"Six Metaphysical Meditations" by René Descartes (translated by William Molyneux). Published by Good Press. Good Press publishes a wide range of titles that encompasses every genre. From well-known classics & literary fiction and non-fiction to forgotten−or yet undiscovered gems−of world literature, we issue the books that need to be read. Each Good Press edition has been meticulously edited and formatted to boost readability for all e-readers and devices. Our goal is to produce eBooks that are user-friendly and accessible to everyone (...) in a high-quality digital format. (shrink)

Richard Wollheim famously argued that figurative pictures depict their scenes, in part, in virtue of their ability to elicit a unique type of visual experience in their viewers, which he called seeing-in. According to Wollheim, experiences of seeing-in are necessarily twofold, that is, they involve two aspects of visual awareness: when a viewer sees a scene in a picture, she is simultaneously aware of certain visible features of the picture surface, the picture’s design, and the scene depicted by the picture. (...) Even though Wollheim’s notion of twofoldness has been very influential, a number of philosophers have put forward powerful arguments against it. In this paper, I defend the claim that some pictorial experiences are twofold in Wollheim’s sense. My argument has two parts. In the first part, I provide a phenomenal contrast argument in favor of twofoldness. In the second part, I respond to what I take to be the most important objections against twofoldness. I believe that both parts together provide strong support for the claim that some pictorial experiences are twofold in Wollheim’s sense. (shrink)

Recently, an increasing number of scholars have been showing interest in old-fashioned racism again. While recent studies on old-fashioned racism apparently increase our knowledge of this psychological theory of racism, the studies actually shed light on a different type of racism, namely offensive racism. The aim of this text is to argue that psychological theories of racism, like old-fashioned racism and modern racism, depend on societies’ social norms. I will show that questionnaires are highly sensitive to social norms, and if (...) there is change in social norms, the original measurement object alters. The theory of old-fashioned racism implicitly assumes agents that follow (or conform to) the social norm to behave prejudiced. Today, however, this social norm does not exist in Western societies. If agents express the same prejudices today, they indicate their willingness to breach the social norm to behave unprejudiced. Thereby, classic old-fashioned racism measures reflect a new kind of racism today. (shrink)

While National Human Rights Institutions are widely regarded as particularly promising tools in the emerging transnational regime for the regulation of business and human rights, we still know little about their potential and actual contribution to this field. This article bridges the gap between business and human rights research and NHRI scholarship, proceeding in three steps: Firstly, I analyze the structural conditions for NHRIs to tackle business-related human rights abuses effectively, focusing on the key conditions of legitimacy and competences. Secondly, (...) I examine the envisaged role and functions of NHRIs in business and human rights regulation according to the Paris Principles and the UN Guiding Principles. Thirdly, I reconstruct and critically assess NHRIs’ mandates and powers to address corporate human rights abuse, based on the analysis of surveys and reports. I argue that there is a significant mismatch between the essential structural conditions for effective NHRI engagement with business and human rights, the expected contribution of NHRIs to the prevention and remedy of corporate human rights abuses, and the limitations of their mandates and powers in practice. To overcome that misalignment and unlock NHRIs’ full potential, this article proposes a reform of the Paris Principles which would provide these institutions with a robust source of international legitimacy and increase the pressure on state governments to extend their powers. (shrink)

It is often assumed that trolling is an intentional action. The aim of the paper is to argue for a form of unintentional trolling. Firstly, we outline minimal conditions for intentional actions. Secondly, an unintentional trolling example is introduced. Thirdly, we will show that in some cases, an utterance can be expressive, while it is perceived as descriptive. On the basis of the justification-suppression model, we argue that the introduced trolling example is such a case. In order to bypass social (...) sanctions for expressing prejudices, agents unintentionally express their prejudices through stories that appear to be descriptive. Thereby, the characterized behavior does not fulfill the minimal conditions for intentional action. Fourthly, we give criteria that can be used to identify unintentional trolls. Finally, after unintentional trolling is analyzed, the trolls’ behavioral goals are considered. In conclusion, an analysis of unintentional trolling is given, which has explanatory benefits in contrast to the classic intentional trolling concepts. (shrink)

The issue analyzes the existent relation between power and violence by philosophy of Hannah Arendt. The tradition of politic thought tends to concern power from the approuch ofcommand and obedience, in other words, the capacity of influence and control that an specific group has about others behavior, materializing itself in general by the employment ofimplements of violence. Taking some distance of this conception in her reflections, Arendt supports power in people’s capacity of joint action, and Politics as the space created (...) by thegathering of women and men capable of acting and bringing the new to the world. (shrink)

