Abstract“Reason of state” is a concept that is rarely used in contemporary legal and political philosophy, compared to everyday parlance; “public reason,” in contrast, is ubiquitous, especially in liberal philosophy, as a legitimacy‐conferring device. In this article it is argued that the unpopularity of the notion of “reason of state” is partly due to its notorious ambiguity. Three different usages of the notion can be identified: a “thin” usage (where “reason of state” is equivalent to the (...) common good); an “ironical” usage (where it is used pejoratively to denounce it as a pretext for application of illegitimate or illegal means); and a “pre‐emptive” usage (where “reason of state” functions as a legitimate second‐order exclusionary reason used to override otherwise mandatory first‐order rules of action). It is argued that only the “thin” usage is helpful in a by‐and‐large liberal‐democratic context. The article then discusses the main dilemmas related to the concept of public reason, especially in its most influential, Rawlsian interpretation, and defends the concept against common critiques. Finally, the two concepts of “reason of state” and public reason are compared, and it is argued that a “thin” usage of “reason of state” is functionally equivalent to public reason, and that both resonate with the theory of “input democracy” (focusing, as it does, on the legitimacy of reasons—or motivations—for applying coercive rules to individuals). The article also identifies a problematic feature of “reason of state”: its emphasis on the state as a privileged interpreter of such reasons and/or as identifying the pool of actors within which the “constituency” of public reason is ascertained. There are good reasons to resist both of these consequences: the former because of its potentially authoritarian consequences, the latter because of reasons provided by cosmopolitan political conceptions. (shrink)

This highly influential anti-Machiavellian text is an important primary source for the understanding of early modern political thought.

The present study aims to analyze the relations between the doctrine of Reason of State and Utopianism in the Italian political culture during the XVIth and XVIIth centuries. Its focus is on the use of time prescribed to the prince as a peculiar tool for preserving his power and the state, while for the utopists time is a condition for rationalising the life of their ideal communities. On the other hand some authors of Reason of State and utopists (...) considered the perfection of the political and social institutions the only way for stabilizing the state, but the perfection is a metaphysical feature devoted to stop the corruption of the political community. So, even in this view, Reason of State and Utopianism are two doctrines that both teach the conservation of the state. (shrink)

From Machiavelli and Guicciardini to Gracián and Richelieu, secrecy is a defining element in the politics of reasons of state, in the art of simulation and dissimulation. These techniques were considered instrumental in order to procure the very survival of the state in situations of permanent emergency. From politics as a secret art centered on the prince’s cabinet, we move gradually along an historical and theoretical path. From English liberalism that places the parliament at the center of politics and the (...) French Enlightenment that exalted the capacity of reason to enlighten the mind and help humankind to leave the state of minority, we move toward democracy as public knowledge, as a ‘house of glass', exposed to the scrutiny and control of public opinion. It is nonetheless clear that neither the proto-liberal parliament nor the subsequent parliamentary democracies will ever become the ‘houses of glass' that democratic ideologies champion. This is true in the recent decades in which populism and demobilization of masses are changing the essence of democracy. (shrink)

This article argues that ideas about reason of state shaped English political debate in the first half of the seventeenth century, especially how the Crown attempted to justify its actions, and how those who attempted to oppose it did so. An understanding of this can lead us to correct some of the problems both with a 'revisionist' account of the early seventeenth century, and with accounts given by historians of political thought. The article also demonstrates that reason of (...) state was a fluid and volatile argument, available not only to those in power, but to those who wished to demonstrate that such power was illegitimate, and establish something different in its place. It is therefore a vital component of any understanding of early modern politics. (shrink)

