The Key Themes in Ancient Philosophy series provides concise books, written by major scholars and accessible to non-specialists, on important themes in ancient philosophy that remain of philosophical interest today. In this volume Professor Wolfsdorf undertakes the first exploration of ancient Greek philosophical conceptions of pleasure in relation to contemporary conceptions. He provides broad coverage of the ancient material, from pre-Platonic to Old Stoic treatments; and, in the contemporary period, from World War II to the present. Examination (...) of the nature of pleasure in ancient philosophy largely occurred within ethical contexts but in the contemporary period has, to a greater extent, been pursued within philosophy of mind and psychology. This divergence reflects the dominant philosophical preoccupations of the times. But Professor Wolfsdorf argues that the various treatments are complementary. Indeed, the Greeks' examinations of pleasure were incisive and their debates vigorous, and their results have enduring value for contemporary discussion. (shrink)

C. C. W. Taylor presents a selection of his essays in ancient philosophy, drawn from forty years of writings on the subject. The central theme of the volume is the moral psychology of Plato and Aristotle, with a special focus on pleasure and related concepts, an area central to Greek ethical thought. Taylor also discusses Socrates and the Greek atomists, showing how Plato's ethics grows out of the thought of Socrates, and that pleasure is also a central (...) concept for the atomists. Pleasure, Mind, and Soul provides a fascinating survey of a range of important topics in the work of some of the greatest ancient philosophers, and which remain the subject of lively philosophical debate today. (shrink)

This paper considers the hermeneutic position, recently gaining some traction in the secondary literature, that Scholastics in the years 1330-1350 were not primarily interested in theology. Rather, their increasing engagement with “English subtleties” – a set of “logico-mathematical” techniques we now associate with scientific inquiry – was driven by their new, distinctively secular, natural-philosophy interests. In this, they become proto-moderns and philosophers in our contemporary sense. Consideration is given to whether this “pretext” reading of the Scholastics is coherent and (...) plausible, and whether the logico-mathematical techniques were the province of natural philosophy at the time, or actually instead discipline-neutral, being employable in both theology and natural theology. The paper then assesses the rather meagre evidence offered for this reading and its unfortunate historiographical implications. It ends by advocating an existing and far more pro... (shrink)

I argue that Mill introduced the distinction between quality and quantity of pleasures in order to fend off the then common charge that utilitarianism is ‘a philosophy for swine’ and to accommodate the (still) widespread intuition that the life of a human is better, in the sense of being intrinsically more valuable, than the life of an animal. I argue that in this he fails because in order to do successfully he would have to show not only that the (...) life of a human is preferable to that of an animal on hedonistic grounds, but also that it is in some sense nobler or more dignified to be a human, which he cannot do without tacitly presupposing non-hedonistic standards of what it means to lead a good life. (shrink)

The experience of pleasure, alongside pain, is a primary element of human life. It rules our instincts and desires for food, sex and for the avoidance of various forms of harm. Crucial to psychological and social well-being, it has preoccupied philosophers from Aristotle to John Stuart Mill and plays a fundamental role in moral and ethical theory, especially utilitarianism. More recently, it has become a central subject for psychologists, biologists and neuroscientists. Yet it remains an elusive and deceptively difficult (...) concept. What is pleasure? How does it differ from happiness? Should we value pleasure? Which theories of pleasure are most plausible? In this rigorous and comprehensive introduction to the topic, Katarzyna de Lazari-Radek unpacks and assesses these questions and many more, including: The history of pleasure from ancient Greece to modern times Pleasure, sensation and consciousness What scientific research reveals about the nature of pleasure. Can pleasure be measured scientifically? 'Higher' and 'lower' pleasures The relation between happiness and pleasure Pleasure and pain Pleasure and animals Pleasure as an ultimate good and the relation between pleasure and rationality. Philosophy of Pleasure: An Introduction is essential reading for students of ethics and political philosophy, and also suitable for those studying related disciplines such as psychology, politics and sociology. (shrink)

But in many orders of beauty, particularly those of the finer arts, it is requisite to employ much reasoning, in order to feel the proper sentiment; and a false relish may frequently be corrected by argument and reflection. There are just grounds to conclude, that moral beauty partakes much of this latter species, and demands the assistance of our intellectual faculties, in order to give it a suitable influence on the human mind (EPM, 173).

