This paper aims to pay tribute to Figal’s comprehensive and innovative analysis of the artwork and beauty, while challenging both his realist position on the immediacy of meaning and his monist stance that reduces sublimity to beauty. To enquire into the origin of aesthetic feelings and sense, and thus, to break the hermeneutic circle, we first trace the origin of this reduction to the reception of Burke’s concept of the sublime by Mendelssohn and Kant. We then recur to Husserl and (...) Dufrenne to trace the origin of the sense of the feeling of sublimity in the realm of affectivity or sensuousness. This genesis takes place in passive experience, where we identify an excess of sensuous sense over categorial meaning that is constitutive of the affective sense that our bodily sensations give to hyletic material. It is argued that this sensuous excess evokes a sublime experience in the phenomenological sense, involving an affective and disruptive bodily experience and an endless process of sense formation. Affective or sensuous sense is thus an event that irreversibly affects the bodily surface. To elucidate this phenomenon, we draw on the theoretical framework of Breton and Bataille, positing it as a form-transgressive ‘convulsive’ sublime, which we then illustrate in the architectural works of Tschumi and Eisenman. In short, we have retrieved the origin of aesthetic experience and redefined the feeling of the sublime as a phenomenological ‘convulsive’ sublimity. (shrink)

_Purpose._ The study aims to substantiate philosophical anthropology as a space for the development of biopolitics, which is a relatively new synthetic scientific knowledge of the political in the biological and the biological in the political, which, however, has its roots in the era of antiquity. The analysis of biopolitics in the context of contemporary global challenges, in particular the COVID-19 pandemic, is carried out, which allows to actualize a new direction of biopolitics – microbiopolitics. _Theoretical basis._ The study (...) is based on an understanding of the initial, in relation to biopolitics, the nature of philosophical anthropology. While philosophical anthropology seeks an answer to the question – who is _Homo sapiens_, given the biosocial nature of man, biopolitics specifies the question in the form – who is _homo politicus_ in modern socio-political space with a focus on the imperative of a human-centred approach in the social sciences. The study is based on scientific works by specialists in philosophical anthropology and biopolitics. _Originality._ The authors substantiate the expediency and relevance of considering philosophical anthropology as a contextual space for the evolution of biopolitical knowledge from the natural philosophy of Antiquity to modern microbiopolitics. _Conclusions._ Philosophical anthropology is seen as a specific epistemological landscape in which fields of scientific knowledge are formed and developed that are in one way or another involved in the philosophical problems of man: philosophical psychology, social anthropology, philosophy of medicine, humanology, philosophy of education, ethics, as well as biophilosophy, bioethics, and, in particular, biopolitics. (shrink)

How do human beings become human? This question lies behind the so-called human sciences. But these disciplines are scattered among many different departments and hold up a cracked mirror to humankind. This is why, in the view of Paul Ricoeur, we need to develop a philosophical anthropology, one that has a much older history but still offers many untapped resources. This appeal to a specifically philosophical approach to questions regarding what it was to be human did not stop (...) Ricoeur from entering into dialogue with other disciplines and approaches, such as psychoanalysis, history, sociology, anthropology, linguistics and the philosophy of language, in order to offer an up-to-date reflection on what he saw as the fundamental issues. For there is clearly not a simple, single answer to the question what is it to be human? Ricoeur therefore takes up the complexity of this question in terms of the tensions he sees between the voluntary and the involuntary, acting and suffering, autonomy and vulnerability, capacity and fragility, and identity and otherness. The texts brought together in this volume provide an overall view of the development of Ricoeurs philosophical thinking on the question of what it is to be human, from his early 1939 lecture on Attention to his remarks on receiving the Kluge Prize in 2004, a few months before his death. (shrink)

Introduction : the antinomy of human reality and the problem of a philosophical anthropology -- Attention: a phenomenological study of attention and its philosophical connections -- The unity of the voluntary and the involuntary as a limit-idea -- The problem of the will and philosophical discourse -- The phenomenology of the will and the approach through ordinary language -- The symbol gives rise to thought -- Freedom -- Myth -- The symbolic structure of action -- Human beings (...) as the subject of philosophy -- Individual and personal identity -- Narrative identity -- The paradoxes of identity -- Strangeness many times over -- The addressee of religion : the capable human being -- Epilogue : personal capacities and mutual recognition. (shrink)

CHAPTER Introduction Some basic questions in philosophical anthropology The question whether there is indeed a concern in Indian thought of what comes under ...

