This is a unique study, contuining the work of Merleau-Ponty and Heidegger, and using the techniques of phenomenology against the prevailing nihilism of our culture. It expands our understanding of the human potential for spiritual self-realization by interpreting it as the developing of a bodily-felt awareness informing our gestures and movements. The author argues that a psychological focus on our experience of well-being and pathology as embodied beings contributes significantly to a historically relevant critique of ideology. It also provides an (...) essential touchstone in experience for a fruitful individual and collective response to the danger of nihilism. Dr Levin draws on Merleau-Ponty's phenomenology to clarify Heidegger's analytic of human beings through an interpretation that focuses on our experience of being embodied. He reconstructs in modern terms the wisdom implicit in western and semitic forms of religion and philosophy, considering the work of Freud, Jung, Focault and Neitzsche, as well as that of American educational philosophers, including Dewey. In particular, he draws on the psychology of Freud and Jung to clarify our historical experience of gesture and movement and to bring to light its potential in the fulfilment of Selfhood. Throughout the book, the pathologies of the ego and its journey into Selfhood are considered in relation to the conditons of technology and the powers of nihilism. (shrink)

Expands our understanding of the human potential of spiritual self-realization by interpreting it as the developing of a bodily-felt awareness informing our ...

The purpose of the study was twofold: Experiment 1 tested the possibility that the mere recollection of food aroused a state of hunger and that different types of food influenced the state of hunger differently; Experiment 2 tested the possibility that food cues affected altruistic behavior. In Experiment 1, 28 participants reported how hungry they felt before and after their recollection of certain foods. Results suggest that recollection of food increased hunger and that the type of food (...) influenced the degree of hunger = 31.88, p <.001, η2 =.54). In Experiment 2, 63 participants were randomly assigned to one of three recollection conditions: noodles, pudding, and control. Participants in the two conditions described each food in detail; control group participants did not. Participants were then asked how much they would be willing to participate in an ostensible experiment. Results indicate that recollection-induced hunger reduced altruistic behavior = 4.11, p =.021, η2 =.12). Cue reactivity theory and the hierarchy of needs could explain these results. (shrink)

In the light of Glucker's claim to have found in "De Divinatione" 1.115 a separate, unnamed Pythagorean-Platonic influence on Cicero, I examine the passage again with special reference to early Platonic interpretation. I find that the "Meno's" influence is wider than had been suspected, suggesting (i) the correspondence between the two types of 'natural' divination, dreams and ecstatic prophecy, and (ii) the kinship of souls. Posidonius' influence on the underlying interpretation of Platonic psychology is to be detected, insofar as (...) he would have read "Meno" 81d as a statement about all souls (together) having all available knowledge. However, Cratippus, Cicero's other main source, can be held to have directly borrowed from "Meno" 81d2-3 for his crowning argument ("De Div." 1.71), and it is likely that other material that uses 81d would also stem from Cratippus. A little is known elsewhere of early interpretation of the "Meno." Comparison with other early 'Platonist' material suggests strongly that we must look to Antiochus' school for this view that dreams regularly contain substantial truth explicable in terms of the nature of soul. This would lead once again to Cratippus, and nothing prevents our detecting his hand behind 1.115. Indeed 1.70, which Glucker uses to argue that Cratippus' dream-divining soul would literally have to leave the body, only makes good sense when understood metaphorically. (shrink)

Misremembering is a systematic and ordinary occurrence in our daily lives. Since it is commonly assumed that the function of memory is to remember the past, misremembering is typically thought to happen because our memory system malfunctions. In this paper I argue that not all cases of misremembering are due to failures in our memory system. In particular, I argue that many ordinary cases of misremembering should not be seen as instances of memory’s malfunction, but rather as the normal result (...) of a larger cognitive system that performs a different function, and for which remembering is just one operation. Building upon extant psychological and neuroscientific evidence, I offer a picture of memory as an integral part of a larger system that supports not only thinking of what was the case and what potentially could be the case, but also what could have been the case. More precisely, I claim that remembering is a particular operation of a cognitive system that permits the flexible recombination of different components of encoded traces into representations of possible past events that might or might not have occurred, in the service of constructing mental simulations of possible future events. So that imagination and memory are but one thing, which for diverse considerations hath diverse names.Thomas Hobbes, Leviathan 1.2. (shrink)

The Iowa Gambling Task (IGT) has become a remarkable experimental paradigm of dynamic emotion decision making. In recent years, research has emphasized the “prominent deck B (PDB) phenomenon” among normal (control group) participants, in which they favor “bad” deck B with its high-frequency gain structure—a finding that is incongruent with the original IGT hypothesis concerning foresightedness. Some studies have attributed such performance inconsistencies to cultural differences. In the present review, 86 studies featuring data on individual deck selections were drawn from (...) an initial sample of 958 IGT-related studies published from 1994 to 2017 for further investigation. The PDB phenomenon was found in 67.44% of the studies (58 of 86), and most participants were recorded as having adopted the “gain-stay loss-randomize” strategy to cope with uncertainty. Notably, participants in our sample of studies originated from 16 areas across North America, South America, Europe, Oceania, and Asia, and the findings suggest that the PDB phenomenon may be cross-cultural. (shrink)

