Various authors have argued that in the future not only will it be technically feasible for human minds to be transferred to other substrates, but this will become, for most humans, the preferred option over the current biological limitations. It has even been claimed that such a scenario is inevitable in order to solve the challenging, but imperative, multi-agent value alignment problem. In all these considerations, it has been overlooked that, in order to create a suitable environment for a particular (...) mind – for example, a personal universe in a computational substrate – numerous other potentially sentient beings will have to be created. These range from non-player characters to subroutines. This article analyzes the additional suffering and mind crimes that these scenarios might entail. We offer a partial solution to reduce the suffering by imposing on the transferred mind the perception of indicators to measure potential suffering in non-player characters. This approach can be seen as implementing literal empathy through enhanced cognition. (shrink)

Everything you always wanted to know about structural realism but were afraid to ask Content Type Journal Article Pages 227-276 DOI 10.1007/s13194-011-0025-7 Authors Roman Frigg, Department of Philosophy, Logic and Scientific Method, London School of Economics and Political Science, Houghton Street, London, WC2A 2AE UK Ioannis Votsis, Philosophisches Institut, Heinrich-Heine-Universität Düsseldorf, Universitätsstraße 1, Geb. 23.21/04.86, 40225 Düsseldorf, Germany Journal European Journal for Philosophy of Science Online ISSN 1879-4920 Print ISSN 1879-4912 Journal Volume Volume 1 Journal Issue Volume 1, Number (...) 2. (shrink)

Consider the claim: Our actions are free if and only if we could have done otherwise; or the claim, We are essentially mental substances because we can exist without our bodies. Both of these claims, along with countless others, employ a notion of possibility. If this notion is to have a place in philosophy, we must be able to justify our modal claims. We need an epistemology of possibility. It is often assumed that the imagination is the key here. The (...) assumption is this; if I can imagine that a proposition is the case, then p is possible. Suppose I am wondering whether Kant Critique could float above my desk; if I can imagine this book floating, then it is possible. But is the imagination a guide to the modal status of propositions? ;To answer this question we must first consider what it is to imagine a proposition. We can distinguish five main methods of imagining: to imagine is to form a mental image, to evoke experiences, to suppose, to pretend, or it is to tell a story. Can any of these methods provide us with a guide to possibility? I contend that only the last two methods are up to this task insofar as they provide us with evidence of p's modal status. Moreover, how good that evidence is depends on our ability to satisfy the requirements of completeness, coherence, and accuracy. Finally, I argue that we will have the best evidence for the possibility of p, if we combine these two methods. For by combining our evoked experiences with a story, we will generate experiences of p, the best possible explanation of a world in which p is true, and an account of p's truth that complements this explanation. Thus, given explanationist standards, we will have what we need to be justified in concluding that p is possible. (shrink)

Determinism and chance seem to be irreconcilable opposites: either something is chancy or it is deterministic but not both. Yet there are processes which appear to square the circle by being chancy and deterministic at once, and the appearance is backed by well-confirmed scientific theories such as statistical mechanics which also seem to provide us with chances for deterministic processes. Is this possible, and if so how? In this essay I discuss this question for probabilities as they occur in the (...) empirical sciences, setting aside metaphysical questions in connection with free will, divine intervention and determinism in history. (shrink)

This study examines whether corporate social responsibility performance is associated with corporate tax avoidance. Employing a matched sample of 434 firm-year observations from the Kinder, Lydenberg, and Domini database over the period 2003–2009, our logit regression results show that the higher the level of CSR performance of a firm, the lower the likelihood of tax avoidance. Our results indicate that more socially responsible firms are likely to display less tax avoidance. Finally, the results from our additional analysis show that the (...) CSR categories community relations and diversity represent particularly important elements of CSR performance that reduce tax avoidance. (shrink)

The purpose here is to give a thorough phenomenological account of the aesthetic experience. The difference between cognitive perception of a real object and the aesthetic experience of an esthetic object is discussed at length. Elements and phases of an esthetic experience are delineated; illustrations of a preliminary emotion of esthetic experience are given, All of which suggest a fundamental change of attitude. From normal perceiving to esthetic perceiving there is a change from categorical structures to qualitative harmony structures, Producing (...) pleasure in the presence of an esthetic object. (staff). (shrink)