Pragmatism, the single originally American philosophical tradition, has in recent decades once again become widely discussed in many fields of philosophy, including metaphysics, epistemology, philosophy of science, philosophy of religion, and moral philosophy. This study seeks to show, both historically and systematically, that the issue of «human nature, » the main problem of philosophical anthropology, is (or at least should be) at the center of pragmatistic philosophizing. The author formulates a contemporary version of pragmatism largely based on William (...) James's (1842-1910) work, arguing that such a neo-Jamesian framework also can meet postmodernistic and irrationalistic threats. (shrink)

The article examines some features of the philosophical-anthropological approach to the cognitive activity of a person, which is presented in it primarily as the «of-being-relationship» of a person to his world. The peculiarities of this approach to cognition are primarily due to the following. All contemporary philosophical trends, such as the transcendental-critical approach, evolutionary theory, existentialism, or various representatives of the linguistic turn, always come from the (cognitive) achievements of culture (intentional, intersubjectively constituted, immersed in the specifics of (...) the subjectivity of consciousness, language, etc. ) and from there they try to investigate the factors enabling the subject's achievements; or, like the evolutionary theory, ultimately level out the essential difference in the principle of organization of human life, limiting it to the adaptive self-preservation of the organism. The philosophical-anthropological approach is based on the laws of the organic as a prerequisite for all cultural formations, from the vital process, and precisely from its fateful breakthrough for the human figure, from which it tries to derive the cognitive relationship as one of the mediators, which contributes to overcoming this gap and restoring the vital cycle in the human world. Accordingly, the cognitive relationship acts as a relationship that emerges in the very being, woven into the specific functionality of a living being, a person. And reflexively decisive here is not "exclusively" the internal status of the subject-object-splitting of the fact of knowledge, but its, so to speak, fully cognitively capable presence as an essential relation. The being of cognition does not arise, it only "does not disappear"; it "accompanies" the entire process of anthropogenesis, during which only an increase in the intensity of the unity of being is observed. As a conclusion, it would be appropriate to demand: scientific thinking, by its type of organization and objective intent, must resort to methodological and conceptual self-criticism, and pay attention precisely to the substantive importance of its anthropological foundations, that is, not simply to certain personal or community circumstances in which a scientist or the scientific community work, and on the anthropic principle as an internal principle, on the basis of which the constitutive interpretation of knowledge as such takes place. (shrink)

Religion and science dialogues that orbit around rational method, knowledge, and truth are often, though not always, contentious. In this article, I suggest a different cluster of gravitational points around which religion and science dialogues might usefully travel: philosophical anthropology, ethics, and love. I propose seeing morality as a natural outgrowth of the human desire to establish and maintain social bonds so as not to experience the condition of being alone. Humans, of all animals, need to feel loved—defined as (...) a compassionate present-with in dynamic dyadic relation such that one experiences the sense of mattering—but that need has an equally natural tendency to be met by creating biased us-and-them distinctions. A “critical” natural ethics, then, is one in which we become aware of and work to undermine our tendency to reify in-group distinctions between “us” and “them.” Religious communities that work intentionally on this can be seen, to some extent, as laboratories of love—or as sites for co-creating knowledge in perilous times. (shrink)

In this paper it is argued that philosophical anthropology is central to ethics and politics. The denial of this has facilitated the triumph of debased notions of humans developed by Hobbes which has facilitated the enslavement of people to the logic of the global market, a logic which is now destroying the ecological conditions for civilization and most life on Earth. Reviving the classical understanding of the central place of philosophical anthropology to ethics and politics, the early work (...) of Hegel and Marx is explicated, defended and further developed by interpreting this through developments in post-mechanistic science. Overcoming the opposition between the sciences and the humanities, it is suggested that the conception of humans developed in this way can orient people in their struggle for the liberty to avert a global ecological catastrophe. (shrink)

