In this article, we discuss the question about how the practices of deceiving become a matter of discussion on moral philosophy and how they could be thought beyond the sieve of this conviction. As we intend to defend, an answer to this question should refer to the Greek thought, particularly, the Platonic thought in dialogues: Hippias minor and The republic, taking as horizon the problem of the disambiguation of Alêtheia, and the exclusion, by philosophical thought, of the forms of clever (...) and astute intelligence that the Greeks named in honor to the goddess Mêntis. On the other hand, should also imply a distinction of perspectives inherent to what we call by deceiving, which put on opposite sides of the deceiver and the deceived, according to the acknowledgement, or not, of the deceiving. Under this bias, we argue that, for the Greeks, the problem wouldn't be mainly the mistake itself – although platonic thought points that – but being deceived, and mainly, self-deceived. (shrink)

Valmaer. [pseud]. [Ream, Michael]. Lawyer's Code of Ethics. A Satire. St. Louis: The F.H. Thomas Law Book Co., 1887. 143 pp. Reprinted 2001 by The Lawbook Exchange, Ltd. LCCN 00-021508. ISBN 1-58477-047-3. Cloth. $65. * Witty satire of the world of law practice, written in the form of an instructional code of ethics, providing advice such as "When old members of the bar do come into contact with the young men, they should by their conduct towards them make them (...) feel their insignificance. Show them that patronage that all great men show towards inferiors. They are obtruders in our select circle, but since they have wedged their way in, they are entitled to a little consideration, but not much; and that only because they are lawyers." Pp. 31-32. Marke, A Catalogue of the Law Collection of New York University (1953) 161. (shrink)

Introduction: Wonder and the births of philosophy -- Socrates' small difficulty -- The wound of wonder -- The death and resurrection of Thaumazein -- The Thales dilemma -- Repetition : Martin Heidegger -- Metaphysics small difficulty -- Wonder and the first beginning -- Wonder and the other beginning -- Theaetetus redux : the ghost of the Pseudes Doxa -- Once again to the cave -- Rethinking Thaumazein -- Openness : Emmanuel Levinas -- Passivity and responsibility -- The ethics of the (...) cave -- Infinity and astonishment -- Opening out : from existent to existence -- Closing down : from existence to existent -- Locking up : totality and infinity -- The phantom of the autrement -- Awakening -- Relation : Jean-Luc Nancy -- The problem of Mitsein -- Mitsein as essential inessentiality -- The myth of essentialism -- Unworking -- Interruption -- Repetition -- Decision : Jacques Derrida -- Thaumazein, the irresponsible, and the undecidable -- Hospitality -- Undecidability revisited -- Much madness is divinest sense (or, who comes after the decision?) -- How to avoid the subject (or, that's not my hedgehog!) -- Undecidability, take three : think here of Kierkegaard -- Mysterium tremendum -- Postlude: Possibility. (shrink)

In the Philebus, Socrates argues that pleasure, like judgment, can be “false”. Most scholars who discuss this claim restrict their interpretation to Socrates’ first argument that pleasure can be “false”, where Socrates uses pseudēs as a synonym of “incorrect”. As a result, scholars have failed to recognize that in the next argument Socrates uses pseudēs to pick out a different problem with pleasure: in certain circumstances, a pleasure can deceptively appear to a subject to be larger or smaller than it (...) really is. As Socrates explicitly distinguishes between these two problems with pleasure, he is guilty of neither confusion nor intentional equivocation in his application of the predicate pseudēs. The distinction also resolves many longstanding interpretive puzzles, including the relationship between mixed and “false” pleasures and why Socrates describes the pleasures of sight, hearing, smell and learning as both pure and “true”. (shrink)

H. Dohm has amply demonstrated how the cook of Plautus, Pseud. 790ff. exhibits characteristic features of the mageiros of Greek comedy. He has also argued, however, that this scene contains substantial Plautine expansion, comparable with that which has been recognised in the cook scene of the Aulularia. I wish to suggest that Dohm is largely right but that the Plautine expansion is even more extensive than he supposes. In 790–838 Plautus is probably for the most part following his Greek (...) model fairly closely. One can trace a logical sequence of ideas, as follows. Ballio: ‘I couldn't have found a worse cook’ . Cook: ‘Why did you hire me then?’ . Ballio: ‘You were the only one left. And why was that?’ . Cook: ‘I am expensive, but nowadays people look for cheap cooks, who produce only concoctions of seasoned vegetables. That is why men are so short-lived’ . Ballio: ‘You can make men live longer then?’ . Cook: ‘Certainly, for 200 years’ . The cook then proceeds to give a list of his fantastic sauces for fish and meat , until he is cut short by Ballio's ‘Damn your lies’ . We have here a typical comic mageiros: he is loquacious and boastful , claims magic powers , denigrates his rivals , reels off lists of foods, real and fictitious , and uses grandiose language . Within this essentially Greek section there are three short passages which look like Plautine additions. First, Dohm is surely right, following E. Fraenkel, to see 790f. as a Plautine addition. (shrink)

