Despite the closure of virtually all original grindhouse cinemas, ‘grindhouse’ lives on as a conceptual term. This article contends that the prevailing conceptualization of ‘grindhouse’ is problematized by a widening gap between the original grindhouse context (‘past’) and the DVD/home-viewing context (present). Despite fans’ and filmmakers’ desire to preserve this part of exploitation cinema history, the world of the grindhouse is now little more than a blurry set of tall-tales and faded phenomenal experiences, which are subject to present-bias. The continuing (...) usefulness of grindhouse-qua-concept requires that one should pay heed to the contemporary contexts in which ‘grindhouse’ is evoked. (shrink)

Many ecological economists have argued that some natural capital should be preserved for posterity. Yet, among environmental philosophers, the preservation paradox entails that preserving parts of nature, including those denoted by natural capital, is impossible. The paradox claims that nature is a realm of phenomena independent of intentional human agency, that preserving and restoring nature require intentional human agency, and, therefore, no one can preserve or restore nature (without making it artificial). While this article argues that the (...) class='Hi'>preservation paradox is more difficult to resolve than ordinarily recognized, it also concludes by sketching a positive way to understand what it means to preserve natural capital during the Anthropocene. (shrink)

Islam gives legal precedence to purity of lineage and known parenthood of all children. In Islam treatment to infertility using IVF is permitted within validity of marriage contract with no genes mixing. The paper shows that the Qur’ān, the word of Allah, and science, the deeds of Allah are not in major conflicts in defining the start of human life. The Holy Qur’ān provides an elegant description of origin, developmental stages of intra-uterine life. The Hadith explains two positions one that (...) believes human embryo get ensouled at conception and the other after 40 days of conception. The paper aims to find that Islam confers moral respect to human embryo, but it also clarifies the absence of full human rights to a developing foetus. In Islam, human embryonic use is probably permissible for therapeutic and reproductive purpose keeping intact the principles of Shari’ah. (shrink)

Pre-modern Arabic biography has served as a major source for the history of Islamic civilization. In this 2000 study exploring the origins and development of classical Arabic biography, Michael Cooperson demonstrates how Muslim scholars used the notions of heirship and transmission to document the activities of political, scholarly and religious communities. The author also explains how medieval Arab scholars used biography to tell the life-stories of important historical figures by examining the careers of the Abbasid Caliph al- Ma'mun, the Shiite (...) Imam Ali al-Rida, the Sunni scholar Ahmad Ibn Hanbal and the ascetic Bishr al-Hafi, each of whom represented a tradition of political and spiritual heirship to the Prophet. Drawing on anthropology and comparative religion, as well as history and literary criticism, the book considers how each figure responded to the presence of the others and how these responses were preserved by posterity. (shrink)

FOR hundreds or even thousands of years posterity saw in Aristotle only the impersonal intellectual majesty of the philosophical system. When awakening humanism began everywhere to seek in the works of the classic writers the impress of their personality, this new interest met in Aristotle with the most stubborn resistance. His was a very different case from that of Plato or Demosthenes. The few notices preserved of his life and person remained in merely external relation to the body of (...) his works. In recent times we have begun, however, to discern the intellectual history of the man Aristotle, and in this regard his relations to Plato naturally acquire special significance. In the various phases of his life these relations took various forms; but in view of late gossip about the pupil's ingratitude to the master, it is as well to say that never was Aristotle^s attitude to Plato other than one of the deepest possible veneration. It has a special psychological fascination to see how this veneration expressed itself at the time when Aristotle found himself committed to philosophical opposition to his master; and it is significant that the only documentary proofs of Aristotle's attitude that we possess belong to these years. Evidently his veneration found this compensating expression when he was forced to publish his philosophical critisma. (shrink)

In the summer of 2012, “meat” themed posters were hung throughout the city of Edmonton, Alberta. A textual analysis of three of the posters from this collection revels that the concept of sacrifice is more appropriate to describe “meat”-eating in Alberta than the concept of the absent referent. These posters celebrate the consumption of “meat” and unabashedly make evident the living animal origins of “meat.” I argue that that the prominence of the cattle industry relative to Alberta’s economy, and its (...) ties to the production and reproduction of dominant Albertan identity negate the requirement of the absent referent. The consumption of “beef” is largely considered an expression of loyalty to the region, and as a means to preserve Alberta’s heritage. The noncriminal putting to death of nonhuman animals can instead be understood as symbolic and literal sacrifices in the constitution of dominant Albertan identity and economy. As such, this paper makes an intervention into ecofeminist literature as well as vegan literature written for mainstream populations that employ the absent referent in the aim of countering “meat”-eating practices. (shrink)

Music, literature, history. These things are not quite alike. But in Europe, before the advent of recording machines that made it possible for sounds to be recorded and played back, the three activities relied on the same technology of preservation. They were kept in/as books. Bookishness, in European and colonial imaginaries, was an often-idealized, powerful means of keeping things from slipping away. An understanding of bookish things as a repository can be evinced in laws that required preserving a copy (...) of newly published literary works and music for the benefit of posterity; or in popular novels where a book featured as the chronicler (both recorder and narrator) of its own adventures, beyond the lifespans of individual users. Scholars have paid specialist attention to the ontological differences among music, literature, and history when they are kept as books. Discipline-specific trainings and conversations tend to emphasize how different these objects and practices are. Yet focusing on their shared mode of bookish preservation offers other rewards. Our multi-authored article is a creative experiment in bringing together musicologists, literary scholars, and historians to test the potential, for our own fields and with implications for other humanities disciplines, of foregrounding this technological convergence. We propose the more capacious categories of bookkeepers (people who keep things as books) and cultures of note-taking (whether glossing a textbook or notating music) as fruitful avenues to avoid writing the artificially separate histories of creation versus consumption, public versus personal, authoritative versus amateurish, or artistic versus documentary practices. Music, broadly conceived, and the nineteenth-century album (a book of blank pages to keep verses, music, memories, and many more things) serve as the starting point for our reflections. Both exhibit a tangential connection to the normative codes of what Roger Chartier called “the order of books.” In considering actors/artifacts/acts at the very margins of textuality, or existing in a perverse relationship with bookishness, our aim is to redraw the knowledge-making structures we use to investigate our objects of study, calling attention to the intermedial and social practices, and cultures of remembrance, in which they are historically imbricated. (shrink)