Philosophic anthropology, Pursuing philosophy's traditional search for reflective self-Knowledge seeks to crystallize the ideas of man underpinning empirical research and moral ideals. Neither the claim that pure speculation can produce factual knowledge nor the contention that a higher synthesis of empirical findings can become philosophy is acceptable. Philosophic anthropology is, Therefore, Most usefully conceived as a critique which traces the necessary presuppositions of the study of man in its various forms of the more rules we apply.

The author distinguishes three main interpretations of the concept, as well as the developmental trends in philosophical anthropology, and reflects on their relationship with critical social philosophy. Consequently, he follows up with an explication of the main assumptions of Arnold Gehlen’s philosophical anthropology and seeks to find out how they influenced the categorical particularity of his critique of postmodern society, labeled as “the crisis of institutions.” The author provides more detailed reflection in references to Gehlen’s Die Seele im (...) technischen Zeitalter, and its analysis of the so-called new subjectivism. The article ends with a critical conclusion, in which the author makes note of certain ideological incongruities in Gehlen’s philosophical standpoint. (shrink)

Interconnections between philosophic anthropology, conceptions of globalization and sustainable development are investigated. Found out that biological, social, intellectual and spiritual parameters of human being determine specific directions and spheres of globalization. Discovering of these interconnectionsallows to make clear necessary measures of transition to sustainable development. Substantiated that such researches serve as a basis for working out of political, economic, social, intellectual and spiritual guidelines of ensuring of reliable international communication’s security, survival of mankind and solution of internal problems of every (...) country. Investigations of interconnections between philosophic anthropology, conceptions of globalization and sustainable development could became as a mainstream of development of philosophy in XXI century. (shrink)

Brian Gregor draws together a hermeneutics of the self—through Heidegger, Gadamer, Ricoeur, and Taylor—and a theology of the cross—through Luther, Kierkegaard, Bonhoeffer, and Jüngel.

Explains how new discoveries in anthropology might help politicians solve foreign policy matters.

I approach the subject of human enhancement—whether by genetic, pharmacological, or technological means—from the perspective of Thomistic/Aristotelian philosophical anthropology, natural law theory, and virtue ethics. Far from advocating a restricted or monolithic conception of “human nature” from this perspective, I outline a set of broadly-construed, fundamental features of the nature of human persons that coheres with a variety of historical and contemporary philosophical viewpoints. These features include self-conscious awareness, capacity for intellective thought, volitional autonomy, desire for pleasurable experiences, (...) and the necessity of healthy biological functioning. On this basis, I contend that there may be legitimate forms of human enhancement for specific purposes related to the physical, cognitive, and emotive dimensions of human existence. However, wider philosophical considerations call into question whether societal attitudes towards enhancement and the differences that may emerge between those who are enhanced versus the unenhanced may raise insurmountable questions of justice, as well as a loss of virtues associated with what Alasdair MacIntyre refers to as our “acknowledged dependency.” This presentation will navigate towards conclusions differentiating principled from practical objections to specific forms of, and means towards achieving, enhancement of certain human capacities. While critical of some forms of human enhancement, I nevertheless argue that other forms of enhancement are, in principle, morally permissible—and for which any practical concerns may be surmountable—insofar as they positively support human flourishing according to our nature as living, sentient, social, and rational animals. (shrink)

This article concerns the way of philosophizing by Karol Wojtyła; a special emphasis is put on the relation between philosophical anthropology and ethics in his thought. The Polish thinker was active in both of them and it seems initially that ethics was his main area of expertise. However, a close examination of select works of Wojtyła confirms that philosophical anthropology was his main field. He was interested in how the person is revealed in his acts, including moral acts. (...) Thus, the person as such remains at the center of attention and reflection of the thinker and his involvement in ethics was to demonstrate how that person matures on the dynamic level. Karol Wojtyła is pre-eminently a philosopher of the human person. (shrink)