A principal hipótese deste trabalho é a de que Sócrates, na Apologia de Platão, utiliza determinados jogos de palavras como uma específica ferramenta retórica. O intuito disso parece ser convencer o leitor de uma prevalência da verdade no conjunto do discurso socrático. Para tanto, busca-se contrabalancear um jogo entre os termos discurso (logon 18b, 19b, 20e, 23d, 27c 28b, 31b, 34b; logos 20c, 26b, 34e; logou 23b; logoi 28c, 32d, 34a, 40b), verdade (aletheian, 17b, 20d, 33c; aletheiai 23b, 28d, 36d; (...) aletheias 29e, 39b) e falsidade ou mentira (epseusanto 17a; pseude 18a; pseudei 26a; pseudetai 20e, 21b; pseudomenoi 34b; pseudos 34e). Nesse sentido, a proposta é apresentar como o discurso de defesa expõe, por meio desses termos, um sentido de hermenêutica socrática, como uma forma peculiar de interpretar oráculos e enigmas. Como obra dramática, a Apologia promove com essa encenação de Sócrates diante do tribunal um efeito retórico claro, pois o foco do discurso não é o júri, mas o leitor. Portanto, é necessário, no plano do discurso de defesa, que Sócrates utilize os recursos de linguagem que o mostrem ao leitor como distinto dos seus acusadores, que “muitas mentiras disseram” (ton pollon hon epseusanto). Palavras-chave: Sócrates; Hermenêutica; Verdade; Discurso. Speech, Truth and Enigma in the Apology Abstract: The main hypothesis of this work is that Socrates, in Plato's Apology, uses certain wordplays as a specific rhetorical tool. The purpose of this seems to be to convince the reader of the prevalence of truth in the whole of Socratic discourse. Therefore, we seek to counterbalance a game between the terms discourse (logon 18b, 19b, 20e, 23d, 27c 28b, 31b, 34b; logos 20c, 26b, 34e; logou 23b; logoi 28c, 32d, 34a, 40b), truth (aletheian, 17b, 20d, 33c; aletheiai 23b, 28d, 36d; aletheias 29e, 39b) and falsehood or lie (epseusanto 17a; pseude 18a; pseudei 26a; pseudetai 20e, 21b; pseudomenoi 34b; pseudos 34e). In this sense, the proposal is to present how the defense discourse exposes, through these terms, a sense of Socratic hermeneutics, as a peculiar way of interpreting oracles and enigmas. As a dramatic work, the Apology promotes with this staging of Socrates in front of the court a clear rhetorical effect, since the focus of the discourse is not the jury, but the reader. Therefore, it is necessary, at the level of the defense discourse, that Socrates uses the language resources that show him to the reader as distinct from his accusers, who “told many lies” (ton pollon hon epseusanto). Key-words: Socrates; Hermeneutics; Truth; Discourse. Discurso, verdad y enigma en la Apología Resumen: La principal hipótesis de este trabajo es que Sócrates, en la Apología de Platón, utiliza ciertos juegos de palabras como herramienta retórica específica. El propósito de esto parece ser convencer al lector del predominio de la verdad en todo el discurso socrático. Por lo tanto, buscamos contrapesar un juego entre los términos discurso (logon 18b, 19b, 20e, 23d, 27c 28b, 31b, 34b; logos 20c, 26b, 34e; logou 23b; logoi 28c, 32d, 34a, 40b), verdad (aletheian, 17b, 20d, 33c; aletheiai 23b, 28d, 36d; aletheias 29e, 39b) y falsedad o mentira (epseusanto 17a; pseude 18a; pseudei 26a; pseudetai 20e, 21b; pseudomenoi 34b; pseudos 34e). En ese sentido, la propuesta es presentar cómo el discurso de la defensa expone, a través de estos términos, un sentido de la hermenéutica socrática, como una forma peculiar de interpretar los oráculos y los enigmas. Como obra dramatica, la Apología promueve con esta puesta en escena de Sócrates frente a la corte un claro efecto retórico, ya que el centro del discurso no es el jurado, sino el lector. Por tanto, es necesario, a nivel del discurso de defensa, que Sócrates utilice los recursos lingüísticos que lo muestren al lector como distinto de sus acusadores, quienes “dijeron muchas mentiras” (ton pollon hon epseusanto). Palabras-clave: Sócrates; Hermenéutica; Verdad; Discurso. Data de registro: 02/08/2023 Data de aceite: 24/01/2024. (shrink)

In this noblest of Epistles Horace has been warning Quinctius to trust his own judgement about his happiness—is he sapiens bonusque? . The plaudits of the people are fickle and can be withdrawn overnight. Only a man who is flawed and in need of treatment is delighted by false honour or upset by untrue defamation: the philosophic man is impervious to both. Horace, prompted by the words ‘pone, meum est’, illustrates the idea of defamation by reference to a very ancient (...) and traditional form of Italian popular justice—flagitatio ordefamatory dunning.The three charges made in the Horatian passage—thieving, homosexuality, and unfilial behaviour—also appear in the classic Plautine catalogue of flagitatio at Pseud. 360 ff., where the pimp Ballio is abused: ‘fur’ , ‘impudice’ , ‘parricida’. (shrink)

