We propose a method for estimating subjective beliefs, viewed as a subjective probability distribution. The key insight is to characterize beliefs as a parameter to be estimated from observed choices in a well-defined experimental task and to estimate that parameter as a random coefficient. The experimental task consists of a series of standard lottery choices in which the subject is assumed to use conventional risk attitudes to select one lottery or the other and then a series of betting choices in (...) which the subject is presented with a range of bookies offering odds on the outcome of some event that the subject has a belief over. Knowledge of the risk attitudes of subjects conditions the inferences about subjective beliefs. Maximum simulated likelihood methods are used to estimate a structural model in which subjects employ subjective beliefs to make bets. We present evidence that some subjective probabilities are indeed best characterized as probability distributions with non-zero variance. (shrink)

Each of the essays included in this volume illuminates an aspect of law, reflecting an unorthodox perception of jurisprudence which combines interests in philosophy, legal theory, criminology, legal history, political and constitutional theory and the history of ideas. This work will broaden the jurisprudential scope of practitioners' professional concerns, but help academics enhance their knowledge of the wealth of information for their own studies.

There is a paucity of experimental data addressing how peers influence adolescent risk-taking. Here, we examined peer effects on risky decision-making in adults and adolescents using a virtual social context that enabled experimental control over the peer “interactions”. 40 adolescents (age 11-18) and 28 adults (age 20-38) completed a risk-taking (Wheel of Fortune) task under 4 conditions: in private; while being observed by (fictitious) peers; and after receiving ‘risky’ or ‘safe’ advice from the peers. For high-risk gambles (but not medium-risk (...) or even gambles), adolescents made more risky decisions under peer observation than adults. Adolescents, but not adults, tended to resist ‘safe’ advice for high-risk gambles. Although both groups tended to follow ‘risky’ advice for high-risk gambles, adults did so more than adolescents. These findings highlight the importance of distinguishing between the effects of peer observation and peer advice on risky decision-making. (shrink)

The paper’s authors are composers operating within the field of experimental music. Their music is created from the use of limited materials placed into repetitive structures involving cyclic pitch patterns and sustained tone textures. This reductive approach to composition provides a fertile area for discussions of temporality, as the music functions outside of standard teleological narrative structures thereby prompting more varied subjective temporal experiences for listeners. The paper will take as its starting point the experience of the listener, rather than (...) the musical score, enhancing discussions from Thomas Clifton’s Music as Heard.1 This angle is particularly relevant when discussing minimal works, as the score does not (and is not intended to) give an indication to what the auditory experience will be, it simply acts as what pianist Philip Thomas describes as a ‘prescription for action’ for the performers.2 Drawing particularly upon work on the temporal experience by Merleau-Ponty (after Husserl), the paper discusses how phenomenological approaches can provide effective insight into the experience of sustained tone and repetitive music. By discussing notions of retention and protention, the two composers will explore how this permeates their compositional approach, particularly in relation to the use of repetition, examining the different types of musical materials used by the composers and how this affects the temporalities experienced upon performance. Points of similarity and variance between the two outlooks are explored in detail, providing an in-depth discussion as to how attitudes towards temporality can result in nuanced differences in output. Fundamental essences are clarified and discussed in relation to other composers’ work, and in particular American composer James Tenney’s work in applying a phenomenological model upon the listening experience is considered alongside the central discussion. The results of this investigation provide both clear artistic statements on the role of phenomenological thought in the creative process, and also tentative starting points for further discussion on experiential temporalities in minimal and experimental musics. (shrink)

This Handbook is the first comprehensive survey of a rapidly expanding sub-field in archaeology, the study of the present and recent past. It seeks to explore the boundaries of this emerging area, to develop a tool-kit of concepts and methods, which are applicable to this new sub-field, and to suggest important future trajectories for research.

We present a spatial system called Specialized Egocentrically Coordinated Spaces embedded in an embodied cognitive architecture (ACT-R Embodied). We show how the spatial system works by modeling two different developmental findings: gaze-following and Level 1 perspective taking. The gaze-following model is based on an experiment by Corkum and Moore (1998), whereas the Level 1 visual perspective-taking model is based on an experiment by Moll and Tomasello (2006). The models run on an embodied robotic system.

