R l purtill has claimed that the ontological argument that plantinga presents in "the nature of necessity" is basically the same as that offered in hartshorne's "the logic of perfection" and that it falls victim to the same criticisms. i argue that plantinga's ontological argument is different enough "not" to fall victim to purtill's criticisms. what makes plantinga's argument different, however, also makes it vulnerable to a different criticism: the god of plantinga's (...) conclusion is not a being greater than which none can be conceived. (shrink)

By taking ‘existence in reality’ to be a great-making property and ‘God’ to be the greatest possible being, Plantinga skillfully presents Anselm’s ontological argument. However, since he proves God’s existence by virtue of a premise, “God (a maximally great being) is a possible being”, that is true only if God actually exists; his argument begs the question of the existence of God.

This book is a unique contribution to the philosophy of religion. It offers a comprehensive discussion of one of the most famous arguments for the existence of God: the ontological argument. The author provides and analyses a critical taxonomy of those versions of the argument that have been advanced in recent philosophical literature, as well as of those historically important versions found in the work of St Anselm, Descartes, Leibniz, Hegel and others. A central thesis of the (...) book is that ontological arguments have no value in the debate between theists and atheists. There is a detailed review of the literature on the topic (separated from the main body of the text) and a very substantial bibliography, making this volume an indispensable resource for philosophers of religion and others interested in religious studies. (shrink)

The most famous objection to the ontological argument is given in Kant's dictum that existence is not a real predicate. But it is not obvious how this slogan is supposed to relate to the ontological argument. Some, most notably Alvin Plantinga, have even judged Kant's dictum to be totally irrelevant to Anselm's version of the ontological argument. In this paper I argue, against Plantinga and others, that Kant's claim is indeed relevant to Anselm's (...) class='Hi'>argument, in the straightforward sense that if the claim is true, then Anselm's argument is unsound. (shrink)

In this chapter, I overview some important topics in the discussion of ontological arguments. Particular ontological arguments discussed are those of Anselm, Descartes, and Plantinga. I then consider objections from Kant, and the implications of some parodies of these arguments. The chapter concludes with some 'questions for reflection'.

General discussion of ontological arguments. (Extended the discussion of ontological arguments in the then current version of my SEP entry on ontological arguments.).

This article is a presentation of Plantinga’s ontological argument in its historical and systematical frames. Criticisms of the argument are presented as well. Philosophical claims underlying the defense of the argument are described as minimalist, but their connection with a strong logical system is noted.

Inspired by the third chapter of Anselm's Proslogion, twentieth century philosophers including Charles Hartshorne and Alvin Plantinga developed “modal” ontological arguments for the existence of God. Such arguments use modal logic to infer God's existence from the premises that (i) God's existence is possible and (ii) if God exists, He exists necessarily. Like other ontological arguments, modal arguments have won few converts to theism; many commentators consider them question‐begging or liable to parody. This article details how recent attempts (...) to defend these arguments have tried to overcome these difficulties by drawing on modern accounts of the epistemology and metaphysics of modality. (shrink)

The Ontological Argument for the existence of God has and puzzled philosophers ever since it was first formulated by St. Anselm. I suppose most philosophers have been inclined to reject the argument, although it has an illustrious line of defenders extending to the present and presently terminating in Professors Malcolm and Hartshorne. Many philosophers have tried to give general refutations of the argument-refutations de- signed to show that no version of it can possibly succeed-of which the (...) most important is, perhaps, Kant's objection, with its several contemporary variations. I believe that none of these general refutations are successful; in what follows I shall support this belief by critically examining Kant's objection. (shrink)

Variations on the ontological argument for most minimal and most mediocre beings.

St Anselm is one of the major thinkers of the medieval epoch of the history of philosophy. Interest in Anselm usually focuses on his discussion of the problem of the existence of God especially as contained in the Proslogion. Indeed Anselm is mostly known for his attempt to proof the existence of God in the Proslogion. The argument he advances here which goes by the name ontological argument has been a point of reference all through the history (...) of Western philosophy and is usually viewed as his most substantive contributions to philosophy of religion, with Hume and Kant criticizing it in the eighteenth century and thinkers such as Hartshorne, Malcom and Plantinga endorsing it in the Twentieth century. Like Augustine before him and Aquinas after him, Anselm did not see any opposition between faith and reason, or again, between philosophy and theology, as he was concerned with providing rational ground for the doctrines of Christianity which he already accepted as a matter of faith. Indeed as commentators rightly note, Anselm’s thought can be summed up in the Augustinian dictum, “faith seeks understanding”, so that he is arguably one of the early pioneers of Christian theology, so far as he sees certain solidarity between faith and reason, with reason providing the excellent service of rational clarification of what we accept by faith. The inter-play Anselm sees as subsisting between faith and reason is one we must take into account if we must appreciate his contributions to theology and metaphysics, for this consideration permeates the whole of his thought. For him clearly, that there is no divorce between faith and reason means concretely that “I do not seek to understand in other that I may believe, but rather I believe in order that I may understand”. (shrink)

