannot not hear, or does it only have the force to disturb those who "retain it"? In other words: should one think of Evil in terms of a choice for irresponsibility which is already situated in the horizon of a responsibility one cannot refuse; or should what in the former case is called Evil, not rather be thought of in terms of a deafness that is sui generis and not the privation of a hearing that ought to be there? Could there not be an irresponsibility that is not the refusal of responsibility, and that, instead of being situated within ethics, would rather complicate our way of conceiving the ethical relation? In the last section I oppose to Levinas's way of conceiving the relation between transcendence and immanence a different approach: the Good is inevitably incarnated and thus pluralized to a point where it becomes difficult to still present it as the Good. Incarnating the transcendent is not merely wrapping it in a context which leaves it unaltered. The incarnans is not just the envelope for the incarnatum. It is its "originary supplement" (Derrida). But then, inevitably, the relation between 'the' Good and 'Being' becomes anti-platonic: transcendence becomes mortal and fragile. It can bleed! It is in terms of such bleeding that we ought to look at some of the conflicts that trouble our societies — multiculturalism being one example amongst others. (shrink)

Whereas Arendt's work has been traditionally received, both by its critics and its admirers, as of one piece, this article uses her proposals for some sort of `organic representation' in On Revolution as a lever to break open that unity and show that it comprises two lines of thought that as such contradict one another. On the one hand her misgivings about representation betray a political version of the metaphysics of presence Derrida has taught us to deconstruct. On the other (...) hand her concept of political freedom and of the role of the public realm goes against the very presuppositions of that metaphysics. That this tension goes unnoticed is largely due to the weight Arendt attached to the theme of participation. By shifting that weight to some of the less prominent themes in her work, I try to give it a different relief, more apt to confront the difficult pluralism of our times. (shrink)

which deliberately imitates Rorty's style), I take issue with the plea for liberalism advocated in his Contingency, Irony and Solidarity by turning a number of his own arguments against him. In particular, I show how Rorty's tendency to think of the 'liberal ironist' as the 'hero' of that book rhetorically obfuscates that the trust of his own argument would rather seem to point to a 'non-ironic non-liberal' individual in the role of the hero. I suggest that what has prevented Rorty (...) from coming to such a conclusion himself, is not just his predilection for 'liberalism', but also a confusion between two notions of ethnocentrism - to which he pointed himself in later writings, without, however, drawing the necessary consequences. Key Words: aletheia • ethnocentrism • finitude • Heidegger • irony • Kierkegaard • liberalism • Rorty. (shrink)

Those who are familiar with the development of contemporary philosophy and in particular of phenomenology, may have frowned at the prospect of having to sit through a praise of visibility. Indeed, if there is any praise to be sung, it is not the visible but the invisible that should be its subject. The realm of the visible suffers from an intrinsic defect: it lacks the depth to resist the movement of appropriation implied in seeing, or more generally in perceiving. It (...) does not dispose of whatLevinas would call the infinity that could help it withstand the gaze that catches it and helps it contest the subject of that gaze its power. There is not enough of the event in it to “summon the subject outside of its autarky.” “The flat phenomenon and the subject to which nothing ever happens form a pair,” Rudolf Bernet writes in a paper with the telling title “Le phénomène et l’invisible (le regard).” It seems indeed left to the invisible to remediate the shortcomings of the eye that sees. Its task is to divest the subject who sees of a handicap it cannot compensate for on its own, — of a kind of Midas complex: whatever it encounters in the light that it throws on things, is fatally robbed of its alterity, leaving the seeing or perceiving subject alone in a solitude that is but the reverse side of the power by which it subjects whatever crosses its way. “The exteriority of light,” Levinas writes in this vein, “does not suffice for the liberation of the I that is its own prisoner.”. (shrink)

