This paper is concerned with an enquiry into male sex offenders' understanding of masculinity to establish whether there exists a link between their view of masculinity and their sexual offending behaviour. The enquiry concerned twenty-five sexual offenders serving prison sentences. A short discussion follows and it is suggested that a sexuality and spirituality support group could be piloted within the prison context in order to give sex offenders a new perspective on how to be male in an evolving and flexible (...) way by meaningful relationship. (shrink)

Introduction: Laughter as an expression of human nature in the Middle Ages and the early modern period: literary, historical, theological, philosophical, and psychological reflections -- Judith Hagen. Laughter in Procopius's wars -- Livnat Holtzman. "Does God really laugh?": appropriate and inappropriate descriptions of God in Islamic traditionalist theology -- Daniel F. Pigg. Laughter in Beowulf: ambiguity, ambivalence, and group identity formation -- Mark Burde. The parodia sacra problem and medieval comic studies -- Olga V. Trokhimenko. Women's laughter and gender politics (...) in medieval conduct discourse -- Madelon Köhler-Busch. Pushing decorum: uneasy laughter in Heinrich von Dem Türlîn's Diu crône -- Connie L. Scarborough. Laughter and the comic in a religious text -- John Sewell. The son rebelled and so the father made man alone: ridicule and boundary maintenance in The Nizzahon vetus -- Birgit Wiedl. Laughing at the beast: the judensau: anti-Jewish propaganda and humor from the Middle Ages to the early modern period -- Fabian Alfie. Yes . . . but was it funny? Cecco Angiolieri, Rustico Filippi and Giovanni Boccaccio -- Nicolino Applauso. Curses and laughter in medieval Italian comic poetry -- Feargal Béarra. Tromdhámh guaire: a context for laughter and audience in early modern Ireland -- Jean E. Jost. Humorous transgression in the non-conformist fabliaux: a Bakhtinian analysis of three comic tales -- Gretchen Mieszkowski. Chaucerian comedy: Troilus and Criseyde -- Sarah Gordon. Laughing and eating in the fabliaux -- Christine Bousquet-Labouérie. Laughter and medieval stalls -- Scott L. Taylor. Esoteric humor and the incommensurability of laughter -- Jean N. Goodrich. The function of laughter in The second shepherds' play -- Albrecht Classen. Laughing in late-medieval verse and prose narratives -- Rosa Alvarez perez. The workings of desire: Panurge and the dogs -- Elizabeth Chesney Zegura. Laughing out loud in the Heptaméron: a reassessment of Marguerite de Navarre's ambivalent humor -- Lia B. Ross. You had to be there: the elusive humor of the Sottie -- Kyle Diroberto. Sacred parody in Robert Greene's Groatsworth of wit -- Martha Moffitt Peacock. The comedy of the shrew: theorizing humor in early modern Netherlandish art -- Jessica Tvordi. The comic personas of Milton's Prolusion VI: negotiating masculine identity through self-directed humor -- John Alexander. Ridentum dicere verum (using laughter to speak the truth): laughter and the language of the early modern clown "pickelhering" in German literature of the late seventeenth century (1675-1700) -- Thomas Willard. Andreae's ludibrium: Menippean satire in The chymische hochzeit -- Diane Rudall. The comic power of illusion-allusion -- Allison P. Coudert. Laughing at credulity and superstition in the long eighteenth century. (shrink)