Gaunilo’s island analogy to Anselm’s ontological argument is often dismissed as weak. Alvin Plantinga rejects the concept of the greatest island as incoherent, arguing that island great making properties like coconutty lack intrinsic maxima—an island with more coconuts can always be found. In contrast, God is omniscient, ensuring that no being can surpass His knowledge. Plantinga suggests that divine attributes guarantee insurmountable greatness, unlike the attributes of an island. However, I challenge this view, arguing that the concept of (...) the greatest possible island is as coherent as that of the greatest possible being, both of which require select interpretation of the properties attributed to them. By applying omni qualifiers to island qualities and appealing to logical possibility, a map to Gaunilo’s lost island may be found. (shrink)

ABSTRACT -/- The Evil That Free Will Does: Plantinga’s Dubious Defense -/- Alvin Plantinga’s controversial free will defense (FWD) for the problem of evil is an important attempt to show with certainty that moral evils are compatible and justifiable with God’s omnipotence and omniscience. I agree with critics who argue that it is untenable and the FWD fails. This paper proposes new criticisms by analyzing Plantinga’s presuppositions and objectionable assumptions in God, Freedom and Evil. Notably, his limited concept of omnipotence, (...) and possible worlds theory lack rigorous argument and are subjectively biased with irrelevant weak examples. My ontological possible worlds theory (Possible Conditional Timelines) shows that it is very likely that the omnipotent God exists of necessity in some worlds but perhaps not this one. Omnipotence is total and absolute, and should imply the freedom of will to actualize all worlds God chooses. Plantinga’s position regarding God’s omniscience of future counterfactuals is implausible based on modal logic conjecture. -/- . (shrink)

If the contemporary rebirth of the ontological argument had its conception in Norman Malcolm's discovery of a second Anselmian argument it had its full-term delivery as a healthy philosophical progeny with Alvin Plantinga's sophisticated modal version presented in the tenth chapter of The Nature of Necessity. This latter argument has been the centre of a huge body of literature over the last fifteen years, and deservedly so. One is impressed that this version of Anselm's jewel (...) is valid and sound if any is. (shrink)

This chapter shows that in certain circumstances desires are a guide to possibility, and that, in these circumstances, human beings desire at least one state of affairs for which the existence of God is a necessary condition. It follows that God’s existence is possible; or, more modestly, anyone with the relevant desires has a reason to believe God’s existence is possible. Thus, a new argument in the tradition of C.S. Lewis’s argument from nostalgia is offered, an argument (...) from certain desires to the possibility premise of the modal ontological argument. It is argued, further, that support for the possibility premise does not succumb to the problem of equipollence, a problem that undermines many attempts to support the possibility premise. (shrink)

I consider what I hope are increasingly sophisticated versions of ontological argument, beginning from simple definitional forms, through three versions to be found in Anselm, with their recent interpretations by Malcolm, Plantinga, Klima and Lowe. I try to show why none of these work by investigating both the different senses of necessary existence and the conditions under which logically necessary existence can be brought to bear. Although none of these arguments work, I think that they lead to interesting (...) reflections on the nature of definition, on the conditions for possessing the property of necessary existence and point towards a different, neo-Platonic ground for God’s meeting the criteria for being logically necessary. (shrink)

Arthur Norman Prior (1914 – 1969) and Georg Henrik von Wright (1916 – 2003) both attended a conference in England sometime in the spring of 1956, after which they corresponded on Anselm’s ontological argument. Prior had at the conference presented a formal treatment of the ontological argument. Based upon notes from the Prior archive at the Bodleian Library, and correspondence with von Wright, we here presents Prior’s and von Wrights’ discussion of Anselm’s argument in light (...) of Prior’s published, as well as unpublished writings on the ontological argument. Three versions of the ontological argument from Prior’s unpublished as well as published papers is presented: a non-modal, an argument from possible existence and finally a modal version. While Prior dismissed the first on the basis of a meta-theorem for proof in argumentation, the second on the basis of a fallacious commutation of operators, he argued that a valid version of the ontological argument can be proven from the distinctive S5 thesis of Lewis modal logic. While Prior gave reasons for a rejection of those distinct S5 thesis, in favour of Lewis S4 system, he also provided a novel argument in favour of accepting the S5 thesis for necessity and possibility. Finally we relate Prior’s work to Plantinga (1974) and consider objections raised by Oppy (2012) and Gale (2007) toward the modal versions of the ontological argument. (shrink)

