This paper addresses a question concerning psycho­logical continuity, i.e., which features preserve the same psychological subject over time; this is not the same question as the one concerning the necessary and sufficient conditions for personal identity. Marc Slors defends an account of psychological continuity that adds two features to Derek Parfit’s Relation R, namely narrativity and embodiment. Slors’s account is a significant improvement on Parfit’s, but still lacks an explicit acknowledgment of a third feature that I (...) call relationality. Because they are usually regarded as cases of radical discontinuity, I start my discussion from the experiences of psychological disruption undergone by victims of severe violence and trauma. As it turns out, the challenges we encounter in granting continuity to the experiences of violence and trauma victims are germane to those we encounter in granting continuity to the experiences of subjects in non-traumatic contexts. What is missing in the most popular accounts of psychological continuity is an explicit acknowledgment of the links that tie our psychological lives to other subjects. A more persuasive notion of psychological continuity is not only embodied and narrative, as is Slors’s notion, but also explicitly relational. (shrink)

Abstract: Those who endorse the Psychological Continuity Approach (PCA) to analyzing personal identity need to impose a non-branching constraint to get the intuitively correct result that in the case of fission, one person becomes two. With the help of Brueckner's (2005) discussion, it is shown here that the sort of non-branching clause that allows proponents of PCA to provide sufficient conditions for being the same person actually runs contrary to the very spirit of their theory. The problem is (...) first presented in connection with perdurantist versions of PCA. The difficulty is then shown to apply to endurantist versions as well. -/- . (shrink)

This paper argues that if persons last over time by “enduring”, then no analysis or reduction of personal identity over time in tenus of any sort of psychological continuity can be correct. In other words, any analysis of personal identity over time in tenus of psychological continuity entails that persons are four-dimensional and have temporal parts. The paper then shows that if we abandon psychological analyses of personal identity---as we must if persons endure---Parfit’s argument for (...) the claim that identity does not matter in survival is easily undenuined. The paper then suggests that this offers support for the claim that persons endure. Along the way the paper tries to clarify the contrast between the doctrine that persons endure and its rival, four-dimensionalism. (shrink)

Those who endorse the Psychological Continuity Approach (PCA) to analyzing personal identity need to impose a non-branching constraint to get the intuitively correct result that in the case of fission, one person becomes two. With the help of Brueckner's (2005) discussion, it is shown here that the sort of non-branching clause that allows proponents of PCA to provide sufficient conditions for being the same person actually runs contrary to the very spirit of their theory. The problem is first (...) presented in connection with perdurantist versions of PCA. The difficulty is then shown to apply to endurantist versions as well. (shrink)

Derek Parfit claims that all that rationally matters for a person is psychological connectedness or continuity, even without identity. A psychological replica of a person whose body is destroyed upon the replication rationally should be considered just as valuable as the original person. I argue against this, maintaining that any such copying procedure would be objectionable. First, I argue that a copy of an original person does not preserve identity to the original person. And second, I argue (...) that because a copy does not retain the identity of the orignial, it is not irrational to regard a copy as of less value than the original. (shrink)

Marya Schechtman has raised a series of worries for the Psychological Continuity Theory of personal identity (PCT) stemming out of what Derek Parfit called the ‘Extreme Claim’. This is roughly the claim that theories like it are unable to explain the importance we attach to personal identity. In her recent Staying Alive (2014), she presents further arguments related to this and sets out a new narrative theory, the Person Life View (PLV), which she sees as solving the problems (...) as well as bringing other advantages over the PCT. I look over some of her earlier arguments and responses to them as a way in to the new issues and theory. I argue that the problems for the PCT and advantages that the PLV brings are all merely apparent, and present no reason for giving up the former for the latter. (shrink)

In this article, I develop and defend a conception of psychological continuity that differs from the 'orthodox' conception in terms of overlapping chains of strongly connected mental states. By recognizing the importance of the (narrative) interrelatedness of qualitatively dissimilar mental contents, as well as the role of the body in psychological continuity, I argue, serious problems confronting the orthodox view can be solved.