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:Religion, Psychiatry, and “Radical” Epistemic InjusticesRosa Ritunnano, MD (bio) and Ian James Kidd, PhD (bio)Hermeneutical injustice as a concept has evolved since its original formulation by Miranda Fricker (2007). The concept has been taken up in psychiatry, with its moral, epistemic and clinical premium on the interpretation of extremely complex and difficult experiences (Kidd et al., 2022). There are many varieties of hermeneutical injustice with different forms, sources, degrees, (...) effects, and interpersonal and socio-structural aspects (Medina, 2017). José Eduardo Porcher has proposed the addition of a new form of ‘radical’ hermeneutical injustice, with a case study of psychotic symptoms involving religious content.He offers different characterizations of this injustice:a particularly radical form of injustice, namely, having their own interpretation of their experiences unjustifiably undermined.a form of hermeneutical injustice that occurs when a patient diagnosed with psychosis is denied the opportunity of interpreting their own experiences within their own religious framework.These are different things. Denying someone the opportunity to interpret their experiences in their own, preferred framework is one way of undermining their interpretations. Another is forcing someone to use your own preferred framework and then belittling their own, which seems doubly wrong. Misusing some preferred interpretive framework can be as unjust as not using it. The two definitions could be combined, but then much will depend on what it means to undermine someone’s interpretation of an experience. We think there is a form of radical hermeneutical injustice—different to the one described by Porcher. Some interpretations of kinds of experience with religious content can be undermined if one is committed to a metaphysical naturalism. In these cases, one person cannot regard someone’s interpretive framework as coherent or intelligible (one that involves supernatural entities, for instance).Most discussions of hermeneutical injustice focus on social structures. Fricker notes structural dimensions to hermeneutical injustice. In a standard case, a group has unequal participation in collective practices for making and using interpretive resources (Ritunnano, 2022). In a rich analysis, José Medina describes four ‘axes’ or dimensions for distinguishing forms of hermeneutical injustice [End Page 235] (Medina, 2017). The source of these injustices can be semantic or performative. The dynamics may be structural or interpersonal, or both. Moreover, there are different degrees of breadth and depth, defined here in terms of the ‘reach’ of the injustice across one’s life, and the depth of damage to one’s hermeneutic agency, respectively (Medina, 2017, p. 45). On this model, what might count as ‘radical’ hermeneutical injustices? Deep and broad hermeneutical injustices can be radical when they are very broad in scope and very deeply damaging. This might be what Porcher has in mind. But we think there is a further option, relevant to his case study.Porcher focuses on a case where individuals experience unusual beliefs and perceptions with religious content receive a ‘psychosis’ diagnosis. The alleged injustice is that the possibility of a genuine religious experience is not recognized and validated. The example is Femi, a young man with Christian background, who enters the mental health system following the onset of psychotic ‘symptoms’. After being found “disoriented and depleted in public” – tired and undernourished—Femi is compulsorily admitted to hospital, explaining he undertook fasting and isolation in response to orders from God. During this time, Femi devoted himself to Bible reading and stopped going to work. In hospital, where the authenticity of God’s voice is challenged by clinicians, Femi is treated for acute psychosis with pharmacotherapy. While remission of symptoms follow, there is no functional recovery, and Femi is described as “unmotivated and apathetic”.Femi interpreted his experiences in religious terms, but this interpretation is not accepted or pursued by the clinicians. Is this a hermeneutical injustice? If so, is it a ‘radical’ one? Granted, Femi’s religious interpretation may be psychologically adaptive—enhancing his sense of life as meaningful (Ritunnano & Bortolotti, 2022). But this is consistent with it being a hermeneutical injustice. Plus, a religious framing may be conducive to his functional recovery after being discharged, especially in conjunction with a supportive religious community, able to help him articulate, understand, and respond to those religious experiences (see Cottingham, 2005; Wynn, 2005). However, none of... (shrink)

