William Alston’s argument against the deontological conception of epistemic justification is a classic—and much debated—piece of contemporary epistemology. At the heart of Alston’s argument, however, lies a very simple mistake which, surprisingly, appears to have gone unnoticed in the vast literature now devoted to the argument. After having shown why some of the standard responses to Alston’s argument don’t work, we elucidate the mistake and offer a hypothesis as to why it has escaped attention.

Among many properties distinguishing emergence, such as novelty, irreducibility and unpredictability, computational accounts of emergence in terms of computational incompressibility aim first at making sense of such unpredictability. Those accounts prove to be more objective than usual accounts in terms of levels of mereology, which often face objections of being too epistemic. The present paper defends computational accounts against some objections, and develops what such notions bring to the usual idea of unpredictability. I distinguish the objective unpredictability, compatible with determinism (...) and entailed by emergence, and various possibilities of predictability at emergent levels. This makes sense of practices common in complex systems studies that forge qualitative predictions on the basis of comparisons of simulations with multiple values of parameters. I consider robustness analysis as a way to ensure the ontological character of computational emergence. Finally, I focus on the property of novelty, as it is displayed by biological evolution, and ask whether computer simulations of evolution can produce the same kind of emergence as the open-ended evolution attested in Phanerozoic records. (shrink)

Des premiers rites baptismaux à la confession moderne, les références au christianisme sont constantes dans l'œuvre de Michel Foucault. Cette constance s'inscrit dans un questionnement philosophique plus large sur notre actualité : comprendre le rapport que nous avons aujourd'hui à nous-mêmes demande de s'interroger sur les actes de vérité que l'Occident a instaurés depuis les premiers siècles chrétiens. Que faut-il dire et manifester de soi pour être transformé dans son être, pardonné, sauvé, jugé ou guéri)? Ce livre propose une étude (...) critique de l'ensemble des lectures chrétiennes de Foucault, avec une attention particulière portée au cours Du gouvernement des vivants. Ni chronologique ni thématique, le parcours suivi espère retrouver la logique d'un travail à la fois philosophique et historique : quand et comment le christianisme a-t-il été constitué par Foucault en objet de recherche, avec quelles pratiques de lecture et quelles conséquences sur l'interprétation)? (shrink)

The paper presents a new logic for reasoning about the formation of beliefs through perception or through inference in non-omniscient resource-bounded agents. The logic distinguishes the concept of explicit belief from the concept of background knowledge. This distinction is reflected in its formal semantics and axiomatics: we use a non-standard semantics putting together a neighborhood semantics for explicit beliefs and relational semantics for background knowledge, and we have specific axioms in the logic highlighting the relationship between the two concepts. Mental (...) operations of perceptive type and inferential type, having effects on epistemic states of agents, are primitives in the object language of the logic. At the semantic level, they are modelled as special kinds of model-update operations, in the style of dynamic epistemic logic. Results about axiomatization, decidability and complexity for the logic are given in the paper. (shrink)

La philosophie peut-elle faire la guerre, comme Bernard-Henri Lévy dans un récent ouvrage le revendique pour sa propre philosophie? Les notions de guerre et de paix sont-elles ici à prendre au pied de la lettre? Ou ne sont-elles que métaphores se référant aux luttes, aux réfutations, aux disputes où peuvent s'engager les philosophes? S'il n'est guère possible de définir la philosophie comme une guerre réelle, il ne paraît pas plus pertinent de la définir comme une guerre de papier. Plutôt que (...) de tracer des lignes de combat et d'affronter des ennemis, les philosophes semblent plus soucieux de tracer des lignes souples, des "lignes de fuite" à la manière de Gilles Deleuze. Ces lignes évacuent les oppositions et les combats pour préférer les connexions entre différences et hétérogénéités. Ce sont en fait d'étranges liens d'amitié que tissent les philosophes. Et c'est bien de cela dont nous parle, depuis Platon, ce philein qui est au coeur du mot même de "philosophie". A l'arrière-plan de cette affaire d'amitié se dessine le moment socratique du non-savoir : débatteurs ou combattants, confrontés au vide du savoir, y abandonnent irrésistiblement la guerre des idées. C'est sans doute là toute la portée, modeste mais indiscutablement philosophique, d'une pratique comme celle du café-philo. (shrink)