In their important book, Causation in the Law, H. L. A. Hart and Tony Honore argue that causation in the law is based on causation outside the law, that the causal principles the courts rely on to determine legal responsibility are based on distinctions exercised in ordinary causal judgments. A distinction that particularly concerns them is one that divides factors that are necessary or sine qua non for an effect into those that count as causes for purposes of legal responsibility (...) and those that do not. Hart and Honore claim that this distinction is often one of fact rather than of legal policy, and that the factual basis is to be found in the ordinary distinction we draw between causes and 'mere conditions'. If this claim is correct, we may hope to illuminate the legal distinction by articulating the principles behind the ordinary one. This is a challenging task since, as in the case of most cognitive skills, we are far better at making particular judgments than we are at stating the general principles that underlie them. Hart and Honore devote the first part of their book to this difficult task. We have, then, two large projects. One is to articulate our ordinary notion of causation, especially the distinction between cause and mere condition. This is the project of constructing an 'ordinary model'. The other is to argue for what we may call the 'shared concept claim', the claim that the concept of legal cause is based on the ordinary notion of causation, that 'causal judgments, though the law may have to systematize them, are not specifically legal. They appeal to a notion which is part of everyday life' (1985, p. lv; all references to follow are from this edition). This essay will focus on Hart and Honore's ordinary model, rather than on their shared concept claim. In my judgment, Hart and Honore's case for some version of the shared concept claim is strong, so they are right to maintain that a better understanding of our ordinary notion of.. (shrink)

Securing a future for philosophy and wisdom in the professionalized and specialized context of twenty-first century academia is the challenge taken up by this article. If the conception of philosophy as the love of wisdom expects too much of philosophers, the construal of philosophy as the study of wisdom expects too little. To attempt to rehabilitate the relationship between philosophy and wisdom by claiming that philosophy is the study of wisdom unreasonably limits the scope of the current vibrant and expansive (...) discipline, leaving it unclear how the more theoretical dimensions of philosophy might fit into it. Moreover, to exclude from consideration the possibility that a person might be improved by philosophy, and his or her life enhanced, is to denature the discipline. The model of philosophy as encouraging friendship with wisdom, on the other hand, does not underestimate philosophy’s potential for helping someone to become the kind of person who could make the choices likely to contribute to the living of a good life. By providing a way of thinking about the relationship between philosophy and wisdom that is appropriate to our age, the idea that philosophers are friends of wisdom can contribute to our evolving practice and understanding of the discipline, while at the same time allowing philosophy and philosophers to remain vitally connected to their heritage. (shrink)

I quote Griffiths' translation: ‘A crown of many designs with all kinds of flowers had girt her lofty head; in its centre a flat disk above the forehead shone with a clear light in the manner of a mirror or indeed the moon, while on its right and left it was embraced by coils of uprising snakes; from above it was adorned also with outstretched ears of corn’. This is the detailed description of the crown worn by Isis in her (...) epiphany to Lucius at Cenchreae. ‘Sulcis’ is strange; it can only refer to the tracks or furrows left by snakes, a notion wholly irrelevant here – we require a noun referring to actual physical parts of the two snakes which border Isis' moon-disk on either side, preferably a reference to their hanging coils – so Griffiths' translation runs ‘on its right and left it was embraced by coils of uprising snakes’, though this does not render his text, which keeps ‘sulcis’. Read ‘spiris’, a word of similar shape to ‘sulcis’; ‘spirae’ is twice used of the coils of snakes by Vergil, at Aen. 2.217 and 12.848; ‘serpentum spiris’ in the latter passage may influence Apuleius’ ‘spiris…viperarum’. The alliteration and assonance of ‘spins’ and ‘spicis’ would be very much in Apuleius' manner as a jingle involving the change of a single consonant between two words – cf. Florida 3 ‘ita Marsyas in poenam cecinit et cecidit’, Apologia 85 ‘acerbiores morsus viventi et videnti offeruntur’ and H. Koziol, Der Stil des L. Apuleius, 204–5. (shrink)

I offer a new Heideggerian reading of Terrence Malick’s 2005 film, The New World, in the style of film-philosophy, alongside a contrasting Cinematic Humanist encounter. I consider if the former is a theory-involving example of philosophy of film, and whether a positive answer to this question entails the latter must be also. I argue that whilst both engagements with the film use the work of other philosophers as part of their appreciation, Cinematic Humanism nonetheless remains one of many possible ways (...) of doing philosophy of film without theory. Having compared these two methods, I suggest reasons why there is nonetheless a potentially valuable relation to be had between philosophy of film with and philosophy of film without theory. Close attention is paid to the film throughout. (shrink)