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:Buddhist-Christian Studies 23 (2003) 159-161 [Access article in PDF] Benedict's Dharma: Buddhist Reflections on the Rule of Saint Benedict. By Norman Fischer, et al. Edited by Patrick Hart, with an afterword by David Steindl-Rast and a translation of the Rule by Patrick Berry. New York: Riverhead Books, 2001. xvi + 222 pp. When Buddhist and Christian monastics meet, they recognize each other as brothers and sisters engaged in a (...) similar quest, despite their doctrinal differences. The nature of this quest is explored in Benedict's Dharma, in which four Buddhists (Norman Fischer, Joseph Goldstein, Judith Simmer-Brown, and Yifa, representing the Zen, Theravadin, Tibetan, and Chinese Buddhist traditions) ruminate on their fraternal and sororal feelings.Venerable Yifa, a nun of the prominent Taiwanese monastery Fo Guang Shan, is the only one of the four in monastic vows, and the reader may wonder what the three non-monastics could offer to a discussion on the monastic life. This is not a new problem. Patrick Henry and Donald Swearer's groundbreaking study, For the Sake of the World: The Spirit of Buddhist and Christian Monasticism (1989), spends a great deal of time on Zen monks, even though there are no Zen monks, theVinaya is kept by the Zen nuns or by the monastics of the parent and sibling lineages of Chan, Son, and Thien. (See my review article, "Why Are There Monks and Nuns?" in Buddhist-Christian Studies 12.) The monastic, it seems, is not confined to the habit.Brother David Steindl-Rast, a monk of Mount Saviour Monastery, grapples with this problem in his afterword, "Conclusions about a Beginning." It was at Mount Saviour that the phrase "the monastic dimension" was coined, to refer to those of monastic bent who for one reason or another did not or could not live in the cloister. One of Brother David's books was to be called, he told me, The Monk in Us, "us" meaning laypeople, but the title had an odd sound and was dropped. So, what is the monastic dimension? Brother David suggests that it is mindfulness, and he comes close to saying that wherever there is mindfulness, there is monasticism. "If mindfulness is all that matters, the monastery is merely a most convenient environment for this kind of life, but it can be lived anywhere, by anyone" (126). He goes on to discuss the phenomenon of monasteries shrinking in size at the same time as the number of long- and short-term visitors to monasteries grows, and proposes that we are moving toward a new understanding of the terms "contemplative," "monastic," and "lay."This insight may point to the most important contribution of this book. It is not about monasticism per se, and it is not a comparative study of the Rule and the Vinaya, with practical suggestions for their mutual reform; rather, it is a meditation on how anyone, monastic or lay, might live the contemplative or mindful life. Throughout the history of the Church and the sangha, laypeople have been in the majority, but attention has been focused on the priests and monastics. Pope Pius X [End Page 159] put it bluntly: the laypeople are the sheep who are to be led, and the clergy are the shepherds who lead. The Church, he added, is not a democracy. I do not know of a Buddhist who has been quite this straightforward, but many have come close, and the history of Buddhism is not that of a democracy. Occasionally, lay movements in both traditions have arisen, basing themselves on the doctrine of the priesthood of all believers or on the teaching of universal Buddha-nature, but they have quickly been co-opted by leaders who proclaimed themselves to be more equal than their fellows. The tragedy for both Buddhism and Christianity is that the contemplative or mindful life has become restricted to a group of professionals, with the attendant belief that such a life is unattainable by most Buddhists and Christians. Now that the dharma has come to the land of the red-faced people, where democracy is... (shrink)

Epistemologists often describe subjects as being capable of adopting a third kind of categorical doxastic stance regarding whether something is the case, besides belief and disbelief. They deploy a variety of idioms in order to ascribe that stance. In this paper, I flesh out the properties that the third kind of categorical stance is supposed to have and start searching for the best ways to ascribe it. The idioms ‘suspends judgment about whether’ and ‘is agnostic about whether’, among others, are (...) found to be unfit to play the desired role. In the end, I suggest that ‘is in doubt as to whether’ is our best choice among the alternatives surveyed here. (shrink)