The paper outlines the historical development of question about ambiguous and mysterious human nature, in particular considering the reasons and conditions for the founding of modern philosophical anthropology. Subsequently, it brings an overview of the conceptual beginnings and directions of anthropological research in Croatia. The focus is on the following questions: When did the investigations begin in the field of philosophical anthropology, in what kind of thinking environments were they shaped and what scientific achievements were reached? The presentation (...) brings to light the cognition that philosophical anthropology in Croatia got its first contours and valuable contributions to the very beginning of the contemporary renewal of this discipline, shortly after its phenomenological and scientific revivals in the ventures of Scheler and Plessner. The development of this research branch is, according to Hans Lankʼs model, divided into four main conceptual orientations. The anthropology from above shows the creative contributions of Stjepan Zimmermann, Vilim Keilbach, Rajmund Kupareo, Miljenko Belić, Ante Kusić, Josip Ćurić, Hrvoje Lasić and Ivan Koprek. The anthropology from below is illustrated by the reference to the research by Vera Ehrlich-Stein, Rudi Supek, the Institute of Anthropology, Pavao Rudan and Darko Polšek. For the anthropology from culture, the philosophical achievements of Pavao Vuk-Pavlović, Vladimir Filipović, Vjekoslav Mikecin, Esad Ćimić, Nikola Skledar, Branka Brujić, Milan Galović and Mihaela Girardi-Karšulin were delineated. Under the anthropology from history, the works of Predrag Vranicki, Milan Kangrga, Vanja Sutlić, Gaja Petrović, Hotimir Burger, Mislava Kukoč and Raul Raunić are outlined. The conclusion summarises four insights. 1. Philosophical anthropology is an under-researched and not enough appreciated field, which represents one of the most fertile currents of thought in the 20th century. 2. Creative contributions are presented in all four major orientations. 3. In the context of anthropological research, lively dialogue and a fruitful meeting of different worldviews were realised. 4. The beginnings of the development of the discipline should be moved earlier in history than previously considered, from the 1950s and 1960s to the early 1930s. The last insight points to the need for further exploration of the perceived, and so far largely neglected, continuity of anthropological themes and related ideas in the history of recent philosophy in Croatia. (shrink)

What is a human being? The twentieth and twenty-first century tradition known as 'philosophical anthropology' has approached this question with unusual sophistication, experimentalism, and subtlety. Such innovations as Arnold Gehlen's description of humans as naturally 'deficient' beings in need of artificial institutions to survive; Max Scheler's concept of 'spirit' (Geist) as the physically and organically irreducible realm of persons and spiritual acts; and Helmuth Plessner's analysis of the way human embodiment transcends spatial locations and limitations ('ex-centric positionality') have inspired (...) generations of European intellectuals. This edited collection from an international network of scholars critically engages the philosophical anthropologies of Scheler, Plessner, Gehlen, Blumenberg, and others in unparalleled detail, showing their applicability to the themes of nature and naturalism, organic life, comparative primatology, cultural anthropology, paleoanthropology, the body, addiction, and death. The volume sets a new standard for Anglophone scholarship on this tradition and will be required reading for specialists in twentieth-century philosophy, history of the human sciences, history of the life sciences, and philosophies of human nature. (shrink)