개인동일성은 우리가 사람으로서 시간을 가로질러 지속하는 조건에 관한 형이상학의 오랜 논제이다. 개인동일성에 대한 지속 조건들의 문제는 ‘시간이 지남에 따른 개인동일성 문제’, 혹은 ‘지속성 질문(the Persistence question)’이라 불린다. 지속성 질문에 답하기 위한 몇 가지 시도들이 있다. 개인동일성과 관련한 지속성 질문에 대한 가장 인기 있는 답변은 심리적 연속성 견해(psychological-continuity views)이다. 이 견해는 심리주의로 알려져 있다. 이 견해에 따르면 개인의 지속은 어떤 심리적 속성들로 구성된다. 또 다른 영향력 있는 답변은 동물적-신체적 견해(brute-physical views)이다. 인간 존재를 생물학적 유기체로 보고 동물적-신체적 조건들이 인간의 지속 (...) 조건이라고 보는 이러한 입장은 우리에게 ‘애니멀리즘(animalism)’으로 알려져 있다. 본 논문은 심리적 연속성과 연결성이 우리의 지속 조건이라고 보는 심리주의와 동물적-신체적 연속성을 지속의 우선순위에 두는 애니멀리즘 혹은 생체주의의 논증들의 핵심 쟁점들을 검토하고, ‘무-사실 논제’를 통해 사실 지속성의 조건에 문제가 되는 사실이 없음을 보일 것이다. (shrink)

This letter responds to the article “On the Authority of Advance Euthanasia Directives for People with Severe Dementia: Reflections on a Dutch Case,” by Henri Wijsbek and Thomas Nys, in the September‐October 2022 issue of the Hastings Center Report.

Is amnesia the mother of discontinuity? Perhaps surprisingly, amnesia is perfectly compatible with psychological continuity. Think, for example, of David Wiggins’ version of Locke. Wiggins first describes a relationCof strongco-consciousnesswhich gives continuity ‘between personPtjand personQtksuch that, for somesufficiencyof things actually done, witnessed, experienced, … at any time byPtj, Qtkshould later havesufficientreal or apparent recollection of then doing, witnessing, experiencing, … them.’ Wiggins continues:… anyone bent on grasping the nerve of Locke's conception of person would see … that (...) the identity-condition he had to refute was one which made the persistence of personPdepend only uponP's being related at each successive phase of his biography in this C-relation toPat each previous phase. (shrink)

Deep brain stimulation is a well-accepted treatment for movement disorders and is currently explored as a treatment option for various neurological and psychiatric disorders. Several case studies suggest that DBS may, in some patients, influence mental states critical to personality to such an extent that it affects an individual’s personal identity, i.e. the experience of psychological continuity, of persisting through time as the same person. Without questioning the usefulness of DBS as a treatment option for various serious and (...) treatment refractory conditions, the potential of disruptions of psychological continuity raises a number of ethical and legal questions. An important question is that of legal responsibility if DBS induced changes in a patient’s personality result in damage caused by undesirable or even deviant behavior. Disruptions in psychological continuity can in some cases also have an effect on an individual’s mental competence. This capacity is necessary in order to obtain informed consent to start, continue or stop treatment, and it is therefore not only important from an ethical point of view but also has legal consequences. Taking the existing literature and the Dutch legal system as a starting point, the present paper discusses the implications of DBS induced disruptions in psychological continuity for a patient’s responsibility for action and competence of decision and raises a number of questions that need further research. (shrink)

In a recent article, Trenton Mericks argues that psychological continuity analyses of personal identity over time are incompatible with endurantism. We contend that if Merricks’s argument is valid, a parallel argument establishes that PC-analyses of personal identity are incompatible with perdurantism; hence, the correct conclusion to draw is simply that such analyses are all necessarily false. However, we also show that there is good reason to doubt that Merricks’s argument is valid.

If persons endure, personal identity cannot be analyzed in terms of psychological continuity. That is one conclusion defended in my “Endurance, Psychological Continuity, and the Importance of Personal Identity’ (PPR, 1999). Rea and Silver (PPR, 2000) claim that my argument for that conclusion is sound only if a parallel argument is sound. The parallel argument concludes that if persons perdure, personal identity cannot be analyzed in terms of psychological continuity. In this paper, I show (...) that Rea and Silver are mistaken. My argument is sound but the parallel argument is not. (shrink)