In this text, we propose to examine the ways in which Nancy’s thought of catastrophe, indebted to Heidegger’s questioning of ontology and its history, embarks on a reading of the contemporary world marked by the passage of the “with” (Mitdasein) from the existential plane to the plainly categorial one. Thus, the ontological constitution of the existing slides into pure juxtaposition, as this appears in his analysis of the “proliferation of ends” and their incessant transformation into means.We also dedicate our attention (...) to the ruin, saturation and rupture of the “construction” model. It is in the infinitization of each and every action, through the unpredictable technical architecture in the base of its design, that the catastrophic penetrates the world with its constitutive multiplicity and the state of “suspension” that defines it. The life of waste in its dispersion is exemplary in this context: the catastrophe thus unfolds in lapses thrown into the environment and the psyche of the subjects, something that can be seen as the introjection of the temporality of struction.The anomie that today shelters the catastrophes that intertwine before our eyes, apparently “scandalous” in a paradigm of action, takes place in a «present that never fulfills itself as presence» (Nancy) and that finds itself in the impossibility of expressing the meaning of the world. The disorder of struction, which characterizes what some inappropriately call the Anthropocene, does not happen as a reversal or a destruction of an order, but rather as a disconnection of the imperative character of the order. From this question, a discussion opens on the meaning of the community that is on the verge of catastrophe. (shrink)

Let T be any logical truth. Does the subject know that T (any random subject)? It is not rational for any subject to believe that they don’t, whoever they are. Similarly, it is not rational for them to believe that their evidence doesn’t support T, and it is not even rational for them to believe that they don’t believe that T. It is not rational for anyone anywhere at any time to believe that they don’t know that T. Such are (...) the conclusions arrived at in this paper. (shrink)

Rorty’s Philosophy and the Mirror of Nature presents the most thorough and sustained critique of Western epistemology and foundationalism in the second half of the twentieth Century. The work deconstructs philosophy as an autonomous discipline generating a “neutral matrix” to assess knowledge, truth, and rationality, offering philosophical analyses of the mind-body distinction, representation, reference, and truth, and ultimately the concept of knowledge as a “mirror of nature.” The deconstruction of Cartesian dualism undermines the mind as the immaterial ground of absolute (...) certainty; the deconstruction of the Kantian empirical-transcendental distinction destroys the transcendental realm as philosophy’s uniquely accessible and founding domain. Instead, Rorty invites us to reconceive philosophy as an edifying voice in the “conversation of mankind.”. (shrink)

§1 According to the paradigmatic formula offered by Kant, the philosopher’s task consists of demonstrating “how we ought to think” as opposed to “how we do think” – that is, logical rules or norms must be separated from the functioning principles of the human mind or from psychological laws. As it is well-known, in the “Preface” to the second edition of the Critique of Pure Reason, the German philosopher stands against “some moderns” who “have thought to enlarge” logic “interpolating psycholo...

The paper is concerned with the rational requirements for suspended judgment, or what suspending judgment about a question rationally commits one to. It shows that two purported rational requirements for suspended judgment cannot both be true at the same time, at least when the entailment relation between questions is understood a certain way. The first one says that one is rationally required to suspend judgment about those questions that are entailed by the questions that one already suspends judgment about. The (...) second one says that one is rationally required to believe the presuppositions of the questions one suspends judgment about. Two plausible solutions to the problem are discussed. One of them explicates the relation of entailment between questions in an alternative manner, and the other one rejects the presupposition requirement. Either way, a closure requirement for suspended judgment can be maintained which is analogous to the closure requirement for belief. Whereas belief is ideally closed under entailment between propositions, suspended judgment is ideally closed under entailment between questions. (shrink)

In this paper, we contend that there are two ways of arguing, namely sincere and insincere arguing. We draw such a distinction, based on the felicity conditions of the complex speech act of arguing as modelled in van Eemeren and Grootendorst’s pragma-dialectical approach. We introduce a conversa-tional setting, which contains a speech act of arguing that does not count as in-sincere arguing, while being a sui gene-ris form of sincere arguing. We desig-nate it as “cooperative inquiry”. Finally, we show that (...) argument evaluation plays a key role in determining whether an in-stance of arguing counts as either argu-ing sincerely or insincerely. Résumé: Dans cet article, nous affir-mons qu’il existe deux manières d’argu-menter, à savoir l’argumentation sincère et l’argumentation non sincère. Nous établissons une telle distinction, basée sur les conditions de félicité de l’acte de parole complexe consistant à argu-menter, tel que modélisé dans l’ap-proche pragma-dialectique de van Eemeren et Grootendorst. Nous intro-duisons un cadre conversationnel, qui contient un acte de parole d'argumenta-tion qui n'est pas considéré comme une argumentation non sincère, tout en étant une forme sui generis d'argumentation sincère. Nous la désignons comme « enquête coopérative ». Enfin, nous montrons que l’évaluation des argu-ments joue un rôle clé pour déterminer si un cas d’argumentation compte comme une argumentation sincère ou non. (shrink)