Hargrove’s ontological argument for Aesthetic Foundation of Wilderness Preservation was the extension of the thinking paradigm from human beings to moral consideration and aesthetic appreciation of wilderness. The thinking paradigm was based on the framework of traditional Western philosophy, which includes metaphysics, epistemology, and ethics. In this article, I will examine Hargrove’s ontological argument by making a little comparison with the perspective of a Chinese philosophical framework. This paper will be divided into three parts. In the (...) part I, I will summarize Hargrove’s ontological argument for natural beauty and environmental preservation. In part II, I will examine the metaphysical framework in Hargrove’s ontological argument. I argue it is the extension of Plato’s metaphysics of the ultimate reality to wilderness. In Part III, I will examine the ethical and aesthetic framework in his ontological argument. I point out Hargrove’s ethical framework comes from ethical rationalism and his aesthetic framework is the legacy of Plato’s aesthetics. By comparison, Chinese metaphysics stresses the process and Chinese ethics stresses care. The two different directions promote the aesthetic appreciation of agricultural land rather than wilderness. (shrink)

In this paper, I have attempted to do two main things. First, I argue that Alvin Plantinga’s new argument against materialism, though interesting, shares the fate of his earlier arguments in that it is, in the end, unsuccessful. Secondly, I then argue, contrary to Plantinga’s view that there is no strong argument for materialism, that there is in fact very strong scientific support that can be offered against the hypothesis that the human mind is an immaterial substance, and (...) hence in support of the conclusion that some form of materialism is true. (shrink)

My aim in this paper is to critically assess Plantinga’s modal ontological argument for existence of God, such as it is presented in the book “The Nature of Necessity”. Plantinga tries to show that this argument is valid and it is rational to believe in his main premise, namely “there is a possible world in which maximal greatness is instantiated”. On the one hand, I want to show that this argument is logically valid in both systems (...) B and S5 of modal logic. On the other hand, I think that this argument is not a good argument to show that God exists or that it is rational to believe in God. (shrink)

Alvin Plantinga has recently turned his attention to materialism. More precisely, he has turned his attention to the thesis that philosophers of mind call materialism.[i] This thesis can be variously formulated. In this essay, I will take “materialism” to be the conjunction of the following two theses.

Anselm’s ontological argument is an argument for the existence of God. This paper presents Iris Murdoch’s ontological argument for the existence of the Good. It discusses her interpretation of Anselm’s argument, her distinctive appropriation of it, as well as some of the merits of her version of the argument. In doing so, it also shows how the argument integrates some key Murdochian ideas: morality’s wide scope, the basicness of vision to morality, moral (...) realism, and Platonism. (shrink)

Alvin Plantinga’s reply to the grounding objection to propositions now called counterfactuals of freedom, originally made by Robert Adams, can be interpretedas follows: if, for the sake of argument, we require counterfactuals of freedom to be grounded in something that makes them true, we can simply (and trivially) say that there are corresponding counterfactual facts that ground them. I argue that such facts, together with the facts about the situations in which moral agents find themselves, would ontologically determine that (...) the agents perform their acts, rendering these acts unfree. Thus, I maintain that, contrary to Plantinga’s intent, allowing the grounding facts into the divine creation situation entails the falsity of Molinism. If there is no other way that God can know what free creatures would do than through counterfactuals of freedom, divine foreknowledge of human acts is inconsistent with human freedom and moral responsibility. (shrink)

Anselm described god as “something than which nothing greater can be thought” [1, p. 93], and Descartes viewed him as “a supreme being” [7, p. 122]. I first capture those characterizations formally in a simple language for monadic predicate logic. Next, I construct a model class inspired by Stoic and medieval doctrines of grades of being [8, 20]. Third, I prove the models sufficient for recovering, as internal mathematics, the famous ontological argument of Anselm, and show that (...) class='Hi'>argument to be, on this formalization, valid. Fourth, I extend the models to incorporate a modality fit for proving that any item than which necessarily no greater can be thought is also necessarily real. Lastly, with the present approach, I blunt the sharp edges of notable objections to ontological arguments by Gaunilo and by Grant. A trigger warning: every page of this writing flouts the old saw “Existence is not a predicate” and flagrantly. (shrink)