We show that the stabilizer of an element a of a countable recursively saturated model of arithmetic M is a maximal subgroup of Aut iff the type of a is selective. This is a point of departure for a more detailed study of the relationship between pointwise and setwise stabilizers of certain subsets of M and the types of elements in those subsets. We also show that a complete type of PA is 2-indiscernible iff it is minimal in the sense (...) of Gaifman. (shrink)

Consider a gas confined to the left half of a container. Then remove the wall separating the two parts. The gas will start spreading and soon be evenly distributed over the entire available space. The gas has approached equilibrium. Why does the gas behave in this way? The canonical answer to this question, originally proffered by Boltzmann, is that the system has to be ergodic for the approach to equilibrium to take place. This answer has been criticised on different grounds (...) and is now widely regarded as flawed. In this paper we argue that these criticisms have dismissed Boltzmann’s answer too quickly and that something almost like Boltzmann’s answer is true: the approach to equilibrium takes place if the system is epsilon-ergodic, i.e. ergodic on the entire accessible phase space except for a small region of measure epsilon. We introduce epsilon-ergodicity and argue that relevant systems in statistical mechanics are indeed espsilon-ergodic. (shrink)

The views on in vitro fertilization within Russian Orthodox Christian society are diverse. One reason for that variation is the ambiguity found in “The Basis of the Social Concept,” the document issued in 2000 by the Russian Orthodox Church and considered to be the primary guidelines for determining the Church’s stance on bioethics. This essay explores how the treatment of infertility reconciles with the Orthodox Christian faith and what methods of medical assistance for infertility may be appropriate for Orthodox Christians. (...) The focus here is on IVF because it is among the most widely used methods to overcome childlessness, and the permissibility of IVF is the object of disagreement among Orthodox. The article defines criteria that can help to discern what is absolutely wrong and must be avoided from what only falls short of the mark, but not very far, for Orthodox Christians. If treatment of the underlying causes of infertility has failed or promises no hope and a husband and a wife do not feel able to carry the Cross of infertility, then from pastoral dispensation they might be blessed to use ethically acceptable variants of IVF. IVF has many variants that are different in their spiritual influence on a person. Orthodox Christians pursuing IVF should seek spiritual guidance and a blessing to pursue IVF. They must not form more embryos than will be transferred in the same cycle. Freezing, discarding, or reduction of embryos is forbidden. Infertile couples ought to use only their reproductive cells. The use of donor gametes is unacceptable. Any embryo formed ought to be transferred into the wife’s womb, and the use of surrogates is impermissible. Only a husband and wife who are able to maintain their marital union and where the wife is still of childbearing age should be blessed to use IVF. (shrink)

Commentary on the first Ukrainian translation of Thomasius’ work entitled “Nucleus disputationis de plagio literario maxime theoreticus, thesibus paucis & brevibus comprehensus”, which is one of the Appendices to the famous “Philosophical dissertation on literary plagiarism”.

That we may rely on our knowledge seems like a platitude. Yet, the view that knowledge is sufficient for permissible reliance faces a major challenge: when much hangs on whether we know, relying on our knowledge seems to license irrational action. Unfortunately, extant proposals to meet this challenge (Hawthorne & Stanley, 2008; Williamson, 2005a; Schulz, 2017, 2021b) either fail to make the correct predictions about high-stakes cases or, as I will argue, face a substantial objection. In this paper, I will (...) offer two novel proposals for defending the sufficiency of knowledge for permissible reliance. My favoured proposal, which I call Flexible Fallibilism, is based on the idea that stakes can affect how we rely on our knowledge and how our knowledge determines what is rational for us to do. Besides making the correct predictions about high-stakes cases, I will argue that Flexible Fallibilism also provides us with a knowledge-based account of when to simplify our practical reasoning. Afterwards, I will present another proposal, which I call Dual Infallibilism, that combines two recent claims by Moss (2013, 2018) and Jackson (2019a) about credal knowledge and the metaphysics of doxastic states. While the offered proposals share various virtues, I will argue that we ultimately should prefer Flexible Fallibilism. (shrink)