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:Nietzsche’s Rhetoric on the Grounds of Philology and HermeneuticsAdrian Del Caro"The philosopher believes the value of his philosophy lies in the whole, in the structure: posterity finds it in the stone with which he built."Human, All Too Human, 1.201"All science only achieved continuity and constancy when the art of correct reading, that is philology, reached its height."Human, All Too Human, 1.270The complexity of Nietzschean rhetoric demands first a (...) basic working definition of rhetoric. In the etymological sense of Greek rhe¯torike¯, the art of oratory, and extrapolated to include the art of communicating effectively through writing, Nietzsche's rhetoric is a highly stylized, deeply self-aware manner of expression designed to convey meaning and to appeal. In the more limited sense of my essay, Nietzschean rhetoric is furthermore a discourse whose communicative and appealing aspects are aimed at the earth for the purpose of grounding human beings. By "rhetoric" I do not mean the negative connotation associated with "insincere or grandiloquent language" (Webster's), though it is certainly the case that Nietzsche's rhetoric frequently takes flight and requires grounding. It is to be expected that a classical philologist by training, and both a teacher and a writer by profession, would have a close understanding and practiced application of rhetoric; the particular challenge in explicating Nietzsche's rhetoric lies in the task to which his rhetoric is put, as well as in the zeal with which he pursued his task. I am not primarily concerned with what Nietzsche had to say about rhetoric while lecturing at the University of Basle, though I agree that Gilman, Blair, and Parent are right to emphasize the importance of rhetoric for the interpretation of Nietzsche's writings and in its own right as a competitor with philosophy (1989, xii, xvi, xx), rather, I am concerned [End Page 101] with the practice of rhetoric that distinguishes Nietzsche's writings from the early 1870s until the so-called Wahnsinnszettel (postcards and letters of madness) written in early January 1889. I also agree with Moore, who analyzes the specifically biological and medical idiom of Nietzsche and concludes "that new light can be thrown on [Nietzsche's] thought by situating it within the historical context of nineteenth-century theories of evolution and degeneration" (Moore 2002, 1-2).1In an early aphorism entitled "Origin of faith" Nietzsche concluded: "Habituation of spiritual principles [Grundsätze] without grounds [Gründe] is called faith."2 I provide the German to demonstrate that whenever possible, Nietzsche drew on the Germanic Grund in his discussions of grounding, even though he was keenly aware of Greek and Latin alternatives and could have used them. So for example Nietzsche's translator (say Holling-dale) could have chosen to use English "grounds" for German Gründe, but chose instead to use "reasons," which is also correct though not exactly in the spirit of Nietzsche's etymological nuance.3 Grundsätze, literally "grounding propositions," given idiomatically as "principles," has no comparable etymology in English. What one becomes accustomed to or adopts as a habit based on faith versus grounds, cannot by definition be grounded, whether or not it is a principle. Based on this example, living with grounds or reasons is living with foundation, with base and support. Living without grounds is simply acquiring habits, living by faith, living groundlessly. A similar usage is involved in English "grounds for dismissal," whereby "grounds" equals "reasons." Even the words founded and unfounded preserve some of the strength of "grounded" and "ungrounded" as I use them. In German "unfounded" is unbegründet or grundlos, participle and adjective respectively, and Nietzsche availed himself whenever possible of German expressions based on ground.The aphorism immediately following "Origin of faith" relies even more on Grund, and its translation into English deserves close attention. "Aus den Folgen auf Grund und Ungrund zurückgeschlossen" becomes "Reasons judged a posteriori on the basis of consequences,"4 which I would render as "grounds and ungrounds retroactively concluded from consequences." Nietzsche uses Grund twice already in the title, and in the body of this "aphorism" of thirty lines a variation of Grund occurs six more times (Gründe, Gr... (shrink)

Renaissance utopias belong to a period when Modernity was being built within political thinking, which turns them into a nexus between classical antiquity and the Enlightment, thereby preserving for posterity a series of critical issues, such as democracy, a radical version of natural law or the need for distribution of goods. Christian humanism is also present and, together with Plato’s concept of justice, it enables these utopias to set a different course from that followed by other Renaissance political theory (...) options, founded either on political realism (Machiavelli) or on jus naturale as a justification of an authoritarian state (Bodin). Thus utopia spreads its wings not only announcing Modernity but also the 20th century socialist horizon. (shrink)

This article demonstrates how class and racial dynamics generate different styles of activism among women's movement organizations. Based on a comparative study of two feminist organizations—one composed of lower-class women of color and another of upper-class white women—it charts the formation of divergent types of gender politics. First, it explores how differences in the class and racial backgrounds of the memberships create distinct organizational needs; second, how these divergent political interests motivate contrasting organizational ideologies, activities, and structures; and finally how (...) they motivate different approaches to the wider women's movement. At the conclusion, implications are drawn for cross-class/race alliances among grassroots women's organizations. (shrink)