" Mai 68, avec ses slogans parfois stupides et son jargon marxisant - déjà kitsch à l'époque -, était une période joyeuse. On s'y levait tard pour gagner moins. On faisait des pieds de nez aux statues des grands hommes. On prenait au sérieux la question du bonheur. Ceux qui haïssent Mai 68, au fond, sont à plaindre : ils avouent que déjà, à vingt ans, ils étaient des petits vieux qui regardaient passer l'avenir dans un rétroviseur. Et pourtant ce (...) sont eux les vrais utopistes. Ils croient qu'une victoire électorale suffira à faire perdre le goût de l'émancipation à celles et à ceux qui en jouissent. Si ce n'était pas si revanchard, ce serait presque émouvant de naïveté. ". (shrink)

Thus Spoke Zarathustra expresses a revolt against the quest for “afterworlds.” Nietzsche is seen transferring rationality to the body, welcoming the many in akingdom of the un-unified multiple, with a burst of enthusiasm at the figure of recurrence. At first, he values an acceptation of suffering through reconciliation with time, and puts the onus on the divine to refute the dismembering of the oneness of meaning and unity of the soul’s quest for joy in eternity. Then confrontingChristianity, he sees its (...) refusal to sacrifice anyone, at the cost of making all sick with a unique healer, and rejects it as incompatible with his ideal of plenitude. Inthe absence of an ontology of the person, the affirmation of the individual and his value, opposed to the antagonistic affirmation of the many put in front of theone God and destroyed by him, ends up dislocating the reality of the self. The Nietzschean option resisted any leveling down—this is its merit—yet the mysteryof the Trinity needs to be brought into the reflection to respect Nietzsche’s own terms in defining the final problem which is also the one option: Dionysus orthe Crucified? (shrink)

La 4e de couv. indique : "La guerre peut-elle être juste? Peut-elle s'affubler d'un qualificatif juste sans injustice? Les récits cosmogoniques sont la merveilleuse monstration que les hommes se sont toujours fait la guerre. L'attitude belliqueuse de certains souverains et les atrocités des champs de bataille ont amené des analystes à définir des critères stricts pour limiter la souffrance humaine. Désormais, tout Etat qui n'observerait pas scrupuleusement les linéaments de cet édit risque d'être déclaré Hostis humani generis. Dans sa conception (...) traditionnelle in stricto sensu, la théorie de la guerre dite juste comporte, d'une part, le jus ad bellum (droit à la guerre) ou droit de faire la guerre et, d'autre part, le jus in bello qui règlemente la conduite de la guerre. Qu'en est-il de l'après-guerre et du jus post bellum? Cet ouvrage, importante contribution au débat sur la théorie de la guerre juste, répond justement à ce questionnement.". (shrink)

Does the existing order have any better justification than the argument that it is ‘natural’? In most of its guises the ‘nature’ argument in fact arises more often than not from an argument whose authority is questionable, since it has been used to back up many forms of tyranny, oppression and exclusion. In this sense we are quite rightly wary of this notion of human nature as used to explore the democratic ideal. If the democratic ideal is associated with the (...) modern experience of the indeterminate and the ‘dissolution of fixed markers of certainty’ (Lefort), it seems to imply the idea of the plasticity of human nature rather more than the hypothesis of an objective human essence. As the feminist and ecology movements have taught us, the question of nature has to remain open in democracy, and open above all for democratic debate. An insistence that there are characteristics intrinsic to human nature that make humans inclined to a democratic way of life reminds us too much of Plato's ideal city or Hobbes's Leviathan. And if we criticize this type of reasoning in those who seem to us to be democracy's enemies, we can scarcely have the face to use it to justify that kind of regime. (shrink)