In this paper, we examine the meta-ontology of AI systems with human-level intelligence, with us denoting such AI systems as AI E. Meta-ontology in philosophy is a discourse centered on ontology, ontological commitment, and the truth condition of ontological theories. We therefore discuss how meta-ontology is conceptualized for AI E systems. We posit that the meta-ontology of AI E systems is not concerned with computational representations of reality in the form of structures, data constructs, or computational concepts, while the ontological (...) commitment of AI E systems is directed toward what exists in the outside world. Furthermore, the truth condition of the ontology (which is meta-ontological assumption) of AI E systems does not require consistency with closed conceptual schema or ontological theories but rather with reality, or in other words, “what is the world” (Smith, 2019, p.57). In addition, the truth condition of AI E systems is verified through operational success rather than by coherence with theories. This work builds on ontological postulates about AI systems that were formulated by Brian Cantwell Smith (2019). (shrink)

There are many ontologies of the world or of specific phenomena such as time, matter, space, and quantum mechanics1. However, ontologies of information are rather rare. One of the reasons behind this is that information is most frequently associated with communication and computing, and not with ‘the furniture of the world’. But what would be the nature of an ontology of information? For it to be of significant import it should be amenable to formalization in a logico-grammatical formalism. A candidate (...) ontology satisfying such a requirement can be found in some of the ideas of K. Turek, presented in this paper. Turek outlines the ontology of information conceived of as a part of nature, and provides the ‘missing link’ to the Z axiomatic set theory, offering a proposal for developing a formal ontology of information both in its philosophical and logicogrammatical representations. (shrink)

We develop multi-conclusion nested sequent calculi for the fifteen logics of the intuitionistic modal cube between IK and IS5. The proof of cut-free completeness for all logics is provided both syntactically via a Maehara-style translation and semantically by constructing an infinite birelational countermodel from a failed proof search. Interestingly, the Maehara-style translation for proving soundness syntactically fails due to the hierarchical structure of nested sequents. Consequently, we only provide the semantic proof of soundness. The countermodel construction used to prove completeness (...) required a completely novel approach to deal with two independent sources of non-termination in the proof search present in the case of transitive and Euclidean logics. (shrink)

The word «history» can always be understood in two different meanings: as what happened in the past and as a story about the past. One and the same past can be described in different ways. The gap between historical events and representations of these events determines the diversity of historical discourses. Shifting the focus of the philosophy of history from identifying the con- ditions for the possibility of historical knowledge to the analysis of the process of historiography reflects an understanding (...) of the fundamental nature of historical discourses for the formation of pictures of the past. But the fascination with the subject of historical representation often overshadows what makes it possible in principle. Historical discourse is a modern narrative of the past. Thus, the condition for the possibility of historical discursiveness is the mediation of the horizons of the present and the past, which is a fundamental feature of the historicity of human existence. This article explains the discourses of memory and oppositional critical scientific history. Discourses of memory are considered as modern forms of manifestation of the historicity of human existence, because it is in them that the constant mediation of time horizons of the past and present becomes thematic. Critical history declaratively opposes the discourses of memory, but reveals the dependence of its methodological foundations on predetermined forms of under- standing the past presented in memory. The opposition between the discourses of memory and critical history structurally repeats the opposition of tradition and scientific history revealed in hermeneutics. The conceptual shift from tradition to memory reflects the fundamental changes in the modern understanding of historicity associated with the further detraditionalization and globalization of the world. Me- mory appears as a new form of understanding the past, associated with the fear of losing it, as well as understanding the distances and gaps in relation to it. Based on the differentiation of collective memory types, the corresponding types of dis- courses are distinguished. It is argued that historical discourses of identity cannot be identified with historical discourses of power, and historical-didactic and historical-aesthetic discourses are independent forms of modern attitude to the past. In an effort to separate critical reconstruc- tion from memory, scientific discourses become counterfactual to the taken for granted past, represented in the narratives of collective memory. (shrink)

