In his Complaint of Peace, the great sixteenth-century humanist Erasmus allows "Peace" to talk. Peace speaks as a plaintiff, protesting her shabby treatment at the hands of humankind and our ever-ready inclination to launch wars. Against this lure of warfare, Erasmus pits the higher task of peace-building, which can only succeed through the cultivation of justice and respect for all human life. First articulated in 1517, the complaint of peace has echoed through subsequent centuries and down to our age--an age (...) convulsed by world wars, holocausts, and ethnic cleansings. Distinguished political scientist Fred Dallmayr traces this complaint from the writings of Erasmus through the evolution of the "law of nations" to recent and contemporary co-plaintiffs in the West. He also highlights the role of non-Western thinkers and teachings in giving voice to "Peace." In addition to Erasmus, Dallmayr engages major thinkers such as Francisco de Vitoria, Hugo Grotius, Immanuel Kant, Hannah Arendt, Martin Heidegger, Mahatma Ghandi, the Dalai Lama, John Rawls, and Martha Nussbaum. This timely book urgently pleads for greater attentiveness to peace's complaint as an antidote to the prevailing culture of violence and the escalating danger of nuclear catastrophe. Dallmayr offers not only a compelling historical narrative, but powerful ethical and religious arguments vindicating the primacy of peace over violence and war. (shrink)

Bd. 1. 1791-1794.--Bd. 2. 1793-1795.--Bd. 3.--1794-1796.--Bd. 4. 1797-1798.--Bd. 5. 1798-1799.--Bd. 6. 1799-1800.--Bd. 7. 1800-1801.--Bd. 8. 1801-1806.--Bd. 9. 1806-1807.--Bd. 10. 1808-1812.

Angeregt von Freunden und Kollegen, hat Ernst Cassirer im amerikanischen Exil mit diesem Werk eine Summe seines Denkens vorgelegt, in der seine Philosophie der symbolischen Formen in ihren Hauptgedanken fortgeführt wird, und zwar in einer Weise, die auch einem breiteren Kreis interessierter Leser zugänglich ist. Cassirer stellt die alte Frage nach dem Wesen des Menschen neu und beantwortet sie, indem er die klassische Antwort mit weitreichenden Folgen abwandelt: Er bestimmt den Menschen als ein Wesen, das Symbole schafft und sich durch (...) Symbole mit seinesgleichen und der Welt verständigt. "Der Begriff der Vernunft ist höchst ungeeignet, die Formen menschlicher Kultur in ihrer Fülle und Mannigfaltigkeit zu erfassen [...]. Alle diese Formen sind symbolische Formen. Deshalb sollten wir den Menschen nicht als animal rationale, sondern als animal symbolicum definieren.". (shrink)

This book provides an in-depth view of the current issues, problems and approaches in the computation of meaning as expressed in language. Aimed at linguists, computer scientists, and logicians with an interest in the computation of meaning, this book focuses on two main topics in recent research in computational semantics. The first topic is the definition and use of underspecified semantic representations, i.e. formal structures that represent part of the meaning of a linguistic object while leaving other parts unspecified. The (...) second topic discussed is semantic annotation. Annotated corpora have become an indispensable resource both for linguists and for developers of language and speech technology, especially when used in combination with machine learning methods. The annotation in corpora has only marginally addressed semantic information, however, since semantic annotation methodologies are still in their infancy. This book discusses the development and application of such methodologies. (shrink)

Modem theory of law in a certain extent needs theological foundation. The dialogue of both law and theology, however, requires specific presuppositions in theological understanding. Paul Tillich's Systematic Theology in its peculiar character of combining theological »paradoxon« and openess for cultural recognition meets these demands.

Modem theory of law in a certain extent needs theological foundation. The dialogue of both law and theology, however, requires specific presuppositions in theological understanding. Paul Tillich's Systematic Theology in its peculiar character of combining theological »paradoxon« and openess for cultural recognition meets these demands.

