Prout's hypothesis was influential in—if not necessary for—the establishment of the atomic weight of oxygen, a figure conclusively demonstrated in 1895. Ironically, the successful determination of oxygen's weight also led to a final refutation of the hypothesis . But more than this, the end of Prout's hypothesis via the determination of oxygen's atomic weight was due to three fundamental changes that characterized the way chemistry was practised and communicated in the late nineteenth century. First, encyclopaedia‐like presentations of past atomic‐weight investigations (...) became the focus in numerous and influential studies. Second, there was a dramatic change in the way professional publications presented investigations and experiments, characterized by experimental detail and apparatus design at the expense of theoretical discussion. Finally, the production of hydrogen became the focus of research, as it was one of the principal components of any investigation into atomic weights. Here I present Prout's hypothesis in its historical context by focusing on these three developments and their influence on the research of Edward Williams Morley. While doing so I also illustrate the way marginalized scientists were able to take advantage of their otherwise dubious position and participate in an active and important role in atomic‐weight investigations. (shrink)

This paper focuses on the cognitive/computational and evolutionary levels. It describes three proposals to make cognition computationally tractable, namely: Resource Rationality, the Adaptive Toolbox and Massive Modularity. While each of these proposals appeals to evolutionary considerations to dissolve the intractability of cognition, Rich, Blokpoel, de Haan, and van Rooij argue that, in each case, the intractability challenge is not resolved, but just relocated to the level of evolution.

This paper focuses on the cognitive/computational and evolutionary levels. It describes three proposals to make cognition computationally tractable, namely: Resource Rationality, the Adaptive Toolbox and Massive Modularity. While each of these proposals appeals to evolutionary considerations to dissolve the intractability of cognition, Rich, Blokpoel, de Haan, and van Rooij argue that, in each case, the intractability challenge is not resolved, but just relocated to the level of evolution.

As scientific discoveries and technological advances continue to modify our perceptions of reality at an unprecedented rate, the traditional frameworks for understanding and organizing our experience of truth and Knowledge have become less and less adequate. David Rich comes to grips with this problem in his innovative study, which shows how both knowledge and truth are conditioned by experience and explores the dynamics of creativity that generate knowledge.

This book is a fundamental and unique masterpiece which reflects the discussions on business and economic ethics over decades in German-speaking countries, and ...

Rich, identified as a freelance writer and the former assistant chief counsel for the state of Arizona, spells out his ideas about the pervasive and detrimental influence of religion on rational thinking and public policy. This is not a scholarly treatise, but rather an extended statement of the author's world view. Annotation copyright by Book News, Inc., Portland, OR.

The concept of person is integral to bioethical discourse because persons are the proper subject of the moral domain. Nevertheless, the concept of person has played no role in the prevailing formulation of human death because of a purported lack of consensus concerning the essential attributes of a person. Beginning with John Locke's fundamental proposition that person is a ‘forensic term’, I argue that in Western society we do have a consensus on at least one necessary condition for personhood, and (...) that is the capacity for conscious experience. When we consider the whole brain formulation of death, and the most prominent defense of it by the President's Commission for the Study of Ethical Problems in Medicine and Biomedical and Behavioral Research, we can readily identify the flaws that grow out of the failure to define human death as the permanent loss of the capacity for conscious experience. Most fundamental among these flaws is a definition of human death that reduces persons to the capacity of the brain to regulate purely physiological functioning. Such a formulation would, in theory, apply to any member of the animal kingdom. I suggest that an appropriate concept of death should capture what it is about a particular living being that is so essential to it that the permanent loss of that thing constitutes death. What is essential to being a human being is living the life of a person, which derives from the capacity for conscious experience. (shrink)

This paper addresses the problems that must be considered if computers are going to treat their users as individuals with distinct personalities, goals, and so forth. It first outlines the issues, and then proposes stereotypes as a useful mechanism for building models of individual users on the basis of a small amount of information about them. In order to build user models quickly, a large amount of uncertain knowledge must be incorporated into the models. The issue of how to resolve (...) the conflicts; hot will arise along such inferences is discussed. A system, Grundy, is described that builds models of its users, with the aid of stereotypes, and then exploits those models to guide it in its task, suggesting novels that people may find interesting. If stereotypes are to be useful to Grundy, they must accurately characterize the users of the system. Some techniques to modify stereotypes on the basis of experience are discussed. An analysis of Grundy's performance shows that its user models are effective in guiding its performance. (shrink)