This poster presents results from applying agent-based modeling to an exploration of risk attitudes and rational decision making in the context of group interaction. We are also interested in the place of agent-based modeling and computational philosophy within the computational humanities. Computational philosophy has not typically been included in Digital Humanities; computational work has been done using philosophy texts as a source for analysis (Kinney 2022; Malaterre et al. 2021; Fletcher et al. 2021; Zahorec et al. 2022), but there are (...) few examples of philosophical arguments being made based on computation (Zahorec et al. 2022). Modeling is largely accepted as a computational humanist method (McCarty 2004; So 2022), but typically models are based on data rather than designed simulations as a method analogous to a thought experiment (Mayo-Wilson / Zollman 2021). Agent-based modeling is not as common in computational humanities, but we are interested in its potential; for instance, see work modeling correspondence networks to better understand lost information and biases in correspondence data sets (Buarque / Vogl 2023), or work simulating past human societies (Romanowska et al. 2021). Our project explores Lara Buchak’s theory of risk-weighted rational decision making by extending it to the context of group populations and interactions. Buchak has proposed risk-weighted expected utility maximization, which incorporates individual risk attitudes into the standard expected utility (EU) calculation based on utility and probability of outcomes (Buchak 2017). This theory provides an explanation for differences of behavior seen in human populations, while still allowing those different choices to be rational. Buchak’s theory has previously only been applied to individual decision making; our work uses agent-based modeling to develop and analyze simulations which incorporate a variety of risk attitudes (risk avoidance and risk seeking) into game theoretic interactions. This project is a collaboration between a philosopher and a research software engineer; we have worked together to develop simulations that implement agents with risk attitudes making risky choices. This presentation focuses on results from an implementation of a hawk/dove game with multiple risk attitudes and risk attitude adjustment. In the hawk/dove game cooperation, or playing dove, is better for the population, but acting aggressively, or playing hawk, is better for an individual if they are in a neighborhood of doves. To set up the game, we place agents on a grid and have them play against each of their neighbors, and accumulate payoffs based on the success of their plays. We define risk attitudes 0 through 9, where that number corresponds to the minimum number of neighbors playing dove for an agent to play hawk. An agent with risk attitude 0 is most risk seeking and always plays hawk; an agent with risk attitude 1 will play hawk if at least one neighbor plays dove; an agent with risk attitude 9 always takes the safe choice and plays dove; an agent with risk attitude 4 or 5 is risk neutral (breaking ties in different ways), which corresponds to expected utility. In this simulation we randomly set agent initial risk attitudes, and then every ten rounds agents compare their payoffs with their neighbors and adopt the most successful risk attitude in their neighborhood. The simulation is coded to stop once risk attitude adjustments stabilize. We define 13 different population states based on primary and second majority of risk averse, risk inclined, or risk moderate, and analysis of over 1 million runs indicate that while it’s more likely to stabilize with the population having become majority risk inclined, that is not the only outcome; we also see cases where the population stabilizes as risk neutral, risk avoidant, and many cases with no clear majority. This diversity of stable populations provides support for the argument that no one risk attitude is uniquely rational, but rather that risk attitudes are conventional. This matches what we observe in the real world: that different populations have different risk attitudes. Our simulations include numerous parameters to vary grid size; adjustment frequency, strategy, and wealth comparison; neighborhood sizes for observing previous choice, playing against, and comparing payoffs for adjusting risk attitudes; and different distributions for initializing risk attitudes. Analysis of parameters and adjusted risk attitudes shows that the strongest correlations are the initial distribution of risk attitudes, which tend to be preserved. * * * This poster was accepted and presented at the DH2024 conference in Washington, D.C. (shrink)

Few critics can ever have shown more light-hearted thoughtlessness towards an anxious posterity than Servius in his casual preservation of the ‘Helen-episode’, lacking in our ancient manuscripts of Virgil and primarily extant only in this precarious form. A pity that Servius spoke at all, if he could not tell us more; and to make matters worse, he ignored the lines in his commentary. Aelius Donatus says nothing of them. Tiberius Claudius Donatus passes peacefully in his interpretatio from 2. (...) 566 to 2. 589; his prosy conscientiousness nowhere else allows him to skip so much. The passage so rashly preserved forms an exasperating Tummelplatz for students of Virgil: ‘quadereviridoctiiampridem inter se certarunt semperque, ni fallor, certabunt.’ The purpose of this paper is to suggest that Servius told the truth about the lines, and was not planting a forgery on a credulous world. (shrink)

This reprint of a collection of essays on problems concerning future generations examines questions such as whether intrinsic value should be placed on the preservation of mankind, what are our obligations to posterity, and whether potential people have moral rights.

This book explores these differences and in particular considers various theoretical perspectives that might be useful for opening new interpretive strategies for critical social theory in relation to these differences.