Multiculturalism is not a recent phenomenon. From the moment a different world appears, a different culture in which the evidence of the cultural world in which I participate is put out of play, we are confronted with the problem of a split between the world as such and my world, which is only one among others, and we find ourselves compelled to seek a solution.One such solution would be to try to deny the split by restricting the meaning of `world' (...) to one's own world alone; another one would be to welcome the split as allowing us to understand that humanity must ultimately be sought beyond all particularism. But it is not by looking at such classical solutions which, though unsatisfactory, are still with us, that we will understand what might be new in this multiculturalism that so commands our attention.What is new is neither the problem posed by it nor the solutions we have found for it, but our fascination with the phenomenon. It is indeed only very recently that the word `multiculturalism' itself has begun to take over from that other key word which fascinated us for so many years: we no longer expect `postmodernism' to provide the answers to all our enigmas, but multiculturalism.This fascination is somewhat surprising. In order to understand it, we will have to try not to let it captivate us. And perhaps it has already captivated us as soon as we see in it only the name of a problem to which we must find a solution as soon as possible. Hence a series of counter-questions: What is it about multiculturalism that manages not only to fascinate us, but also to make us believe that our fascination merely points out the urgency of a problem that only concerns us to the extent that it concerns others? Whence the tendency to treat the multicultural as something that primarily deals with the existence — ethical or political — of the other, and hence as something that implicates us in an intrigue that interpellates us only in that dimension of our existence that we are content to call our ethical or political responsibility?Multiculturalism would put us `in response' to the other. It would thus be of concern to that part of our subjectivity in which we find ourselves linked to others. But it would not cut deeper than that. As if our fascination for the other would not engage us in another aspect of our being, as if our `non-intersubjective' subjectivity had nothing to do with it, as if our very existence were only implicated in the multicultural by the threads of an intersubjectivity which are only the warp of a subjectivity already there, and ultimately unaffected by it. Let us pause for a moment to consider what is seductive about this logic of the `as if', for it is in this logic that most ethical and political approaches to the multicultural seem to find their point of departure. (shrink)

Interculturalism and multiculturalism seem to be finished. ‘Transculturalism’ is now the order of the day, an idea which, apart from referring to a break with the classical conception of culture, also indicates in which direction a solution should be sought: in the mutual intersection, penetration, interweaving and overlapping between the cultural forms and lifestyles cutting through the various national or ethnic cultures which are now seen to be less monolithic and less hermetic than they had appeared through multicultural spectacles. In (...) short, métissage is in, and we all find ourselves in a big melting pot where the political problem no longer consists in combining the different ingredients but in giving shape to the combination which has already come about de facto — and by ‘shape’, transculturalism is not simply referring to the syncretism of bringing old, already existing elements together, but rather means to establish something new.Multiculturalism, according to the champions of transculturalism, has never succeeded in doing this. Instead of leading to cultural contact, it produced a flourishing of cultural separatism, a kind of totalitarian particularism which carried ‘retribalization’ even into education: instead of grouping plants according to Linnaeus’ classification scheme, Mexican- American children now follow their ‘own’ rediscovered ethnobotanical principles.Multiculturalism, then, seems on the one hand to be outdated by facts which it cannot very well place within its own concept of culture . And, on the other hand, multiculturalism seems to have led to a fiasco when it has been able to impose itself politically: “Instead of plurality we find particularism; instead of citizenship, a dictatorship of minorities.” Authors such as Welsch in Germany, Finkielkraut in France, or Procee in the Netherlands are thus in search of a new concept of culture which would be able to curb multicultural violence.Since the plausibility of their ‘transcultural’ alternative seems to depend on the extent to which one is convinced by their critique of multiculturalism, I will begin by examining this critique , then go on to formulate another critique which concerns multiculturalism as well as transculturalism , and which is mainly centred on what I take to be a mistaken concept of alterity and difference which one finds in both conceptions and which links them together. (shrink)

This paper is about difficulties in the normative justification of an unconditional basic income-difficulties which are related to the scope of egalitarian justice as well as the dimension(s) of the equalisandum. More specifically, it is contended that Philippe Van Parijs’s justification derived from the principle of Maximin real freedom runs into problems in environments in which scarcity does not offer a conceptual basis for a satisfactory account of social interdependencies. We discuss the following cases: (i) Scarcity is seen as a (...) general equilibrium phenomenon in a dynamic environment. (ii) Social forces of production (particularly non-rival and only partially excludable inputs) play a role in creating wealth. (iii) Informal exclusion mechanisms and patterns of ‘local justice’ matter. (iv) Certain forms of heterogeneity play a role. (shrink)

