Fodor and LePore's attack on conceptual role semantics relies on Quine's attack on the traditional analytic/synthetic and a priori/a posteriori distinctions, which in turn consists of four arguments: an attack on truth by convention; an appeal to revisability; a claim of confirmation holism; and a charge of explanatory vacuity. Once the different merits of these arguments are sorted out, their proper target can be seen to be not the Traditional Distinctions, but an implicit assumption about their superficial availability that we (...) have abundant reason to reject. Once we reject it, we can see how issues of the absorbtion of conventions, the revisability of belief, and confirmation holism are compatible with the Traditional Distinctions, and that Quine's discussion only serves to camouflage the question of whether some confirmation relations are constitutive of meaning and knowable a priori. (shrink)

Wilson et al. focus on one class of AGL tasks: the cognitively demanding task of detecting non‐adjacent dependencies (NADs) among items. They provide a typology of the different types of NADs in natural languages and in AGL tasks. A range of cues affect NAD learning, ranging from the variability and number of intervening elements to the presence of shared prosodic cues between the dependent items. These cues, important for humans to discover non‐adjacent dependencies, are also found to facilitate NAD learning (...) in several nonhuman animal species. (shrink)

I reply to Stainton and Viger by pointing out that my “folieist” claim—that standard linguistic entities (“SLEs”) such as words and phonemes are illusions—would not have the calamitous consequences for linguistics that they fear. Talk of “a language” need only be understood as talk of an I‐language precisely as Chomskyans have proposed; and I reply to Adger by pointing out that, since SLEs are not generally describable as real, local physical phenomena, perception of them cannot be explained as any sort (...) of “transduction.” An intentionalist understanding of “representation of” is needed where mere transduction fails. (shrink)

Wilson et al. focus on one class of AGL tasks: the cognitively demanding task of detecting non‐adjacent dependencies (NADs) among items. They provide a typology of the different types of NADs in natural languages and in AGL tasks. A range of cues affect NAD learning, ranging from the variability and number of intervening elements to the presence of shared prosodic cues between the dependent items. These cues, important for humans to discover non‐adjacent dependencies, are also found to facilitate NAD learning (...) in several nonhuman animal species. (shrink)

Shoemaker (1996) presenteda prioriarguments against the possibility of ‘self‐blindness’, or the inability of someone, otherwise intelligent and possessed of mental concepts, to introspect any of her concurrent attitude states. Ironically enough, this seems to be a position that Gopnik (1993) and Carruthers (2006, 2008, 2009a,b) have proposed as not only possible, but as the actual human condition generally! According to this ‘Objectivist’ view, supposed introspection of one's attitudes is not ‘direct’, but an ‘inference’ of precisely the sort we make about (...) the attitudes of others, an inference that has the advantage in our own case ofonlyour own sensory data and memories, our behavior, and of the context we are in; i.e. we are all substantially self‐ blind. After sorting out a number of methodological and verbal issues, I argue, first, that thea prioriarguments against Objectivism don't succeed, and that Gopnik and Carruthers are right to regard the issue as an empirical one. On the other hand, I think they seriously underestimate the difficulty of establishing Objectivism. It is unlikely there is an inferential procedure from the data of pure sensation, behavior and context to the relevant self‐attributions that would be as spectacularly reliable as people manifestly seem to be. Moreover, there is a simpler model: the mind very likely consists of a panoply of sub‐routines some of whose outputs are ‘tagged’ for their having been so processed, rather in the way that software ‘documents’ are on standard computers. Introspection plausibly consists in a person's simply attending to distinctive constellations of these tags, even though they may lack phenomenal feels. This draws attention to an important independent fact: that much of phenomenology (or ‘what it's like’ to be in a certain state) may be constituted by facts that are not phenomenal. (shrink)