Nostalgia is only the beginning of a recognizably ideological discourse. The way through to the ideological sense of Tennyson’s “failure,” beneath the phenomenal glow of Eliot’s nostalgia, lies in the entanglement of minority in this complex of meanings, the determination that Tennyson is properly placed when seen as a “minor Virgil.” The diffusion of a major talent in minor works suggests that what Tennyson or Eliot might have been was another Virgil, and for Eliot that means simply a “classic.” In (...) “What Is a Classic?,” we are told that English literature has no classic poet who would exalt, as Virgil or Dante did, the truths of his age.14 The absence of a modern classic reflects not an individual failure but rather the absence of a universal truth, which has been hidden in the minor works. Here is the reason both for the ambivalence Eliot expresses about the fact of minority and for the peculiar, and certainly not necessary, association of poetic minority with a marginal elite.15It is the latter point to which I now want to turn. If it has been shown that the canon Eliot legislated in his early career was not merely an arbitrary set of aesthetic preferences, we have not yet fully evinced the ideological sense of Eliot’s canonical principle. We have only determined that one way to reconstruct Eliot’s canon would be to list those “minor” poets. But the essential quality of their minority, what drives them away from the “mainstream” of English literature, is what Eliot approved as their fidelity to “tradition.” Such a concept of tradition must be exclusive as well as revisionary, because it implies that the major poets of English literary history cannot also be “traditional.” Eliot finally understood that his canonical principle was the literary reflection of a more fundamental evaluative norm, extrinsic to literature, which he identified as “orthodoxy.” So he tells us in After Strange Gods that he is rewriting “Tradition and the Individual Talent” by substituting “orthodoxy” for “tradition,” and this is unquestionably an ideological correction.16 In the same way, the canon of minor writers is established retrospectively as determined by the rule of orthodoxy. Neither they nor the young Eliot need be orthodox Christians for this rule to have enabled their productions. It is precisely Eliot’s meaning that these elite, like the “elect” before them, may come at some point to a conviction of their election, yet they were always the elect. In this sense, Eliot’s conversion to Christianity was the recognition that he already belonged to a marginal elite, whose membership had been polemically foreshadowed by the construction of an alternative canon. 14. The whole argument of “What Is a Classic?” is interesting in this respect. Eliot’s standard of classical value is “universality,” which is opposed to the “provincial.” The closest English literature comes to a classical age is in the eighteenth century, and this too fails because its “restriction of religious sensibility itself produces a kind of provinciality: the provinciality which indicates the disintegration of Christendom, the decay of a common belief and a common culture”.15. But at least a hint about how to make this connection is given in Eliot’s “The Classics and the Man of Letters,” To Criticize the Critic : “The continuity of literature is essential to its greatness; it is very largely the function of secondary writers to preserve this continuity, and to provide a body of writings which is not necessarily read by posterity, which plays a great part in forming the link between those writers who continue to be read”.16. Eliot, After Strange Gods: A Primer of Modern Heresy, p. 22. John Guillory, assistant professor of English at Yale University, is the author of Poetic Authority: Spenser, Milton, and Literary History. He is currently working on a study of canon-formation. (shrink)

The civil war which ended in the victory of Octavian and the suicide of Antony and Cleopatra is one of the most exciting but most obscure periods of Roman history, obscure mainly because the victor succeeded in imposing bis version of affairs upon his countrymen and through them on posterity. That is not to say that his version is necessarily completely false: the danger that threatened Rome was a real one, the national feeling that resulted in the coniuratio totius (...) Italiae of 32 B.C. and that inspired Virgil and Horace later was not an artificial growth, though it was carefully tended. But in kindling the requisite war-feeling and in rousing the necessary enthusiasm both sides had to propagand for themselves, and in ancient times propaganda often became a matter of personal abuse and mud-slinging. In this Octavian's agents were perhaps more successful, though few nowadays would accept the conventional portraits of Antony and Cleopatra as anywhere near the truth. But Antony's propaganda, though not so effective, was not obliterated by Octavian's victory; indeed a great deal of it is still preserved and masquerades as fact in histories of the period, where Octavian's personal character suffers badly. (shrink)

This study examines the possibility of rhetoric in light of Parmenidean being.

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:Philosophy and Rhetoric 33.2 (2000) 116-136 [Access article in PDF] Being, Time, and Definition: Toward a Semiotics of Figural Rhetoric Carol Poster For if History in the transferred sense of particular books called "histories," is rather apt to be false: nothing but History in the wider and higher sense will ever lead us to the truth. The Future is unknown and unknowable. The Present is turning to Past even (...) as we are trying to know it. Only the Past itself abides our knowledge. --George Saintsbury, A Letter BookDefining and classifying figures of speech and thought have been among the more important tasks of rhetoricians and grammarians for more than two millennia. The inventional focus, however, of much modern rhetorical theory has tended to relegate figuration either, on the one hand, to the domains of literary criticism or linguistics (the heirs of ancient grammar) or, on the other hand, to an ancillary position. The concomitant marginalization of the study of figures has had a significant effect upon contemporary scholarship in historical rhetoric. Many of the seminal scholarly works on the history of rhetoric have denigrated or minimized the importance of figural rhetoric. As Brian Vickers (1990, 294-95) has mentioned, George Kennedy and numerous other historians of rhetoric (e.g., Clarke 1996, 34) tend to condemn the teaching of figural rhetoric as dreary, tedious, and otiose. Often, the very periods themselves in which the study of the figures was pursued most vigorously and extensively are omitted from or condemned by modern scholarly discussion. As Marjorie Curry Woods has pointed out (1995, 73-78), biases against the medieval period, especially as found in Charles Sears Baldwin (1928) and Kennedy (1963, 1980) have in many ways defined the contours of our discipline, especially our attitudes toward the study of figures and tropes. Late antiquity and the Middle Ages, the periods of "decline" so deplored by Baldwin, Vickers, Kennedy, and others, were those in which figural rhetoric flourished, and both the sheer [End Page 116] volume of extant figural treatises and the continuity of figural rhetoric from the Hellenistic period through such contemporary semipopular books as Arthur Quinn's Figures of Speech: 60 Ways to Turn a Phrase (1982) and William Espy's The Garden of Eloquence: A Rhetorical Bestiary (1983) demand attention from the historical scholar. Along with the trivialization of figures in contemporary rhetoric has come a drastic oversimplification of the semiotics of figural terminology, which, in turn, contributes to the trivialization of many recent accounts of figures. To recover a more complex understanding of the semiotics of figural terms, we must start with a historical understanding of figuration, because rhetorical terms are encased in numerous historical strata that determine our understandings of them. 1 As Richard Rorty (1984, 49-75) argues concerning the historiography of philosophy, rational and historical reconstruction are mutually interdependent. A brief history of figural rhetoric From antiquity through the present, lists of figures have either occupied substantial sections of general treatises on rhetoric or grammar or have been the subject of specifically figural handbooks. Use of what we might term highly figured speech appears to predate the development of theoretical models for analysis of figures by many centuries. The Homeric epics, which were to provide the standard examples of rhetorical figures for many subsequent centuries, use patterns of speech later to be named and classified as rhetorical figures, but neither figural terminology nor self-conscious reflection upon figures qua figures appears in the epics. Similarly, although Gorgias was renowned for his use of the "Gorgianic" figures that later took his name, there is no evidence that he attempted systematic catologuing or development of specialized terminology for the figures. The testimonia describing his use of poetic words and figures (DK82a1, DK82a2, DK82a4, DK82a32--translated in Sprague 1972) do not attribute to him any invention of technical terminology.The question of invention of specific terminology for rhetorical figures is part of a more general historical question of the development of rhetoric as a self-conscious field. As Thomas Cole (1991) and Edward Schiappa (1991) have pointed out, the first... (shrink)