Philosophical Anthropology is one of the post-Husserlian splinters -- a dizzying mix and match of phenomeno-psycho-anthro-philosophical hyphenated schools of thought. It arose first in the 1920's out of the same intellectual promptings as existentialism, which it briefly rivaled. It differs from existentialism and other phenomenologies in fine ways which Landmann combs scrupulously, along with distinctions among the sub-specialties that have proliferated within the field itself. Fortunately, two more general premises distinguish it from other forms of anthropology. First, taking (...) anthropology in its broadest sense as man's search for a self-conception, it allows a signal, shaping importance to its own formulations: culturally speaking, and psychologically too, man tries, tends to fit his self-image. Second, embracing man and everything human as its focus, it assumes phenomenology's grandest claims: reconciliation of the inward and the outer, and, by inference at least, a proper holistic restoration of the essential human sphere. The impulse and the method are widely evident now and several disciplines seem to be quivering toward some such point of convergence. But it is a moot point whether Philosophical Anthropology will stake out the ground. Landmann traces it from its substantive origins with the Greeks down through its most niggling modern self-assertions in a strictly academic survey of high-philosophical or similarly accredited propositions, The argumentative appeals (Freud, Nietzsche) seem rather dated now; and there is a further difficulty in that the action and its object are one and the same, the medium, so to speak, is the message -- i.e., thought about man. While this is a necessary aspect of the method, it can be disorienting. Scholars, however, will know where they are, and this will admit admirably to conventional, general uses. (shrink)

A collection of Essays over the last 20 years, exploring different dimensions of the philosophical debate on "subjecthood" and "subjectivity" in Modernity, as it was framed by the "Controversy on the subject" from the 1960's, and showing how it is now continued in a "controversy on the Universal.".

U prvom delu ovog clanka je rec o pretpostavkama, strukturi i dometima onog misljenja coveka koje je vrlo ambiciozno preduzela "filozofska antropologija" s pocetka dvadesetog veka. Potom se izlazu razlicite varijante filozofske kritike, kao i antropoloske samokritike statusa i ogranicenja ove "discipline". Najzad, u zavrsnom delu rada se signaliziraju glavni orijentiri recentnih kontroverzi oko mogucnosti i karaktera radikalnog odbacivanja i/ili svojevrsne reafirmacije filozofeme "covek".

First and 2d ed. published under title: Philosophical psychology. Includes bibliographies.

Abstract:In this paper I will explore the contribution of philosophical anthropology to music education research which, over recent years, has been showing an increasing interest in the human body. In order to do this I will especially be drawing on the ideas of one of its pioneers, Helmuth Plessner. Plessner’s philosophy should be understood as an effort to overcome the Cartesian dualism ‘mind/body’ and to highlight the unity of a human being and her/his relation to her/his environment. With his (...) central theory of “eccentric positionality,” Plessner draws on a human’s relation to her/his body because a human is able to acknowledge that “I am body” and “I have body” while at the same time being able to realize her/his own situation and reflect upon it. Plessner grounds his thinking about music on his phenomenological observation about sound. He remarks that sound, which can be at the same time far and near, has voluminosity, impulsivity, an undeviating relation to human expressivity, is organized in vertical and horizontal arrangement, and tends towards sequentially. Because of all this, sound is compliant with a human body. His philosophy and especially his writings about music and sound could be fruitful for music educational theory and praxis. Some crucial aspects of his theory are embodiment in music, the relation between the meaning of music and body movements, the relation between the conduct of music and conduct of a human and the formation of culture as an open process. In this theoretical terrain concrete proposals and more general suggestions for an efficient and successful music education practice can be located. (shrink)

The paper is a critical analysis of Paul Ricoeur’s philosophy of work as it is formulated in a number of essays from the 1950s and 60s. It begins with a reconstruction of the central theses advanced in ‘Travail et parole’ (1953) and related texts, where Ricoeur sought to outline a philosophical anthropology in which work is given its due. To give work its due, from an anthropological standpoint, is to see it as limited by counter-concept of language, according to (...) Ricoeur. The paper then argues that this way of understanding the anthropological significance of work is not only internally problematic, but at odds with phenomenological insights to be found elsewhere in Ricoeur’s oeuvre, particularly Le Volontaire et l’involontaire (1950). The final section of the paper makes some suggestions for how the phenomenological and anthropological poles of a philosophy of work might be better integrated, and the ‘nexus between speech and work’ better described. (shrink)

