The book follows on the heels of the acclaimed Criticism of Heaven, being the second volume of a five volume series called Criticism of Heaven and Earth.

Introduction to Engineering Ethics provides the background for discussion of the basic issues in engineering ethics. Emphasis is given to the moral problems engineers face in the corporate setting. It places those issues within a philosophical framework, and it seems to exhibit both their social importance and their intellectual challenge. The primary goal is to stimulate critical and responsible reflection on moral issues surrounding engineering practice and to provide the conceptual tools necessary for pursuing those issues. As per new ABET (...) 2000 guidelines, more and more introductory engineering courses cover engineering ethics as part of their instruction. Students preparing to function within the engineering profession need to be introduced to the basic issues in engineering ethics. This book places those issues within a wider philosophical framework than has been customary in the past and aims to stimulate critical and responsible reflection on the moral issues surrounding engineering practice and to provide the conceptual tools necessary for pursuing those issues. (shrink)

On trouve dans l'oeuvre de saint Augustin plusieurs allusions à Sagesse 7:27b: in seipsa manens innouat omnia. Il est évident que la source principale de l'expression manens in se, fréquemment employée par l'évêque africain, est le Livre de la Sagesse. Dans les «Confessions» VII, IX, 14, Augustin affirme que l'origine de cette doctrine se trouve dans le «Libri platonicorum». L'A. montre qu'il a facilement pu extraire cette phrase des «Ennéades» de Plotin, ainsi que l'idée de l'action divine dans le monde (...) malgré le caractère immuable de Dieu. (shrink)

The aim of this paper is to situate the notion of reification as a neutral foundation for the three spheres of recognition. Reification, as a negative concept, allows the possibility of recognition to take place in Axel Honneth’s three spheres of recognition; namely, love, law, and esteem. My argument is that the givenness of these positive aspects of recognition is made possible by the existence of necessary reifications to which pathologies allow a certain form of intersubjective realisations. This form brings (...) about the possibility of an “otherwise” situation. Drawing from the intersubjective theory of recognition in Georg Hegel’s and Martin Heidegger’s instrumentalist hermeneutics (i.e., Vorhandenheit) of authenticity, I aim to pursue the necessary qualification to which reification is to be considered as a neutral ground for normativity to germinate. My contention is that the neutral state of reification is made possible when it is seen as a productive discourse situation in which recognition becomes possible. (shrink)

Revered by some as the most important twentieth century theorist of free society, Friedrich A. Hayek has been reviled by others as a mere reactionary. Impartial throughout, the author offers a clear exposition and balanced assessment that judges Hayek's theory by its own lights. The author argues that the key to understanding Hayek lies in an appreciation of the proper link between descriptive social science and normative political theory. He probes the idea of a spontaneous order and other notions central (...) to Hayek's thought, and concludes that they are unable to provide the "scientific" foundation Hayek seeks for his liberalism. By drawing out the distinctive character of Hayek's thought, the author presents a new and more accurate picture of this important social and political theorist. (shrink)

C. S. Jenkins has recently proposed an account of arithmetical knowledge designed to be realist, empiricist, and apriorist: realist in that what’s the case in arithmetic doesn’t rely on us being any particular way; empiricist in that arithmetic knowledge crucially depends on the senses; and apriorist in that it accommodates the time-honored judgment that there is something special about arithmetical knowledge, something we have historically labeled with ‘a priori’. I’m here concerned with the prospects for extending Jenkins’s account beyond arithmetic—in (...) particular, to set theory. After setting out the central elements of Jenkins’s account and entertaining challenges to extending it to set theory, I conclude that a satisfactory such extension is unlikely. (shrink)

Philip Kitcher's account of scientific progress incorporates a conception of explanatory unification that invites the so-called 'obsessive unifier' worry, to wit, that in our drive to unify the phenomena we might impose artificial structure on the world and consequently produce an incorrect view of how things, in fact, are. I argue that Kitcher's attempt to address this worry is unsatisfactory because it relies on an ability to choose between rival patterns of explanation which itself rests on the relevant choice having (...) already been made. I also suggest a way of answering the worry that Kitcher is not likely to endorse. (shrink)

The primary meaning of the Song would then have to do with human sexual love—the experience of it, its delights, its fidelity, and its power.

Penelope Maddy advances a purportedly naturalistic account of mathematical methodology which might be taken to answer the question 'What justifies axioms of set theory?' I argue that her account fails both to adequately answer this question and to be naturalistic. Further, the way in which it fails to answer the question deprives it of an analog to one of the chief attractions of naturalism. Naturalism is attractive to naturalists and nonnaturalists alike because it explains the reliability of scientific practice. Maddy's (...) account, on the other hand, appears to be unable to similarly explain the reliability of mathematical practice without violating one of its central tenets. (shrink)

Philip Kitcher has advanced an epistemology of science that purports to be naturalistic. For Kitcher, this entails that his epistemology of science must explain the correctness of belief-regulating norms while endorsing a realist notion of truth. This paper concerns whether or not Kitcher's epistemology of science is naturalistic on these terms. I find that it is not but that by supplementing the account we can secure its naturalistic standing.