In Plautus and elsewhere in old Latin there is an imperative suffix -mino of medio-deponential meaning: opperimino, PL True. 188 , progredimino, id. Pseud. 859, arbitramino, id. Epid. 695, praefamino, Cato, RR. 141, 2, famino Paul. Fest. 62, 10, Th., all 2 sg.; in legal documents, antestamino , in the XII Tables, fruimino , CIL. 1, 199, profitemino in Lex Iulia Municipalis, all 3 sg. The generally accepted explanation of the form is that it arose from a contamination of (...) the ordinary 2 pl. medio-passive imperative in -mini and the 2, 3 sg. forms in -to, Lindsay, Latin Language, p. 517, Von Planta, Gramm. d. oskisch-umbr. Dial. II, pp. 310 sqq., Buck, Elementarb. d. oskisch-umbr. Dial. p. 112, Sommer, Hdb. d. lat. Laut- u. Formenlehre, p. 366, Stolz, Lat. Gramm*. p. 158. The Oskan and the Umbrian forms in -mo, -mu, U. spahamu, eturstahmu, persnimu, O. censamur, all of 2 or 3 sg., and U. arsmahamo, caterahamo of 2 or 3 pi., are identified with the Lat. -minō forms on the assumption that the Osk-Umbr. -mu represents an older *-mnō which in turn arose by syncope from -*menō Von Planta, l.c. This explanation is the most satisfactory that has been given, and we may suppose that Latin, Oskan, and Umbrian had an imperative form in *-menō. (shrink)

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:Music and Structure in Roman ComedyTimothy J. MooreWell over a century ago, Friedrich Ritschl and Theodor Bergk independently reached the same conclusion regarding the markings of DV and C in some of the manuscripts of Plautus: the initials stand for diverbium and canticum; and their association, respectively, with scenes in iambic senarii and scenes in other meters implies that in Roman comedy passages in iambic senarii were unaccompanied, whereas (...) passages in all other meters were cantica, accompanied by the tibiae (Ritschl 1871–72, Bergk 1872).1 Ritschl’s and Bergk’s conclusions provide the best explanation not only of the rubrics in the manuscripts, but also of descriptions of performance in the grammarians and other ancient authors, and several allusions to the tibicen in the plays of Plautus. It is therefore not surprising that while there have been a few dissenters, most scholars have agreed with Ritschl’s and Bergk’s basic distinction between iambic senarii and other meters based on accompaniment.2 The implications of that distinction for the structure of Roman comedy, however, have remained unappreciated.Not that meter has been ignored by those proposing structural rules for Roman comedy. Soon after Ritschl and Bergk presented their [End Page 245] discoveries, Andreas Spengel (1877) argued that arrangement of lyric passages, accompanied stichic verse, and iambic senarii contributed to a five-act structure in all the plays of Plautus. Much more recently, Adolf Primmer has contended that all Roman comedies can be divided into three or more acts comprised of combinations of accompanied and unaccompanied meters (1984, 16–20). Although both Spengel and Primmer offer some valuable insights into the metrical arrangement of the plays, two factors vitiate their theories. First, in their determination to find universal structural principles, both scholars try to force the metrical patterns of many plays into procrustean schemata, ignoring passages which do not fit the molds they have created.Second, both scholars assume regular division of the plays of Roman comedy into acts divided by musical interludes. There is indeed one passage where a musical interlude certainly occurred (Pseud. 573a; see below), and in other passages the exit and reentrance of a character would make such an interlude likely (Cistell. 630, Trin. 601). Spengel, Primmer, and others who have assumed regular musical interludes have postulated that these occurred regularly when the text suggests that the stage was empty, and temporal verisimilitude would demand that an interval should pass before one of the characters reenters.3 Given the freedom with which Plautus and Terence apparently ignore the constraints of temporal verisimilitude even when the stage is not left empty, however, any attempt to prove the existence of interludes based on how much time must pass between events on stage divided by an empty stage is doomed to failure; and as Conrad, Questa and others have shown, there is much evidence to suggest that with a very few exceptions Roman comedies were performed continuously, without act breaks.4In her study of Plautus’ polymetric cantica Helen Hull Law approaches musical structure from another perspective. She observes that a great number of Plautus’ plays feature regular patterns of iambic senarii, followed by polymetric cantica, followed by trochaic septenarii; [End Page 246] and that on many occasions polymetric cantica occur at the beginning of new units of action (1922, 103–5). Law’s observations are invaluable for an appreciation of the musical structure of Plautus’ plays; nevertheless, they are limited by her emphasis on the polymetric cantica.It is not at all clear how the polymetric cantica were performed. Most scholars have assumed that polymetric passages were sung, whereas the performance of stichic verse other than iambic senarii was either “melodramatic,” with actors speaking independently of the accompaniment, or “recitative,” in which actors chanted in time with the tibiae.5 There is, however, no evidence that the polymetric cantica were “sung” in our sense of the word, or that the method in which the polymetrics were performed differed from the performance of other passages labeled cantica in the manuscripts.6 The most important musical distinction therefore appears to have been not that between the polymetric cantica and stichic meters, but rather that between unaccompanied iambic senarii... (shrink)