The view that an account of personal identity can be provided in terms of psychological continuity has come under fire from an interesting new angle in recent years. Critics from a variety of rival positions have argued that it cannot adequately explain what makes psychological states co-personal (i.e. the states of a single person). The suggestion is that there will inevitably be examples of states that it wrongly ascribes using only the causal connections available to it. In (...) this paper, I describe three distinct attacks on the psychological continuity theory along these lines. While I acknowledge that a number of interesting issues arise, I argue that the theory can withstand all three attacks. (shrink)

According to the psychological account of personal identity for someone to be one and the same person over time Y today must have some of the beliefs, desires, intentions and memories that X had yesterday, as well as some memories of the events that happened to X yesterday. But, on this account, we have the undesirable result that persons can be reduplicated unless we add an additional requirement: Y is uniquely psychologically continuous with X. In an attempt to avoid (...) the problem of reduplication in a different way I invoke arguments for active externalism and the embodied mind. The motivation for exploring embedded and embodied approaches to cognition is that they cast doubt on the easy separation of brain and body which is often taken for granted in the identity literature. With these approaches in mind, the simple assumptions by which brains are imagined to be transplanted into new bodies, and agents are said to be teletransported to new environments should be reviewed. Whilst embodiment provides us with some reasons to re-evaluate our understanding of brain transplant thought experiments, we ultimately see that the nature of teletransportation is consistent with the mind as both extended and embodied. (shrink)

An important concern sometimes voiced in the neuroethical literature is that swift and radical changes to the parts of a person’s mental life essential for sustaining his/her numerical identity can result in the person ceasing to exist—in other words, that these changes may disrupt psychological continuity. Taking neurointerventions used for rehabilitative purposes as a point of departure, this short paper argues that the same radical alterations of criminal offenders’ psychological features which under certain conditions would result in (...) a disruption of numerical identity can be achieved without these having any effect on numerical identity. Thus, someone interested in making radical alterations to offenders’ psychology can avoid the charge that this would kill the offenders, while still achieving a radical transformation of them. The paper suggests that this possibility makes the question of what kinds of qualitive alterations to offenders’ identity are morally permissible pressing, but then briefly highlights some challenges for arguments against making radical qualitative identity alterations to offenders. No data are available. (shrink)

A widely accepted view in the discussion of personal identity is that the notion of psychological continuity expresses a one--many or many--one relation. This belief is unfounded. A notion of psychological continuity expresses a one--many or many--one relation only if it includes, as a constituent, psychological properties whose relation with their bearers is one--many or many--one; but the relation between an indexical psychological state and its bearer when first tokened is not a one--many or (...) many--one relation. It follows that not all types of psychological continuity may take a one--many or many--one form. This conclusion casts doubt on the Lockean approach to the issue, by showing that the notion of psychological continuity Lockeans rely on may not be available. (shrink)

In this paper, I delineate a variety of questions related to personal identity and ontology. I develop and compare the Confucian conception of the person and the view of the person developed throughout Derek Parfit’s work on personal identity and ontology. I will demonstrate that the Confucian conception of the person has numerous instructive similarities with Parfit’s work on personal identity, despite a number of differences. I argue, briefly, that this project is worthwhile as a piece of comparative philosophy. One (...) of the final two sections of the paper develop a new hybrid account of personal identity and ontology that combine the Confucian and Parfitian views of personal identity and personal ontology. The last section of the paper goes into detail developing this view in response to potential questions, and responds to some objections to this hybrid account, including objections based on a similarity between the Confucian account and the narrative account of personal identity. (shrink)

I find myself ambivalent with respect to the line of argument that Schonbein offers. I certainly want to acknowledge and emphasize at the outset that Schonbein’s discussion has brought to the fore a number of central, compelling and intriguing issues regarding the nature of the dynamical approach to cognition. Though there is much that seems right in this essay, perhaps my view is that the paper invites more questions than it answers. My remarks here then are in the spirit of (...) scouting some of the surrounding terrain in order to see just what Schonbein’s claim is and what arguments or options may be open to the dynamicist. (shrink)

Michela Bella’s Ontology after Philosophical Psychology: The Continuity of Consciousness in William James’s Philosophy of Mind offers a detailed survey of James’s thought using “continuity” as its focal lens. Because the book presumes significant familiarity with James and frequently includes dense exegesis of his work’s most technical aspects, it is primarily for specialists. It will particularly interest James scholars studying the entanglement of the metaphysical with the psychological and epistemological.Combining “historical” and “theoretical” points of view, Bella tracks (...) “James’s gradual translation of psychological experimental observations of the continuity of thought into an ontological perspective... (shrink)