A persistent feature in Jesuit reports about the late Ming and early Qing was the notion that an enduring peace and concord pervaded the Chinese political system. Although the Jesuits did not invent this association, which was rooted in Greco-Roman historiography, the Jesuit encyclopaedist Antonio Possevino was the first to link the ‘perpetual peace’ and ‘supreme concord’ of the Chinese state to the Confucian intellectual tradition. As the Jesuits’ missionary strategy developed under the tutelage of Matteo Ricci, ‘public peace’ and (...) ‘the calm of the Republic’ came to be perceived as the ultimate purpose of the Confucian precepts and one of the hinges on which the aims of Christianity, Confucianism and natural law can be reconciled. The supreme expression of the link between Confucianism and peace can be found in the Confucius Sinarum philosophus, which presented for the first time an accessible translation of three of the four Confucian classics. Yet while retaining the view that pre-Qin Confucianism espoused peace as a central political aim, the Confucius Sinarum philosophus challenged the view that contemporary China could be regarded as a utopic actualization of Confucian peace. This paper will discuss this shift as an attempt to coopt the Chinese political experience as an argument against the pragmatic political philosophy known as ‘reason of state’, which was perceived by Jesuit thinkers as atheistic and immoral. (shrink)

A term of art, originally Italian, becoming common usage in other European vernaculars in the late sixteenth century. It meant practical reflection, albeit in writing and general in form, about all aspects of statecraft . It claimed practical usefulness in virtue of its grounding in experience and history, contrasting itself with “mirrors of princes,” which were supposedly ignorant of the realities of politics. More narrowly, reason of state meant a “Machiavellian” disregard for legal, moral, and religious considerations when the (...) “interests of the state” or “necessity” required it. Particularly contentious were the justifiability of dishonesty, duplicity, breach of faith and even treaty obligations, violence against opponents and competitors, illegal taxation, disregard of the claims of traditional institutions and officeholders, and the practice of religious toleration. Opponents of “reason of state” attempted to demonstrate that, on the contrary, adherence to religion, morality, and legality was the best policy, in that it earned providential rewards, but also that in strictly pragmatic terms it was most likely to bring political success. However, these proponents of “true reason of state” acknowledged that strict adherence to these norms was sometimes impossible, and when it was, statesmen must attempt to avoid the greater evil. Having become the subject of a vast literature and even a standard university topic, reason of state faded as an issue in the later seventeenth century. Realpolitik from the nineteenth century onwards resembles it, with the state representing a morality superior to the norms of legality and private morality, a view in turn contested by advocates of human rights and international morality. (shrink)

Thomas Fitzherbert's two-part Treatise concerning Policy and Religion (1606, 1610) was a rebuttal of unidentified Machiavellians, statists or politikes and their politics and policies. The work was apparently still well-regarded in the following century. Fitzherbert's objections to ‘statism’ were principally religious, and he himself thought the providentialist case against it unanswerable. But for those who did not share his convictions, he attempted to undermine Machiavellism on its own ground. Like both ‘Machiavellians’ and their opponents, he argued by inference from historical (...) examples, but with a particularly copious knowledge of historians ancient, medieval and modern to draw on. Equally, however, he deployed the principles of speculative (principally Aristotelian) ‘political science,’ as well as theology and jurisprudence, to demonstrate that the kind of knowledge that Machiavellians required to guarantee the success of their ‘reason of state’ policies was simply unobtainable. A particularly striking strategy (perhaps modelled on that of his mentor and friend Robert Persons) was Fitzherbert's attempt to demonstrate, on the Machiavellians’ own premises, that they advocated policies which were very likely to fail, and would be visited with divine punishments sooner as well as later, whereas policies that were compatible with faith and morals were also much more likely to succeed, even judged in purely human and ‘statist’ terms. (shrink)

Niccolò Machiavelli's seminal work, The Prince, argued that a ruler could not govern morally and be successful. Giovanni Botero disputed this argument and proposed a system for the maintenance and expansion of a state that remained moral in character. Founding an anti-Machiavellian tradition that aimed to refute Machiavelli in practice, Botero is an important figure in early modern political thought, though he remains relatively unknown. His most notable work, Della ragion di Stato, first popularised the term 'reason of state' (...) and made a significant contribution to a major political debate of the time - the perennial issue of the relationship between politics and morality - and the book became a political 'bestseller' in the late sixteenth and the seventeenth century. This translation of the 1589 volume introduces Botero to a wider Anglophone readership and extends this influential text to a modern audience of students and scholars of political thought. (shrink)