There are many ways in which a speaker can confuse their audience. In this paper, I will focus on one such way, namely, a way of talking that seems to manifest a cross-level kind of cognitive dissonance on the part of the speaker. The goal of the paper is to explain why such ways of talking sound so twisted. The explanation is two-pronged, since their twisted nature may come either from the very mental states that the speaker thereby makes manifest, (...) or from how the speaker chooses to express themselves (even if there is nothing wrong with their mental states). So-called ‘Moore-paradoxical’ utterances are but one example of the phenomenon, and the explanation of what is wrong about them is subsumed under a more general explanation here—one that captures also the twisted-ness of utterances whereby questions are raised or intentions expressed. (shrink)

HR/AL: Professor Taylor, what are you working on these days? CT: Well, several things. One of the things I am working on is something I was lecturing this fall at the New School University, and that I have called ‘modern social imaginaries’. It is an attempt to understand western modernity in terms of the different ways in which people imagine their social existence. These imaginaries are a condition for new kinds of practices that are characteristic of modernity. This research is (...) an internal part of a larger project to understand modern secular civilization, the modern west as a secular civilization. What does that notion exactly mean? What does it amount to? How did it happen? (shrink)

In 2016, the theme chosen for the Ecumenical Fraternity Campaign was: "Common House, our responsibility." Organized by the National Council of Christian Churches of Brazil, CFE has the overall objective of ensuring the right to sanitation for all people and commit ourselves in the light of faith, public politics and responsible attitudes to ensure the integrity and the future of our common home. The book of the prophet Amos, who inspired the motto of this campaign, "I want to see the (...) right sprout as the source and run the justice which stream that does not dry out.", is a revelation that also at that time had already acute social crises based on economic progress did not translate into equality and justice for all. In this line of thought, also include the thought of Pope Francis contained in his Encyclical Letter: Laudato Si ', therefore, its content covers the same reasoning Text-Base CFE/2016. To prevent such a relevant subject is forgotten, it is proposed, the objective of this Article, the constant resumption of the reading of the documents referenced herein, whose reflections can contribute to awaken in us a consciousness that materializes in responsible attitudes towards the preservation of our Common Home. (shrink)

En este trabajo se analiza el recurso a la escatología y al universo profético-apocalíptico de orientación antiliberal durante la consumación de la independencia de México, en 1821. Las diversas fuentes impresas utilizadas revelan la importancia que adquirieron los discursos sibilinos en la transición del virreinato al Imperio, así como su potencial movilizador. Se argumenta que estos sirvieron para denunciar el liberalismo revolucionario, fomentar la alternativa emancipadora y proponer lecturas mesiánicas renovadas. A través de esos tres aspectos se exploran las posibilidades (...) del pensamiento escatológico y del marco profético a la hora de comprender los cambios político-religiosos del periodo de las independencias iberoamericanas. (shrink)