It has become all too common in discussing Rorty’s work, to distinguish the reasonable and constructive Rorty from the outrageous, destructive and irresponsible enfant terrible of twentieth century American philosophy. According to this familiar reading, one can unproblematically distinguish those rhetoric flourishes that have enraged so many of his philosophical colleagues from the substantive, and one might even say constructive, insights that are hidden in his work. However, as I will argue in this paper, this distillation process is not only (...) hermeneutically suspicious, but actually hinders our ability to make sense of what Rorty was trying to say. Rorty’s call was to “break the crust of convention”; not for destruction’s sake but to warn us against the dangers of all forms of fundamentalism and dogmatism and more importantly, open up the possibilities of a post-foundationalist, post-representationalist culture where solidarity and imagination at the service of human dignity replace the old obsession with objectivity and the quest for certainty. (shrink)

El objetivo de este artículo es analizar la representación cinematográfica de las residencias para personas mayores. Recurrimos al método hermenéutico comparado para analizar cuatro películas de habla hispana estrenadas entre 2010 y 2020: Arrugas, El agente topo, La plaga y Quien a hierro mata. El análisis de resultados se fundamenta en un análisis temático inductivo, mediante la categorización e identificación de temas recurrentes en las tramas que analizamos desde planteamientos de la sociología y gerontología social. Argumentamos que la representación de (...) las residencias en estas películas entraña, en diferentes grados, tendencias contrapuestas de reproducción y problematización de imaginarios estigmatizantes propios del nursing home specter. Por un lado, las narrativas privilegian la reproducción de un imaginario que asocia las residencias al abandono, la soledad y los malos cuidados, reforzando el ideal de cuidados familista que caracteriza a la sociedad española. Por otro, identificamos secuencias que evidencian la potencialidad del cine para problematizar estereotipos y profundizar en la comprensión de realidades complejas. Estos imaginarios cinematográficos cobran mayor relevancia en el actual contexto de replanteamiento del modelo residencial. (shrink)

O texto visa apresentar e explicar o papel desempenhado pelas noções de telos e arché na compreensão tanto do movimento dos animais quanto da ação humana realizada no âmbito ético-político. Além disso, pretende evidenciar a importância de estabelecer a distinção modal do tempo em passado, presente e futuro elaborada na Ética a Nicômacos, em oposiçãoà abordagem quantitativa do mesmo empreendida na Física, a fim de poder explicar o silogismo prático.

I supplement Frankish's defence of illusionism by pressing a point I've made elsewhere regarding how actual computational proposals in psychology for conscious processes could be run on desktop computers that most people wouldn't regard as conscious. I distinguish the w-consciousness of such a desktop from the s-consciousness people think humans but no such machines enjoy, which gives rise to an explanatory gap, invites first scepticism, unwanted analgesia, and is not supported by Cartesian introspections or any other non-tendentious evidence. Rather, along (...) lines suggested by Wittgenstein and Chomsky, it seems to be an illusory projection of our innate, involuntary responses to things that look and act like our conspecifics, one encouraged by a decontexualized philosophical over-reading of ordinary talk, akin to an over-reading of a term like 'the sky'. However, it also seems to be an illusory projection we can't entirely dispel. (shrink)

Responding to bivalent stimuli slows subsequent performance. In prospective memory research, prospective memory targets can be considered as bivalent stimuli because they typically involve features relevant for both the prospective memory task and the ongoing task. The purpose of this study was to investigate how responding to a prospective memory target slows subsequent performance. In two experiments, we embedded the prospective memory task in a task-switching paradigm and we manipulated the degree of task-set overlap between the prospective memory task and (...) the ongoing task. The results showed consistent after-effects of responding to prospective memory targets. The specific trajectory of the slowing depended on the amount of task-set overlap. These results demonstrate that responding to prospective memory targets results in after-effects, a so far neglected cost on ongoing task performance. (shrink)