In the later sixteenth century, 'reason of state' was a vogue term in practical discourse, not a theory-backed concept. In order to cope with what they thought it designated, orthodox Catholic and Protestant thinkers had first to construct a coherent identity for it. In doing so, they also conflated it with 'Machiavellism' and the politiques. 'Reason of state' thereby acquired theorization and canonical authors. This essay seeks to show that defenders of Catholic religious and moral orthodoxy, notably Jesuit (...) writers, did not find reason of state wholly repellent or intractable, but on the contrary largely domesticated, and appropriated, it. (shrink)

Acclaimed writer and historian Noel Malcolm presents his sensational discovery of a new work by Thomas Hobbes : a propaganda pamphlet on behalf of the Habsburg side in the Thirty Years' War, translated by Hobbes from a Latin original. Malcolm's book explores a fascinating episode in seventeenth-century history, illuminating both the practice of early modern propaganda and the theory of "reason of state".

This volume charts the development of political thought between 1517-1625. Drawing on a wide range of sources from Europe and beyond, it offers a new reading of early modern political thought, making connections between Christian Europe and the Muslim societies that lay to its south and east.

Deep legal change occurs when, without legal justification, one legal rule is replaced by another. While often ignored in legal theory, these rule-breaking normative transformations are common and significant enough to warrant careful attention. In this thesis, I analyse the structure of deep legal change and discuss how a philosophically rigorous jurisprudence should approach a legal phenomenon that appears to be legally inexplicable. In particular, I focus on the implications of rule-breaking rule-changes for our conception of courts and legal reasoning. (...) To understand why deep legal change occurs, we need to provide a normative explanation that clarifies why courts, as courts, have reasons to break the law. My solution takes me to G. W. F. Hegel’s Philosophy of Right. Hegel invites us to think of the judicial process as being grounded in two institutional values: the establishment of legal security and the protection of the “universal interest” of the state. Sometimes, these two values come into conflict. In these moments, established legal rules give way to fundamental state-interests. With Hegel, we can say that it is inevitable that political reasons periodically override legal reasons. In deep legal change, the fundamentally political character of law becomes visible. While reminiscent of Carl Schmitt and the literature on emergency powers, this theory of law is much closer to the reason-of-state tradition. Against the background of several historical case studies and contemporary scholarship, I demonstrate the novelty, coherence, and explanatory power of a Hegelian account of deep legal change. (shrink)

A new political practice, the ‘reason of state’, informed the ends and practices of natural study in the late sixteenth century. Informed by the study of the Roman historian Tacitus, political writers gathered ‘secrets of empire’ from both history and travel. Following the economic reorientation of ‘reason of state’ by Giovanni Botero (1544–1617), such secrets came to include bodies of useful particulars concerning nature and art collected by an expanding personnel of intelligencers. A comparison between various writers describing (...) wide-scale collections, such as Botero, Francis Bacon (1561–1626), Jakob Bornitz (1560–1625) and Matthias Bernegger (1582–1640), reveals that seventeenth-century natural intelligencers across Europe not only were analogous to political intelligencers, but also were sometimes one and the same. Those seeking political prudence cast themselves as miners, prying precious particulars from the recesses of history, experience and disparate disciplines, including mathematics, alchemy and natural philosophy. The seventeenth-century practice of combining searches for secrets of empire, nature and art contests a frequent historiographical divide between empirical science and Tacitism or reason of state. It also points to the ways political cunning shaped the management of information for both politics and the study of nature and art. (shrink)

