Inferentialism is the view that representational content is explained by linguistic or mental states interacting according to inferential rules. Mendelovici's and Bourget's swapping argument against inferentialism shows that rules of inference do not sufficiently constrain content. This paper argues that their argument can be further strengthened so that its conclusion yields that the content and inferential roles are strictly independent. It is then argued that this conclusion is untenable and that the argument, rather than undermining inferentialism, corrodes the model-theoretic foundations (...) of standard philosophical semantics. The paper concludes with some hints towards an alternative semantic paradigm inspired by intuitionistic type-theory that is immune to the swapping argument. (shrink)

The thesis develops a naturalist theory of phenomenal consciousness. The argument proceeds in three broad steps. The first consists in a defense of a representationalist view of consciousness. The second part argues that the relevant form of mental representation can be explained in terms of the predictive processing approach to brain function. The final part consists in an attack on metaphysical realism inspired by Bayesian approaches to cognition and a discussion of the implications of metaphysical anti-realism for the hard problem (...) of consciousness. (shrink)

The semantic closure theory of consciousness attempts to explain the privacy of conscious representations. Such an explanation requires that representational content is more than just information carried by cognitive states but also arises in virtue of functional interrelations between such states. This paper shows that, given such a fine-grained view of representational content, the privacy or non-communicability of certain mental contents can be readily explained. Furthermore, the degree of semantic closure, i.e. the degree to which the states of a representational (...) system bear non-communicable content, can be quantified in information theoretic terms. A toy simulation of the evolution of semantic closure is presented. (shrink)