This paper focuses on the philosophical-ethical foundations of Constantine’s definition of philosophy, as well as its anthropological and axiological aspects. The focus is placed on the relationship between definitions of philosophy postulated by Constantine the Philosopher and John of Damascus, the latter of which traces the six classical definitions systematized by Platonic commentators. Byzantine thinkers proposed a method of unifying both the theoretical and practical aspects of ancient philosophy with a Christian way of life by interpreting the classical definitions (...) of philosophy and dividing it into theoretical and practical parts, the latter including ethics. Constantine understood philosophy in the sense of the second (knowledge of things Divine and human) and the fourth (becoming like God) meanings of earlier definitions, with the addition of the Christian sense of acting in accordance with the image of God. In addition to these gnosiological and anthropological aspects, the paper also observes the axiological aspect of Constantine’s definition of philosophy, which appears to be a foundation for exploring human behaviour as in compliance with Christian laws encouraging changes in ethical principles so as to follow a new code of ethics, through which new values were presented to the Slavs. (shrink)

This chapter contains sections titled: The Status of Humans in Maimonides' Ontology Matter, Privation, and Evil Accounting for Multiplicity of Persons The Constitution of Soul and Body Immortality of the Soul: Personal or General? Conclusion further reading.

Being Human is the fruit of many years teaching Philosophical Anthropology, conducting Phenomenological Workshops, and reading classic texts in the light of a reflective awareness of the field of experience. Being Human is intended to look to what is typically assumed but not examined in much of current philosophical literature.

This book explores aspects of William H. Poteat’s philosophical anthropology, which proposes a post-critical alternative to the prevailing dualistic conception of the person and opens a path to recovery of the pre-reflective ontological ground of the person where our personhood can be recovered and re-appropriated.

Bennett and Hacker criticize a number of neuroscientists and philosophers for attributing capacities which belong to the human being as a whole, like perceiving or deciding, to a “part” of the human being, viz. the brain. They call this type of mistake the “mereological fallacy”. Interestingly, the authors say that these capacities cannot be ascribed to the mind either. They reject not only materialistic monism but also Cartesian dualism, arguing that many predicates describing human life do not refer to physical (...) or mental properties, nor to the sum of such properties. I agree with this important principle and with the critique of the mereological fallacy which it underpins, but I have two objections to the authors’ view. Firstly, I think that the brain is not literally a part of the human being, as suggested. Secondly, Bennett and Hacker do not offer an account of body and mind which explains in a systematic way how the domain of phenomena which transcends the mental and the physical relates to the mental and the physical. I first argue that Helmuth Plessner’s philosophical anthropology provides the kind of account we need. Then, drawing on Plessner, I present an alternative view of the mereological relationships between brain and human being. My criticism does not undercut Bennett and Hacker’s diagnosis of the mereological fallacy but rather gives it a more solid philosophical–anthropological foundation. (shrink)

Filozoficko-antropologické dědictví Viktora E. Frankla zůstává dosud nedoceněnou oblastí v jeho široké tvůrčí činnosti, která zahrnuje také neurologické, psychiatrické, psychoterapeutické a axiologicko-etické bádání. Franklovým dílem však prolíná svébytná multidimenzionální koncepce člověka, která je v následujícím příspěvku úzce spojena s Franklovou primární profesní orientací - péčí o zdraví a snahou o uzdravení nemocných - a s jednou z dominant Franklovy tragické triády - utrpením.

This analysis places the English translation of Heinrich Popitz’s Phenomena of Power: Authority, Domination, and Violence in the broader tradition of philosophical anthropology. It is argued anthropological arguments such as that offered by Popitz give insights not otherwise available to strict disciplinary inquiries. Poptiz’s discussion of power also suggests an important tension in philosophical anthropology. While Popitz contends power relations are “humanly produced realities” not “imposed by nature,” he nevertheless provides some support that physical and biological factors might (...) contribute to an understanding of power. This discussion illustrates this tension using examples drawn from Popitz discussion of power, threats of violence, and the exercise of authority. (shrink)

