The threat of malpractice litigation in the United States is encouraging physicians again to assume responsibility for their patients. The fundamental ethical problem, however, is that this approach denies the patient's moral agency. In this essay, responsibility to patients, rather than for them, is discussed as an alternative to the emerging neo-paternalism. Responsibility to avoids the ethical problems of assuming responsibility for moral agents and could reduce the threat of litigation as well.

The essays in this volume, with the exception of Gary Ferngren's, derive from ancestral versions originally presented at a symposium, 'Conflicts with Newborns: Saving Lives, Scarce Resources, and Euthanasia: held May 10-12,1984, at the Mercer University School of Medicine, Macon, Georgia. We wish to express our gratitude to the Georgia Endowment for the Humanities for a generous grant for the symposium and to Mercer University and the Medical Center of Central Georgia for additional financial support. The vit:ws expressed in this (...) volume do not necessarily represent those of the Georgia Endowment for the Humani ties, Mercer University, or the Medical Center of Central Georgia. We have endeavored to bring together a group of individuals with contrast ing viewpoints to display some of the range of approaches to a major problem in public policy: medical decisions regarding the treatment of defective newborns. So many persons contributed to the symposium that acknowledg ment of each would be impossible. Although unnamed, we express our sincere appreciation to each. Three individuals, however, must be recognized: R. Kirby Godsey, President, Mercer University; William P. Bristol, Dean, Mercer University School of Medicine; and Kenneth C. Henderson, Medical Director and Director of Medical Education, Medical Center of Central Georgia. Without their support, the symposium could not have succeeded and this volume would not have been possible. We wish also to express our gratitude to S. G. M. (shrink)

Govind Chandra Pande, b. 1923, Indian philosopher and historian; contributed articles.

Chalmers (2018) maintains that even if we understood every physical process in the brain we could still wonder why these processes give rise to conscious experience. The meta-problem is the challenge of explaining why we think this 'hard problem' exists. This response to the target paper endorses illusionist accounts of three 'problem intuitions' about consciousness: duality, presentation, and revelation. Subject–object duality is explained in terms of a clash between two compelling but contradictory convictions about consciousness. Phenomenal presence is understood in (...) relation to the configurational features of sensory experiences. And intuitions of revelation are explained as due to an unfounded belief in introspective ontological access. These illusionist analyses are used to bolster the case for physicalist realism rather than to support 'strong' illusionism. In addition to addressing the meta-problem they suggest a promising approach to the hard problem as wel. (shrink)

Praise for the First Edition: '... a unique and lively business ethics text... fresh and delightful... Sekhar's witty use of stories and cases will engage and enlighten business people in India and the rest of the world' - Joanne B Ciulla, The Journal of Business Ethics 'Richly international in scope and contributes to global concern' - Newsltter IIAS Leiden University 'This book makes an important contribution through its holisitc and balanced approach to the issue... Each chapter has a fair number (...) of relevant cases - many of which are good living examples one can learn from' - Business Standard This Second Edition of Sekhar's highly acclaimed book on business ethics has been revised keeping the student reader in mind. This unique text discusses the way ethical conflicts are handled in reality. The author argues that ethical education should be designed to produce balanced, pleasant and effective managers with the power of insight. Only then will they have the courage to create and use ethically desirable means to sustain organizations in an ambience of liberalism and democratic choice. (shrink)

Papers presented at a seminar held in 2011 organized by the Department of Philosophy, University of Hyderabad.

Daniel Dennett and others have suggested that qualia and introspectible phenomena do not exist. Dennett's account of consciousness, along with several related approaches, has been called illusionism by Keith Frankish. Frankish's analysis is helpful and provocative. As currently presented, however, his 'strong' version of illusionism suffers from several basic confusions, particularly regarding its relationship to eliminative materialism. This paper contrasts strong illusionism with an alternative that is easier to understand and more sharply focused -- fallibilist experiential realism, or, less technically, (...) modest realism. Fallibilist realism affirms the existence of experiential states that are commonly considered qualitative and phenomenal, but shares Frankish's agenda of thoroughly re-evaluating our judgments about such experiences. To illustrate the advantages of modest realism, I compare the ways illusionism and modest realism address two challenging puzzles: explaining how qualitative differences among sensory experiences could be constituted by differences among neural states, and explaining how neural states could constitute any conscious experiences whatsoever. (shrink)

pt. 1. De dicto: Necessary and contingent truths, by G. W. Leibniz. New essays concerning human understanding, by G. W. Leibniz. Introduction to the critique of pure reason, by Immanuel Kant. On the nature of mathematical truth, C. G. Hempel. Two dogmas of empiricism, by W. V. O. Quine. In defense of a dogma, by H. P. Grace and P. F. Strawson. The a priori and the analytic, by A. Quinton. The truths of reason, by R. Chisholm.--pt. 2. De re: (...) Reference and modality, by W. V. O. Quine. De re et de dicto, by A. Plantinga. World and essence, by A. Plantinga.--Bibliography (p. 200-202). (shrink)

Knowledge of God -- In essence -- In person -- Incommunicable attributes -- Communicable attributes -- The will of God -- Providence.