The author deals with the operational core oflogic, i.e. its diverse procedures ofinference, in order to show that logicallyfalse inferences may in fact be right because –in contrast to logical rationality – theyactually enlarge our knowledge of the world.This does not only mean that logically trueinferences say nothing about the world, butalso that all our inferences are inventedhypotheses the adequacy of which cannot beproved within logic but only pragmatically. Inconclusion the author demonstrates, through therelationship between rule-following andrationality, that it is (...) most irrational to wantto exclude the irrational: it may, at times, bemost rational to think and infer irrationally.Focussing on the operational aspects of knowingas inferring does away with the hiatus betweenlogic and life, cognition and the world(reality) – or whatever other dualism one wantsto invoke –: knowing means inferring, inferringmeans rule-governed interpreting, interpretingis a constructive, synthetic act, and aconstruction that proves adequate (viable) inthe ``world of experience'', in life, in thepraxis of living, is, to the constructivistmind, knowledge. It is the practice of livingwhich provides the orienting standards forconstructivist thinking and its judgments ofviability. The question of truth is replaced bythe question of viability, and viabilitydepends on the (right) kind of experiential fit. (shrink)

According to Thomas Aquinas, both logic and metaphysics are characterized by the same universal scope. The consideration of metaphysics extends to everthing which is, as its subject is being insofar as it is being. And the science of logic too considers everything which is, not as it exists in reality but insofar as the whole of being falls under the consideration of reason. Because of the equivalence between the logical sphere of reason and the real sphere of being metaphysics has (...) an affinity with logic. This similarity is mentioned by Aquinas in order to explain the legitimate use of a logical mode of reasoning within metaphysics. Metaphysics is not identical with logic, but the modus logicus, the logical mode of reasoning, is to a certain extent useful for the philosopher in his inquiry into metaphysical matters. In his Commentary on Aristotle’s Metaphysics Thomas refers frequently to this ‘modus logicus' by which Aristotle is said to proceed in his investigation into substance. However, it is not altogether clear what this method consists in and how the similarity between logic and metaphysics, on which the modus logicus is based, should be understood. In this article I want to clarify the meaning of the modus logicusin Aquinas and its revelance for metaphysics. This might help us to understand better how according to Thomas logic and metaphysics are related to one another and in what sense they are different. (shrink)

En Self-Constitution. Agency, Identity, and Integrity (2009), Christine Korsgaard defiende la conclusión de que el imperativo categórico rige la acción humana porque es el único principio que permite alcanzar la unidad psíquica plena, la cual, según Korsgaard, es un prerrequisito esencial para la acción efectiva. Para los agentes humanos, alcanzar esa unidad -que consiste en hacer coherentes distintos impulsos hacia la acción- es una actividad constante, denominada "autoconstitución". De acuerdo con Korsgaard, ésta es la fuente originaria de la normatividad y (...) de las identidades prácticas e incluso de la identidad personal. Después de exponer las ideas centrales del libro, presento dos objeciones: primero, critico la equiparación del imperativo categórico con la autoconstitución exitosa, pues no toda falla de auto-constitución es una falla moral. Segundo, argumento que la tesis de que la identidad personal es producto de la autoconstitución es problemática y que, al defenderla, Korsgaard confunde identidad práctica con identidad personal. In Self-Constitution. Agency, Identity, and Integrity (2009), Christine Korsgaard argues that the categorical imperative rules human action because it is the sole principle that allows us to reach the complete psychic unity that, Korsgaard thinks, is an essential prerequisite for effective action. Reaching this unity -which consists in making cohere diverging impulses for action- is for human agents a constant activity called "self-constitution." According to Korsgaard, this activity is the source of normativity, of human practical identities and even of personal identity. After explaining the main ideas of the book, I present two objections. First, I criticize the linkage of the categorical imperative to successful self-constitution, for not every failure of the latter counts as a moral failure. Second, I argue that the thesis that personal identity is a product of self-constitution is problematic and that it betrays a confusion between practical identity and personal identity. (shrink)