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:Journal of the History of Ideas 61.4 (2000) 617-634 [Access article in PDF] Edmund Burke and Reason of State David Armitage Edmund Burke has been one of the few political thinkers to be treated seriously by international theorists. 1 According to Martin Wight, one of the founders of the so-called "English School" of international theory, Burke was "[t]he only political philosopher who has turned wholly from political theory (...) to international theory." 2 The resurgence of interest in Burke as an international theorist has not, however, generated any consensus about how he might be classified within the traditions of international theory. Wight variously divided thinkers into trichotomous schools of Realists, Rationalists, and Revolutionaries, Machiavellians, Grotians, and Kantians, or theorists of international anarchy, habitual intercourse, or moral solidarity; 3 more recent international theorists have refined or supplemented these categories to construct similar trinitarian traditions of Realism, Liberalism, and Socialism, and of Empirical Realism, Universal Moral Order, and Historical Reason. 4 Burke's place within any of these traditions remains uncertain. Debate over whether he was a realist or an idealist, a [End Page 617] Rationalist or a Revolutionist, has concluded variously that he was a "conservative crusader" or an "historical empiricist," a belated dualist or a Cold Warrior before the fact, or, most egregiously, "a proto-Marxist, or more precisely proto-Gramscian" theorist of hegemony. 5 The fact that Burke so obviously eludes definition may put in doubt the analytical utility of closely-defined "traditions" of international theory. 6Burke's relationship to conceptions of reason of state provides a more precise example of the confusion within such taxonomies. According to one recent historian of international theory, Burke "laid the foundations" of the "conservative approach to International Relations informed by the two modern notions of state interest and necessity, by raison d'état"; however, in the words of another, "Burke... was vehemently opposed to the idea of Reason of State and did not subscribe to the view that national interests override moral laws." 7 The assumptions on which each of these judgments rests are clearly incompatible: on the one hand that a "conservative approach" in the realm of foreign affairs implies an espousal of reason of state defined as the primacy of "state interest and necessity," that Burke did indeed acknowledge; on the other hand that reason of state is defined more exactly as "the view that national interests override moral laws" and that Burke did not hold such a view, so could not be defined as a reason-of-state theorist. It might of course be possible that Burke held various views on such matters at various points in his long literary and political career or that he argued for differing conceptions of reason of state in differing contexts. To test such a hypothesis demands a historical account of Burke's relationship to the theories of reason of state held by his contemporaries and predecessors. [End Page 618]To place Burke within traditions of reason of state might seem to be a simple category error. After all, he famously scorned "dashing Machiavellian politicians," deplored "the odious maxims of a Machiavellian policy," condemned "the dreadful maxim of Machiavel that in great affairs men are not to be wicked by halves," and identified the Discorsi as the inflammatory textbook of French republicanism. 8 His strictures on Machiavelli and Machiavellianism affirmed avant la lettre the classic modern account of reason of state offered by Friedrich Meinecke, which counterposed "raison d'état on the one hand, and ethics and law on the other" and traced the emergence of this separation to the heathen Florentine who had given the tradition its familiar nickname. 9 Such accounts of reason of state and of Machiavelli reinforced the long-standing interpretation of Burke as the last of the medieval theorists of natural law, for whom no merely human calculations of advantage or interest could override the dictates of divine reason. If reason of state represented the doctrine that political expediency should supersede moral law, then Burke could only have been its (and Machiavelli's) enemy: his "politics... were grounded... (shrink)

Rawls and Schmitt are often discussed in the literature as if their conceptions of the political had nothing in common, or even referred to entirely different phenomena. In this essay, I show how these conceptions share a common space of reasons, traceable back to the idea of public reason and its development since the Middle Ages. By analysing the idea of public reason in Rawls and in Schmitt, as well as its relation to their theories of political representation, (...) I show in what way Schmitt's concept of the political cannot be divorced from an idea of justice, while, conversely, Rawls ' conception of justice cannot be divorced from a theory of the political. In that way this paper thematizes the internal relation that each theory establishes between justice and power, deliberation and decision, and consensus and disagreement. (shrink)