The correspondence between Richard von Mises and George Pólya of 1919/20 contains reflections on two well-known articles by von Mises on the foundations of probability in the Mathematische Zeitschrift of 1919, and one paper from the Physikalische Zeitschrift of 1918. The topics touched on in the correspondence are: the proof of the central limit theorem of probability theory, von Mises' notion of randomness, and a statistical criterion for integer-valuedness of physical data. The investigation will hint at both the fruitfulness and (...) the limits of several of von Mises' notions such as ``collective'', ``distribution'' and ``complex adjuncts'' (characteristic functions) for further developments in probability theory and in ``directional statistics''. By pointing to the selectiveness of Pólya's criticism, the historical analysis shows the differing expectations of the two men with respect to the further development of the theory of probability and its applications. The paper thus gives a glimpse of the provisional state of the theory around 1920, before others such as P. Lévy (1886–1971) and A. N. Kolmogorov (1903–1987) stepped in and created a new paradigm for probability theory. (shrink)

Die 1810 gegründete Berliner Universität hat auf vielen Gebieten Epoche gemacht - auch in der Philosophie. Keine andere deutsche Universität brachte so zahlreich bedeutende Philosophen hervor, deren Namen in keiner Philosophiegeschichte fehlen. Das nunmehr vorliegende Buch bietet die erste Gesamtdarstellung der Geschichte der Berliner Universitätsphilosophie bis 1946. Den Band durchzieht die These, dass die Berliner Universität in ihrer Geschichte ein eigenes philosophisches Profil ausgeprägt hat, das auch heute noch philosophisch interessant und bildungspolitisch aktuell ist.

In Hobbes' Theorie des Leviathan sind weder der Naturzustand noch der staatliche Zustand und das Strafrecht widersprüchlich. Der radikale Subjektivismus ist der archimedische Punkt, von dem aus sich die scheinbaren Widersprüche auflösen lassen. Locke kehrt zu einem Rechtsobjektivismus zurück, hat aber kein Prinzip der Begrenzung von Strafen.

Recent publications (Henrich, Seeberg) claim that Kant has been profoundly influenced by contemporary publications on juridical deductions. I try to show, that this cannot be right. The introductory note of the “Transcendental Deduction” (Critique of Pure Reason A 84) poses two questions: “quid facti?” and “quid juris?”. The first is answered by the demonstration of the possibility of relations between pure concepts and pure intuition und sensations, the second by the implicit refutation of David Hume. Kant and his interpreters sustain (...) the possibility of using juridical concepts, that are neither related to real juridical facts nor are only metaphers, but have a special philosophical signification. But what should that be? (shrink)

It is claimed that some important moral rules — more precisely: the social establishment of such rules — can best be argued for in terms of hypothetical imperatives, addressed to each member of the society in question. The main presuppositions of this conception of morality are analysed and the implications of it for the relations between morality on the one hand and such things as prudence, sanctions, and equality on the other are examined.

A logic is called higher order if it allows for quantification over higher order objects, such as functions of individuals, relations between individuals, functions of functions, relations between functions, etc. Higher order logic began with Frege, was formalized in Russell [46] and Whitehead and Russell [52] early in the previous century, and received its canonical formulation in Church [14].1 While classical type theory has since long been overshadowed by set theory as a foundation of mathematics, recent decades have shown remarkable (...) comebacks in the fields of mechanized reasoning (see, e.g., Benzm¨. (shrink)

Is it rational to believe in the existence of a God who is not only omnipotent but also good or morally perfect? This is the famous Problem of Evil, the Theodicy problem. Unlike many theologians and philosophers who feel convinced of either the existence or the non-existence of a good God, I defend a sceptical view based on the following two assumptions: 1. The believers have so far not been able to show that all the evils of the world, for (...) which God is responsible, are logically necessary means for the attainment of higher values. 2. The burden of proof - contrary to what many theologians say - lies clearly on the believers in God’s goodness and not on the non-believers. Insofar we have at present no sufficient reason to believe in a God who is not morally indifferent. (shrink)

Die gängige Unterscheidung zwischen 'Modellen von etwas' und 'Modellen für etwas' basiert weitgehend auf der Zuordnung der einen zu den Wissenschaften, der anderen zu den Künsten und den entwerfenden Disziplinen. Diese Aufteilung hält einer näheren Untersuchung nicht Stand. Zudem hat sie die Einsicht vereitelt, dass und wie Forschen und Entwerfen im Modell ineinander verflochten sind.