Avant d'être un ensemble de lois et de normes, de se conjuguer à l'impératif à la manière kantienne, l'éthique n'est-elle pas d'abord, radicalement, relation responsable à Autrui, au Visage d'Autrui, dans lequel s'annonce énigmatiquement une forme de transcendance qui désigne un au-delà du sujet que je suis et du prochain qui me fait face? Relation qui est d'emblée appel, "vocation" et suscite une réponse. L'éthique est "réponse", "responsabilité" tant sur le plan des rapports intersubjectifs que sur celui des rapports réglés (...) par l'anonymat des règles et dispositifs institutionnels (moraux, juridiques, politiques, etc.), elle est démarche personnelle et pratique collective. C'est le concept de responsabilité qui fournit le principe d'intelligibilité de l'éthique exposée dans ce livre et envisagée, toutes différences sauvegardées, en son statut séculier comme en sa reprise dans la mouvance de la foi. (shrink)

Le discours éthique est à la mode, nourri de craintes et de plaintes, de précautions vertueuses, de pétitions de principes. Dans le champ médical, il apparaît comme réservé aux questions touchant à la maîtrise de la vie, aux cas difficiles excédant les régulations coutumières, aux soignants spécialistes de soins particuliers (procréation, greffes... ). Peut-on parler d'une éthique de la pratique quotidienne d'un soin à donner, d'un geste à faire, d'un mot à dire, au chevet d'un malade, dans une consultation pour (...) un trouble banal, un acte de soin infirmier habituel, un exercice rééducatif ordinaire, d'une éthique de la clinique partageable par tous les soignants? Dans le champ clinique, le discours psychologique est proposé pour comprendre ce qui advient, venu de l'autre ou de soi, dans la relation singulière initiée par une souffrance et une demande de soin. Est-il un appui suffisant? L'auteur ne prétend donner ni réponse, ni modèle. A partir de l'analyse des cadres convenus, thérapeutique, déontologique, juridique, éthique, il invite au questionnement des discours, des théories et des pratiques, à une réflexion sur le " bon pour la vie " et le " bien pour l'homme ". Il appelle les intervenants dans le champ du soin, soignants, mais aussi gestionnaires, législateurs, juristes, à penser ensemble une visée éthique du soin de l'humain, à l'intégrer dans un " vivre ensemble " fondé sur la possibilité d'une conscience interrogative, réflexive et critique. (shrink)

Die Arbeit formuliert einen zeitgemassen Bildungsbegriff, der sich dennoch nicht in dem technologischen Kompetenzdenken erschopft, das den gegenwartigen Mainstream von Bildungstheorie und Didaktik so nachhaltig pragt. Dies erfolgt auf der Grundlage des hermeneutischen Verfahrens, welches Hannah Arendts Kant-Rezeption zugrunde liegt. Bildung wird als praktischer Prozess verstanden, durch den Formen der Weltorientierung erschlossen werden. Zudem wird deutlich gemacht, auf welche Weise philosophische Bildung eine wichtige Rolle fur die politische Bildung von Schulerinnen, Schulern und allen sich Bildenden uberhaupt spielt. Diese genuin politische (...) Perspektive schliesst eine Lucke in der philosophiedidaktischen Forschung der letzten Jahrzehnte. (shrink)

Over the last two decades foundationalism has been severely criticized. In response to this various alternatives to it have been advanced, notably coherentism. At the same time new versions of foundationalism were crafted, that were claimed to be immune to the earlier criticisms. This volume contains 12 papers in which various aspects of this dialectic are covered. A number of papers continue the trend to defend foundationalism, and foundationalism's commitment to basic beliefs and basic knowledge, against various attacks. Others aim (...) to show that one important objection against coherentism, viz. that the notion of 'coherence' is too vague to be useful, can be countered. (shrink)