This dissertation argues that the disjunction between philosophical ontology and the commonsense universe in early Greek thinkers results in a concomitant incommensurability of language and the kosmos. When language and the world no longer stand in a relationship of one-to-one correspondence, the two related problems of unwritability and ineffability arise. ;I trace the linguistic consequences of the separation of the sensible and noetic worlds historically, from early Eleatic thinkers through Plato and neoplatonism . I argue that the tendency of modern (...) scholarship to construct philosophy, rhetoric, and poetry as distinct disciplines is not only historically inaccurate when applied to classical thinkers, but also obscures the unified and interdisciplinary character of the Greek inquiry into the nature of language and the world and the relationship between logos and kosmos. I conclude by examining the doxographical tradition to show that the model of Greek thought that I advocate is the one we find in ancient histories of philosophy and rhetoric. ;Although this dissertation concentrates on the relationship between philosophy and rhetoric in antiquity, it does have consequences for contemporary approaches to both disciplines. If philosophy and rhetoric have their origins in a unified science of logos rather than a war between sophists and philosophers, we no longer can justify our Balkanization of the two disciplines on historical grounds. Poetry, philosophy, and rhetoric all are concerned with language and its relationship with the world, and just as it is not particularly advantageous to divide the world into warring nations, so it is equally unproductive to divide the understanding of logos into warring disciplines. (shrink)

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:Whose Aristotle? Which Aristotelianism? A Historical Prolegomenon to Thomas Farrell’s Norms of Rhetorical CultureCarol PosterThe description of various works of logical and rhetorical theory as “Aristotelian,” although far from unusual, is not particularly informative, because it assumes, incorrectly, that there is some ultimate singular Aristotle being imitated by all authors who consider themselves, or who are labeled by others, Aristotelian. In fact, there never has been an interpretation of (...) Aristotle that satisfies the canon of St. Vincent of Lerins, “quod ubique, quod semper, quod ab omnibus creditum est”; instead, there have been almost as many Aristotles as there have been interpreters of Aristotle. Thomas Farrell’s Norms of Rhetorical Culture (1993), therefore, is not so much situated against the background of some single, unique, undisputed Aristotle but, rather, as he himself mentions, within an evolving tradition of Aristotelianism.The historical transformations of Aristotle include two distinct traditions, one oriented toward scientific-technical philosophy andthe other toward rhetorical-poetic and ethical humanism.1 The technical-philosophccical tradition, in which Aristotle was conceived primarily [End Page 375] as metaphysician and natural philosopher, emphasized the logical treatises of the organon, the speculative systems of the Physics and Metaphysics, and the scientific works of the biological treatises. This tradition originated in the Greco-Roman middle and Neoplatonic schools and has had a continuous history stretching through the Middle Ages, Counterreformation, neo-Thomism, and certain contemporary European postmodernisms. The rhetoricalhumanistic tradition, on the other hand, emphasizing the Rhetoric, Poetics, Politics, and ethical treatises, views Aristotle as a practical philosopher, concerned with the productive arts and those matters about which knowledge is probable rather than certain. This rhetorical-humanistic tradition was a relatively negligible aspect of Aristotle’s ancient reception, had a slight presence in the Islamic and Latin traditions, developed in certain strands of Renaissance humanism, and came to fruition in the late eighteenth century, primarily, though not exclusively, within a Protestant tradition. In eighteenth-and early nineteenth-century Britain, the rhetorical-humanistic Aristotle found expression directly in neoclassical poetics and, in a more complicated fashion, in a group of authors (including the Scottish moderates and the slightly later Oxford Noetics) who enlisted Aristotle in a battle against skepticism and materialism. It is the latter of the two strands of the rhetorical-humanistic Aristotle that resurfaces (albeit in an indirect and mediated fashion) in the work of Alastair MacIntyre, Richard McKeon (and other members of the Chicago school), and Thomas Farrell, who used Aristotle’s model of probable deliberation and habituated virtue to construct an alternative to twentieth-century skepticism and materialism.Significant Strata of Aristotelian ReceptionThe history of Aristotelian reception is not monolithic. There has been tremendous variation across periods and national traditions of what works were considered authentically Aristotelian, which of those works were considered important, and how they were interpreted. The phases of Aristotelian reception immediately relevant to Farrell’s work include Greco-Roman Platonism, Islamic commentary, medieval Latin Christianity, Renaissance humanistic textual recovery, neoclassical “Aristotelianism,” early modern Aristotelianism and anti-Aristotelianism, and the nineteenthcentury rehabilitation of Aristotle. This article will summarize briefly pre eighteenth-century interpretations of Aristotle as prolegomena to a close analysis of the works of two eighteenth-century Scotsmen, James Moor [End Page 376] and John Gillies, whose reconfiguration of Aristotle’s Rhetoric, Poetics, and Organon as tools for practical wisdom in modern society anticipated (and, albeit indirectly, influenced) Farrell.2AntiquityTwo distinct strands of Aristotelian reception, the rhetorical-humanistic and technical-philosophical, originated in antiquity. Of these, the rhetorical-humanistic strand was substantially less important. Neither the Poetics nor the Rhetoric was well known in antiquity. The Rhetoric was not the subject of a Greek commentary until the Byzantine period and, although occasionally cited by Greco-Roman rhetoricians including Cicero, Quintilian, and Dionysus of Halicarnassus, was not widely or carefully read.3 The Poetics was also virtually unknown and was never the subject of an ancient commentary.4The Greek commentaries on Aristotle, which are predominantly technical-philosophical in character, include some fifteen thousand pages of extant text. Despite the existence of a distinct ancient Peripatetic school, the majority of commentaries were produced in the Platonic schools, where the works of Aristotle... (shrink)