Human lives are full of pleasures and pains. And humans are creatures that are able to think: to learn, understand, remember and recall, plan and anticipate. Ancient philosophers were interested in both of these facts and, what is more, were interested in how these two facts are related to one another. There appear to be, after all, pleasures and pains associated with learning and inquiring, recollecting and anticipating. We enjoy finding something out. We are pained to discover that a belief (...) we hold is false. We can think back and enjoy or be upset by recalling past events. And we can plan for and enjoy imagining pleasures yet to come. This book is about what Plato, Aristotle, the Epicureans and the Cyrenaics had to say about these relationships between pleasure and reason. (shrink)

For Pleasure argues that aesthetic pleasure and formal experimentalism hold the twinned capacity to maintain a global racial order and also to undo it.

For many, the word 'pleasure' conjures associations with hedonism, indulgence, and escape from the life of the mind. However little we talk about it, though, pleasure also plays an integral role in cognitive life, in both our sensory perception of the world and our intellectual understanding. This previously important but now neglected philosophical understanding of pleasure is the focus of the essays in this volume, which challenges received views that pleasure is principally motivating of action, unanalyzable, (...) and caused, rather than responsive to reason. Like other books in the Oxford Philosophical Concepts series, it traces the development of the focal idea from ancient times through the 20th century. The essays highlight points of departure for new lines of inquiry rather than attempting to provide a full picture of how the idea of pleasure has been explored in philosophy. The volume begins by showing how Plato, Aristotle, early Islamic philosophers, and philosophers in the Medieval Latin tradition, such as Aquinas, honed in on the challenge of unifying the variety of pleasures so that they fall under one concept. In the early modern period, philosophers shifted from understanding the logic of pleasure to treating pleasure as a mental state. As the studies of Malebranche, Berkeley and Kant show, the central problem becomes understanding the relation of pleasure to other sensory experiences, and the role of pleasure in human cognition and knowledge. Short interdisciplinary reflections interspersed between essays focus on art of 16th and 17th century textbooks and the difficult music of composers like Bach, which demonstrate translation of these concerns to cultural production in the period. As the essay on Mill shows, the 19th century development of scientific psychology narrowed the definition of pleasure, and so its philosophical focus. Contemporary accounts of pleasure, however, in both philosophy and psychology, are now recognizing the limitations of this narrow focus, and are once again recognizing the complexity of pleasure and its role in human life. (shrink)

This chapter contains sections titled: Background The Way Forward.

The theme of the pleasure of knowledge is central in Averroes’ aesthetical reflection of Aristotle’s Poetics, regardless whether we side with the logical or with the moral interpretation. The first one stresses the continuity between Averroes and previous commentators in his attempt to reconstruct the Poetics as an integral part of the Logic itself, whereby poetic discourse is conceived as a form of reasoning based on syllogisms. According to the latter perspective, however, pleasure is central in that poetry (...) is a tool towards the pursuit of happiness: in this perspective it is necessary to bear in mind some common themes present in other works by Averroes. The pleasure of contemplative knowledge must go hand in hand with the pursuit of communal happiness and therefore with the good and proper order of c... (shrink)

A. E. HEATH WHEN I had finished reading the manuscript of this book I came to the reluctant conclusion that Mr. Hector Hawton, though not an academic person, ...

In this article I intent to go through the Epicurean thought and the role it plays in the concrete life of man. In this endeavour, I shall use some of Epicurus’ maxims, and also The Poem of Nature, written by Lucretius, and thought up in the spirit of Epicureism. The idea from which the entire argument grows is sustained by the pragmatic role that Epicurus cultivates in respect to life. In fact, this is the same way that his very (...) class='Hi'>philosophy looks like. Another issue to be discussed here deals with the way in which Greek philosophy is brought into man’s factual space by Epicureism. To conclude, we shall see the limits to which Stoicism and Epicureism merge, and which is the belt separating the two conceptions. (shrink)