We prove that the two-variable fragment of first-order intuitionistic logic is undecidable, even without constants and equality. We also show that the two-variable fragment of a quantified modal logic L with expanding first-order domains is undecidable whenever there is a Kripke frame for L with a point having infinitely many successors (such are, in particular, the first-order extensions of practically all standard modal logics like K, K4, GL, S4, S5, K4.1, S4.2, GL.3, etc.). For many quantified modal logics, including those (...) in the standard nomenclature above, even the monadic two-variable fragments turn out to be undecidable. (shrink)

A model M of PA has the omega-property if it has a subset of order type omega that is coded in an elementary end extension of M. All countable recursively saturated models have the omega-property, but there are also models with the omega-property that are not recursively saturated. The papers is devoted to the study of structural properties of such models.

As a remedy for the bad computational behaviour of first-order temporal logic (FOTL), it has recently been proposed to restrict the application of temporal operators to formulas with at most one free variable thereby obtaining so-called monodic fragments of FOTL. In this paper, we are concerned with constructing tableau algorithms for monodic fragments based on decidable fragments of first-order logic like the two-variable fragment or the guarded fragment. We present a general framework that shows how existing decision procedures for first-order (...) fragments can be used for constructing a tableau algorithm for the corresponding monodic fragment of FOTL. Some example instantiations of the framework are presented. (shrink)

Aicardi et al. look to neuroscience to mitigate the limitations of current robotics technology. They propose that robotics technology guided by neuroscience has the capacity to create intelligent robots that function with awareness and capacity for abstraction and reasoning. As neurorobotics extends the capability of robotics technology, it introduces new social and ethical concerns, in particular co-opting civilian applications for military use, conflicts between industry and the academy, and data security. However, here we argue that empirical evidence has shown that (...) human cognition is faulty; therefore there is not a clear motivation to build intelligent robots on a human model; representation of meaning in the brain is not well-understood; therefore neuro-robotics is limited; and to the extent that intelligent robots become a reality, the ethics of robot rights will be of central concern. (shrink)

This textbook is a second edition of the successful, Mathematical Logic: On Numbers, Sets, Structures, and Symmetry. It retains the original two parts found in the first edition, while presenting new material in the form of an added third part to the textbook. The textbook offers a slow introduction to mathematical logic, and several basic concepts of model theory, such as first-order definability, types, symmetries, and elementary extensions. Part I, Logic Sets, and Numbers, shows how mathematical logic is used to (...) develop the number structures of classical mathematics. All necessary concepts are introduced exactly as they would be in a course in mathematical logic; but are accompanied by more extensive introductory remarks and examples to motivate formal developments. The second part, Relations, Structures, Geometry, introduces several basic concepts of model theory, such as first-order definability, types, symmetries, and elementary extensions, and shows how they are used to study and classify mathematical structures. The added Part III to the book is closer to what one finds in standard introductory mathematical textbooks. Definitions, theorems, and proofs that are introduced are still preceded by remarks that motivate the material, but the exposition is more formal, and includes more advanced topics. The focus is on the notion of countable categoricity, which analyzed in detail using examples from the first two parts of the book. This textbook is suitable for graduate students in mathematical logic and set theory and will also be of interest to mathematicians who know the technical aspects of the subject, but are not familiar with its history and philosophical background. (shrink)

We prove a number of results concerning the variety of first-order theories and isomorphism types of pairs of the form $(N,M)$ , where $N$ is a countable recursively saturated model of Peano Arithmetic and $M$ is its cofinal submodel. We identify two new isomorphism invariants for such pairs. In the strongest result we obtain continuum many theories of such pairs with the fixed greatest common initial segment of $N$ and $M$ and fixed lattice of interstructures $K$ , such that $M\prec (...) K\prec N$. (shrink)

We argue that the Internet is, and is acting as, an EA because it shapes our belief systems, our worldviews. We explain key concepts for this discussion and provide illustrative examples to support our claims. Furthermore, we explain why recognising the Internet as an EA is important for Internet users and society in general. We discuss several ways in which the Internet influences the choices, beliefs, and attitudes of its users, and we compare this effect with those of psychological conditioning (...) and brainwashing techniques. Finally, we present examples where the Internet’s epistemic agency acts at scale, affecting large portions of society rather than individuals. (shrink)

We discuss Robinson's model theoretic proof of Tarski's theorem on undefinability of truth. We present two other “diagonal-free” proofs of Tarski's theorem, and we compare undefinability of truth to other forms of undefinability in nonstandard models of arithmetic.

