Abstract: Using a critical review of the literature, we study a challenge from philosophical anarchism to J. Raz's theory of legal authority: it would be irrational to follow an order with which one disagrees, since it would mean acting against what is considered more justified. Through references from decision theory and epistemology, and deploying examples about tools for assisting in routine decision-making, we sketch two possible answers: first, it may be justifiable to put yourself in a situation that leads to (...) irrationally acting; second, according to the “blindspots” theory, we outline some restrictions from a theory of rationality to the authority. (shrink)

This dialogue between Achilles and the Tortoise – in the spirit of those of Carroll and Hofstadter – argues against the idea, identified with the “traditional” interpretation of Aristotle’s “sea battle argument”, that future contingents are an exception to the Principle of Bivalence. It presents examples of correct everyday predictions, without which one would not be able to decide and to act; however, doing this is incompatible with the belief that the content of these predictions lacks a truth-value. The cost (...) of using a non-classical logic to cope with that may be too high for Stagirite’s defenders, and they would still need to explain why our ordinary predictions seem to have a binary truth-value. In the end, the paper suggests that the problem of future contingents – and of free will – is not a logical problem at all, but rather a limit on what an agent can believe before taking a decision. (shrink)

A partir de uma revisão crítica da literatura, estuda-se um desafio do anarquismo filosófico à teoria da autoridade jurídica de J. Raz: seguir uma ordem de que se discorda seria irracional, pois equivaleria a agir contra o que se considera mais justificado. Utilizando referências atinentes à teoria da decisão e à epistemologia, além de exemplos sobre ferramentas de auxílio à tomada de decisão do cotidiano (como experts e programas), esboçamos duas possíveis respostas, que correspondem a duas concepções instrumentais distintas de (...) autoridade: numa, é justificável para o agente colocar-se numa situação que o leve a agir de forma inconsistente com suas crenças – a ideia de “submeter-se à autoridade”, afim a uma “confiança cega”; noutra, utilizando a teoria dos “pontos-cegos”, delineiam-se restrições que uma teoria da racionalidade impõe à teoria da autoridade. (shrink)

Translation into Portuguese of SEP entries on Philosophy of Economics.