In a series of incisive readings of signature historical works, Mark Poster charts the move from social history to new practices of cultural history that are drawing strength from poststructuralist interpretive strategies and raising issues found in feminist and postcolonialist discourse. In the process, he sets forth an outline for a postmodern historiography that can negotiate the contested terrain between the ambiguities of discourse and the pull of the "real." As Poster provides close readings of leading historians and theorists such (...) as Lawrence Stone, Francois Furet, Michel de Certeau, and Michel Foucault, key themes animate his work: the often irreducible difference between past and present; the relationship of writing and representation to power and domination; the dissolving distinctions between high and low culture, production and consumption, and reality and fiction; and, most important, a new perspective on human agency and the construction of political subjects. (shrink)

FOUCAULT by J. G. Merquior Berkeley: University of California Press, 1985. 188pp., $8.95 (paper).

Some patients who have been diagnosed as “dead by neurologic criteria” continue to exhibit certain brain functions, most commonly, neuroendocrine functions. This preservation of neurologic function after the diagnosis of “brain death” or “brainstem death” is an ongoing source of controversy and concern in the medical, bioethics, and legal literatures. Most obviously, if some brain function persists, then it is not the case that all functions of the entire brain have ceased and hence, declaring such a patient to be (...) “dead” would be a false positive, in any nation with so-called “whole brain death” laws. Furthermore, and perhaps more concerning, the preservation of any brain function necessarily entails the preservation of some amount of brain perfusion, thereby raising the concern as to whether additional areas of neural tissue may remain viable, including areas in the brainstem. These and other considerations cast significant doubt on the reliability of diagnosing either “brain death” or “brainstem death.”. (shrink)

It is argued that the preservation of truth by an inference relation is of little interest when premiss sets are contradictory. The notion of a level of coherence is introduced and the utility of modal logics in the semantic representation of sets of higher coherence levels is noted. It is shown that this representative role cannot be transferred to first order logic via frame theory since the modal formulae expressing coherence level restrictions are not first order definable. Finally, an (...) inference relation, calledyielding, is introduced which is intermediate between the coherence preservingforcing relation introduced elsewhere by the authors and the coherence destroying, inference relation of classical logic. (shrink)

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:Evidence, Authority, and Interpretation: A Response to Jason HelmsCarol PosterAs someone with a long-standing interest in Heraclitus, I am delighted that Philosophy and Rhetoric is providing a forum for an ongoing discussion of his work.1 Although Jason Helms and I do disagree on specific matters concerning Heraclitean interpretation, we are, I think, in full agreement concerning the importance of Heraclitus for both rhetorical and philosophical studies and intend these (...) essays as contributions to what, it is hoped, will be a fruitful ongoing discussion of Heraclitus within the interdisciplinary tradition of this journal. Rather than address many minor points of disagreement superficially, I will concentrate below on close analysis of a few specific issues that I consider paradigmatic of differences in method rather than merely in conclusions.Panta Rhei (All Things Flow)That Heraclitus was interested in establishing any sense of orthoepia plays down his insistence on the panta rhei (everything flows). To suggest any final rightness of words would suggest that everything flows but the Logos.(Helms, this issue)Actually, I do not use the phrase “final rightness of words” but, rather, describe Heraclitus as “focus[ing] on the problem of correctness of names” and as [End Page 288] “consider[ing] the possibility that one can learn something about the nature of things by examining the non-literal sense of their names” (2006, 15).2 Name is an English equivalent of the Greek onoma (Latin nomen, substantive as opposed to verb or particle), not rhêma (word, verb, phrase) or logos (word, account, speech, saying, story, ratio, reason, etc.). The phrase “correctness of names” alludes to an ongoing discussion among scholars in classics and philosophy about a specific problem in early Greek thought (normally discussed in relation to Heraclitus, Protagoras, Prodicus, Plato’s Cratylus, and Aristotle’s Categories and On Interpretation).More importantly, Helms seems to think it impossible a priori that Heraclitus might have considered some sort of doctrine of flux compatible with a belief in correctness of names. Ancient evidence, however, suggests that Heraclitus did, in fact, consider stability of logos, correctness of names, and sensible flux compatible in some manner.For logos as unchanging, dk22b1 begins, “Of the logos that exists always [eontos aiei] uncomprehending are men.”3 Although the syntax is ambiguous, eontos aiei suggests some stability of logos. Sextus Empiricus states that Heraclitus considered the “divine logos” stable and eternal and human reason grounded in its participation therein (Adv. Math. 7.126–33).4 The “commonality” of logos in dk22b2 also suggests some interpretive stability, in the sense of logos not varying with respect to the perception of the individual.The phrase panta rhei, although solidly entrenched in the reception history of Heraclitus, often as part of a “doctrine of flux,” is not actually a well-attested Heraclitean saying (included in the dk “b” fragments) but, rather, derived from early testimonia. Whether the phrase is a paraphrase, indirect quotation, or Platonic/Aristotelian recasting of Heraclitus is uncertain. The earliest sources are Platonic:Therefore you [Theaetetus] were quite right in saying that knowledge is nothing else than perception, and there is complete identity between the doctrine of Homer and Heraclitus and all their followers— that all things are in motion like streams [hoion rheumata kineisthai ta panta]—the doctrine of the great sophist Protagoras that man is the measure of all things—and the doctrine of Theaetetus that, since these things are true, perception is knowledge.(Theaet. 160d) [End Page 289]Those... would agree well enough with Heraclitus that all things move and nothing remains still [panta menein ouden].(Crat. 401d)Heraclitus says that all things move and nothing remains still [hoti panta chorei kai ouden menei], and he likens the universe to the current of a river, saying that you cannot step twice in the same stream.(Crat. 402a)Nor will he condemn himself and all things and say that there is no health in them, but that all things are flowing like leaky pots [panta hôsper keramia rhei], or believe that all things are just like people afflicted with catarrh, flowing and running all the time [rheumatos te kai katarrou panta ta chrêmata].(Crat. 440c–d... (shrink)