Located at the intersection of philosophy of cognitive science and philosophy of biology, this thesis aims to provide a novel approach to understanding the strong continuity between life and mind. This thesis applies the Free Energy Framework, predictive processing and the conceptual apparatus from ecological psychology to reveal different manners in which the organizational processes and principles underlying life have been enriched so as to result in cognitive processes. By using these anticipatory cognitive frameworks this thesis unveils different forms (...) of cognition at work in surprising places and considers how such expressions of cognition are ultimately driven by various forms of environmental complexity. Importing the concepts of affordances, environmental information and perceptual medium from ecological psychology into predictive processing and the Free Energy Framework, an empirically grounded account of cognition as an anticipatory process that allows living systems to adapt to various degrees of uncertainty in their environments at distinct and yet overlapping timescales is argued for. In doing so, this thesis attempts to identify both the explanatory limits of ecological coupling accounts of perception and action, and the possible environmental conditions under which the predictive brain evolved from its decentralized non-neural predecessors as a solution to uncertainty. In contributing to a novel approach to constraining the mind, the various concepts deployed in both philosophy and cognitive science are sharpened, furthering the current debate on what cognition is and how it is related to life. (shrink)

Do continuing education (CE) mandates increase participation in ethics programs and enhance their perceived outcomes? In a study of 5,198 North American psychologists, significant differences were found between mandated and nonmandated psychologists in relation to their participation in ethics programs but not in the perceived outcomes associated with those trainings. Although 64.3% of those psychologists operating under ethics mandates reported completing at least one ethics training within the previous year, only 40.7% of those without such mandates reported doing likewise. Overall, (...) both groups tended to view their ethics training quite favorably in relation to its perceived outcomes, though they differed in relation to their endorsement of CE mandates. Results are discussed in relation to the ongoing development of evidence-based CE and its role in developing critical professional competencies. (shrink)

This paper presents four theorems that connect continuity postulates in mathematical economics to solvability axioms in mathematical psychology, and ranks them under alternative supplementary assumptions. Theorem 1 connects notions of continuity (full, separate, Wold, weak Wold, Archimedean, mixture) with those of solvability (restricted, unrestricted) under the completeness and transitivity of a binary relation. Theorem 2 uses the primitive notion of a separately continuous function to answer the question when an analogous property on a relation is fully continuous. Theorem (...) 3 provides a portmanteau theorem on the equivalence between restricted solvability and various notions of continuity under weak monotonicity. Finally, Theorem 4 presents a variant of Theorem 3 that follows Theorem 1 in dispensing with the dimensionality requirement and in providing partial equivalences between solvability and continuity notions. These theorems are motivated for their potential use in representation theorems. (shrink)

This paper provides an analysis of Franz Brentano’s thesis that psychology employs a distinctive method, which sets it apart from physiology. The aim of the paper is two-fold: First, I situate Brentano’s thesis (and the broader metaphysical system that underwrites it) within the context of specific debates about the nature and status of psychology, arguing that we regard him as engaging in a form of boundary work. Second, I explore the relevance of Brentano’s considerations to more recent debates about autonomy (...) on the one hand and theoretical and/or methodological integration on the other. I argue that Brentano puts his finger on the idea that an integrated research process presupposes the existence of distinct methods and approaches, and that he highlights the philosophical challenge of accounting for such distinct methods. I suggest that Brentano’s ideas offer unconventional perspectives on current debates, in particular regarding first-person methods and the investigative process in cognitive science. (shrink)

According to the Psychological-Continuity Account of What Matters, you are justified in having special concern for the well-being of a person at a future time if and only if that person will be psychologically continuous with you as you are now. On some versions of the account, the psychological continuity is required be temporally ordered, whereas, on other versions, it is allowed to be temporally unordered. In this paper, I argue that the account is implausible if (...) the psychological continuity is allowed to be temporally unordered. I also argue that, if the psychological continuity is required to be temporally ordered, it cannot plausibly be purely psychological (in the sense that the psychological continuity is not required to be caused through spatio-temporal continuity of a brain). The upshot is that no plausible version of the Psychological-Continuity Account of What Matters is purely psychological. So psychological continuity is not what matters in survival. (shrink)