Corporate social responsibility (CSR) has repeatedly been described as an “essentially contested concept,” which means that its signification is subject to continuous struggle. We argue that the “CSR institution” (CSRI; i.e., the set of standards and rules regulating corporate conduct under the banner of CSR) is legitimized by narratives which “decontest” the underlying concept of CSR in a manner that safeguards the CSRI from calls for alternative institutional arrangements. Examining several such narratives from a structuralist perspective, we find them to (...) be permeated with six recurrent ambiguities that we show to be reflective of three deep-set taboos: the taboo of the noncongruency between corporate profit objectives and societal needs, the taboo of multinational firms’ continued contribution to the emergence of global socioenvironmental issues, and the taboo of the CSRI’s moderate results in solving these problems. We contend that the perpetuation of these taboos contributes to inhibiting substantial change in the way of doing business, and we sketch out possibilities for initiating a “recontestation” of CSR’s meaning. (shrink)

The paper develops an objection to the extensional model of time consciousness—the view that temporally extended events or processes, and their temporal properties, can be directly perceived as such. Importantly, following James, advocates of the extensional model typically insist that whole experiences of temporal relations between non-simultaneous events are distinct from mere successions of their temporal parts. This means, presumably, that there ought to be some feature(s) differentiating the former from the latter. I try to show why the extensional models (...) offers no credible ground for positing such a difference. (shrink)

In this book, he argues that the purpose of democracy should be to promote justice - we need not just democracy (in the sense of unqualified democracy) but a just democracy. Machiavelli and Rawls must be brought together.

Biological individuals are usually defined by evolutionists through a reference to natural selection. This article looks for a concept of individuality that would hold at the same time for organisms and for communities or ecosystems, the latter being unaffected by natural selection. In the wake of Simon’s notion of “quasi-independence,” I elaborate a concept of “weak individuality” defined by probabilistic connections between sub-entities, read off our knowledge of their interactions. This formal scheme of connections allows one to infer what are (...) the individuals in the domain addressed by the theory of the interactions. The article argues that if ecosystems do not have strong individuality, they still possess a weak individuality, ecological theories providing the values of the variables in the formula for individuality. (shrink)

Critical theory with emancipatory aims today to find a source of regeneration in ordinary cultures, and in particular, in TV series. Certain series can play a role in reinventing critical theories, drawing on the tradition of the Frankfurt School but shifting some of that School’s formulations through contact with current forms of interpretive sociology and pragmatic sociology. This requires a cross-border dialogue between the “language game” of TV series and the “knowledge game” of political theory, to use concepts inspired by (...) Ludwig Wittgenstein. In this article, I will focus on four series: seasons 1 of American Crime and The Sinner ; Sharp Objects ; and Unorthodox. The resources provided by these cultural works can help us formulate a critical decoding of important aspects of the current ideological context, in particular, the intersecting identitarian and ultra-conservative tendencies we find in France, Europe, the United States, and Brazil. These critical resources bear affinities to a political philosophy of the opening of being inspired by the ethical reflections of Emmanuel Levinas. (shrink)

The role of state services in a market economy has been lately at the care of an intellectual and political debate in Belgium as well as in most European countries. State companies as the Post Office, the Railways and the Telegraph Service have to face an ever more fierce competition and have to be efficient and profitable.The way to deal with privatisation bas however been much less clearcut in Belgium than in other countries such as the United Kingdom or France. (...) A law bas been passed recently and the monopoly position of the Transport and Telecommunications state companies has been alleviated and their autonomy increased as a result. A distinction has been made between, on the one hand, the commercial activities for which they have to compete with the private sector and, on the other hand, the activities of public interest which are subject to certain limitations laid down in a management contract. (shrink)

This paper sets out a new way of combining Kripke-complete modal logics: lexicographic product. It discusses some basic properties of the lexicographic product construction and proves axiomatization/completeness results.

In this paper, we show that the implication fragment of classical propositional logic is finitary for unification with parameters.

In the ordinary modal language, KD is the modal logic determined by the class of all serial frames. In this paper, we demonstrate that KD is nullary.