Table of Contents: Olivier Massin, 'Pleasure and Its Contraries'; Colin Klein, 'The Penumbral Theory of Masochistic Pleasure'; Siri Leknes and Brock Bastian, 'The Benefits of Pain'; Valerie Gray Hardcastle, 'Pleasure Gone Awry? A New Conceptualization of Chronic Pain and Addiction'; Richard Gray, 'Pain, Perception and the Sensory Modalities: Revisiting the Intensive Theory'; Jonathan Cohen and Matthew Fulkerson, Affect, Rationalization, and Motivation; Murat Aydede, 'How to Unify Theories of Sensory Pleasure: An Adverbialist Proposal'; Adam Shriver, 'The Asymmetrical (...) Contributions of Pleasure and Pain to Subjective Well-Being'. (shrink)

Pleasure, the defining object of kāmaśāstric scholarship, is harmonious sensory experience, the product of a “good fit” between the self and the world. It comes about when one moves in a world of fitting sense objects, and one has made oneself fit to enter that world. The bulk of kāmaśāstric literature is devoted to developing, enhancing, and enacting specific bodily and sensory capabilities in order to maximize one’s ability to affect and be affected by the world. This article examines (...) the model of subjectivity implied by kāmaśāstra, tracking two sorts of changes to the self assumed by this body of texts. First, it presents and analyzes the ways in which the social actors described in this literature come into being in and through the cultivation and performance of particular bodily and social acts; the “artifactual” nature of the self is presumed. Second, it considers the changing set of acts that are described and prescribed over the course of kāmaśāstric history, noting the increasing place of physiognomy and of magico-medical alterations of the body, and the elision of the social sphere of sensual activity. Finally, this article situates the kāmaśāstric model of subjectivity in relation to the larger śāstric project, drawing out the model of empiricism that it presupposes, and speculating upon the epistemological/ontological implications of kāmaśāstra as a science. (shrink)

This paper explores how philosophy might be worthwhile on hedonic grounds for the Epicurean Sage who has achieved tranquility, reached the limit of pleasure, and thus for whom there is no further pleasure to pursue. I argue that philosophy might be worthwhile to the Epicurean Sage because it helps her maintain tranquility by preventing a painful boredom that could result without it.

Philosophy and its descendents in the behavioral sciences have traditionally divided incentives into those that are sought and those that are avoided. Positive incentives are held to be both attractive and memorable because of the direct effects of pleasure. Negative incentives are held to be unattractive but still memorable (the problem of pain) because they force unpleasant emotions on an individual by an unmotivated process, either a hardwired response (unconditioned response) or one substituted by association (conditioned response). Negative (...) incentives are divided into those that are always avoided and those that are avoided only by higher mental processes—archetypically the passions, which are also thought of as hardwired or conditioned. Newer dichotomies within the negative have been proposed, hinging on whether a negative incentive is nevertheless sought (“wanted but not liked”) or on an incentive's being negative only because it is confining (the product of “rule worship”). The newer dichotomies have lacked motivational explanations, and there is reason to question conditioning in the motivational mechanism for the older ones.

Both experimental findings and the examination of common experience indicate that even the most aversive experiences, such as pain and panic, do not prevail in reflex fashion, but because of an urge to attend to them. The well-established hyperbolic curve in which prospective rewards are discounted implies a mechanism for such an urge, as well as for the “lower” incentives in the other dichotomies. The properties of these lower incentives are predicted by particular durations of temporary preferences on a continuum that stretches from fractions of a second to years. (shrink)

What Frankel has done in his book is to give the general reader an excellent selection of readings from ancient, modern and contemporary philosophers. In his foreword Frankel gives an overview on how philosophy "testifies to man’s capacity to take pleasure in the free play of intelligence." Philosophy in his estimation is an encounter with the human situation not measured in symbolic notation but revealed in tensions that struggle to find truth. He divides the readings into five (...) sections which are: Philosophy and Religion, Philosophy and Politics, Philosophy and the Ideal of Reason, Philosophy and the Irrational and The Significance of Philosophy. There is a biographical introduction before each reading and an afterword at the end of each section. The reading selections have continuity and are not too technical. Some of the philosophers represented are: Plato, Berkeley, James, Royce Nietzsche and Russell. This text could be used for an introduction to philosophy class where there are students who need a little stimulation and direction toward cultivation.—G. D. (shrink)