Behavioral studies have demonstrated differences in the effect of constrained retrieval of semantic vs. non-semantic information on the encoding of foils. However, the impact of recognition on foils between semantic and non-semantic trials remains unclear. This study thus examines the roles of recognition—familiarity and recollection—in constrained retrieval for foils. We applied the event-related brain potentials data of new/old effects to elucidate the neural mechanisms underlying the “foil effect.” Participants encoded semantic and non-semantic tasks, were tested in a blocked memory (...) task with new words presented as foils, and performed a surprise recognition task involving foils and completely new words. Behavioral results showed better recognition performance regarding reaction times and accuracy by hit and correct reject for semantic vs. non-semantic trials in Phase 2. Conversely, inferior recognition performance in reaction times and accuracy by hit and correct reject was noted for semantic vs. non-semantic foils in Phase 3. ERP results showed more positive Frontal N400 for hit in non-semantic trials, more positive late positive component for correct rejects in semantic trials in Phase 2, and more positive LPC for hits in both semantic and non-semantic trials only in Phase 3. Through dual-processing theory, we prove that different task types in constrained retrieval depend on different retrieval processes. Particularly, familiarity may be applied more often in non-semantic trials, and recollection in semantic trials. The difference in processes between semantic and non-semantic trials during constrained retrieval affects incidental encoding of foils. (shrink)

Carroll Izard’s theoretical and empirical work has played a preeminent role in energizing the renascence in the study of the emotions and emotional development in normality and pathology. A brief historical overview of his career is presented. Izard’s differential emotions theory (DET) has exerted influence in a number of domains and disciplines. Illustrations are provided from research and prevention in developmental psychology and developmental psychopathology. Personal recollections of Cal Izard are provided showing that Izard is not only an influential (...) theoretician and researcher, but also a wonderful emotional being. (shrink)

Bringing Ritual to Mind explores the cognitive and psychological foundations of religious ritual systems. Participants must recall their rituals well enough to ensure a sense of continuity across performances, and those rituals must motivate them to transmit and re-perform them. Most religious rituals the world over exploit either high performance frequency or extraordinary emotional stimulation to enhance their recollection. But why do some rituals exploit the first of these variables while others exploit the second? McCauley and Lawson advance the (...) ritual form hypothesis, arguing that participants' cognitive representations of ritual form explain why. Reviewing evidence from cognitive, developmental and social psychology and from cultural anthropology and the history of religions, they utilize dynamical systems tools to explain the recurrent evolutionary trajectories religions exhibit. (shrink)

Dustin Peone argues that memory is the foundation of philosophical thought. This may seem strange to the contemporary reader, but it is something that philosophers themselves have known since before Socrates. Peone advocates a doctrine of "memory as philosophy" that ties philosophical recollection back to the wisdom of the Muses, daughters of Memory, who sing of "what was, is, and shall be." Part One draws on the work of philosophers from Cicero to Vico to Bergson to articulate the meaning (...) and significance of memory. Peone understands memory not merely in its psychological sense, but as the key to metaphysical and moral thinking. Part Two takes up the philosophical history of memory. Peone gives an overview of its role as both a speculative and technical instrument from ancient Greece through Renaissance Europe. Then with the rise of modernity and the critical philosophy of Descartes, the memory tradition falls into disrepute. Why did this happen? Was it accidental? Is a philosophical system grounded in memory possible after Descartes? In the final chapters, Montaigne and Hegel are analyzed as practitioners of "memory as philosophy" in the modern world. (shrink)

Recollections of humanistic and transpersonal psychology’s origin’s morph into the pros and cons of humanistic/transpersonal oriented schools developing APA accredited clinical programs. This discussion dovetails with the question will ATP ever become an APA division, raising an interesting alternative for those of us considering a career in counseling: becoming a spiritual coach. Enter the issue of psychedelic therapy and the Supreme Courts decision to allow ayahuasca as a sacrament by the Uniao Do Vegetal Church, and the importance of why (...) humanistic and transpersonal psychology need to clearly map out the territories and sub-divisions of science and religion. Finally this conversation raises a concern, that Maslow’s call for a “trans-human” psychology sought to encourage creating what we now call ecopsychology. (shrink)

This study was designed to investigate the effects of aging on consciousness in recognition memory, using the Remember/Know/Guess procedure . Remembering and Knowing. In E. Tulving & F. I. M. Craik , The Oxford Handbook of Memory. Oxford University Press.). In recognition memory, older participants report fewer occasions on which recognition is accompanied by recollection of the original encoding context. Two main hypotheses were tested: the speed mediation hypothesis . The processing-speed theory of adult age differences in cognition. Psychological (...) Review, 3, 403–428) and the executive-aging hypothesis . An application of prefrontal cortex function theory to cognitive aging. Psychological Bulletin, 120, 272–292). A group of young and a group of older adults took a recognition test in which they classified their responses according to Gardiner, J. M., & Richarson-Klavehn, A. . Remembering and Knowing. In E. Tulving & F. I. M. Craik , The Oxford Handbook of Memory. Oxford University Press. remember-know-guess paradigm. Subsequently, participants completed processing speed and executive function tests. The results showed that among the older participants, R responses decreased, but K responses did not. Moreover, a hierarchical regression analysis supported the view that the effect of age in recollection experience is determined by frontal lobe integrity and not by diminution of processing speed. (shrink)