L’article cherche à mettre en lumière les carrières et les motivations des auteurs italiens qui ont écrit sur la raison d’État entre 1550 et 1650. La moitié d’entre eux furent des ecclésiastiques aux positions très différentes auxquels se joignaient juristes, médecins et gens de lettres. Nombre d’ecclésiastiques enseignaient dans les universités et tentaient d’obtenir un poste de secrétaire ou de conseiller à la cour, auprès d’un prince ou d’un cardinal. D’autres motifs les poussaient à rédiger leurs traités: la réprobation des (...) idées de Machiavel, l’ouverture d’espaces d’action pour le prince, mais aussi la défense des libertés républicaines. Ces traités et recueils de maximes proposent surtout un savoir littéraire. Leur influence sur la rationalisation de l’État est ici analysée de manière sceptique. (shrink)

Rawls and Schmitt are often discussed in the literature as if their conceptions of the political had nothing in common, or even referred to entirely different phenomena. In this essay, I show how these conceptions share a common space of reasons, traceable back to the idea of public reason and its development since the Middle Ages. By analysing the idea of public reason in Rawls and in Schmitt, as well as its relation to their theories of political representation, (...) I show in what way Schmitt's concept of the political cannot be divorced from an idea of justice, while, conversely, Rawls' conception of justice cannot be divorced from a theory of the political. In that way this paper thematizes the internal relation that each theory establishes between justice and power, deliberation and decision, and consensus and disagreement. (shrink)

Withdrawal is an act by which a member state of an international organization willingly terminates its membership. The right to withdraw from international organizations is explicitly mentioned in the constitutions of most of them and the circumstances regarding to the right of withdrawal vary depending on the organization. The purpose of this paper is to explain the right and procedures of withdrawal, and the reasons that result with the will of states to withdraw from international organizations. For the realization of (...) this research are used qualitative methods, based on the bibliography that is related to international organizations, with special emphasis with the right and procedures of the withdrawal of states from international organizations. Furthermore, some informations are also collected from the credible internet sources, which have valuable data about the withdrawals of states from international organizations and the reasons that result with such decisions. The results of the research have shown that since the appearance of international organizations until today, there were and there are decisions of states to withdraw from international organizations, coming from the reluctance of states to hand over to international organizations parts of their sovereignty. The conclusions of this paper aim to increase knowledge about the real meaning of the processes of withdrawals of states from international organizations. (shrink)

Philosophers have come to distinguish between ‘right’ and ‘wrong’ kinds of reasons for belief, intention, and other attitudes. Several theories about the nature of this distinction have been offered, by far the most prevalent of which is the idea that it is, at bottom, the distinction between what are known as ‘object-given’ and ‘state-given’ reasons. This paper argues that the object-given/state-given theory vastly overgeneralizes on a small set of data points, and in particular that any adequate account of the distinction (...) between the ‘right’ and ‘wrong’ kinds of reason must allow state-given reasons to be of the right kind. The paper has three main goals, corresponding to its three main parts. In part 1 I set up the problem by introducing the right-kind/wrong-kind distinction, the object-given/state-given distinction, and the object-given/state-given theory, according to which the former distinction simply amounts to the latter. Part 2 presents the main argument of the paper: I argue against the object-given/state-given theory by showing that all of the earmarks of the ‘right’ and ‘wrong’ kinds of reason apply to reasons not to intend and not to believe, but that these cases can’t be captured by the object-given/state-given theory. Finally, in part 3 I use these arguments to motivate and explore a more general hypothesis about the rightkind/wrong-kind distinction, and explore some of the consequences of rejecting the object-given/stategiven theory. (shrink)