Jeff McMahan's impressive recent defence of the embodied mind theory of personal identity in his highly acclaimed work The Ethics of Killing has undoubtedly reawakened belief that physical continuity is a necessary component of the relation that matters in our self-interested concern for the future. My aim in this paper is to resist this belief in a somewhat roundabout way. I want to address this belief in a somewhat roundabout way by revisiting a classic defence of the belief that (...) enormous changes in the contents of a person's psychology does not preclude justified fear of future pain. I have in mind Bernard Williams' The Self and the Future (1970) in which he argues, against the psychological view, that physical continuity is necessary for survival. I examine Williams' second thought experiment which ostensibly supports that intuition and afterwards defend two related claims. First, I argue that a close examination of the second thought experiment reveals that one's prior commitments to a particular criterion of personal identity can influence one's response to that thought experiment. Second, I argue that Williams' second thought experiment is set out in questionbegging terms. I do not claim, however, that the intuition under consideration lacks justification; I only claim that Williams' second thought experiment does not provide the needed support. (shrink)

In this paper, I argue that standard psychological continuity theory does not account for an important feature of what is important in survival – having the property of personhood. I offer a theory that can account for this, and I explain how it avoids the implausible consequences of standard psychological continuity theory, as well as having certain other advantages over that theory.

Ontology after Philosophical Psychology develops a theoretical and historical analysis of William James’s psychology of the stream of consciousness and its connections with his philosophy of radical empiricism. This context enables a fuller understanding of James’s epistemological effort to deal with science, as well as his pluralistic metaphysics.

_Psychology on the Web: A Student Guide_ is directed at those who want to be able to access psychology Internet resources quickly and efficiently without needing to become IT experts. The emphasis throughout is on the location of high quality psychology related Internet resources likely to be useful for learning, teaching and research, from among the billions of publicly accessible Web pages. Whilst the author has drawn on a large volume of technical literature, it is written on the basis of (...) practical experience acquired over many years of using Internet resources in the context of teaching undergraduate and postgraduate courses in the social sciences covering a wide range of topic specialisms, and in informing academic staff. In addition to extensive coverage of topics relating to the efficient location of files and Web sites, Part III provides a substantial and annotated list of high quality resources likely to be of use to students of psychology. The work is structured so that it will be found useful by both beginners and intermediate level users, and be of continuing use over the course of higher education studies. (shrink)

The starting-point of this article is Graham Richards’ (1995) claim that American psychology includes a moral project present even before the discipline got underway as a modern institution. We accept this, but identify a different kind of moral project, stemming from the radical critique of morality by Ralph Waldo Emerson, rather than the moral aims of Noah Porter and James McCosh. This leads to a morality based on (but not reducible to) psychological events, and worked out, not in academic (...) psychology, but in the practical disciplines of counselling and psychotherapy. We trace its elaboration from Freud to the writings and practice of Albert Ellis and Carl Rogers. The critique is of a traditional morality of obligation with its discourse of ‘shoulds’ and ‘oughts’. A parallel is drawn with a similar (and contemporaneous) critique in moral philosophy. (shrink)

Excerpt from The Psychological Aspects of Christian Experience Continued observation of the various methods of religious instruction has brought upon me a conviction that grows stronger as the years go by, that there must be, as Francis Peabody says, a new expansion of the range of studies appropri ate to the teachers of religion. There ought to be a far deeper study of the psychology of reli gion. The appeal to the impulses and emotions, so prevalent in the methods (...) of some teachers, is far behind twentieth century enlightenment. It was foreign to the methods of our Saviour. He taught men. He did not frighten them into ao tion, neither entice them. He instructed their minds in truth. Ye shall know the truth and the truth shall make you free. About the Publisher Forgotten Books publishes hundreds of thousands of rare and classic books. Find more at www.forgottenbooks.com This book is a reproduction of an important historical work. Forgotten Books uses state-of-the-art technology to digitally reconstruct the work, preserving the original format whilst repairing imperfections present in the aged copy. In rare cases, an imperfection in the original, such as a blemish or missing page, may be replicated in our edition. We do, however, repair the vast majority of imperfections successfully; any imperfections that remain are intentionally left to preserve the state of such historical works. (shrink)