The question "What is pleasure?" has been a thorn in the side of philosophy since the time of Socrates. David L. Perry attempts to arrive at a satisfactory answer in the form of a definition of pleasure. In the end, he offers two definitions, turning on two radically different notions of pleasure--that of enjoyment and that of being pleased about. Perry is best when dealing with the cognitive aspects of pleasure and with pleasure as (...) a reason for acting. He discusses the extent to which belief is involved in pleasure, the notion of a "false pleasure," the relation between taking pleasure in something and thinking it a good thing, one's knowledge of one's own pleasure, and the ways in which pleasure can be given as a reason for acting. In the end, it appears there can be no single definition of pleasure, and this problematic concept remains to be satisfactorily elucidated by philosophers. (shrink)

This time, McGirr shares his love of philosophy, looking at the works of twenty eminent thinkers across history. The book goes back to Pythagoras and comes forward to the contemporary Australian Frank Jackson; back to Mungo Woman and forward to Martha Nussbaum, by way of Simone Weil and Iris Murdoch. It is animated by two related questions: from where do we draw a sense of life's purpose, and how can philosophy make life better? It ranges widely across subjects: (...) from solitude to community, language to order, experience to ecstasy, the idea of good to that of a good idea. McGirr's approach is warm and inviting. Drawing on many years' experience teaching philosophy to teenagers, he shares stories from his life and discusses how philosophers have shed light on them. Ideas to Save Your Life is often funny, but it is serious about philosophy. It makes the impenetrable accessible, the indescribable palpable, and invites you to change the way you see the world. (shrink)

This volume deals with the general theory of pleasure of Plato and his successors.The first part describes the two paradigms between which all theories of ...

This volume deals with the general theory of pleasure of Plato and his successors. The first part describes the two paradigms between which all theories of pleasure oscillate: Plato's definition of pleasure as the repletion of a lack, and Aristotle's view that pleasure is the perfect performance of an activity. After an excursus on Epicureans and Stoics, the book concentrates on Neoplatonism, opposing the 'standard Neoplatonic view' of Plotinus and Proclus to the original viewpoint of Damascius' (...) commentary on Plato's "Philebus," The volume sheds light on the discussion between hedonists and anti-hedonists, by concentrating on the 'crucial point' at which any philosophical analysis of the good life (hedonistic or other) ought to argue that the life of the philosopher is the most desirable, and thus truly pleasurable, life. (shrink)

In this paper, I argue that Phenomenalists about pleasure can concede a key claim, Heterogeneity, commonly used to object to their theory. They also can then vindicate the aspirations of J. S. Mill’s doctrine of higher pleasures, while grounding their value claims in a naturalistic metaethics. But once Phenomenalists concede Heterogeneity they can no longer consistently endorse Hedonism as the correct theory of wellbeing, since they implicitly commit to recognizing distinct kinds of pleasure that are independently good-making. I (...) also explore further issues that arise for a Pluralist theory of pleasure: How could there be distinct kinds of pleasure? How can pleasures be measured? Is it possible for some pleasures to be superior in kind to others? What unifies the category of pleasant experiences? Is the value of pleasant experiences natural or non-natural? (shrink)

That all pleasure is good and all pain bad in itself is an eternally true ethical principle. The common claim that some pleasure is not good, or some pain not bad, is mistaken. Strict particularism (ethical decisions must be made case by case; there are no sound universal normative principles) and relativism (all good and bad are relative to society) are among the ethical theories we may refute through an appeal to pleasure and pain. Daniel Dennett, Philippa (...) Foot, R M Hare, Gilbert Harman, Immanuel Kant, J. L. Mackie, and Jean-Paul Sartre are among the many philosophers addressed. (shrink)

In Living for Pleasure, philosopher Emily Austin offers a lively, jargon-free tour of Epicurean strategies for diminishing anxiety, achieving satisfaction, and relishing joys.