Is amnesia the mother of discontinuity? Perhaps surprisingly, amnesia is perfectly compatible with psychological continuity. Think, for example, of David Wiggins’ version of Locke. Wiggins first describes a relationCof strongco-consciousnesswhich gives continuity ‘between personPtjand personQtksuch that, for somesufficiencyof things actually done, witnessed, experienced, … at any time byPtj, Qtkshould later havesufficientreal or apparent recollection of then doing, witnessing, experiencing, … them.’ Wiggins continues:… anyone bent on grasping the nerve of Locke's conception of person would see … that the identity-condition (...) he had to refute was one which made the persistence of personPdepend only uponP's being related at each successive phase of his biography in this C-relation toPat each previous phase. (shrink)

Although episodic memory is a widely studied form of memory both in philosophy and psychology, it still raises many burning questions regarding its definition and even its acceptance. Over the last two decades, cross-disciplinary discussions between these two fields have increased as they tackle shared concerns, such as the phenomenology of recollection, and therefore allow for fruitful interaction. This editorial introduction aims to provide a comprehensive and up-to-date presentation of the main existing conceptions and issues on the topic. (...) After delineating Tulving’s chief theoretical import and multifaceted legacy, it goes on to chart the different attempts to capture the episodicity feature of memory according to three categories: a first approach aims to show the cognitive abilities required for a subject to episodically remember; the second defines episodicity as a stage-specific feature; the last explains episodicity in terms of the epistemological properties of episodic memory. This state of the art thereby sets the stage for the contributions of the present volume, which will be introduced in conclusion. (shrink)

Time and Memory throws new light on fundamental aspects of human cognition and consciousness by bringing together, for the first time, psychological and philosophical approaches dealing with the connection between the capacity to represent and think about time, and the capacity to recollect the past. Fifteen specially written essays offer insights into current theories of memory processes and of the mechanisms and cognitive abilities underlying temporal judgements, and draw out key issues concerning the phenomenology and epistemology of memory and its (...) role in our understanding of time. (shrink)

This paper examines the issue of what the self is by reviewing neuropsychological research,which converges on the idea that the self may be more complex and differentiated than previous treatments of the topic have suggested. Although some aspects of self-knowledge such as episodic recollection may be compromised in individuals, other aspects—for instance, semantic trait summaries—appear largely intact. Taken together, these findings support the idea that the self is not a single, unified entity. Rather, it is a set of interrelated, (...) functionally independent systems. Implications for understanding the self in various areas of psychological research—e.g., neuroimaging, autism, amnesia, Alzheimer’s disease, and mirror self-recognition—are discussed in brief. (shrink)

This article demonstrates that Ibn Sīnā’s theory of experience (taǧriba) requires a cross-reference between logic and psychology. Following the Basran linguistic tradition, he paraphrases derived names (ism muštaqq) into the li-x y formula: for example, ʿālim (“knowing”) is paraphrased into lahu ʿilm (“an act of knowing belongs to him”). His theory of experience employs this formula for arranging observed phenomena into a certain form of a syllogism and describing functions of the brain’s inner senses. Ibn Sīnā arranges observed phenomenon (...) into the li-x y formula or the proposition of which a predicate is a derived name of y. Meanwhile, he holds that the sense of recollection is involved in the process of experience. Recollection is an inner sense of the brain, which preserves maʿnā perceived by the sense of estimation. Estimation means to perceive maʿnā (y) that inheres in a subject (x), and to make a judgment about x based on y. Thus, in this process, the analysis of derived names arranges observed phenomena into a rational order, and the inner sense establishes the causation between apprehension and logical assertion. The article concludes by discussing the relation of this philosophy to medicine. (shrink)

: This paper investigates the way in which Rudolf Carnap drew on Gestalt psychological notions when defining the basic elements of his constitutional system. I argue that while Carnap's conceptualization of basic experience was compatible with ideas articulated by members of the Berlin/Frankfurt school of Gestalt psychology, his formal analysis of the relationship between two basic experiences ("recollection of similarity") was not. This is consistent, given that Carnap's aim was to provide a unified reconstruction of scientific knowledge, as (...) opposed to the mental processes by which we gain knowledge about the world. It is this last point that put him in marked contrast to some of the older epistemological literature, which he cited when pointing to the complex character of basic experience. While this literature had the explicit goal of overcoming metaphysical presuppositions by means of an analysis of consciousness, Carnap viewed these attempts as still carrying metaphysical baggage. By choosing the autopsychological basis, he expressed his intellectual depth to their antimetaphysical impetus. By insisting on the metaphysical neutrality of his system, he emphasized that he was carrying out a project in which they had not succeeded. (shrink)