Are there wrongs for which states cannot apologise? In this chapter, I argue that the answer is 'Yes'. I begin with the simple observation that reasoning as a state official requires a conception of what officials do, and so a conception of what is - and is not - properly undertaken on behalf of the state. To act as an official, then, requires a theory of what happens in a well functioning state: it requires a 'normative theory of the state. (...) What officials believe to be necessary for a state to be a good example of its kind will affect what they recognise as outside the bounds of what a state official ought to do. This limit on what can be recognised as something prior officials ought not to have done is illustrated by Canada's official apology for imposing residential schools on indigenous peoples. Canada's official apology left out a crucial feature of the schools policy in part because of the influence of integrationist theories of the state. An integrationist view of good statehood has limited officials' ability to see the project of restructuring indigenous communities and inculcating attachment to an overarching identity as a wrong in itself, and distorted officials' diagnosis of what went wrong in previous policy. One effect has been to allow contemporary officials to offer a sincere and comprehensive apology for past officials' human rights violations in indigenous communities while themselves pursuing policies in these communities that violate human rights. The lesson of the Canadian apology is that how state officials theorise the state can undermine their capacity to recognise human rights violations for what they are and distort their judgements of what must be done in remedy. (shrink)

Actions to prepare for and prevent pandemics are a common topic for bioethical analysis. However, little attention has been paid to global catastrophic biological risks more broadly, including pandemics with artificial origins, the creation of agents for biological warfare, and harmful outcomes of human genome editing. What’s more, international policy discussions often focus on economic arguments for state action, ignoring a key potential set of reasons for states to mitigate global catastrophic biological risks: moral reasons. In this paper, I frame (...) the mitigation of such risks as a global public good, and I explore three possible categories of moral reasons that might motivate states to provide this global public good: nationalism, cosmopolitanism, and interstate obligations. Whilst there are strong objections to moral nationalism as a reason for states to act, moral cosmopolitanism may provide a broad reason which is further supplemented for individual states through the elaboration of interstate moral obligations. The obligations I consider are moral leadership, fairness, and reciprocity. Moral reasons for individual states action may more effectively or more appropriately motivate states to mitigate global catastrophic biological risks. (shrink)

A state-based reason for one to intend to perform an action F is a reason for one to intend to F which is not a reason for one to F. Are there any state-based reasons to intend? According to the Explanatory Argument, the answer is no, because state-based reasons do not satisfy a certain explanatory constraint. I argue that whether or not the constraint is correct, the Explanatory Argument is unsound, because state-based reasons do satisfy the constraint. (...) The considerations that undermine the Explanatory Argument also generate a strong, positive case for the existence of state-based reasons to intend. (shrink)

The paper outlines the debate on European state socialism as a social and political order. There are different attempts to obtain a better understanding of the core principles of this type of society and a continuing public debate on it. Following the end of the decade of the transition from “socialism to capitalism” we can observe a renewal in the debates on the “Ancient regime” and its heritage. There are different reasons for this phenomenon; these include new insights from the (...) archives and the recent politics on history in post-socialist societies. The new “zeitgeist” following the world financial crisis of 2008 might be an additional reason. The issues that developed are discussions on the nature of state socialism, some hypotheses on the role of reformers within the changes to late socialism from the perspective of political science, and some assumptions on the methods adopted by former reform socialists after 1989. (shrink)

The more than thirteen-year co-existence of the Ukrainian state and the Church in the qualitatively new conditions prevailing in the post-Soviet space together with the formation of an independent Ukraine, functioning during this period of state-church relations give reasonably reliable grounds for scientific analysis, a number of generalizations and conclusions regarding the results and conclusions conditions of state policy on religion, church and religious organizations, ensuring in Ukraine the right of everyone to freedom of world view and religion - on (...) the one hand, and repair and optimize -tserkovno and religious life - on the other. (shrink)

A provision of the Hungarian constitution, adopted in 2011, has renamed the state. The name changed from the Republic of Hungary to Hungary, while the form of the state has remained “republic”. The purpose of this study is to explore the meaning, significance, and several consequences of this provision. The analysis consists of three main parts. The first one gives a general overview of the functions of the names of states. It claims that not only names but also changing or (...) modifying names of states—taking place either by name-giving or by shaping convention—can serve certain functions. The second part focuses on the historical and constitutional details of renaming the Hungarian state, and summarizes the legal context that provided the framework for the 2011 renaming. The third part outlines the arguments for the change, takes a look at the official justification and actual reasons, and reveals some of the consequences of the name change in the past decade. The main contention of the paper is that the renaming of the Hungarian state that took place in 2011 lacked any overt and reasonable justification, and is best explained as an expression of anti-republican sentiment, which indicated, and partly paved the way for the transition into a kind of an authoritarian regime. Finally, the study raises a possible interpretation of the renaming of the Hungarian state in 2011, the point of which is that it adumbrated many later changes in public law and political systems. (shrink)