Humans have always sought to change their environment—building houses, monuments, temples, and roads. In the process, they have remade the fabric of the world into newly functional objects that are also works of art to be admired. In this second edition of his popular Existential Pleasures of Engineering, Samuel Florman explores how engineers think and feel about their profession. A deeply insightful and refreshingly unique text, this book corrects the myth that engineering is cold and passionless. Indeed, Florman celebrates engineering (...) not only crucial and fundamental but also vital and alive he views it as a response to some of our deepest impulses, an endeavor rich in spiritual and sensual rewards. Opposing the "anti-technology" stance, Florman gives readers a practical, creative, and even amusing philosophy of engineering that boasts of pride in his craft. (shrink)

What is the contrary of pleasure? “Pain” is one common answer. This paper argues that pleasure instead has two natural contraries: unpleasure and hedonic indifference. This view is defended by drawing attention to two often-neglected concepts: the formal relation of polar opposition and the psychological state of hedonic indifference. The existence of mixed feelings, it is argued, does not threaten the contrariety of pleasure and unpleasure.

In this study, George Rudebusch addresses whether Socrates was a hedonist--whether he believed pleasure to be the good. In attempting to locate Socrates' position on hedonism, Rudebusch examines the passages in Plato's early dialogues that are the most disputed on the topic. He maintains that Socrates identifies pleasant activity with virtuous activity, describing Socrates' hedonism as one of activity, not sensation. This analysis allows for Socrates to find both virtue and pleasure to be the good, thus solving the (...) textual puzzle and showing the power of Socratic argument in leading human beings toward the good. (shrink)

A good deal of recent debate over the nature of pleasure and pain has surrounded the alleged phenomenon of unconscious sensory pleasure and pain, or pleasures and pains whose subjects are entirely unaware of them while experiencing them. According to Ben Bramble, these putative pleasures and pains present a problem for attitudinal theories of pleasure and pain, since these theories claim that what makes something a sensory pleasure or pain is that one has a special sort (...) of pro- or con-attitude toward it at the time one experiences it. In this paper, I look at the two existing defenses of attitudinal theories against this worry and explain (following Bramble) that each is inadequate. I show that this inadequacy is in part a result of existing attitudinal theories failing to recognize an important distinction in pro- and con-attitudes, and I propose and defend an amended attitudinal view that does recognize this distinction. I then offer a more promising response to the objection from unconscious sensory pleasures and pains: that experiences of apparently unconscious pleasure or pain only seem pleasant or unpleasant because their subjects are disposed to experience pleasantness or unpleasantness. In this sense, unconscious pleasures and pains are not really pleasures or pains at all. (shrink)

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:Measurement, Pleasure, and Practical Science in Plato's Protagoras HENRY S. RICHARDSON 1. INTRODUCTION TOWARDS THE END OF THE PROTAGORAS Socrates suggests that the "salvation of our life" depends upon applying to pleasures and pains a science of measurement (metr$tik~techn~).Whether Plato intended to portray Socrates as putting forward sincerely the form of hedonism that makes these pleasures and pains relevant has been the subject of a detailed and probably (...) interminable debate, to which this paper will not directly contribute. By contrast, it seems to be supposed by almost all who have written on the topic that this hedonism, whoever is espousing it, puts forward pleasure as a single, homogeneous yardstick of value to serve as the basis of a supremely simple standard of choice. This standard simply directs one to seek the maximal amount of pleasure. The underlying supposition is that the hedonism put forward in the Protagorasallows one to define a maximum because all goods are commensurable. But, as I shall emphasize in the sequel, hedonism does not imply commensurability, nor does commensurability imply hedonism. The interpretive thesis of this essay is that the common presumption that the dialogue's hedonism carries commensurability with it has impeded our ability to understand the Protagor~'s relation to the other dialogues, and has distorted the fundamental purpose of Socrates's practical science. These matters are of more than textual interest. My reasons for trying to remain neutral as to the longstanding debate about attributing the dialogue's hedonism are not limited to wanting to avoid quagmires and remove confusions that have resulted from unwarranted interpretive assumptions. To many, the Protagorasis of tremendous importance as an early articulation of a calculative ideal for ethical or practical decisionmaking, whether or not Plato or Socrates was committed to that ideal. Looking [7] 8 JOURNAL OF THE HISTORY OF PHILOSOPHY 28:1 JANUARY x99 o back at the Protagorasfrom our twentieth-century perspective encourages the expectation that we might find there some argument for the crucial features of such a calculative ideal, as we have come to understand it. One such feature, prominent especially in the classical utilitarians, is that of the commensurability of goods, which in turn allows the precise definition of a maximizing rule. If the Protagoraspresented a calculative conception involving commensurability, then we might expect to find in the dialogue some argumentfor the rational necessity of commensurability. My claim will be that since there is no compelling evidence that the idea of commensurability is found in the dialogue, there is'hardly likely to be an argument for it there. In fact, it is of philosophical interest to see how far the arguments against weakness of will and for the unity of virtue (whoever is making them) can proceed without relying upon commensurability; This way of putting the philosophical points at issue here underlines the relative modesty of what I am claiming about commensurability. I argue that there is nothing in the dialogue that requires us to see commensurability as part of its hedonism, that the arguments proceed without relying upon commensurability, and that in some respects the problem of understanding the relationship of the Protagorasto Plato's other dialogues is eased if we refrain from attributing any commensurability here. I will show that a clearer picture of what is doing the argumentative work in the last secdon of the dialogue will result if we thus separate commensurability from hedonism, and that an illuminatingly different way of understanding the role of the science of measurement is thereby suggested. None of this amounts to a compelling argument that the idea of commensurability is not to be found in the dialogue. Rather, my case simply undermines the positive reasons for finding the idea there. Apart from the greater clarity which separating hedonism and commensurability allows, this modest negative case links up with the deeper philosophical moti,~ation I have mentioned by casting cold water on any hopes that the Protagorascould be made to yield an argument specifically linking commensurability to rationality. In one respect, my interpretive strategy is akin to that of commentators who have attempted to ease the tension between the Protagorasand the Gorgias by arguing that the form of hedonism... (shrink)