Philosophical anthropology is the philosophical study of the conditions of human existence and the issues that confront people in the conduct of their everyday lives. This book surveys, from a contemplative, philosophical point of view, a wide variety of human-interest issues, including happiness, luck, aging, the meaning of life, optimism and pessimism, morality, and faith and belief. The author's deliberations blend historical, theoretical, and personal perspectives into philosophical appreciation of the human condition. The philosophers of Greek (...) antiquity took philosophy to center around just this issue of intelligent living - of determining the nature of life under the guidance of reason. Such a perspective puts philosophical agenda - a position it contested with the philosophy of nature throughout classical antiquity. In more recent times, however, its prominence has declined - no doubt, the author suggests, because modern man's achievements have been more notable in the natural than in the human science. (shrink)

This is the first book-length work to focus on the philosophical and anthropological contribution of Mabogo More, a prominent and influential black South African existentialist thinker.

The guest editor introduces No. 3 Vol. 1 (2012), "Philosophical Anthropology and Social Analysis." .

_Purpose._ This research involves revealing the methodological significance of the anthropological understanding of values for conducting modern scientific research. _Theoretical basis._ Philosophical anthropology acts as an epistemological basis for answers to ontological questions that are part of the structure of such problems in modern science as the construction of a scientific picture of the world, the ordering of data of natural attitude, and anthropocosmism. The ontological basis for the formation of the anthropological theory of values is the teaching of (...) Wilhelm Leibniz, Immanuel Kant, Rudolf Lotze, and Martin Heidegger. _Originality._ The creation of a scientific picture of the world, the research of natural attitude, and an anthropological approach to cosmology carried out from the viewing angle of the philosophy of values show the close mutual conditioning of these scientific issues. A successful determination of one’s value positions by a scientist-researcher is impossible without his/her agreeing with his/her picture of the world with the prevailing ideas about the world in their society. Such ideas are studied by anthropocosmism, which researches not so much the world in itself, but a view of this world from the standpoint of the existing state of society and the main intentions of its development. _Conclusions._ The value attitude of scientists at a certain stage of the development of scientific knowledge forms their picture of the world, which has the form of self-explanatory scientific provisions. The facts of modern physics must always, one way or another, receive their legitimation through the world of the human natural attitude. Even the unobservable characteristics of the microcosm are explained by appealing to knowledge about the observable characteristics of the world. The anthropocentric nature of cosmology is determined by the fact that in modern philosophy, the values of a person explain not only the way of one’s cognition but also the way of one’s inclusion in the world. (shrink)

Cultural and historical variability is completely overwhelming and within its context it is almostimpossible to decipher something “essential”, some “invariant variable” which would comprise a clueto what the human is, – this idea is presented as the main presupposition of Eugen Fink’s philosophicalanthropology. A major direction of Fink’s works is a fundamental critique of traditional ontology anda search for a worldly thinking that would be more appropriate or implicit in human “worldly” existence.While following Husserl’s transcendental philosophy, Fink opened up a (...) new philosophical domainthat is implicit in transcendental mode of awareness. His effort consisted in “revealing” what is alreadyamidst us, what we have silently guessed and lived but dared not speak. This “revelation” is at thebasis of Fink’s conception of education. Education is a movement from authority to autonomy, fromsubmission to “pregiven” and ready-made answers toward the creative, the free activity which is itsown source.Keywords: being human, temporality, freedom, productivity, creativity, political self-understanding. (shrink)

Helmut Plessner was one of the founders of philosophical anthropology, and his book _The Stages of the Organic and Man_, first published in 1928, has inspired generations of philosophers, biologists, social scientists, and humanities scholars. This volume offers the first substantial introduction to Plessner’s philosophical anthropology in English, not only setting it in context with such familiar figures as Bergson, Cassirer, and Merleau-Ponty, but also showing Plessner’s relevance to contemporary discussions in a wide variety of fields in the (...) humanities and sciences. (shrink)

