English summary: The freedom potential of modern societies, above all the justification of political authority, is today linked to a democratically constituted order. What is meant by the idea of being democratic seems, however, to be anything but clear. Is it only a question of representing the people through elections, ballots, and political parties, or does it include institutional culture, the division of powers, and the legal regime within a community? A "philosophy of the republic," as developed in this volume's (...) contributions, shows that the current "dominance of the democratic" falls short of accounting for the independent significance to the republican self-organisation of state and society. German description: Das Freiheitspotential moderner Gesellschaften, vor allem die Rechtfertigung politischer Herrschaft, wird heute mit einer demokratisch verfassten Ordnung verknupft. Was eine demokratische Ordnung ausmacht, was also die Idee des Demokratischen meint, scheint aber alles andere als klar zu sein. Soll es nur um Fragen der Reprasentation des Volkes durch Wahlen, Abstimmungen und Parteien oder daruber hinaus auch um die institutionelle Kultur, die Gewaltenteilung und das Rechtsregime innerhalb eines Gemeinwesens gehen? Eine "Philosophie der Republik," wie sie in den Beitragen dieses Bandes entwickelt wird, kann zeigen, dass die aktuelle "Dominanz des Demokratischen" keine eigenstandige Bedeutung der republikanischen Selbstorganisation von Staat und Gesellschaft beimisst. Mit Beitragen von: David Abraham, Andreas Anter, Susanne Beck, Jochen Bung, Daniela Demko, Horst Dreier, Andrea Marlen Esser, Helmut Goerlich, Bernd Grzeszick, Klaus Gunther, Matthias Kaufmann, Jean-Francois Kervegan, Thomas Khurana, Stephan Kirste, Oliver Lembcke, Rochus Leonhardt, Georg Lohmann, Wolfgang Schild, Christian Schmidt, Thomas Schmidt-Lux, Kurt Seelmann, Hannes Siegrist, Pirmin Stekeler-Weithofer, Trevor Wedman, Marc Andre Wiegand, Benno Zabel, Sabrina Zucca-Soest. (shrink)

In order to understand Hegel's approach to philosophy, we need to ask why, and how, he reacts to the well-known criticism of German Romantics, like Novalis and Friedrich Schlegel, against philosophical system building in general, and against Kant's system in particular. Hegel's encyclopedic system is a topical ordering of categorically different ontological realms, corresponding to different conceptual forms of representation and knowledge. All in all it turns into a systematic defense of Fichte's doctrine concerning the primacy of us as actors (...) with respect to any knowledge claim or scientific theory. Hegel's limitations of the principle of causality and of the possibility of using mathematical methods in science show, in fact, how a merely compatibilist solution of Kant's third antinomy can be overcome. (shrink)

Robert Musil sagt über seinen Roman „Der Mann ohne Eigenschaften“, dieser sei „religiös unter den Voraussetzungen der Ungläubigen“, kritisiert aber Kierkegaards Entweder-Oder ebenso wie Hegels angeblich entscheidungsschwaches Sowohl-als-auch-Denken. Dieses wird hier dargestellt als spekulative Betrachtung der Wahrheit, des Ganzen des Seins, einerseits, als absolute Haltung zur Endlichkeit von allem Seienden, auch des eigenen Subjekts, andererseits, so aber, dass das gemeinsame und dabei indefinit-unendliche Selbst-Bewusstsein zum gemeinsamen Thema aller wahren Religion wird, wie es die Aufklärung aus dem Blick verloren hat.

Addresses various crucial approaches to the history of philosophy - narrative, philological, hermeneutic, and systematic. This book elaborates the principles of each approach and puts focus on their capacity to properly comprehend problems.

What are pure geometric forms? In what sense are there an infinite number of points on a line? What is the relationship between empirically correct statements about real bodily figures (or movements) and the ideal truths of a pure mathematical geometry (also in space-time)? Starting from Kant and Wittgenstein, the book demonstrates how our dealings with figures and symbols is to be understood beyond the technical mastery of forms of calculation and proof.

Man's rational capacities rest on education and this makes the form of human sapience interpersonal. As persons, however, we do not take part in the tradition of sapience only passively. That is, mere rationality in Kant's sense, i.e. the faculty of following implicit norms or explicit rules, is not enough for personhood. It requires also reason in Hegel's sense, i.e. free active participation in developing 'the idea' (eventually of good human life), as well as 'the concept', i.e. joint generic knowledge (...) that defines the inferential content of our words and sentences. In making reasonable proposals for developing these persons are themselves the free 'spirit' of the human world. (shrink)

The question of meaning is perceived as being at the root of religion. Philosophy presents secular competition with its radical criticism of the concretizations used in theological language and of the way meaning is derived from "holy" - in other words inviolable - values of a god. This consideration of meaning has not always dealt with worldly purposes and other-worldly goals. Rather it has revolved around achieving a reasonable understanding of the subject itself and the right position in relation to (...) it or - as in the case of the meaning of human life - living a good life overall. (shrink)

It is a heroic enterprise to develop a systematic reading of Hegel's Doctrine of Being, the first of three books in the Science of Logic. The basic idea of Houlgate's grand interpretation of Hegel's three parts of this Doctrine, which I call the Logic of Quality, Quantity and Measure, is that Hegel demands a ‘presuppositionless derivation of categories’ (II: ix). Hegel on Being (in short: HoB) presents a thoroughgoing and rigorous interpretation in a kind of dialogue (as I would characterize (...) what HoB marks as ‘Excursus’) with Kant (I: 19–46, 307–73; II: 171–79) and especially Frege's formal logic and his attempts of a predicative definition of numbers (II: 25–138). In any case, HoB makes us aware of the really problematic presuppositions in post-Fregean Analytic Philosophy. (shrink)