A cursory reading of Thomas Aquinas’s work can give the impression he condones a despotic or exploitative relationship between humans and the environment. Many philosophers and theologians have sought to dispel this impression and draw out a more robust Thomistic environmental ethic. In this paper, I support this endeavor by describing how, in Thomas’s work, the environment is God’s artistic property and how this notion qualifies our use of the environment. Next, I consider two concepts related to artistic property: vandalism (...) and showcasing. I explore these concepts as they relate to the environment and find they give us reasons not to deface or destroy creatures and to look to creation for guidance in problem-solving. (shrink)

Laughter:. Scientific Investigation. By Robert R. Provine. 2000. New York: Viking. $24.95 (cloth).

Wynn describes a revolution in cognitive abilities some 500,000 years ago, which added new sophistication to the curiosity of early man – the ability to form hypotheses. This derivative of archaic curiosity is a fundamental feature of learning, and it is our contention that the naive hypothesis testing behavior of early man will have left a distinctive trail in the archaeological record.

Among the most significant findings of SUPPORT was that 50% of ICU patients suffered from moderate to severe pain during the last days of life. At the time of its publication late in 1995, SUPPORT was merely the latest in a long series of articles in the medical literature documenting the widespread and significant undertreatment of pain, beginning with a 1973 study of hospital inpatients. Much has been written about the phenomenon of undertreated pain and inadequate care of patients at (...) the end of life, and many positive suggestions for reform of clinical education and clinical practice have been iterated and reiterated in the two decades separating the studies. Proposals for modifying clinician behaviors in this aspect of patient care have tended to focus on particular barriers to effective pain management and palliative care. (shrink)

After critiquing chaos, catastrophe, and complexity theories, showing their limitations in the contemporary era, Rich furthers the development of crisis theory ...

“And the earth was without form, and void; and darkness was upon the face of the deep” Genesis This article examines the problem of belief as it relates to radical negativity and as such engages with two positions in regard to the Real of the void. The first, drawing from speculative realism seeks to conceptualise this void in positive terms, as something that can be reached and in a sense overcome. The second, Hegelian account, by contrast, situates the void as (...) something inherent to the very coordinates of reality and being itself. As such the following discussion specifically examines the status of objective reality within the continental philosophical paradigm. (shrink)

In the mid to late 1980s a debate arose over the moral and legal authority of advance medical directives. At the center of this debate were two point-counterpoint law journal articles by Rebecca Dresser and Nancy Rhoden. What appeared to have the makings of an ongoing critical dialogue ended with the untimely death of Nancy Rhoden. Rebecca Dresser, however, has continued her challenge of advance directives in numerous publications, most recently in a critique of Ronald Dworkin's Life's Dominion. Like Rhoden, (...) Dworkin has been a staunch advocate of advance directives as an exercise of what has come to be referred to as prospective or precedent autonomy. In this paper I will consider a number of the issues that Dresser has repeatedly raised about the infirmities of advance directives, and suggest that it is from an understanding of and appreciation for the narrative dimension of the life of a person that advanced directives draw one of their most powerful justifications. (shrink)

In a recent special supplement to the Hastings Center Report entitled “Improving End-of-Life Care—Why Has It Been So Difficult?” Robert Burt wrote the following in an essay ominously entitled “The End of Autonomy”: No one should be socially authorized to engage in conduct that directly, purposefully, and unambiguously inflicts death, whether on another person or on oneself. Decisions that indirectly lead to death should be acted upon only after a consensus is reached among many people. No single individual should be (...) socially authorized to exercise exclusive control over decisions that might lead to death, whether that individual is the dying person, the attending physician, or a family member acting as health care proxy. (shrink)

This article considers the question of whether corporate entities can benefit from the criminal-law defence of duress. The excuse of duress is accorded in recognition of the defendant’s extreme fear of a threatened consequence, and it is unclear whether corporate entities—as distinct from their members—can experience fear. Many proponents of corporate rationality deny that corporations can have emotional states. I argue that corporations can experience the fear that is necessary to ground a claim of duress, but that the law should (...) only allow fear to excuse coerced corporate action in a narrow set of circumstances. (shrink)