The thesis of the present volume is critical and dual. (1) Present day philosophy of man and sciences of man suffer from the Greek mis taken polarization of everything human into nature and convention which is (allegedly) good and evil, which is (allegedly) truth and fal sity, which is (allegedly) rationality and irrationality, to wit, the polar ization of all fields of inquiry, the natural and social sciences, as well as ethics and all technology, whether natural or social, into the (...) totally positive and the totally negative. (2) Almost all philosophy and sci ences of man share the erroneous work ethic which is the myth of man's evil nature - the myth of the beast in man, the doctrine of original sin. To mediate or to compromise between the first view of human nature as good with the second view of it as evil, sociologists have devised a modified utilitarianism with deferred gratification so called, and the theory of the evil of artificial competition (capitalist and socialist alike) and of keeping up with the Joneses. Now, the mediation is not necessary. For, the polarization makes for abstract errors which are simplistic views of rationality, such as reductionism and positivism of all sorts, as well as for concrete errors, such as the disposition to condemn repeatedly those human weaknesses which are inevitable, namely man's inability to be perfectly rational, avoid all error, etc. , thus setting man against himself as all too wicked. (shrink)

SummaryThough Peter Gordon mentioned philosophical anthropology in his book Continental Divide, he has not yet realized how it works independently from Cassirer's and Heidegger's prejudices. The whole argument between them before, in and after Davos raged around the status of philosophical anthropology: How do the spiritualisation of life and the enlivening of the spirit come about? This was not just the central question for philosophical anthropology founded by Max Scheler, but also in Wilhelm Dilthey's life philosophy, which (...) was systematized by Georg Misch. Cassirer and Heidegger shared three shortcomings with respect to the Life-philosophical Anthropology. Neither had a philosophy of nature or a philosophy of sociaty or a philosophy of history. The insight into the unfathomability of humans is given a political edge in Helmuth Plessner's book Power and Human Nature. Elevating it to the principle of democratic equality with respect to the worth of all cultures one opens up the potential for a form of civil competition that might supersede ethnocentric wars. (shrink)

This book explores the question of what it means to be a human being through sustained and original analyses of three important philosophical topics: relativism, skepticism, and naturalism in the social sciences. Kevin Cahill's approach involves an original employment of historical and ethnographic material that is both conceptual and empirical in order to address relevant philosophical issues. Specifically, while Cahill avoids interpretative debates, he develops an approach to philosophical critique based on Cora Diamond's and James Conant's work (...) on the early Wittgenstein. This makes possible the use of a concept of culture that avoids the dogmatism that not only typifies traditional metaphysics but also frequently mars arguments from ordinary language or phenomenology. This is especially crucial for the third part of the book, which involves a cultural-historical critique of the ontology of the self in Stanley Cavell's work on skepticism. In pursuing this strategy, the book also mounts a novel and timely defense of the interpretivist tradition in the philosophy of the social sciences. Towards a Philosophical Anthropology of Culture will be of interest to researchers working on the philosophy of the social sciences, Wittgenstein, and philosophical anthropology. (shrink)

The covid-19 pandemic and the increasingly polarized political situation in many countries today have highlighted the significance of various humanly natural intellectual mistakes, cognitive biases, and widespread inferential errors. This essay examines, at a philosophical meta-level, the relation between our natural epistemic errors and the kind of humanly unavoidable transcendental illusion analyzed by Immanuel Kant in the Transcendental Dialectic of the First Critique. While both kinds of illusion are usually primarily discussed in an epistemological context, my approach is not (...) exclusively epistemic. Rather, my main argument extends the broadly Kantian critique of reason – as a critical via negativa focusing on what is epistemically “wrong” about us, as the kind of cognitive agents we human beings naturally are – into a pragmatically enriched investigation of “the negative” as constitutive of the human condition, that is, our lack of sufficiently critical epistemic and ethical capacities, including our propensity to both cognitive error and moral evil. Our being inescapably inclined to manifest such negativities in our epistemic and ethical lives, and our insufficient awareness of doing so, are, arguably, “transcendental facts” about us, to be critically examined in terms of a Kantian-cum-pragmatist philosophical anthropology. This significantly enriches our picture of transcendental philosophy. (shrink)