Contemporary philosophers writing on the issue of personal identity agree that, whatever is disputable about fission cases, there is little doubt that, if there could be fission, there would be psychological continuity between the original person and her offshoot (if the branching is one-one), or between the original personand her offshoots (if the branching is one-many). The belief is one with a long history dating back to John Locke; it has, over time, acquired the status of self-evident truth. (...) This paper is not an attempt to refute this deeply rooted belief, though I think the near universal acceptance of it is rather unfortunate. My main goal in what follows is to make an initial case for three forms of psychological discontinuity that I believe would exist between the fission ancestor and the offshoots. If I am right about the existence of the three forms of psychological discontinuity, contemporary Lockeans on the issue of personal identity will need to rethink their position, or so I will argue in the last section of the paper. (shrink)

Any theory that analyses personal identity in terms of phenomenal continuity needs to deal with the ordinary interruptions of our consciousness that it is commonly thought that a person can survive. This is the bridge problem. The present paper offers a novel solution to the bridge problem based on the proposal that dreamless sleep need not interrupt phenomenal continuity. On this solution one can both hold that phenomenal continuity is necessary for personal identity and that persons can (...) survive dreamless sleep. (shrink)

This book provides a comprehensive study of major issues of moral psychology throughout history, from ancient to early modern philosophy. The volume focuses primarily on the Western history of philosophy but also deals with Jewish and Islamic heritage. The Introduction chapter lays out the historical background in broad strokes, giving the reader the “lay of the land” when it comes to the terms of analysis and their overall development within the Western tradition of moral psychology. The book continues by studying (...) and analyzing moral anthropology, moral agency and motivation, virtues and social and political commitments, taking a thematic approach in a specific time-period and focus on the most unique and/or fruitful discussions about a particular historically situated discussion when it comes to thinking about questions and/or ‘problems’ in the field of moral psychology. Aimed at both a layman and academic audience, this book is of great interest to a broad readership. (shrink)

This study seeks to provide a new resolution to an old controversy regarding Wilhelm Dilthey's methodological writings, written from 1880 to 1911. This controversy concentrates on the relations of Dilthey's early psychology and his late hermeneutics. On one side of this controversy stand interpreters who claim that the appearance of the late hermeneutics marks a dramatic change in Dilthey's thought, and even creates an internal paradox in his thinking. On the other side, stand interpreters who view his thought as a (...) unified whole, by claiming that these methods were meant to work in tandem and complement each other. I largely agree with the latter group of interpreters regarding the unity of Dilthey's writings; however, instead of basing my view on the methodological level of Dilthey’s writings, I will concentrate on the object of these two methods. According to my new answer to the question of the continuity of Dilthey’s thought, Dilthey did intend to replace his early psychology with his late hermeneutics; even so, his thought should still be viewed as consistent and stable because he continued to apply both different methods to the same object: inner-universal content, that is, the inner psychological source of outer human reality. In this way, I will try show that the consistency of Dilthey's thought is derived from the stable destination he aspired to reach with the help of the different methods. (shrink)

Philosophically, the most interesting objection to the reliance on advance directives to guide treatment decisions for formerly competent patients is the argument from the loss of personal identity. Starting with a psychological continuity theory of personal identity, the argument concludes that the very conditions that bring an advance directive into play may destroy the conditions necessary for personal identity, and so undercut the authority of the directive. In this article, I concede that if the purpose of a theory (...) of personal identity is to provide an answer to the question What is it for a person to persist over time?, then reflection on personal identity poses a potentially serious threat to the moral authority of advance directives. However, as Marya Schechtman observes, questions about how a single person persists through change are not what most of us are interested in when we think about who a person is. Rather, we are interested in what it means to say that a particular set of actions, experiences, and characteristics is that of a given person rather than someone else. (shrink)

"In this book, the second edition of the author's Principles of Psychology, he continues his attempt to forge naturalistic constructs (descriptions, interpretations) for psychological events. Despite the enormous development of psychology in the interval, the author still stresses the fact that psychological events are in all respects as natural as chemical reactions, electromagnetic radiation, or gravitational attraction. The attempt to transform psychology into a natural science is doubly motivated. First, there is the need to develop valid constructs for (...) an important series of happenings. Second, such results smooth the way for workers in other sciences such as physics, physiology, and anthropology in their inevitable encounter with psychological issues"--Preface. (PsycINFO Database Record (c) 2010 APA, all rights reserved). (shrink)