Cumulative evidence suggests that, for children and adolescents, peer relatedness is an essential component of their overall sense of belonging, and correlates with subjective well-being and school-based well-being. However, it remains unclear what the underlying mechanism explaining these relationships is. Therefore, this study examines whether there is a reciprocal effect between school satisfaction and overall life satisfaction (Hypothesis 1), and whether the effect of peer relatedness on life satisfaction is mediated by school satisfaction (Hypothesis 2). A non-recursive model with instrumental (...) variables was tested with econometric and structural equation modeling methodologies, using a cross-sectional sample ofn= 5,619 Chilean early adolescents (49.2% girls), aged 10, 11, and 12 (46.13, 44.99, and 8.88% respectively). Results were highly consistent across methods and supported the hypotheses. First, the findings confirmed a significant reciprocal influence between school satisfaction and overall life satisfaction, with a greater impact from school to life satisfaction. Second, the effect of peer relatedness on overall life satisfaction was fully mediated by school satisfaction. The study further suggests the importance of considering reciprocal effects among domain-specific satisfaction and overall life satisfaction and illustrates the application of non-recursive models for this purpose. (shrink)

We investigate sequent calculi for the weak modal (propositional) system reduced to the equivalence rule and extensions of it up to the full Kripke system containing monotonicity, conjunction and necessitation rules. The calculi have cut elimination and we concentrate on the inversion of rules to give in each case an effective procedure which for every sequent either furnishes a proof or a finite countermodel of it. Applications to the cardinality of countermodels, the inversion of rules and the derivability of Löb (...) rules are given. (shrink)

Authentique zoologue, Aristote fait de l’homme un animal parmi d’autres au sein des êtres naturels. Les travaux scientifiques, cependant, malgré des rapprochements, mettent déjà en évidence sa singularité, tandis que l’animal non humain, considéré comme dépourvu de raison malgré des nuances, est exclu du champ de l’éthique dont la bestialité marque la limite. La vertu se conquiert en grande partie contre la part animale de l’homme mais l’animal en est incapable au sens strict. L’animal n’a guère valeur de modèle et (...) la lecture d’Aristote fournit peu d’arguments immédiatement exploitables en faveur de sa protection. (shrink)

In his paper “Double Vision, Phosphenes and Afterimages: Non-Endorsed Representations rather than Non-Representational Qualia,” Işık Sarıhan addresses the debate between strong representationalists and qualia theorists. He argues that qualia theorists like Ned Block and Amy Kind who cite double-vision, afterimages, etc., as evidence for the existence of qualia are mistaken about the actual nature of these states. According to Sarıhan, these authors confuse the fact that these states are non-endorsed representational states with the fact that they are at least partly (...) non-representational. I argue that Sarıhan’s argument contains gaps that suggest that he misidentifi es the mistake that leads these qualia theorists to their conclusion. In my view, these qualia theorists do not confuse the fact that the states in question are non-endorsed states with the fact that they are non-representational, but rather mistake certain representational contents, or certain aspects of these contents, for qualia. (shrink)

Rene Descartes has been described as the "father" of modern philosophy. This selection of Descartes' writings attempt to answer central questions surrounding self, God, free-will and knowledge, using the science of thought as opposed to received wisdom based on the tenets of faith.

Recently, psychologists have developed indirect measurement procedures to predict suicidal behavior. A prominent example is the Death/Suicide Implicit Association Test (DS-IAT). In this paper, I argue that there is something special about the DS-IAT which distinguishes it from different IAT measures. I argue that the DS-IAT does not measure weak or strong associations between the implicit self-concept and the abstract concept of death. In contrast, assuming a goal-system approach, I suggest that sorting death-related to self-related words takes effort because death-related (...) words trigger avoidance-impulses, which suicide ideation weakens. The DS-IAT taps into weakened automatic responses from the self-preservation system. Additionally, the suggested cognitive structure, illuminated with the selfish-goal theory, explains predictable suicidal behavior. (shrink)

A symmetric network consists of a set of positions and a set of bilateral links between these positions. For every symmetric network we define a cooperative transferable utility game that measures the “power” of each coalition of positions in the network. Applying the Shapley value to this game yields a network power measure, the β-measure, which reflects the power of the individual positions in the network. Applying this power distribution method iteratively yields a limit distribution, which turns out to be (...) proportional to the well-known degree measure. We compare the β-measure and degree measure by providing characterizations, which differ only in the normalization that is used. (shrink)