Psychiatric disorders like eating disorders might be underpinned by differences in decision making. However, little previous research has investigated this potential relationship using longitudinal data. This study aimed to understand how components of decision making measured by the Cambridge Gambling Task in the United Kingdom’s Millennium Cohort Study at age 11 might explain clusters/types of ED prodrome involving body dissatisfaction, intention to lose weight, dietary restraint, excessive exercise and significant under/overweight measured in the MCS at age 14. Latent class analysis (...) revealed two groups within the cohort: a non-prodromal eating pathology group, who were more likely to be of “average” weight, according to the UK90, with minimal disordered attitudes and behaviors in relation to eating and weight; and a second group with prodromal eating pathology, who had more body dissatisfaction, a desire to lose weight, were using dietary restriction and exercise to influence weight and were more likely to be “overweight” according to the UK90. Logistic regression showed that, after adjustment for confounding, higher risk-taking scores were associated with a 60% greater probability of being in the prodromal eating pathology group, and higher scores on quality of decision making were associated with a 30% lower probability of being in the prodromal eating pathology group. Helping young people to engage in moderate risk taking and improving decision making might reduce the later presence of ED prodromes. (shrink)

Philosophical Investigations, EarlyView.

Recent work in epistemology has many defects. It ignores the distinction, Fatal to the standard view, Between being justified in believing and being justified in being certain. It neglects the many contextual implications of knowledge statements. It forgets that there are many things one knows without having evidence. It does not do justice to the view that knowing implies (or contextually implies) the impossibility of one's being mistaken about what one claims to know.

Astrobiology aims to determine the distribution and diversity of life in the universe. But as the word “biosignature” suggests, what will be detected is not life itself, but an observation implicating living systems. Our limited access to other worlds suggests this observation is more likely to reflect out‐of‐equilibrium gasses than a writhing octopus. Yet, anything short of a writhing octopus will raise skepticism about what has been detected. Resolving that skepticism requires a theory to delineate processes due to life and (...) those due to abiotic mechanisms. This poses an existential question for life detection: How do astrobiologists plan to detect life on exoplanets via features shared between non‐living and living systems? We argue that you cannot without an underlying theory of life. We illustrate this by analyzing the hypothetical detection of an “Earth 2.0” exoplanet. Without a theory of life, we argue the community should focus on identifying unambiguous features of life via four areas: examining life on Earth, building life in the lab, probing the solar system, and searching for technosignatures. Ultimately, we ask, what exactly do astrobiologists hope to learn by searching for life? (shrink)

The existence of evil is compatible with the existence of God, most theists would claim, because evil either results from the activities of free agents, or it contributes in some way toward their moral development. According to the ‘free-will defence’, evil and suffering are necessary consequences of free-will. Proponents of the ‘soul-making argument’—a theodicy with a different emphasis—argue that a universe which is imperfect will nurture a whole range of virtues in a way impossible either in a perfect world, or (...) in a totally evil one. The pain of animals is widely thought to constitute a major difficulty for both of these accounts, for if we ask whether the only evils present in the world result directly from the free actions of created agents, or contribute in some way to ‘soul-making’ of such agents, we are bound to admit that, on the face of it, much animal pain does not. (shrink)

This paper examines the impact of neoreactionary (NRx) thinking – that of Curtis Yarvin, Nick Land, Peter Thiel and Patri Friedman in particular – on contemporary political debates manifest in ‘architectures of exit’. We specifically focus on Urbit, as an NRx digital architecture that captures how post-neoliberal politics imagines notions of freedom and sovereignty through a micro-fracturing of nation-states into ‘gov-corps’. We trace the development of NRx philosophy – and situate this within contemporary political and technological change to theorize the (...) significance of exit manifest within the notion of ‘dynamic geographies’. While technological programmes such as Urbit may never ultimately succeed, we argue that these, and other speculative investments such as ‘seasteading’, reflect broader post-neoliberal NRx imaginaries that were, perhaps, prefigured a quarter of a century ago in The Sovereign Individual. (shrink)