For all of Brandom’s self-professed allegiance to Hegel, there is something perplexing about his fixation on semantic and epistemological issues at the expense of the type of social and political considerations that are at the heart of Hegel’s system. However, and although Brandom himself concedes that his work is circumscribed to a number of highly specialized and technical issues in the philosophy of mind and language, the truth is that his views often radiate to other philosophical fields, if not always (...) explicitly. My claim in this article is that at the heart of Brandom’s semantic theory, there are elements of a critical project, one that offers a normative standpoint to judge and improve our current practices. Moreover, these progressive features of Brandom’s normative pragmatics should be seen in the light of his adoption of a series of hermeneutic themes, ultimately culminating in his recollective conception of rationality and his edifying view of semantics. (shrink)

Coincidiendo con los cincuenta años del inicio del Concilio Vaticano II y con los veinte años de la promulgación del Catecismo de la Iglesia Católica, su Santidad el Papa Benedicto XVI, a través de la Carta Apostólica Porta Fidei, ha declarado un Año de la Fe que abarcaría desde el 11 de Octubre del presente año 2012 hasta el 24 de Noviembre del próximo año 2013. Se desea, en este tiempo, redescubrir el don de la fe, y para ello como (...) hará el propio Pontífice– no se encontrará mejor apoyo que la doctrina de San Agustín de Hipona. Les invito, pues, a atravesar “la puerta de la fe” (Hch. 14,27), que permitirá adentrarnos en la Iglesia para vivir en comunión con Dios, de la mano del “Doctor más universal y el genio más vigoroso que ha poseído la Iglesia”. (shrink)

À partir de la comparaison entre l’Oedipus chymicus de Leibniz écrit en 1710 et ce qui nous a semblé un possible référent, le texte homonyme de J.J Becher de 1664, l’article s’efforce de déterminer les raisons de l’attrait que Leibniz éprouve pour la chimie de son temps. Si les pratiques de codage et de décodage de la démarche alchimique ainsi que l’attention portée aux transformations des états de la matière constituent indéniablement des points de convergence avec la philosophie leibnizienne, il (...) ne nous semble néanmoins pas possible de conclure de là à une influence de la philosophie chimique, et en particulier de la notion de semence, sur la constitution de la monade leibnizienne. (shrink)

Le propos de ce recueil est de développer deux thématiques : raison et folie et déraisons de la raison. D'un côté, on interroge la décision spéculative et politique qui "lie et sépare à la fois raison et folie" dans les termes mêmes employés par Michel Foucault (1961). L'âge classique, le siècle de la raison, commence par constituer un autre de la raison : le fou, renvoyé "au jardin des espèces". Il faut donc revisiter cette archéologie des dualismes mutilants : raison (...) et folie, normal et pathologique, âme et corps, à la lumière des travaux les plus récents. La folie aujourd'hui s'aborde de manière préoccupante dans les politiques de santé mentale qui visent à criminaliser la folie : psychiatrie menacée d'un retour de l'enfermement et de la violence. Psychiatrie sinistrée mais qui est déjà sur la voie de la résistance, notamment dans la culture, comme l'atteste la présence de la mélancolie en son sein, mais aussi dans les développements contemporains de la psychothérapie institutionnelle et de ses équipements comme de ses concepts. Sans négliger d'autres initiatives. Enfin, la rationalité elle-même n'est pas une donnée immédiate de la science. Elle se construit sur fond d'irrationalité. Là aussi, les dualismes familiers et stérilisants sont dissipés. (shrink)

This paper examines the status of medical experiments using the Leibnizian conception of knowledge. The aim is to consider whether experimentation is a “perceptive foretaste” or a real condition for the advancement of knowledge. To this end I argue, first, that acting on bodies could be a way to understand them and, second, I establish a place for medical experiments in the field of learning. In these ways, I identify a “provisional empiricism” in Leibniz’ medical texts.