This present volume is the twenty-ninth in the Re-Reading the Canon series, the title of each of which volumes begins Feminist Interpretations of . . . . Surprisingly, the volume on Augustine has appeared relatively late in the series. The editor has collected eleven essays plus a poem on feminist interpretations of the bishop of Hippo, who has certainly exerted a powerful influence on the view of women in the Western Christian churches of all major denominations. Besides the essays, Stark (...) has provided a substantial introduction to the volume in which she touches upon the principal events of Augustine's life and briefly sketches the main points of each essay.The feminist interpretations of Augustine included in the volume represent a broad spectrum running from quite radical to fairly moderate or even tame approaches. In "Augustine, Sexuality, Gender, and Women," Rosemary Radford Ruether presents a call to critique the views of Augustine from which women and men have suffered for over 1500 years in Western Christianity. Anne-Marie Bowery argues in "Monica: The Feminine Face of Christ" that Augustine's portrait of Monica allows us to "reframe the masculine image of the divinity" that is. (shrink)

The possibility of consistency between the basic quantum principles of quantum mechanics and wave function collapse is reexamined. A specific interpretation of environment is proposed for this aim and is applied to decoherence. When the organization of a measuring apparatus is taken into account, this approach leads also to an interpretation of wave function collapse, which would result in principle from the same interactions with environment as decoherence. This proposal is shown consistent with the non-separable character of quantum mechanics.

We prove that if $A$, $B$ are noncomputable c.e. sets, $A<_{sQ_{1}}B$ and [($B$ is not simple and $A\oplus B\leq _{sQ_{1}}B$) or $B\equiv _{sQ_{1}}B\times \omega $], then there exist infinitely many pairwise $sQ_{1}$-incomparable c.e. sets $\{C_{i}\}_{i\in \omega }$ such that $A<_{sQ_{1}}C_{i}<_{sQ_{1}}B$, for all $i\in \omega $. We also show that there exist infinite collections of $sQ_{1}$-degrees $\{\boldsymbol {a_{i}}\}_{i\in \omega }$ and $\{\boldsymbol {b_{i}}\}_{i\in \omega }$ such that for every $i, j,$ (1) $\boldsymbol {a_{i}}<_{sQ_{1}}\boldsymbol {a_{i+1}}$, $\boldsymbol {b_{j+1}}<_{sQ_{1}}\boldsymbol {b_{j}}$ and $\boldsymbol {a_{i}}<_{sQ_{1}}\boldsymbol {b_{j}}$; (...) (2) every c.e set in $\boldsymbol {a_{i}}$ is a maximal set; and (3) every c.e. set in $\boldsymbol {b_{j}}$ is a non-maximal hyperhypersimple set. We prove that a noncomputable c.e. $sQ$-degree contains either only one or infinitely many c.e. $sQ_{1}$-degrees. The $sQ_{1}$-degrees of c.e. cylinders are dense upper semilattice. (shrink)

Duncan Pritchard has argued that his basis-relative anti-luck construal of a safety condition on knowing avoids the problem with necessary truths that safety conditions are often thought to have, viz., that beliefs the contents of which are necessarily true are trivially safe. He has further argued that adding an ability condition to truth, belief, and his anti-luck safety conditions yields an adequate account of knowledge. In this paper, we argue that not only does Pritchard’s anti-luck safety condition have a problem (...) with necessary truths, adding an ability condition is of no help. Indeed, the same sort of case that precipitates Pritchard’s introduction of an ability condition shows the inadequacy of his completed anti-luck account of knowledge. Moreover, reconstruing safety as an anti-risk condition as Pritchard has recently done does not fix the problem we’ve identified. We conclude by entertaining a radical suggestion to the effect that the failures of safety-based accounts of modal knowledge are due to failures of doxastic success rather than failures to satisfy an anti-luck (or anti-risk) condition. Accepting this radical suggestion makes available the view that there is, after all, no special problem between safety and necessary truths. (shrink)

Cet article prend pour point de départ les généalogies de l’enfance de Michel Foucault disséminées dans son œuvre et complexifiées par les études foucaldiennes contemporaines, en particulier les recherches féministes de Silvia Federici (et ses généalogies des femmes) et les études postcoloniales d’Ann Laura Stoler (et ses généalogies des colonisés). Foucault passant sous silences l’histoire des femmes et des colonies, ce détour par des généalogies féministes et postcoloniales nous permettra de nous inscrire dans les débats sur l’intersectionnalité. En effet, depuis (...) les années 1990, cette perspective méthodologique a été pensée de multiples manières (comme articulation, matrice, assemblage etc.), il s’agira donc de voir comment penser l’intersectionnalité en référence aux cadres d’analyse foucaldiens et à leurs critiques. Plus précisément, en réunissant ces auteurs et leurs généalogies, cet article tentera de se situer dans les débats contemporains sur l’intersection du Childism et du mouvement décolonial. Alors que certains auteurs considèrent que la production de l’enfance/de l’âge précède la production de la colonialité/de la race, d’autres voient le contraire. Pour entrer dans ces débats, nous reprendrons à Bacchetta (2015) l’idée de co-formations et de co-productions des rapports coloniaux et âgistes dans l’histoire longue des métropoles et des colonies. Ce faisant, nous tenterons de décrire et d’analyser les relations d’assujettissement (de genre, de classe, de race ou d’âge) d’une part, comme un effet de multiplicité selon des conjonctures spécifiques, et d’autre part, comme la cristallisation de relations de pouvoir qui s’étendent sur de larges espace-temps. (shrink)