Can agents overcome unconscious psychological influences without being aware of them? Some philosophers and psychologists assume that agents need to be aware of psychological influences to successfully control behavior. The aim of this text is to argue that when agents engage in a proactive control strategy, they can successfully shield their behavior from some unconscious influences. If agents actively check for conflicts between their actions and mental states, they engage in reactive control. For engaging in reactive control, agents need awareness (...) of those mental states which are in conflict with an action. In contrast, if agents are actively maintaining a goal in consciousness, they engage in proactive control. Proactive control does not consist of conflict detection or conflict resolution. I argue that proactive control explains how agents overcome unconscious psychological influences. In doing so, I claim that consciousness is important for engaging in reactive and proactive control. (shrink)

The Discourse on the Method for Reasoning Well and for Seeking Truth in the Sciences offers a concise presentation and defense of René Descartes' method of intellectual inquiry--a method that greatly influenced both philosophical and scientific reasoning in the early modern world. Descartes's timeless writing strikes an uncommon balance of novelty and familiarity, offering arguments concerning knowledge, science, and metaphysics (including the famous "I think, therefore I am") that are as compelling in the 21st century as they were in (...) the 17th. Ian Johnston's new translation of the original French text is modern, clear, and thoroughly annotated, ideal for readers unfamiliar with Descartes's intellectual context. An approachable introduction engages both the historical and the philosophical aspects of the text, helping the reader to understand the concepts and arguments contained therein. (shrink)

Jackendoff's position with respect to categories is unclear. Positing categories is implausible in several respects; it makes the binding problem in language seem more massive than it actually is; and it makes it difficult to explain language acquisition. Waiting for connectionism to fulfill its promise, a different track is sketched which is residually symbolic, exemplarist, and analogy-based.

This paper is about the two ways Plato considers that pleasures can be true, as rational pleasures and as pleasures without pain. The main points under examination are the interpretation of Platonic pleasures as propositional attitudes, and the relation between pleasure itself and feeling pleasure.

Juger qu'une action est la bonne et cependant en effectuer une autre : la chose est d'apparence si paradoxale qu'on a commencé par en nier la possibilité. Les études réunies ici traitent de la façon dont les philosophes antiques. Platon, Aristote ou les stoïciens. ont, de Socrate à Plotin, entrepris de penser l'acrasie et son opposé. la maîtrise de soi. Elles envisagent l'infléchissement ultérieur du questionnement chez les penseurs chrétiens. d'Augustin à Thomas d'Aquin et au stoïcisme moderne. et proposent des (...) réflexions originales sur la décision et l'autonomie. La confrontation entre Takrasiu des anciens et la " faiblesse de la volonté " des contemporains constitue l'une des lignes directrices de ce recueil. (shrink)

On pense souvent l’éthique comme un fait strictement humain : les hommes et eux seuls auraient des préoccupations éthiques ; seuls les comportements humains auraient à obéir à des règles éthiques; les règles en question concerneraient au premier chef, pour ne pas dire exclusivement, la relation des agents humains entre eux. La même chose peut être répétée, mutatis mutandis, au sujet du droit. Dans cette perspective, traditionnelle, les animaux sont au mieux des exclus : ni agents éthiques, ni bénéficiaires sinon (...) marginalement (quand, par exemple, le respect des droits du propriétaire leur assure une protection contre certains mauvais traitements) ; ils jouent le rôle de faire-valoir : si les humains sont des agents éthiques, ou si l’éthique les protège vis-à-vis de certains agissements, c’est précisément en vertu du fait qu’ils ne sont pas de simples animaux ; en vertu de ce qui les différencie des « bêtes » ou des animaux non-humains. La valeur que reconnaît l’éthique, peu ou prou, s’identifie à la part de la non-animalité de la « personne » humaine. (shrink)

Aristote fait parfois état d’une pensée animale. Dans le De motu animalium, il paraît même considérer que les animaux ont recours à des syllogismes pratiques : il vaut cependant mieux résister à toute tentation de croire qu’il explique en ces termes le comportement animal, dans la mesure où il refuse d’attribuer aux animaux non humains le raisonnement, et tout d’abord l’universalité de la pensée ; or, qui dit absence de concepts ou de jugements universels dit incapacité d’établir les prémisses d’un (...) syllogisme. (shrink)

In this paper I explore, in sections 2 and 3, respectively, Herman Dooyeweerd’s notion of naive experience and the notion of common sense as found in the writings of Thomas Reid and G. E. Moore. I argue in section 4 that naive experience and common sense are assigned a structurally similar functional role by their advocates—viz., the role of touchstone for philosophy. In the final section I stage a conversation between Dooyeweerd and Reid about the touchstones they adopt.