The aim of this article is to provide an overview about Simone Weil’s interpretation of the Good in Plato. The article has two parts. In the first one, we focus on her exegesis of the ancient Greek civilization and of the Pythagorean tradition. We also signalize that her interpretation cannot be confused with the one done in Neoplatonism. After that, we investigate her interpretation of Plato’s philosophy with special emphasis on two dialogues : Republic and Timaeus. In the second part (...) we research two main concepts of Simone Weil’s philosophy, i.e., the notions of value and of lecture and finalize our text with the question of how we should situate her appropriation of the Platonic tradition. (shrink)

This chapter describes some basic, often puzzling features of intentionality, with an eye to its role not so much in ordinary folk ascriptions but in serious psychological explanations, especially in many of Noam Chomsky's own presentations of his theory. It then considers Chomsky's censure of the notion, leading him to deny what would seem to be the explicit intentionalisms on which he seems to rely. Implicit in Chomsky's treatment of grammar is the idea that the positing of the language faculty (...) offers an “abstract” perspective on a physical system (the human brain) that implements the relevant features of the abstracta in ways we currently don’t understand. Two initial problems might be raised for this picture, one regarding inference and the other, generalization. The proposed model is effectively saying that theorists track states and generalizations of the linguistic system in an explicitly representational format, but what the theory is true of need not have such representational properties. (shrink)

In Entities and Indices, M. J. Cresswell argued that a first-order modal language can reach the expressive power of natural-language modal discourse only if we give to the formal language a semantics with indices containing infinite possible worlds and we add to it an infinite collection of operators $${{\varvec{actually}}}_n$$ actually n and $$ Ref _n$$ R e f n which store and retrieve worlds. In the fourth chapter of the book, Cresswell gave a proof that the resulting intensional language, which (...) he called $${\mathscr {L}}^*$$ L ∗, is as expressive as an extensional variant of it, called $${\mathscr {L}}$$ L, which has full quantification over worlds. In both linguistics and philosophy, Cresswell’s book has been viewed as offering a compelling argument for preferring extensional systems in the study of natural language. In this paper, after providing a model-theoretic definition of the relation being as expressive as that can be applied to Cresswell’s languages $${\mathscr {L}}$$ L and $${\mathscr {L}}^*$$ L ∗, we show that the intensional language $${\mathscr {L}}^*$$ L ∗ is not as expressive as the extensional language $${\mathscr {L}}$$ L. This result, we claim, undermines Cresswell’s argument to the effect that English modal discourse has the power of explicit quantification over worlds. Additionally, we show that $${\mathscr {L}}^*$$ L ∗ does become as expressive as $${\mathscr {L}}$$ L when we add Cresswell’s operator of universal modality $$\square $$ □ to $${\mathscr {L}}^*$$ L ∗, which provides an extra amount of expressive power. Recently, I. Yanovich has advocated a view that is similar to ours in important respects. At the end of the paper we offer a short discussion of his formalism. (shrink)

Alors que le débat sur le caractère scientifique ou pseudo-scientifique de l’agriculture biodynamique occupe régulièrement le débat public, l’histoire et la philosophie des sciences ne semblent que très peu s’être emparées de ce sujet. La thèse défendue ici est double : tout d’abord, si l’agriculture biodynamique rencontre un relatif succès aujourd’hui, cela tient sans doute au fait que son théoricien, R. Steiner, a été un des premiers à critiquer le paradigme qui domine l’agronomie, ou en tout cas l’agriculture, depuis plus (...) d’un siècle. Cette critique semble d’ailleurs se maintenir dans ses motifs tout au long du XXe siècle, jusqu’à une certaine critique contemporaine de l’agro-industrie et de ses conséquences désastreuses sur l’environnement. Or, et c’est la seconde thèse défendue ici, cette critique semble méconnaître voire occulter la réalité des débats internes qui ont traversé l’agronomie au cours du XXe siècle et qui continuent de l’agiter aujourd’hui : l’agronomie système a ainsi par exemple intégré dans ses objets des éléments de l’agriculture biodynamique. Selon nous, le problème principal est que l’agronomie est souvent abordée selon une approche externaliste, qui doit impérativement être complétée par une approche internaliste afin tout d’abord de distinguer ce qui relève de la science et ce qui relève du mysticisme, et ensuite de saisir toute la richesse historique et épistémologique de l’agronomie. (shrink)