How should the global set of social institutions distribute income and wealth among members of different states? I present a Theory of Global Justice which supports the Bounded Significance of State Borders: The states system must satisfy the Determinate Human Needs of all, and the distribution within each state must satisfy Rawls' Difference Principle. However, justice does not require a Global Difference Principle: income and wealth need not be distributed so as to maximize the income and wealth of the globally (...) worst off. ;The Theory of Global Justice illuminates the status of claims to equality within contractualism. There is no general presumption for equality of condition, and only contingent grounds for equality of certain goods. ;The claim to satisfaction of needs and the claim to equal income and wealth stem from two different sources: The Principle of Human Rights and The Principle of Equal Procedural Controls. The Principle of Equal Procedural Controls applies among citizens within state borders, but not among individuals in different states. ;Chapter 1 presents the central concepts of the Theory of Global Justice: states systems, contractualism and impact arguments. ;The Theory of Global Justice recognizes two kinds of interests as grounding claims on social institutions: Determinate Human Needs, and various controls over factors which affect our lives. Chapter 2 explains the notion of Determinate Human Needs. ;Chapter 3 argues for The Principle of Human Rights. The set of international institutions must seek to secure the satisfaction of the Determinate Human Needs of all. ;Chapter 4 presents the Principle of Equal Procedural Controls. Participants in important procedures can sometimes reasonably claim an equal share of procedural controls. ;The Principle of Equal Procedural Controls applies differently among compatriots and among foreigners. Chapter 5 claims that this principle requires equality of Social Primary Goods and the Difference Principle among citizens. ;Chapter 6 denies that the Principle of Equal Procedural Controls applies among individuals in different states in such a way as to support a Global Difference Principle. State borders thus legitimately affect individuals' grounds for claiming equal shares of procedural controls. (shrink)

Presidential pardon has always existed in criminal law and continues to constitute a very important competence of the head of state in many modern day countries. In the past, the clemency given by the sovereign represented an act which showed his/her mercy upon their subjects. It was often used as a tool to show the arbitrary will of the sovereign that constituted the law, rather than the law itself. Therefore, the classical school of criminal law that appeared in the 18th (...) century and emphasized the importance of the principle of legality, opposed harshly every kind of arbitrary deciding that excluded the law at the interest of the sovereign. This school is among the only interpretations of criminal law that engages for a complete abandonment of institutes such as pardon or amnesty. The revolutionary French Penal Code of 1791, which was strongly influenced by the classical school, excluded clemency for the proved wrongs that were severely punished. However, due to imperfections of the criminal justice system, amnesty and pardon or clemency, continue to exist and to be used in modern day criminal law. They are no longer considered acts of arbitrary decisions of the sovereign, instead they should represent important instruments of criminal law, used rarely and wisely with specifically designed goals that aim to bring justice rather than deny it. However, there are many cases when these institutes have been inappropriately used in a very arrogant way which shows that the ancient regime is not yet over for some countries in which the highest institutions continue to act as old and middle age despots. This article will analyze the legal reasoning of the institution of presidential pardon. It will try to establish why the classical school was so strictly opposed to this institute making use of the studies and interpretations found in the writings of Cesare Beccaria. It will explain the philosophy of modern day institutions of amnesty and pardon and the way in which they are regulated in the legal theory and practice. The article will explain the recent developments in Macedonia in regard to the use of presidential pardon. The methods to be used consist of desk research, historical and comparative methods and analysis of legal texts, laws and judicial decisions. (shrink)