In Chapter 12 of Warrant and Proper Function, Alvin Plantinga constructs two arguments against evolutionary naturalism, which he construes as a conjunction E&N .The hypothesis E says that “human cognitive faculties arose by way of the mechanisms to which contemporary evolutionary thought directs our attention (p.220).”1 With respect to proposition N , Plantinga (p. 270) says “it isn’t easy to say precisely what naturalism is,” but then adds that “crucial to metaphysical naturalism, of course, is the view that there is (...) no such person as the God of traditional theism.” Plantinga tries to cast doubt on the conjunction E&N in two ways.His “preliminary argument” aims to show that the conjunction is probably false, given the fact (R) that our psychological mechanisms for forming beliefs about the world are generally reliable.His “main argument” aims to show that the conjunction E&N is self-defeating — if you believe E&N , then you should stop believing that conjunction.Plantinga further develops the main argument in his unpublished paper “Naturalism Defeated” (Plantinga 1994).We will try to show that both arguments contain serious errors. (shrink)

There are three major theses in Plantinga’s latest version of his evolutionary argument against naturalism. (1) Given materialism, the conditional probability of the reliability of human cognitive mechanisms produced by evolution is low; (2) the same conditional probability given reductive or non-reductive materialism is still low; (3) the most popular naturalistic theories of content and truth are not admissible for naturalism. I argue that Plantinga’s argument for (1) presupposes an anti-materialistic conception of content, and it therefore begs the (...) question against materialism. To argue for (2), Plantinga claims that the adaptiveness of a belief is indifferent to its truth. I argue that this claim is unsupported unless it again assumes an anti-materialistic conception of content and truth. I further argue that Plantinga’s argument for (3) is not successful either, because an improved version of teleosemantics can meet his criticisms. Moreover, this version of teleosemantics implies that the truth of a belief is (probabilistically) positively related to its adaptiveness, at least for simple beliefs about physical objects in human environments. This directly challenges Plantinga’s claim that adaptiveness is indifferent to truth. (shrink)

This chapter contains sections titled: Plantinga's First Objection: Naturalism and the Concept of Function Plantinga's Third Objection: Materialism and Belief Plantinga's Second Argument: Naturalism as Self‐Defeating Summing Up.

We must agree, I think, with Frank Ebersole that there is something preposterous in supposing that the God of religious belief, the God who handed down tablets to Moses on Mt. Sinai, etc., should be proven to exist by the ontological argument. Indeed, when we place the one, the ontological argument, by the side of the other, the God of religious belief, there seems hardly to be any connection between them. But if we agree to this (...) perception of things, what sense can we make of the ontological argument, for example, the “pull” that it sometimes exerts on us? (shrink)

Let all finite sequences of letters of the English alphabet be ordered serially so that shorter sequences precede longer ones, and sequences of the same length are ordered alphabetically. Thus, an ordinal number is assigned to every possible English sentence of finite length. Among these numbers, some--call them S-numbers --will be the numbers of sentences which are instructions for writing down an infinite sequence of numbers. Now, it is impossible to state, in an English sentence of finite length, a generally (...) applicable procedure for determining whether an arbitrarily given number is an S-number. (shrink)

In a recent article, ‘Tensed Time and Our Differential Experience of the Past and Future,’ William Lane Craig attempts to resuscitate A. N. Prior's ‘Thank Goodness’ argument against the B-theory by combining it with Plantinga's views about basic beliefs. In essence Craig's view is that since there is a universal experience and belief in the objectivity of tense and the reality of becoming, ‘this belief constitutes an intrinsic defeater-defeater which overwhelms the objections brought against it.’ An intrinsic defeater-defeater (...) is a belief that enjoys such warrant for us that it simply overwhelms the defeaters brought against it without specifically rebutting or undercutting them. Thus, Craig claims that an effete philosophical argument like McTaggart's paradox is nothing more than ‘an engaging and recalcitrant brain teaser whose conclusion nobody really takes seriously.’ It is difficult to reconcile this statement with Craig's own writings elsewhere. For Craig has vigorously argued in at least two other articles that 'hybrid A-B theorists like McCall, Schlesinger, and Smith [who give ontological status to both A-properties and B-relations] are in deep trouble’ since they are all effectively refuted by McTaggart's Paradox. It is not Craig's inconsistency regarding the significance of McTaggart conundrum that I want to draw attention to, however. Rather I wish to raise a different issue. (shrink)

In this paper I will suggest an interpretation of Spinoza's ontological argument on which the argument, properly construed, is valid, and Spinoza, if granted the claim that it is possible that God exists, is successful in obtaining the conclusion of the argument. The interpretations given by H.A. Wolfson, G.H.R. Parkinson, and William A. Earle will then be argued to be deficient on textual and logical grounds. Leibniz’ assessment of the argument, namely that it “permits us (...) only to conclude that God's existence follows if his possibility is already proven,” is thus held to be correct. (shrink)