First a word about my title: ‘Happiness’ is ground upon which so many angels have feared to tread that it seemed not inappropriate for me to rush in. It is a subject to which we all do give thought, not only with the force majeure of professional philosophising, but in our personal lives; however, in trying to sort the subject out a little, and it is one about which both our literature and our thinking are notoriously muddled, I fear I (...) may rather have generated confusion than diminished it. In attempting by a somewhat roundabout method to clarify a little the sort of question, though scarcely, I am afraid, the sort of answer, that is appropriate to such thought, it has, perhaps inevitably, seemed necessary to consider in almost as much detail the more fashionable subject of Pleasure; and here too, with less excuse, the points I wish to make are abbreviated and unashamedly oversimplified. An Aunt Sally, however, has its uses, and my neck is not so precious that it cannot afford to be stuck out. (shrink)

The object of the present work is to rectify the neglect that pleasure and displeasure have been suffering from in the philosophy of mind, and to give an account of pleasure and displeasure which reveals a striking degree of unity and theoretical tractabiliy underlying the diverse phenomena: a representationalist account.

This paper presents the Universality Argument that pleasure is goodness. The first premise defines goodness as what should please all. The second premise reduces 'should' to perceptual accuracy. The third premise invokes a universal standard of accuracy: qualitative identity. Since the pleasure of all is accurate solely about pleasure, pleasure is goodness, or universal moral value. The argument proceeds from a moral sense theory that analyzes moral concepts as concerned with what all should hope for, feel (...) guilty about, and admire. This requires rejecting practical anti-empiricism, the view that moral judgment concerns empirically inaccessible norms governing action. (shrink)

In the Critique of Judgment Kant repeatedly points out that it is only the pleasure of taste that reveals to us the need to introduce a third faculty of the mind with its own a priori principle. In order to elucidate this claim I discuss two general principles about pleasure that Kant presents, the transcendental definition of pleasure from § 10 and the principle from the Introduction that connects pleasure with the achievement of an aim. Precursors (...) of these principles had been employed by Kant and others in empirical psychology. But how can such principles of empirical psychology be transferred to transcendental philosophy? I suggest that Kant accomplishes this by deriving the connection of pleasure with achievement of an aim from the transcendental definition and the assumption that faculties have interests. I finally reconstruct § 11 as a ‘regressive argument’ from the peculiarities of the pleasure of taste to the need to acknowledge a new faculty. (shrink)