We prove the preservation theorems for NATP; many of them extend the previously established preservation results for other model-theoretic tree properties. Using them, we also furnish proper examples of NATP theories which are simultaneously TP2 and SOP. First, we show that NATP is preserved by the parametrization and sum of the theories of Fraïssé limits of Fraïssé classes satisfying strong amalgamation property. Second, the preservation of NATP for two kinds of dense/co-dense expansions, i.e. the theories of lovely (...) pairs and of [Formula: see text]-structures for geometric theories, and dense/co-dense expansion on vector spaces is proved. Next, we prove the preservation of NATP for the generic predicate expansion and the pair of an algebraically closed field and its distinguished subfield; for the latter, not only NATP, but also the preservation of NTP1 and NTP2 is considered. Finally, we present some proper examples of NATP theories using the results proved in this paper, including the parametrization of DLO and the expansion of an algebraically closed field by adding a generic linear order. In particular, we show that the model companion of the theory of algebraically closed fields with circular orders (ACFO) is NATP. (shrink)

Media are surely central to Western societies of the past several centuries and to the emerging global societies of the contemporary era and the future. There is a thickening, an intensification and an increasing complexity to the use of information machines, technologies that are necessary in the production, reproduction, storing and distribution of texts, images and sounds, the constituent elements of culture. The phenomenon has been termed a “media ecology,” adding a new layer to the ecologies of animal, vegetable and (...) mineral. It behooves anyone engaged in critical discourse to take serious account of media. I argue they offer a key to understanding the process of globalization in relation to a new configuration of interaction between humans and machines. (shrink)

This is an expanded edition of the first comprehensive overview of the work of Jean Baudrillard, one of the most fascinating thinkers on the French intellectual scene. To the original selection of his writings from 1968 to 1985, this new edition adds examples of Baudrillard's work since that time. _Reviews of the First Edition_ "This is a good book, and the author of its selected writings, Jean Baudrillard, deserves only a share of the compliment. It is difficult to introduce a (...) difficult author, and Mark Poster has done a brilliant job. He has selected wisely from Baudrillard's writings.... More important, Poster has written what may be, pound for pound, the best introduction to a social theorist I have read.... Poster has somehow said everything the uninitiated needs to know before deciding to read Baudrillard."—_Contemporary Sociology_ "Following the lead of thinkers such as Foucault, Derrida, and Deleuze, Baudrillard engages in a task of pointing _away_ from any traditional sociological themes. His writings demand that one turn away from convenient or customary interpretations of society and, in the process, one is forced to use his or her imagination in new ways."—_Choice_ "Poster's Introduction presents what is probably as clear and intelligent an exposition of Baudrillard's ideas as you'll find anywhere."—_Philosophy and Literature_. (shrink)

This paper explores the aesthetic aspects at play in the preservation efforts in the Bosc de Tosca to gain insight into the role of aesthetics in preservation of natural heritage. The preservation of landscapes entails a complex balancing between aesthetics and sustainability, as preservationist decisions based primarily on appearance may be at odds with pressing environmental concerns. If the area to be preserved is a constantly evolving and lived landscape, the interventions enacted on the place may affect (...) the current appearance and the way in which the area is lived now and in the future. By resorting to the issues discussed in intergenerational aesthetics, this paper aims to show how including the potential aesthetic experience and values of future generations may help in making more aesthetically and environmentally sustainable decisions. The paper begins with a description of the Bosc de Tosca and its surroundings, its metaphysical status, and a description of the preservation approaches at play in the area. It then presents the main stakes of intergenerational aesthetics. It ends by discussing specific aspects of the preservation of the Bosc de Tosca area and aesthetic interventions to show the complex relationship between aesthetics and sustainability and how intergenerational aesthetics can contribute to both theory and practice of preservation taking into account environmental concerns. (shrink)

Before World War II French intellectuals had paid little attention to Hegel. Only offbeat intellectuals like André Breton's surrealists and a circle of young Marxists in the 1920s paid tribute to the German dialectician. Among the reasons suggested by Alexandra Koyré for the lack of interest were the obscurity of Hegel's writing, the strength of Cartesian and Kantian traditions, Hegel's Protestantism, but, above all, the incredulity of the French toward Hegel's “strict identity of logical synthesis and historical becoming.” If this (...) was the situation, how can we account for the precipitous turn to Hegel in the 1940s? In the eyes of many converts to Hegel, the catastrophic defeat of France in 1940 had discredited liberal-bourgeois intellectual and political traditions, leaving France in a conceptual vacuum. (shrink)

This book, which Foucault himself has judged accurate, is the first to provide a sustained, coherent analysis of Foucault's work as a whole. To demonstrate the sense in which Foucault's work is beyond structuralism and hermeneutics, the authors unfold a careful, analytical exposition of his oeuvre. They argue that during the of Foucault's work became a sustained and largely successful effort to develop a new method"interpretative analytics"capable fo explaining both the logic of structuralism's claim to be an objective science and (...) the apparent validity of the hermeneutical counterclaim that the human sciences can proceed only by understanding the deepest meaning of the subject and his tradition. "There are many new secondary sources on Foucault. None surpass the book by Hubert Dreyfus and Paul Rabinow. . . . The American paperback edition contains Foucault's 'On the Genealogy of Ethics,' a lucid interview that is now our best source for seeing how he construed the whole project of the history of sexuality."David Hoy,London Review of Books. (shrink)