I argue that spinoza's ontological argument is successful when it is understood to have two premises: (i) it is possible for god to exist, (ii) it is necessary that, if god exists, he necessarily does. the argument is valid in s5. spinoza is in a position to establish the second premise of the argument on the basis of his definitions and axioms. the first premise was assumed to be true, but, as leibniz noted, it must be (...) established for the conclusion of the argument to be forthcoming. this is one of the main problems with the argument, and it requires a solution to the problem of the attributes. certain alternate interpretations of spinoza are then argued to be deficient on textual and logical grounds. (shrink)

Here I reply to a recent exchange between Edgar Danielyan and Brian Garrett regarding Alvin Plantinga’s assessment of Gaunilo’s ‘ideal island’ objection to Anselm’s ontological argument. I argue that an ideal island is conceivable if it’s defined as any island exhibiting an ideal ratio of great-making island properties.

The ontological argument, as understood by the first interpretation, runs as follows: The concept of God is the concept of a being than which nothing greater can be conceived. This latter concept includes the concept of a being which exists necessarily, for necessary existence is one of the perfections of an absolutely perfect being; that is, the concept of God is the concept of a being which exists necessarily. God then must conceived as existing necessarily, and hence we (...) must attribute to his essence necessary existence. According to the first interpretation, this inference from concepts alone constitutes the whole of the ontological argument. The argument is thus analytic and purely rational. (shrink)

Saint Anselm’s ontological argument is usually interpreted either (1) as an attempt to deductively prove God’s existence or (2) as a form of prayer, which is not intended to “prove” God’s existence, but rather to deepen the devotion of those who already believe. In this paper I attempt to find a mean between these two interpretations, showing that while Anselm’s argument is not a deductive proof, it is nevertheless a proof of God’s existence. I argue that Anselm’s (...) ontological argument is analogous to Aristotle’s to elegktikōs apodeixai (retorsive argument) for the truth of the principle of non-contradiction in Metaphysics IV: an argument that does not move from premises to conclusion, but rather demonstrates the truth of its conclusion by showing that its conclusion is always presupposed. I argue that interpreting Anselm’s ontological argument in this way exempts it from the most common objections against it. (shrink)

This paper is a criticism of Plantinga’s analysis of a version of the ontological argument. He thinks it is obvious that his version is valid and that the only question of interest is whether a key premise is true. The paper lays out two relevant semantical accounts of modal logic. It contends that Plantinga needs to show that one is preferable to the other.

This paper is a reply to Stephen Makin's response to my previous criticism of his defense of a conceptual ontological argument. (All relevant bibliographical details are provided in this paper.).

This essay takes up a challenge recently posed by Graham Oppy: to clearly express, in premise-conclusion form, Hegel's version of the ontological argument. In addition to employing this format, it seeks to supplement existing treatments by locating a core component of Hegel's argument in a slightly different place than is common. Whereas some prominent recent treatments (Williams, Bubbio, Melechar) focus on Hegel's definition of the Absolute as the Concept, from the third part of his Science of Logic (...) (the Doctrine of the Concept), mine focuses on earlier definitions from the first (the Doctrine of Being). As I hope to show, there are even more resources in Hegel's Logic for an ontological argument than those emphasized in recent treatments: the concept, the Idea, etc. Already in the first third of the Logic, we find a compelling response to a famous Kantian counter-argument to the ontological proof. The counter-argument is summed up in the phrase ‘existence [Sein] is not a real predicate’. Hence, Hegel's response as I interpret it will take the form of a competing analysis of Being, a Lehre vom Sein (Doctrine of Being). What do we learn when we put the ontology back into Hegel's ontological argument? That Being is neither predicate, nor subject, nor copula, but a monist (or ‘infinite’) category. The larger importance of this exercise to our understanding of Hegel's thought lies in the way it clarifies his profound debt to even non-idealist conceptions of God, such as the one espoused by Spinoza. (shrink)

Formulations of Anselm’s ontological argument have been the subject of a number of recent studies. We examine these studies in light of Anselm’s text and (a) respond to criticisms that have surfaced in reaction to our earlier representations of the argument, (b) identify and defend a more refined representation of Anselm’s argument on the basis of new research, and (c) compare our representation of the argument, which analyzes that than which none greater can be conceived (...) as a definite description, to a representation that analyzes it as an arbitrary name. (shrink)