Natura 2000 is a network of natural sites whose aim is to preserve species and habitats of relevance in the European Union. The policy underlying Natura 2000 has faced widespread opposition from land users and received extensive support from environmentalists. This paper addresses the ethical framework for Natura 2000 and the probable moral assumptions of its main stakeholders. Arguments for and against Natura 2000 were analyzed and classified according to “strong” or “weak” versions of the three main theories of environmental (...) ethics – anthropocentrism, biocentrism, and ecocentrism. Weak (intergenerational) anthropocentrism was found to underlie the Natura 2000 network itself and the positions of environmentalists, while strong (traditional) anthropocentrism pervaded the positions of economic developers. Land users seemed to fall somewhere between weak and strong anthropocentrism. The paper discusses the relation between ethics and different attitudes towards Natura 2000, highlighting some of the implications for the network’s ongoing implementation. It is shown that Natura 2000 achieves a strong reversal of the burden of proof from conservation to economic development and land use change under anthropocentrism. It is argued that the alleged theoretical divide between anthropocentrism and non-anthropocentrism in relation to the burden of proof does not seem to hold in practice. Finally, it is predicted that the weak versions of anthropocentrism, biocentrism, and ecocentrism, are likely to converge extensively in respect to nature conservation policy measures. (shrink)

O presente estudo se destina a fazer uma breve análise sobre o direito social à educação, sua influência para o alcance da dignidade da pessoa humana e o seu alcance no formato EAD no Brasil. O artigo trata das metodologias de ensino viabilizadas pelo EAD, qual a sua contribuição na formação desses jovens e crianças e se a fruição dos benefícios desse método de ensino são possível por todas as classes sociais de forma isonômica. A pretensão é analisar como o (...) EAD pode trazer a democratização do ensino no país e qual caminho viabilizará isto. (shrink)

Os objetivos do presente estudo foram: realizar uma série histórica dos procedimentos realizados pelos serviços odontológicos na Atenção Primária em Saúde (APS) no município de Canoas e verificar a redução da proporção de procedimentos de exodontia. Os dados foram coletados do Departamento de Informática do SUS (DATASUS) e foram agrupados em blocos de procedimentos odontológicos: exodontias, restauradores, preventivos, periodontais, endodônticos/urgências e outros procedimentos. Verificou-se que houve redução da proporção de exodontias e quando foram calculadas as médias do período de 10 (...) anos, utilizando os critérios específicos da APS e do IDSUS, as proporções de exodontias foram 4,46% e 4,83%. Neste contexto, conclui-se que a série histórica evidencia a redução das proporções de exodontias no município e as médias das proporções das exodontias no período avaliado foram maiores quando comparadas com a meta estabelecida pelo Plano Anual de Saúde (2,8). (shrink)

This article analyses the contributions of the sociologies or theories of the South to the contemporary debates on the production of theory in the social sciences. Starting with the assumption that these projects adopt a critical view of how sociology has privileged certain objects over others in a colonial way, it proposes an analysis that makes use of certain aspects of the actor-network theory. This approach, it is suggested, will help the sociologies of the South to focus on the production (...) of ontoforms as their specific object, ontoforms which expand and at times challenge the established hegemonic notions of the social and of agency in this area of knowledge. (shrink)

Este artigo objetiva apresentar as interpretações de Arthur Danto e Gianni Vattimo sobre a questão “fim da arte”, introduzida por Hegel em seus Cursos de Estética. Segundo Danto há, no presente, uma transformação radical nas condições de produção das artes. As definições da arte não podem mais se fundamentar na inspeção direta das obras, exigindo uma mudança na forma de se refletir sobre a arte. O “vazio” das definições de arte no momento em que “tudo é permitido” traz a questão (...) do “fim da arte”. Ora, para Danto, o “fim da arte” não significa o fim das produções artísticas na contemporaneidade, mas o fim das narrativas mestras. É um meio de se mostrar que as narrativas que definiram a arte tradicional chegaram a um fim e que a arte contemporânea não mais permite uma representação por narrativas. Vattimo, discorre, em consonância com Danto, acerca das transformações da arte e das insuficiências da Estética tradicional na contemporaneidade. Contudo, Vattimo destaca a incapacidade da Estética em compreender os mass media e suas possibilidades positivas. Para Vattimo, a reprodutibilidade técnica e a massificação são inconciliáveis com as definições tradicionais da Estética. Assim, a reflexão vattimiana busca apreender o sentido do estético na sociedade dos mass media, remetendo-se à questão do “fim da arte” em um sentido “pervertido” como generalização da esfera dos meios de comunicação. (shrink)