Philosopher Louis Mackey facilitates a new understanding of Kierkegaard using the tools of literary criticism.

Locke is famous for defining madness as an intellectual disorder in the realm of ideas. Numerous commentators take this to be his main and only contribution to the history of psychiatry. However, a detailed exegetical review of all the relevant textual evidence suggests that this intellectualist interpretation of Locke’s account of madness is both misleading and incomplete. Affective states of various sorts play an important role in that account and are in fact primordial in the determination of human conduct generally. (...) Locke’s legacy in this domain must therefore be revised and the intellectualist bias that dominates discussions of his views must be redressed. (shrink)

Both science and theology involve philosophy. They both involve reasoned argument, evaluation of possible explanations, clarification of concepts, ways of interpreting experience, understanding the present significance of what has gone before us, and other such eminently philosophical tasks. They both involve philosophy, especially when they enter into dialogue with each other. In fact, they involve philosophical thinking even when they may not be aware of it. In this paper I will explore a specific area of philosophy that is particularly important (...) as a bridge between theology and science. I am referring to the area of meaning. Questions regarding meaning are fundamental because whatever is said about the nature of life, by scientists, by theologians, or by anyone else, must be expressed in meaningful words. Meaning is like the ground we walk on. It constitutes what we need to proceed with our activity. Without solid ground under our feet, we cannot go anywhere. (shrink)

This book is based on the premise that the realm of being is meaningful to the extent that we are able to view it comprehensively. Our understanding, in its degree, depends on the breadth of our knowledge; for everything, as we shall see, tends to shed light on everything else. But the knowledge we have today, although far exceeding that of our predecessors, does not serve this purpose of illumination insofar as it remains unassembled, partitioned among the minds of the (...) specialists who respectively represent the fields into which it is divided. ... In one of its aspects, this book is an exercise in perspective. As such, it will have much to say of the very small and the very large, of analysis and synthesis.--Preface. (shrink)

L'espace-temps du cinéma est un piège, une bonne occasion d'ouvrir, une fois encore, la retraite de l'espace à l'empire du temps. La peinture n'avait pas le temps, le cinéma l'a pris. La " théorie ", avec André Bazin, a, pour mieux assurer cette propriété, inventé le " hors-champ ". La pensée, aujourd'hui, doit se soumettre à la règle de cette ordonnance sous peine de se retrouver " hors-jeu ". Mais le cinéma, lui, obéit-il à cette loi paternelle? Que fait-il lorsqu'il (...) s'échappe dans la cour de sa récréation? Renoir, lorsqu'il a couru tout autour de la cour, dans Le Crime de monsieur Lange, et Hitchcock, lorsqu'il a, dans Fenêtre sur cour, condamné l'imprudence d'un homme qui, à la lettre, se mêlait de ce qui ne le regardait pas, avaient-ils l'œil ailleurs? Ou encore, avec Lang ou Straub, n'avaient-ils pas compris qu'il était plus important de rajouter un " hors-d'œuvre " à leur menu que de contempler voire d'adorer la Tunique " sans couture " de la réalité? (shrink)

Preview: If we define “philosophy” simply as “love of knowledge,” then it is obviously a requirement for any serious scientific, scholarly, or professional pursuit – in whatever field. Philosophy’s relevance is also wide-ranging or even universal when we define it as the most basic or general discipline: the one that poses foundational questions regarding the nature and legitimacy of knowledge itself. Philosophy does seem, however, to have special pertinence for the human sciences, and perhaps especially for the mental-health-related disciplines and (...) professions of psychiatry and clinical psychology. Physics and the biological sciences run up against such problematic issues as the nature of causality, the impact of the observer on the observed, or the essence of life; yet these disciplines seem able to progress quite nicely on their own, with little demand for philosophers or for philosophizing of an explicit sort. Fields like psychiatry and clinical psychology appear, by contrast, to have a more profound need for such input; and indeed, without self-critical philosophical thinking, they often seem to run the risk of degenerating into one or another form of what philosopher of science Imre Lakatos called a “degenerating research program” – whether this take the form of reductionism, rigidification, or mere banality. (shrink)

Jon Elster's subtle and richly illustrated argument raises more avenues of inquiry and application than one could possibly explore in a short comment. I will therefore confine myself to addressing three interrelated questions: First, can the distinctions among interest, passion, and reason on which his analysis depends really be maintained? Second, what implications does his work hold for some republican and liberal theories that insist on a public sphere purged of interest and passion or that defend a private sphere providing (...) the space necessary to indulge interest and passion? Finally, what does his analysis tell us about the possibility of a meta-theory that would mediate among interest, passion, and reason? With regard to the first question, Elster's own argument suggests that the boundaries among interest, passion, and reason are at least permeable. Each motive masquerades as the other or becomes transmuted into the other. Moreover, once one takes the consistency and imperfection constraints into account, the external manifestations of the different motives will often be identical. A positivist, who believes that all that matters are external manifestations that can be measured or observed, might therefore hold that the distinctions Elster analyzes are ones that are hardly worth worrying about. (shrink)

FROM VARIOUS THINKERS and in different languages we have been receiving an identical message: the philosophy of the subject initiated by Descartes' cogito has reached a definitive impasse. Critical reactions range from attempts to dispose of the subject altogether to efforts to restore pre-Cartesian theories. The authors here presented adopt positions different from either of those extremes. Fully aware of the modern predicament they advocate neither a return to a pre-Cartesian past nor do they dismiss outright the post-Cartesian subjective starting (...) point. Theoretical attitudes once adopted cannot simply be discarded: philosophy has to work its way through them. Still, the proposed answers vary substantially. In Philosophy and the Mirror of Nature, Richard Rorty advocates abandoning traditional truth claims in favor of a rational "conversation" carried on between incommensurable positions. Francis Jacques's Différence et subjectivité reverses the traditional priority of subject to relation. In Généalogie de la psychanalyse Michel Henry attempts to reclaim a theory of "pure" subjectivity from the wild growth of its objectivist deviations. Alasdair MacIntyre exposes the disastrous moral consequences that have resulted from the primacy of an autonomous, isolated subject and proposes a program for a socially and historically more integrated ethical reconstruction. No idea has of late more consistently come under fire than that of the subject as sole source of meaning and value. Heidegger attributed it to Descartes, and three of the studies show the direct impact of his reading. Yet similar tendencies had been at work in analytic philosophy. Rorty presents pragmatic anti-subjective interpretations of language going back to Wittgenstein; Francis Jacques supports his attack by Russell's theory of relations. (shrink)