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:Aristotle's Rhetoric against Rhetoric:Unitarian Reading and Esoteric HermeneuticsCarol PosterIn Platonic scholarship, it recently has become a commonplace to foreground problems of interpretation.1 Most Anglo-American discussions of Aristotelian rhetoric, however, while often involving disagreements about specific readings of individual passages in the Aristotelian corpus, frequently presume the adequacy of a relatively unproblematic hermeneutic with respect to overall, as opposed to local, interpretive strategies.2 Readings of Aristotle's Rhetoric such as those (...) in collections edited by Erickson 1974, Furley and Nehemas 1994, and Rorty 1996 mainly address specific technical issues while eschewing discussion of more general hermeneutic problems. Even those scholars who have attempted to situate the Rhetoric with respect to broader problems in Aristotelian philosophy usually have restricted the scope of their inquiries to such specific issues as the relationship of rhetoric to Aristotelian psychology, ethics, or politics rather than considering the methodological implications of the esoteric nature of the Aristotelian [End Page 219] corpus.3 Specific interpretation of the Rhetoric, however, presumes a general hermeneutic for reading the Aristotelian corpus.One of the most dramatic shifts in the past few decades of scholarship concerning ancient philosophy has been the rehabilitation of late antiquity in general and neoplatonism in particular.4 Among continental scholars especially, this has resulted in a concomitant interest in neoplatonic esoteric readings of Plato.5 The recent essays on and translations of the generally neoplatonic Greek Commentaries on Aristotle and the work of Gadamer 1986 and Reale 1990 mark the beginning of a similar movement towards neoplatonic esoteric interpretation in Aristotelian studies.6 Unfortunately, this shift in philosophical historiography has had little effect upon rhetorical scholarship.7There are four specific areas in which the neoplatonic turn in ancient philosophical historiography can contribute to a general hermeneutic for understanding Aristotle's Rhetoric: (1) the unity of Plato and Aristotle, (2) esotericism, (3) the textual status of the Aristotelian corpus, and (4) the role of endoxai.Plato and Aristotle: The Unitarian ApproachColeridge once stated:Every man is born an Aristotelian or a Platonist. I do not think it possible that anyone born an Aristotelian can become a Platonist; and I am sure that no born Platonist can ever change into an Aristotelian.(Coleridge 1888, 118) [End Page 220]His dictum has become a truism of modern philosophical historiography. These two giants of ancient philosophy have been seen as two polar opposites rather like north and south poles of a magnetized bar around which lesser philosophers have gathered like iron filings. Such was not the case in late antiquity. In the 15,000 extant pages of the Greek Commentaries on Aristotle, the fundamental unity of Plato and Aristotle is almost universally acknowledged,8 especially in works subsequent to Porphyry's seminal, but no longer extant, "On the School of Plato and Aristotle Being One" (Sorabji 1990, 2). In the neoplatonic schools, Aristotle's works, and, in fact, the discipline of rhetoric itself, were often taught as "lesser mysteries" propaideutic to the "greater mysteries" of Plato (Marinus 1814, 13 and Saffrey 1990, 178).Although the neoplatonic assumption of unity between Plato and Aristotle and the voluminous corpus of neoplatonic commentaries on Aristotle might appear useful only in the study of, for example, medieval philosophers who routinely viewed Aristotle through the lens of neoplatonism, such is not the case. Considering the possibility of a greater unity between Plato and Aristotle than is usually assumed has significant consequences for interpretation of Aristotle himself.9While arguments concerning the possibility of constructing a unitarian model of Platonic-Aristotelian philosophy in general tend to hinge on the question of the separation of the forms in Plato and their existence as formal causes or enhulē eidē in Aristotle, most comparisons of Platonic and Aristotelian rhetoric eschew broader theoretical concerns, instead contrasting Aristotle's Rhetoric with a limited group of Platonic dialogues, namely Gorgias, Protagoras, and Phaedrus.10 Scholarly opinions can be broadly divided into two camps, one asserting that [End Page 221] Plato disapproved of rhetoric while Aristotle approved of it, and the other claiming that Aristotle's Rhetoric carries out a program for the "ideal rhetoric" outlined in Plato's Phaedrus. In this article I shall... (shrink)

Explores how Deleuze's philosophy can help us to understand our digital and biotechnological futuresIn a world where our lives are increasingly mediated by technologies, we need to pay more attention to Deleuze's often explicit focus onour reliance on the machine and the technological. These essays are a collective and determined effort to explore the usefulness Deleuze in thinking about our present and future relianceon technology. At the same time, they take seriously a style of thinking that negotiates between philosophy, science (...) and art.ContributorsWilliam Bogard, Abigail Bray, Ian Buchanan, Verena Conley, Ian Cook, Tauel Harper, Timothy Murray, Saul Newman, Luciana Parisi, Patricia Pisters, Mark Poster, Horst Ruthrof, David Savat, Bent Meier Sorensen and Eugene Thacker.". (shrink)

Structural realists claim that structure is preserved across instances of radical theory change, and that this preservation provides an argument in favor of realism about structure. In this paper, I use the shift from Newtonian gravity to Einstein’s general relativity as a case study for structural preservation, and I demonstrate that two prominent views of structural preservation fail to provide a solid basis for realism about structure. The case study demonstrates that (i) structural realists must be epistemically (...) precise about the concrete structure that is being preserved, and (ii) they must provide a metaphysical account of how structure is preserved through re-interpretation in light of a new theory. Regarding (i), I describe a means of epistemic access to the unobservable that I call “thick detection” of structure, which isolates the structure that will be preserved. Regarding (ii), I argue that thickly detectable structure is preserved across theory change through a process of extracting the old structure from the new structure, much like what has been done with geometrized versions of Newtonian gravity. With these two responses in hand, the structural realist can adequately account for the preservation of structure and can provide a strong argument in favor of structural realism. (shrink)