We give a short proof of a theorem of Kanovei on separating induction and collection schemes for Σ n formulas using families of subsets of countable models of arithmetic coded in elementary end extensions.

This paper discusses the concept of information formulated by Michael (Michał) Heller. Heller—a philosopher, theoretical physicist, cosmologist, and theologian—provided a complex image of information and its role in nature, which is rarely found in studies of information. Heller posited that the laws of nature may be interpreted as information, or as providing information, presenting this as a complementary view to scientific structuralism (not discussed in this paper). According to Heller, the informational content of a structure in nature is inversely proportional (...) to that structure’s degree of freedom. The more constrained or complex a structure is, and the less likely it is to exist, the more information it contains. In Heller’s view, the concept of information in Shannon’s Theory of Communication (ToC) is inadequate for expressing the notion of information beyond a numerical measure of a signal structure. Information in Heller’s research closely aligns with the concepts of Jacquette’s and Perzanowski’s combinatorial ontology (concepts not discussed in this paper) and the general theory of information (GTI) of Mark Burgin, although Heller did not explicitly make these connections. (shrink)

By the end of his life Plato had rearranged the theory of ideas into his teaching about ideal numbers, but no written records have been left. The Ideal mathematics of Plato is present in all his dialogues. It can be clearly grasped in relation to the effective use of mathematical modelling. Many problems of mathematical modelling were laid in the foundation of the method by cutting the three-level idealism of Plato to the single-level “ideism” of Aristotle. For a long time, (...) the real, ideal numbers of Plato’s Ideal mathematics eliminates many mathematical problems, extends the capabilities of modelling, and improves mathematics. (shrink)

In philosophy, it is always refreshing to introduce unconventional ideas. It requires a certain audacity from the author; he or she may face the wall of silence or be shunned by academia, both treatments being undesirable. However, these are more rewarding than gathering laurels for beating the dead philosophical cats like Humes, Leibnitzs, Wittgensteins, Whiteheads, and others, a practice that for many philosophers is their life's opus. Bartłomiej Skowron’s book _Part and Whole: Towards Topo-Ontology_, published by Oficyna Wydawnicza Politechniki Warszawskiej (...) in 2021, certainly does not fall into this category. Skowron undertakes a discovery trip into an unknown land in his book, exploring new philosophical territories. (shrink)

el presente texto es una revisión crítica de parte de la obra del escritor argentino Jorge Luis Borges con el fin de evidenciar el talante filosófico de este autor. Para ello se presta especial atención al uso de la noción de infinito y las paradojas que de él resultan. Nuestra conclusión es que, si se va a considerar a Borges como filósofo, se debe concluir que, ante todo, es un “filósofo de las paradojas”. Sobre esta base se puede entender su (...) idealismo escéptico. (shrink)

The Logic & Structure project is about the language of mathematical logic and how it can be of use in the visual arts. It involves a conversation between a mathematical logician and a group of artists. The project is ongoing, and this is a report on its first two phases. This text has two parts. The first, “Logic”, is a short introduction to certain aspects of logic, as it was presented to the participants. The second part, “Structures”, describes some of (...) the outcomes.The inspiration for the project comes from modern model theory whose advances revealed the extent to which formal methods may be helpful in describing and analysing mathematical structures. While the structures that are studied are often immensely complex, the formal language in which their properties can be expressed is simple. Its syntax is precisely defined and well understood, and this understanding often successfully guides us in our explorations of the rich world of mathematical objects. Our goal is to see the extent to which a similar approach could be of value when talking about works of art as structures. To this end, one could try to describe existing art objects in terms of suitably chosen formal languages, but we follow a reverse route. The language is described first, and the participating artists are asked to come up with artwork in which formal elements and their relations are chosen in advance, making it easier to identify those features of the created pieces that can be formally expressed. In other words, we are not thinking of applying formal methods to create art; rather we want to begin with samples that can serve as material for discussion. (shrink)